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INTRODUCTION
Proclaim LIBERTY throughout all the Land unto all the inhabitants thereof.  Lev. XXVX
This inscription appears on the Liberty Bell — one of the most famous symbols of thefoundation of the American nation. This bell, engraved with the words found in
Leviticus— the third book of the Old Testament, was rung in the proclamation of liberty. This
appeared unproblematic at our nation’s founding.   
The founders of this nation and their forbears came to this land to escape the tyranny —
some religious and some political. And on this new soil began an experiment — an experi-
ment which intended liberty as ordered liberty and as ordered included religious liberty. The
founding documents — the Bill of Rights — of this new nation attempted to set down the
meaning of this liberty. This was a daunting task for never before 1791 had a nation enshrined
religious liberty in its founding and directing documents. This provision for religious liberty
was written by James Madison into the first amendment to the constitution in the two clauses
which have become known as the establishment clause and the free exercise clause. In regard
to religion the first amendment reads: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” The demarcation between free ex-
ercise and establishment, as well as the tension inherent in the two gerundive phrases
addressing religious liberty, has been present since their writing by James Madison. Madison
himself struggled in writing them and this nation has struggled in its history to understand
their meaning, to respect the limits of each, to recognize the power of both, and to keep their
creative tension appropriate. The national aspiration for liberty has not been perfect in the
history of its development. But errors, made evident in a free and open society, are suscepti-
ble to correction.     
To celebrate that liberty the Garaventa Center for Catholic Intellectual Life and American
Culture of the University of Portland hosted the conference The American Experiment:
Religious Freedom on April 12-14, 2007. The purpose of the conference was to examine the role
of religious freedom — in its original articulation and meaning, and in the ongoing history —
in the American Experiment. The theme of the conference has its source in the identity of
the University of Portland as a Catholic, Holy Cross, and American institution of higher learn-
ing. This triple identity claimed by Oregon’s Catholic University calls the university to acknowl-
edge that its flourishing has been made possible by the religious freedom provided by the
nation; that its flourishing and the nation’s flourishing are rooted in the recognition of the in-
trinsic dignity of all human life; and that the spirit of freedom and the spirit of religion, which
together marked the founding of this Nation, can guide its future.  This conference was fash-
ioned to contribute to the work of the university in fulfilling its function as a Catholic Univer -
sity in America in the Twenty-first Century — marshalling and placing its intellectual resources
in the service of the Church and the Nation. 
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Papers were submitted to the conferences not only from scholars in the United States but
also from an international set of scholars, including those as far away as Malaysia, Turkey,
Indonesia, and Rome, and as close as Canada. Papers were received from theologians,
philosophers, political theorists, legal theorists, judges, attorneys, and historians. In addition,
papers were submitted by established scholars, rising scholars, graduate students, and under-
graduate students. Finally, sessions were planned in the conference to provide opportunities
for the voices of many religious traditions to be heard and for a variety of perspectives on the
myriad religious freedom issues and cases to be addressed. Topics presented in the confer-
ence included: the meaning of religious freedom for Jews, Christians, and Muslims as viewed
from the perspective of the adherents of those faiths; the history of religious liberty and non-
establishment through the lens of particular court cases; school prayer and school bible read-
ing; the role of religious freedom in civic life and in political choices; conscientious objection
in its history and in its role in an all volunteer military; the expansion and contraction of free
exercise as well as the raising and sinking of the wall of separation; the separation and limits of
canon and civil law as tested in the litigation of sexual abuse by clergy; comparative studies of
religious freedom — its practice and protection — in various countries; and the presentation
of emerging cases which will contribute to the continuation of the experiment. 
As appropriate to a Catholic University prayer was an integral part of the conference. 
The conference opened with the celebration of the Eucharist on Thursday April 12th at the
Chapel of Christ the Teacher. The celebrant and homilist for Mass was the Rev. E. William
Beauchamp, C.S.C., president of the University of Portland, a member of the Congregation of
Holy Cross, and an attorney. In his homily, set within the week of the great feast of Easter, the
text of which opens these proceedings, Fr. Beauchamp recalled the transition from death to
life that is the Easter celebration. He reminded that in religious belief rooted in the Resur -
rection we move from death to life and this faith provides hope to take up the tasks of re-
demption and reconciliation in the contemporary world. Fr. Beauchamp noted that the
founders of this nation similarly acted out of their faith to establish a nation rooted in faith
and in hope that this new order would serve as a beacon of hope and aspiration to the new
 nation and to the world.
Archbishop John G. Vlazny, ordinary of the Archdiocese of Portland in Oregon, closed the
conference with the celebration of the Eucharist. His homily completes these proceedings. In
his homily, rooted in the account of the faith of Thomas and the faith of the early disciples,
Archbishop Vlazny reminded us that we — as individuals and as Church — are afraid but that
just as the early disciples we must move beyond that fear to become effective Christian wit-
nesses. This will require transformation in our lives. Because we are human, we — as individ-
uals and as Church — will on occasion fail, but our faith in the promise of Jesus to be with us
gives us the hope to rise out of sin and to journey to meet Christ. 
Justice Antonin Scalia presented the opening address — the Garaventa Lecture — to an
 audience of 1800 people gathered in the Chiles Center at the University of Portland. In his
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keynote address, Realism and the Religion Clauses, Justice Scalia indicated that there were thir-
ty religion cases that had come before the court in his tenure on the court. Of those thirty
cases, he dissented in only eight of the Court opinions. The examination of these particular
dissents provided his text for a critique of techniques of constitutional construction, that is,
those rulings by the majority that seemed to him untethered to the realism rooted in the ac-
cepted practices of the American people. The context for the address was supplied by the
quotation — familiar to some as spoken in the presidential primaries of Robert Kennedy; but
unfamiliar to most as to its origin — which says, “Some men see things as they are and say
why; I dream things that never were and ask why not.” Justice Scalia suggested that in its re-
cent history the Court had fashioned abstractions and has applied these abstractions — such
as the Lemon Test for the Establishment Clause cases and the Sherbert Test for the Free
Exercise cases — and furthermore, he claimed, that when applied to some cases the resulting
opinions have been occasions in which the court departed from the accepted practices and
traditions of the American people. Justice Scalia suggested that the prudent jurist ought to de-
rive rulings of the court in the raw material of society’s traditions — the accepted constitution-
al practices of the American people. He concluded by adverting to the quotation that supplied
the context within which his lecture had been set and reminded the audience of its origin in
the work — Back to Methuselah— of George Bernard Shaw in which it is the Serpent who says
to the woman Eve, “You see things as they are and say why, but I dream things that never
were and I ask why not.” 
This volume of proceedings contains twenty-two out of approximately sixty papers accepted
for presentation at the conference. The proceedings is divided into four sections. The papers
in the first section examine major historical cases. The papers in the second section examine
emerging issues. The focus of papers in the third section is on historical development. The
work of the fourth section is theoretical analysis. 
I. Major Historical Cases 
In the first paper, From Pierce to Smith: The Oregon Connection and the Supreme Court Religion
Jurisprudence, Judge Diarmuid O’Scannlain, of the Federal Court of Appeals in the Ninth
Circuit, examines two landmark decisions — Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of
Jesus and Mary and Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith—
of the United States Supreme Court arising out of the state of Oregon. Judge O’Scannlain finds
some curious connections between these two decisions and subsequent Supreme Court deci-
sions as exemplified in the trajectory from Pierce to Griswold, Roe v. Wade, and Lawrence v.
Texas and the evolution of the invocation of the “substantive” due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment in support of the free exercise right of the First Amendment. He
 indicates some trends in Court decisions that require attention of the voices of the religious
traditions in their communities and in their legislatures, if the exercise of their traditions is to
continue to have standing in the law.   
In The Sinking Wall of Separation: the Supreme Court and the Establishment Clause 1947-2005,
Edward F. Mannino examines leading Supreme Court decisions, stretching over a period of
 almost sixty years, which are related to aid to parochial schools and school prayer. He sees an
evolution in the decisions and maintains that this development is a product of the particular
concerns ascendant in a particular historical period and that the decisions manifest the par-
ticular value sets of the Justices, who, in their understanding of the establishment clause and
the free exercise clause, decided them.
In Too Brave to Fight: Conscientious Objection during World War I, James McGowan presents
a straightforward account of the history of conscientious objection in 20th century United
States. The paper includes discussion of legislative intent, judicial decisions, and political con-
sequences. It includes a rich discussion of the particular lives very negatively affected by the
legislation, its judicial interpretation, and its military implementation. McGowan’s paper de-
scribes the historical shift in exemption requirements from rigorous “well-recognized” religious
groups to relying only upon a belief that “occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to
that filled by the orthodox belief in God.” 
In Divine Inscriptions in Context: In God We Trust on U.S. Coins and Currency, Biff Rocha fo-
cuses analysis on a critique of Jon Murray’s written testimony before the Congressional sub-
committee on Consumer Affairs and Coinage on Sept. 14, 1988 concerning the use of a
religious motto on public currency. Rocha examines Murray’s specific claims “that America
was founded as a secular nation” and that “two fanatically religious individuals tricked the
many” in order to include “In God We Trust” on the coins. Ultimately, the paper argues the
complexity and diversity of views that dominated debate and decisions about the foundation
of the nation. Regarding currency, Rocha offers the evidence that each stage of implementa-
tion passed through the legislative process and he concludes with anecdotal evidence that
there is widespread support for the religious words on coinage today.  
In The Edgerton Bible Case, Timothy C. Shiell provides an overview of the 1890 Wisconsin
case. The Wisconsin Supreme Court set a national standard banning Bible reading for religious
instruction in public schools. Shiell presents the arguments of the court in the decision and
analyzes two issues that remain significant in current court decisions. In particular, legislative
intent and the freedom of religious speech continue to pervade court decisions and Shiell
traces some of the historical threads of these arguments. From his perspective, Edgertonwas
precedent setting in the questions that follow from the issue of legislative intent. “Is a court
justified in overruling the religious intentions of the framers of a law? How exactly should we
determine what the intentions of the framers were? How much weight ought future courts
give to an earlier court’s holding on the intentions of the framers?” Similarly, the freedom of
religious speech issue continues to raise the question of protecting rights to religious expres-
sion within a public school, but within the boundaries set by the establishment clause. Shiell
observes that the U.S. Supreme Court bans Bible reading when the context appears to be state-
sanctioned proselytizing, but permits Bible reading when the context appears to be secular or
private speech.
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II. Framing Emerging Issues  
In Remarks from a Peculiar Lamp-Post: Observations of a Christian Trial Lawyer on Fifteen Years
of Suing the Church, Attorney Kelly Clark reflects on the vocation and profession of an attor-
ney who is required by both his professional code and his moral duty to pursue justice for
clients even when that pursuit causes serious problems for an institution — here the Catholic
Church in the Archdiocese of Portland in Oregon — that has accomplished and continues to
accomplish so much that is good in serving the flourishing of the community in Oregon
Just as the title of the paper suggests, in Religion as Speech: The Growing Role of Free Speech
Jurisprudence in Protecting Religious Liberty, Mark Cordes examines the role of free speech in
the protection of religious freedom. His study begins with early twentieth century decisions
from the 1930s and continues analysis through the mid-1980s with the Rehnquist Court. The
early cases set the precedent for including a wide range of religious speech activities, includ-
ing distribution of religious tracts, open-air preaching and selling religious literature, under
the protection of free speech. The second precedent from early decisions stated that when
regulating speech government cannot discriminate because of its content. This content neu-
trality defined by the second precedent has been the basis for rejecting many Establishment
Clause arguments. Whereas many public institutions and in particular public education insti-
tutions have excluded religious clubs and presentations with the ostensible support of the
Establishment Clause, historically the Courts argue that content neutrality allows access to re-
ligious speech, just like other types of contents of speech protected by the Free Speech
Clause, without violating the Establishment Clause. Cordes presents the cases where the Free
Speech Clause and the Establishment Clause have created significant tension in reconcilia-
tion. However, the Courts’ decisions consistently provide greater levels of protection to reli-
gious speech. Especially interesting is Cordes’s analysis of the way in which the Supreme
Court has deepened the protection to religious speech as part of content neutrality, at the
same time that it has exposed religious groups to restrictions under laws of general applicabil-
ity. As Cordes clearly states “[W]hereas before the focus was on the burden on religion, now
the focus is on the nature of the regulation. Burdens on religious exercise that are incidental
to general laws are not protected; only when religion is targeted is there a free exercise burden.”  
In American Civil Religion in an Age of Religious Pluralism, Ann Williams Duncan, beginning
with the proposition that there is an American civil religion, examines the challenge that reli-
gious and cultural pluralism present both for the internal peace of the United States and for
the global peace. She suggests that only with a new understanding of its own myths will the
United States be able to fashion a new civil religion accessible and acceptable both at home
and abroad.  
In Faith, Social Reform in the Inner City, and the Establishment Clause, Judge Virginia M.
Kendall examines how two separate groups — the Department of Justice and the Jesuits —
worked to better the lives of the residents in the high crime areas of the near west and near
southwest sides of Chicago. The two groups approached the problem from entirely different
11
I N T R O D U C T I O N
motivations and perspectives. The Jesuits focused on Pilsen and Little Village in order to
serve the poorest families in those immigrant Mexican neighborhoods. Historically, the
Jesuits are educators, and in keeping with their tradition and mission, they chose to address
the issue by opening a school, the Cristo Rey School. The Department of Justice, through the
United States Attorney’s Office in Chicago, chose to address the gun violence that plagued the
streets with a law enforcement initiative aimed at reducing the murder rate. The Jesuits’ pro-
gram was entirely privately funded. The DOJ Program, dubbed “Project Safe Neighborhoods,”
was entirely publicly funded. The contributions of both groups to increased stability and low-
ering of the crime rates in their respective neighborhoods were augmented by the participa-
tion of the churches in their communities. Judge Kendall suggests that the success of these
programs in service of the civic good might present some challenges to current establishment
clause interpretation. 
In Our Freedom Depends on the Rule of Law, Senator Patrick Leahy maintains that the com-
mitment to the rule of law, especially by those is in power, is the best protection of freedom.
He suggests that the current administration has assaulted the Constitution, undermined
human rights, and eroded our privacy and freedoms. In his overview of recent legislation
such as the Military Commissions Act and by federal treatment of detainees, he suggests that
the United States has changed its political fabric in critical and unprecedented ways since
2002. Leahy extends this criticism to demand greater accountability at the national and inter-
national level. The United States needs to step forward and protect the victims of genocide
throughout the world, and fight for global access to medicines essential for dealing with cur-
rent health crises.
In Restoring the Intrinsic Value of Human Life, William Wagner advocates a federal legislative
proposal to stop physician-assisted killing. Biblical references justify his position criticizing
physician-assisted suicide and brief reference to problems following from the comparative
case in the Netherlands. Wagner’s legislative proposal relies on rights of Congress under the
Commerce Clause to regulate interstate commerce. In the author’s paper, this type of legisla-
tive strategy is the appropriate strategy for ending the practice in a way that will survive
Supreme Court scrutiny.
III. Historical Development 
In The Establishment Clause and the Limits of Pure History, Kyle Duncan argues that typically
Justices invoke history to support particular understandings of the Establishment Clause.
Duncan criticizes the strategic employment of history to validate diametrically opposed posi-
tions. Duncan maintains that Scalia, in contrast, retaliates against the interpretations that
draw abstract lessons from history applied to the modern world. Instead, Scalia interprets the
Establishment Clause through the filter of legal tradition for clarification and validation.
Traditions reveal the policy making decisions and political norms that lie outside of the
Constitution’s areas of exclusion. McCreary demonstrates Scalia’s approach where traditions
narrow the uncertainties and define parameters of the Establishment Clause. Broad conceptu-
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al distinctions between ‘religious’ and ‘secular’ appear to focus debate in the typical use of his-
tory. Government and religion as institutions become the more limited focus through Scalia’s
historical lens. However, Duncan argues, without a stronger textual meaning Scalia’s ap-
proach slips from legal interpretation to theological determination. In response to the ob-
served dilemma, Duncan concludes that Justices should focus on “establishment of religion”
as a legal and not a cultural construct.
Zachary Foreman’s paper, Hemlock and the First Amendment: Tracing Religious Freedom from
the Trial of Socrates to the U.S. Constitution explores the balance of freedom and restraint as the
essential foundation for viable, sustainable democracy. In this context, the execution of
Socrates presents democracy’s struggle to control those who may undermine it while poten-
tially threatening the principle of freedom. Foreman traces the legacy of this dilemma from
Athens to America presenting the arguments of many prominent intellectuals in support for
non-democracies. The Founders relied on the virtue of the citizenry as the protection against
unbridled relativism. Several thinkers put forward religion as the safety mechanism to protect
those virtues. His conclusion closes the circle to question the challenge to religious freedom
in the U.S. today as a parallel to the challenge of Socrates within fourth century democratic
Athens.
In Jeffersonian Walls and Madisonian Lines: The Supreme Court’s Use of History in Religion
Clause Cases, Mark Hall studies all religion clause cases, and analyzes the extent to which
Supreme Court Justices invoke history in their opinions. In particular he investigates the
trends of the Court in its use of history and with respect to individual Justices in terms of
whether they are “liberal” or “conservative.” Hall concludes with a cautionary note about the
way history has been invoked and the way it ought to be used to preserve its legitimacy as
part of opinions of the Justices.
In Jacques Maritain, Religion, and the American Experiment, Thomas Albert Howard pres-
ents an assessment of America from the writings of philosopher Jacques Maritain. While
often ignored because of his more apparent religious perspective, Maritain provides a fasci-
nating understanding of America’s freedom of religion. In contrast to Europe’s secularist
 approach that historically pitted the state against religion, America fostered a more open set
of possibilities that emphasized the compatibility of the state and religious participation.
Howard provides the historical context for these diverging paths and analyzes the positive
consequences following from America’s incorporation of religious freedom into its political
and civic institutions.  
Constitutional Prophets: Ancient Paradigms and Modern Expectations by Chris Stadler pres-
ents an analysis of the central leadership role accorded to and claimed by American presi-
dents. He roots this leadership role as representative of the nation and the voice of the people
in the paradigm of leadership rooted in ancient Biblical sources. He describes the purpose of
the paper as two-fold: first, and more narrowly, it is to provide a corrective emphasis on cur-
rent explanations of the Bush presidency; second and more broadly, to illustrate, by reflecting
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on how presidents lead as a social institution, the role and function of the American presiden-
cy from a particular cultural perspective.  
IV. Theoretical Analyses
In Conscience and Religious Liberty: Antidote to the Totalitarianism of the Positivist Mind, Rev.
Robert Araujo, S.J. avers that the dominant prejudices, including the canonization of plural-
ism and choice, operative in the contemporary liberal democracy and enshrined in positive
law, can function as a form of totalitarianism unless the right to religious freedom is protected.
He looks to history, in the lives of Saint Thomas More and Clemens Cardinal von Galen, to
provide guidance for those who, in the presence of a properly formed conscience, choose to
refuse to do or cooperate in what the positive law requires or permits.   
In How Protecting Religious Freedom Sustains Freedom Itself, David C. Cochran analyzes the
importance of religious freedom from the perspective of sustaining freedom more broadly.
He presents the two understandings of negative liberty and then positive liberty. Under nega-
tive freedom, there is a wide range of views of religious liberty and he outlines several of
these views including freedom of expression and consensus. For the perspective of positive
liberty, Cochran develops Taylor’s thesis of autonomy within the context of religious freedom.
The free individual is an autonomous individual, but autonomy can be achieved only through
developing identity. Because identity depends upon moral frameworks, religion remains a
vital source for identity formation and autonomy, and therefore a vital part of freedom more
broadly. 
In “Two There Are:” Understanding the Separation of Church and State, Richard W. Garnett
maintains that the proper understanding of the role of church and state is the protection of re-
ligion from government distortion so that religion and the state, neither of which is alien from
the other, may flourish. Furthermore, he maintains that freedom of religion is a structural
 feature of social and political life which protects freedom of conscience, which develops and
sustains constitutionally limited government, and which preserves the values and vision to
guide the direction of this nation.   
In Respecting Respective Spheres: The Role of Religion in Public Life, Steven Green delineates
boundaries for religion and religious practice in the context of a secular state. There are three
categories for appropriate thresholds defining spatial contexts for the maximum, constrained,
and minimum religious expression. Within the private sphere religious content and advocacy
is at its greatest. Green describes the private sphere as including the church or religious insti-
tution itself. For the author, within this sphere religious leadership should be permitted to
comment on social and political issues currently restricted by the Internal Revenue Code. In
the second category where government has created a forum for opinion and expression, reli-
gious expression should be permitted but more constrained than the level in the private
sphere. Finally, where religious leaders or groups participate in government programs or
functions, government should be permitted to issue the sharpest constraints to the point of
excluding religious perspectives. 
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In Neither Robber Barons nor Philosopher Kings: Political Prudence in the Just Polity, John
O’Callaghan pursues the question of what kind of leaders are appropriate to fashion the just
society. His study begins with the examination of Plato’s argument against Thrasymachus in
the Republic to distinguish real justice from apparent justice and then moves to the Aristotelian
distinction between prudence and cleverness to a similar distinction held by Thomas Aquinas.
He develops Aquinas’s notions of prudence as personal and political and as perfect and im-
perfect. He concludes that the prudence of imperfection is sufficient for just governance in
the contemporary American polity.
The Garaventa Center for Catholic Intellectual Life and American Culture is deeply grate-
ful to Mary Garaventa and her family for their continuous support of the center which bears
their family name and for their support of the University of Portland which nourished many
members of their family. We are also grateful to the Foundation — Our Sunday Visitor — for
their grant in support of the conference. 
The Garaventa Center and the editors of this proceedings are deeply indebted to Jamie
Powell for her remarkable dedication to this conference and to the project of the proceedings.
Her work on every detail of the conference — from the initial call for papers to the sending
forth of participants — was remarkable. Her insightful comments, her ongoing work with the
editors and with individual authors, and her sustaining encouragement were invaluable. We
are grateful also to Rachel Barry-Arquit and Sue Säfve for their marvelous creativity, for their
dedication to both projects — the conference and the proceedings — and for their painstaking
care in bringing both projects to completion.   
Margaret Monahan Hogan, Ph.D.
Lauretta Conklin Frederking, Ph.D.
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HOMILY
MASS IN THE EASTER SEASON
THE AMERICAN EXPERIMENT: 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
 B Y  R E V.  E .  W I L L I A M  B E AU C H A M P,  C . S . C .
P R E S I D E N T  O F  T H E  U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  P O RT L A N D
Ihave to admit upfront that I often feel very inadequate preaching during this special weekof the year, as we continue our celebration of the great feast of Easter. I suppose one reason
I feel this way could be because I am inadequate. But, I suspect the main reason for this
appre hension is the nature of what we celebrate this week, this holiest of seasons. There are
things about the life of Jesus that, as human beings, we find easier to comprehend than others
— things to which we can easily relate, things we can internalize in our own lives and under-
stand without too much difficulty because they are the types of things that we experience as
human beings in our everyday existence. One of these things is death, and the unavoidability
of it.
As we watch newscasts on television, or read the daily newspapers, we become aware of
the fact that we seem to be enamored with bad news, with tragedies; and one gets the impres-
sion that very little good is happening in our world. Our world is rife with war, with violence
and suffering, with hatred and terrorism. There is also so much news (and television and
movie drama) about death — and death seems so final.
That is really the issue we are confronted with when we reflect upon and celebrate Jesus
Christ’s resurrection. We can more easily understand and accept Jesus as a human being, that
as Son of God he took our flesh as his own from a teenage virgin; that he grew up much as you
and I do, except for sin; that Jesus ate and drank, got tired and slept, laughed and wept; that
his flesh was beaten and spat upon, and nailed to a tree; that he died and was buried in a tomb
of rock. And death seems so final.
We can accept all of the above without much question because it is within the realm of our
human understanding and experience. But during this Easter Week we celebrate the incom-
prehensible. After a lifetime of what many would call failures, leading to his death, Jesus rose
from the dead in a split second. After we spend a somber Holy Week recalling passion and
death of Jesus, we gather with joy and proclaim “Alleluia! He is risen!”
We pack the churches on Easter Sunday to celebrate this beautiful and joyful feast. In
seems so natural, so simple — it is all so beautiful. But, is it that simple? Is Easter merely a
day or two of celebration for us, a day on which the beautiful flowers and music, and the
sense that spring has finally arrived, all come together to make us feel good, to feel as if we
have done something good by going to church to celebrate? Or is it, most importantly, the cel-
ebration of something we have really incorporated into our lives — a celebration of our deep-
est belief, a recognition of the cornerstone of our Christian faith, and acknowledgement that
all that we believe about the person of Jesus Christ only makes sense because of this incredi-
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ble event of his resurrection?
The resurrection as an event is so simple, yet we often tend to make it so complex. Our
human understanding tells us that it is impossible. Only our faith tells us it is so. But, our faith
is weak. We come to celebrate the Easter season with our doubts and fears, with our short-
comings and failures, with our humanity. We come as people who want desperately to be-
lieve, but perhaps whose real life experiences and human weaknesses make us pause, make
us reticent.
But, we are not alone. Mary Magdalene despaired when she believed the body of her Lord
had been stolen, and when she saw him after the resurrection she at first thought it was the
gardener. Thomas in very human fashion would insist that he put his hands into the wounds
of Jesus before he could accept the fact that Jesus had risen. Jesus would appear to the disci-
ples after the resurrection, and eat with them, and invite them to touch him assuring them he
was not a ghost; he would remind them of all that Scripture had foretold of him and how he
had fulfilled the prophecies of old. Yet they would still hide and barricade themselves in fear
until the Holy Spirit came upon them and opened their minds and hearts and sent them forth.
Jesus passed through death. But even his earliest followers who walked with him, and who
heard him tell of his death and resurrection, had to be urged to move from the empty tomb
and from the past. This was, after all, a past in which they could leave everything for Jesus to
do. They had chosen to follow him because they had dreams, they had hopes. Perhaps they
believed Jesus would lead them to a life of power and prestige, of wealth and comfort. His
death had presented them with a crisis, a call for commitment in a much deeper way, a call for
their death to the old way of life in which they had expectations of Jesus that were rooted in
their human understandings and limitations, their human experiences of sorrow and joy. They
were called to move beyond what they could fully understand to what they believed in faith. 
The message of our celebration in this and every Easter season is that we, as followers of
Christ, must not cling to the tomb, but must find resurrection faith. We must move beyond
our understanding to a faith that sends us forth with hope, to accept our task and responsibili-
ties in this world, to be where Christ is. He beckons us forth into a mission with his disciples
to our neighbor and to the whole world. He calls us to meet him in the ever-continuing task of
redemption and reconciliation.
We gather the next few days for a seminar on religious freedom as established and protect-
ed in our country’s Constitution. We are honored to have Justice Antonin Scalia present to be
the keynote speaker for the conference. While the actual “freedom of religion” clause as con-
tained in the Bill of Rights of our Constitution is short and very direct, the federal courts’ in-
terpretation of this clause over the decades has been varied and often controversial. What
seems so simple on its face has often become very complex in its enforcement and in the liv-
ing out of what it allows and restricts.
The settlers and founders of this country were committed to religious freedom; they recog-
nized in their own way that they were sent by God to establish a nation both blessed by God
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and called by God to be a beacon of hope and aspiration, a nation rooted in faith and belief in
a God who was with them and guided them. They drafted a Constitution replete with free-
doms, beginning with the freedom of religion. But, we recognize that with freedom comes re-
sponsibility. As we gather in this chapel at the opening Mass for this conference in which we
will reflect upon the role of religious freedom in the American experience, as we reflect upon
the freedom of religion clause of our Constitution in its simplicity and complexity, we profess
that our lives are rooted in Christ. We profess that all of the blessings and freedoms we enjoy
are gifts from God, and we reflect upon how we have, or have not, used these gifts to bring
Christ’s message of compassion, of peace, of forgiveness, of healing and sharing to our trou-
bled world.
The resurrection of Jesus was the fulfillment of everything he came to do. His disciples
were overwhelmed with the knowledge of this simple fact — Jesus lives! As they came to be-
lieve, they did not go back to living as they did before. And neither can we.
The disciples realized that they had to find a new way, a way that reflected the profound
experience they had undergone. They did not do this perfectly, and they often did it with
great struggle. But, they did it because they were driven to do so. Having cast their lives with
Jesus, and then having realized that he had risen, they could not deny the power of his love
which opens tombs, and locked rooms, and people’s minds and hearts. They could not pre-
tend that something earth-shattering and of infinite importance had not happened; they
could not pretend that their lives would still be the same. And neither can we.
Today, more than ever, we need Resurrection. Too often we look on in fear and hopeless-
ness at the secularism that is overtaking our society; or at the imprisonment of more-is-better
consumerism; or at the darkness of evil, oppression, violence, hatred and misunderstanding.
We become trapped in the conviction that we cannot feed the hungry, or shelter the home-
less, or employ the jobless, or love the poor, or end the hatred and violence that consumes
our world — because the problems seem too great. 
We need Resurrection. We need to hear and know that Jesus, Son of God, has taken the first
step and is with us. His power is at work, rolling back stones, lifting burdens — a power much
stronger than the forces of evil that surround us — a power that gives life, not death. We need
to realize more than ever that with the freedom to practice our religion that we enjoy comes
the responsibility to make Jesus known and loved, and to not succumb to those who would
try to silence us, often in the name of that same Freedom of Religion clause.
Our invitation as we gather in this chapel, and for this conference, is to know, even though
we do not fully understand, but to know in the depths of our being that we can never be the
same — because Christ is truly risen. We are called to experience the resurrection as real as
the earliest disciples. Let us pray that this Easter season we will come to more fully compre-
hend that we are called to pass with Jesus through his resurrection, from death to the old
ways into a new life — a life of hope, a life of love, a life of faith.
SECTION 1 
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FROM PIERCE TO SMITH:
THE OREGON CONNECTION 
AND SUPREME COURT 
RELIGION JURISPRUDENCE
 B Y  D I A R M U I D  F.  O ’ S C A N N L A I N *
It is a distinct honor to be invited by the University of Portland, Oregon’s Catholic Uni ver -sity, to participate in such a distinguished conference on religious freedom that examines
the history, the tension, and the power of the religious propositions of the First Amendment.
I commend its Garaventa Center for assembling such diverse presenters in its colloquia, rang-
ing in faith traditions from Christianity to Judaism to Islam, and in intellectual disciplines
from history to political science to theology to medicine and, of course, to law. 
As this conference takes place in Oregon, I thought it fitting to reflect on the role of two
landmark religious decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States arising out of this
state: Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary,1 decided over eighty
years ago, and Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith,2 decid-
ed within the last eighteen. While both of the cases were brought by religiously observant
plaintiffs seeking relief from restrictive state measures, each carries its own significance for
religious freedom. As an Oregonian, as well as a Ninth Circuit judge privileged to have cham-
bers in the Pioneer Courthouse in the heart of downtown Portland, I became fascinated by
the increasingly extensive scholarship on these very important cases having a common geo-
graphical origin in this state. Please join with me in exploring some curious connections be-
tween these two decisions which lead me to some counterintuitive conclusions about their
impact on religious freedom, the subject of this conference. Of course I speak only for myself
and not for my colleagues or the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
On June 1, 1925, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the
Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, which for ease of reference I will call “Pierce.”3 The decision re-
sponded to two appeals brought by Walter Pierce, the Governor of Oregon, with respect to the
validity of the Oregon Compulsory Education Act of 1922, a voter-passed initiative requiring
Oregon parents to send their children ages 8-16 to public school, and imposed fines and
prison terms for non-compliance. 
The Society of Sisters was (and still is) a religious order of Catholic nuns, which ran several
boarding schools in Oregon, including St. Mary’s Academy and St. Francis School in down-
town Portland. Fearing that the new Oregon law would deprive its schools of revenue and
Catholic parents of the ability to obtain religious training for their children, the Society of
Sisters had challenged the Act in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon.
There, the order sought to enjoin enforcement of the law by three defendants: Walter Pierce,
Governor of Oregon; Isaac Van Winkle, Attorney General of Oregon; and Stanley Myers,
District Attorney for Multnomah County. Arguing before a special three-judge panel, the reli-
gious order claimed that the law violated the Contracts Clause and the Due Process Clause of
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the Fourteenth Amendment, and sought an injunction.4 The three-judge court, consolidating
the case with a challenge to the Act brought by the Salem, Oregon-based Hill Military Academy,
a private non-religiously affiliated school, unanimously enjoined the Oregon statute on the
grounds that it violated the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Supreme Court affirmed, holding
that the Act violated the “liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and educa-
tion of children under their control.”5
Public perceptions have cast the Pierce decision as a victory for religious liberty, and many
academics encourage this view. Professor Stephen Carter of Yale Law School writes that “what
Pierce ultimately represents is the judgment that in order to take religious freedom seriously,
we must take the ability of parents to raise their children in their religion seriously.”6
The Society of Sisters made an explicit argument for religious freedom in its bill of com-
plaint, stating that “said pretended law attempts to control the free exercise and enjoyment of
religious opinions and to interfere with the rights of conscience.”7 But, interestingly, the
Society did not explicitly invoke the federal Free Exercise Clause, for that clause would not be
incorporated against the states until 1940.8 The Society instead claimed that the Oregon
Compulsory Education Act deprived the religious order of liberty without due process of law
as applied to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment.9 This argument turned upon the
freedom of parents to send their children to private schools, such as St. Mary’s, which would
offer religious training as well as general education.
The district court had enjoined the Act based upon the schools’ rights to economic liberty
and substantive due process. Citing Lochner v. New York, Murphy v. California, and Meyer v.
Nebraska, District Judge Wolverton wrote for the three-judge district court:
The right to contract in relation to one’s business is a liberty that may not be inhib-
ited without entrenchment upon rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. … The right to engage in a useful, legitimate business, not harmful
or vicious, is protected under the amendment, and cannot be abrogated. …
It cannot be successfully combated that parochial and private schools have ex-
isted almost from time immemorial — so long, at least, that their privilege and
right to teach the grammar grades must be regarded as natural and inherent, as
much so as the privilege and right of a tutor to teach the German language with
the grammar grades, as was held in Meyer v. Nebraska. … The absolute right of
these schools to teach in the grammar grades … and the right of the parents to
 engage them to instruct their children, we think, is within the liberty of the
Fourteenth Amendment.10
Although the district court styled this right as part of the “liberty” component, its decision
was grounded essentially in the schools’ property rights to patronage. Despite the strong in-
terest in religious education at stake, the court did not discuss religious liberty at all. Instead,
the court granted relief on the same grounds to both the Society of Sisters and Hill Military
Academy, holding that the Oregon Compulsory Education Act deprived all such schools of
property without due process of law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution. The court expressly rejected the Society of Sisters’ Privileges and
Immunities Clause argument, concluding that the clause did not protect businesses such as
schools. As a footnote I should add that I feel some affinity with this panel because it included
a late member of my own court, United States Circuit Judge William Ball Gilbert, sitting by
designation, who was the first Oregonian to be appointed to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit. 
The state defendants appealed directly to the Supreme Court of the United States. Governor
Pierce emphasized in his Supreme Court brief that “after arguing the case mainly on the ques-
tion of the deprivation of liberty without due process of law … [the judges] decide[d] the case
solely on the question of the deprivation of property without due process of law.”11 Rather
than defend the precise reasoning of the district court, however, the Society of Sisters re-
sponded that both a property right and a liberty interest were at stake. The Society carefully
pointed out that there were strong religious interests at stake but that it expected the Court to
“sit [ ] in impartial judgment … upon all faiths and creeds.”12 I mentioned that the Society did
not ask the Court to rule based upon the Free Exercise Clause, which had not yet been incor-
porated against the states. Fascinatingly, it was the Oregon Attorney General, Isaac Van Winkle,
in his separate appellate brief, who expressly raised the possibility that the Supreme Court
might incorporate the clause so as to support the Society of Sisters’ claims. Vehemently argu-
ing that the federal Free Exercise Clause did not protect against state laws indirectly limiting
religious liberty,13 the Attorney General declared: “The books are full of cases in which the
contention has been advanced that the religious convictions of a party have required him to
break the law, and … that the laws in question are [therefore] unconstitutional. The courts
have everywhere refused to uphold this contention.”14 The Attorney General pointed to the
Court’s decision in Reynolds v. United States,15 which ruled that Mormon believers had no First
Amendment right to constitutional exemption from anti-polygamy laws. The Reynolds Court
had explained: “To permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief
 superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto
himself. Government could exist only in name under such circumstances.” Attorney General
Van Winkle argued that Reynolds and other precedent required the Supreme Court to uphold
Oregon’s law, which the state viewed as a legitimate requirement that “all immigrants admit-
ted to all the advantages and opportunities of life in the United States … be taught by the state
the English language, and the character of American institutions and government.”16
The Society of Sisters thereupon seized the opportunity in its oral argument before the
Supreme Court to make a not-so-subtle claim that the Oregon law was motivated by anti-
Catholic animus. Pointing out that “the question of religious liberty [was] thrust into the case
for the first time by the briefs filed on behalf of the Attorney General and the Governor of the
State,”17 the Society essentially argued that they constituted an admission regarding the pur-
pose of the law.  The Society asserted that the state’s briefs revealed that the “underlying
 motive and the immediate intent and purpose of this measure were antireligious and to
 prevent religious instruction to children.”18 The law, the Society continued, was worse than
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“any atheistic or sovietic measure ever adopted in Russia”19 and sought to “destroy[ ] the right
to religious liberty and freedom of education in the name, in the cant, on the pretence of
Americanization.”20
This claim was not surprising in light of the public perceptions of the law. Reports in the
local Oregonian newspaper indeed commented that “[a]ccusations that the law was backed by
the Ku Klux Klan and was aimed at the Roman Catholic Church have been heard from every
side since the statute was put on Oregon’s books.”21 And evidence demonstrates that the most
active supporters of the ballot initiative indeed were members of the KKK, who placed a simi-
lar compulsory education measure on the ballot in Washington state in 1924 — after the Oregon
district court’s decision but before the Supreme Court rendered the final word on such laws.
The anti-Catholic innuendos also came through in the Governor’s and Attorney General’s
briefs, which were laced with complaints about the lack of proper immigrant assimilation, at
a time when many immigrants were Catholic.  
Yet the Supreme Court declined to rule on religious liberty grounds. Not only did the
Supreme Court fail to read the Free Exercise Clause as offering protection against state laws,
but the Supreme Court did not specify that the “liberty interest” of the Fourteenth Amendment
was a religious one. Instead, the Supreme struck down the law based upon the personal “liberty
of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their con-
trol.”22 Thus the Court shifted away from the economic basis of the district court’s decision
and did not even reference the religious liberty arguments presented by both parties in the
case, choosing instead to articulate a form of parental liberty unconnected to economic or re-
ligious interests. 
By grounding its decision in a non-religious-based parental right derived from the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court enabled the Hill Military Academy to emerge victorious in tandem
with the Society of Sisters. And the holding meant victory to many more claimants than those
at bar, for it heralded a substantive due process legacy that continues to unfold — with direct
and indirect consequences for religious freedom. 
In the decades to come, this substantive due process reasoning would spawn consequences
that undermined many of the traditional values held dear by adherents of religion. While the
immediate result of Pierce was to preserve the rights of parents to send their children to private
religious schools, its decision soon was cited in support of the far less traditional rights of con-
traception, abortion, and sodomy. These three “rights” would not only be deeply confounding
to the order of nuns who brought the case, but to many others who hold similar values and
care about religious freedom. 
In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court articulated an expansive right to privacy based in the
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause and the emanations and penumbras of the Bill
of Rights. It expressly invoked Pierce for precedential support, reading the case to stand for re-
ligious liberty under the First Amendment as well as due process rights under the Fourteenth.
The Griswold Court did not limit the Pierce decision to parental rights, nor did it appear to no-
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tice that the decision did not cite the First Amendment at all. The Griswold Court’s citation to
Pierce made clear that the latter would be used by the Court as an increasingly flexible tool to
expand personal liberties beyond those defined by the constitutional text. 
This point became all the more evident in Roe v. Wade,23 when the Court widened the rea-
soning in Pierce to include a right to abortion.  In discussing what it called “the roots” of “this
guarantee of personal privacy,” the Court noted that Pierce had established the right in the
realm of “child rearing and education.”24 When the Court reaffirmed Roe fifteen years later in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, it invoked the case law supporting substantive due process and
cited Pierce as one of the first decisions demonstrating “an aspect of liberty [to be] protected
against state interference by the substantive component of the Due Process Clause.”25
In Lawrence v. Texas,26 the Court struck down a state ban on sodomy, concluding that the
ban conflicted with the Court’s “broad statements of the substantive reach of liberty under the
Due Process Clause in earlier cases, including Pierce v. Society of Sisters.”27 Again, Pierce provided
the Court with crucial support for a substantive due process decision that left many advocates
of traditional religious values very much perplexed. 
By providing an extra-textual ground for constitutional freedom in the context of private re-
ligious education, Pierce profoundly affected the methodology of the Court and the trajectory
of the law. That seminal case has paved the way for new interpretations of the personal liber-
ty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment and the particular rights accorded to members
of the human family vis-à-vis one another and vis-à-vis the state. These changes have affected
a realm in which religion has long played a predominant role in inculcating values and prac-
tices. And, in time, these legal changes appear to have taken on a moral stature of their own:
the frequent coincidence of moral and legal commands — such as those against murder, theft,
and perjury — leads many to presume the law to carry both juridical and normative weight.
Persons adhering to traditional faith-based teachings might have good reason to be less san-
guine about that 1925 Oregon victory today. 
In the decades following Pierce, the Court made jurisprudential changes that would alter
the way it approached future religious liberty claims. In the 1940 decision Cantwell v.
Connecticut, the Court, perhaps inevitably after Gitlow,28 incorporated the Free Exercise
Clause against the states. In the 1963 decision Sherbert v. Verner,29 the Court articulated the
now-familiar free exercise test that barred states from infringing on free exercise in the ab-
sence of a compelling state interest.30 In Sherbert, the state had refused to provide unemploy-
ment compensation to a Seventh Day Adventist who had been fired for refusal to work on a
Saturday, the Sabbath day of her faith. The Court held that the state was required to provide
an exemption to the rule in order to avoid forcing a religious adherent to “abandon his reli-
gious convictions” in order to retain his livelihood.31 “To deny an exemption … [would be] in
effect to penalize’”32 the exercise of religious liberty, the Court concluded. The Sherbert deci-
sion became the core basis for claims of religious exemption from neutral and generally appli-
cable laws. 
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But by 1990, another Oregon case would once again determine the scope of religious liberty
under the Free Exercise Clause, and in a most unanticipated way. In Unemployment Division
v. Smith, which I will refer to as “Smith,” two religious claimants sued the State of Oregon for
denial of unemployment benefits. Alfred Smith and Galen Black had “ingested peyote for
sacramental purposes at a ceremony of the Native American Church,”33 and as a result, had
been fired from their jobs at a private drug rehabilitation organization. Although the two men
were not criminally prosecuted for their drug use, Oregon denied them unemployment bene-
fits because they had been fired for “work-related misconduct.”  Citing Sherbert, Smith and
Black argued that the Free Exercise Clause required an exemption from the general rule.
They argued that the state’s interest in “preserv[ing] the financial integrity of the [unemploy-
ment] compensation fund”34 did not constitute a compelling reason to infringe on free exer-
cise. They asserted that the relevant consideration could not be the state’s much more
important interest in enforcing its criminal laws, because they had not been prosecuted.
While successful in the Supreme Court of Oregon, they failed to persuade the Supreme
Court of the United States, where then-Attorney General David Frohnmayer (now President
of the University of Oregon) personally argued the state’s case and prevailed. In a 5-4 opinion
authored by Justice Scalia, the Court rejected Smith’s and Black’s free exercise claims. The
opinion began with the text of the Free Exercise Clause. Although Justice Scalia conceded that
“no case of ours has involved the point,”35 he stated “it would doubtless be unconstitutional” for
the government to ban “acts or abstentions only when they are engaged in for religious rea-
sons.”36 On the other hand, Justice Scalia found the clause ambiguous as to whether “‘prohibit-
ing the free exercise [of religion] includes requiring any individual to observe a generally
applicable law that requires (or forbids) the performance of an act that his religious belief for-
bids (or requires).”37 Without any reference to the history of the clause, Justice Scalia wrote
that “it is a permissible reading of the text … to say that if prohibiting the exercise of religion …
is not the object … but merely the incidental effect … the First Amendment has not been of-
fended.”38 Characteristically, Justice Scalia went on to ensure that the reading was not only
permissible but correct. Uncharacteristically, he looked solely to precedent — without consid-
ering the original meaning and history of the clause — to make this determination. 
The Smith Court invoked Reynolds v. United States as the first occasion the Court had to as-
sert the rule that “[c]onscientious scruples … [do not] relieve[ ] the individual from obedience
to a general law not aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious beliefs.” That, you may
recall, was precisely the argument made, and the case cited, by the Attorney General of
Oregon in Pierce, when he argued that religious liberty did not justify overturning the
Compulsory Education Act. The Court had declined to discuss the matter in its Pierce opinion,
but it met the argument head-on in Smith. Quoting Reynolds, Justice Scalia reiterated: “’Laws’
… ‘are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere reli-
gious belief and opinions, they may with practices. … Can a man excuse his practices to the
contrary because of his religious belief?  To permit this would be to make the professed doc-
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trines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to
become a law unto himself.”39 Justice Scalia made clear that the argument for non-exemption
— ignored by the Court in Pierce— was dispositive in Smith. He stated: “There being no con-
tention that Oregon’s drug law represents an attempt to regulate religious beliefs, the commu-
nication of religious beliefs, or the raising of one’s children in those beliefs, the rule to which
we have adhered ever since Reynolds plainly controls.”40
But the application of Reynolds was less likely in 1990 than it would have been in 1925, due
to the interposition of Sherbert’s compelling interest test. Recognizing that Sherbert could be
read to require religious exemptions based on free exercise, Justice Scalia meticulously distin-
guished the case. Although acknowledging that Sherbert addressed “the denial of unemploy-
ment benefits,” he concluded that the case was different in crucial ways. Most importantly,
Smith and Black had violated a criminal law, whereas “the conduct at issue in [Sherbert] was
not prohibited by law.”41 And Justice Scalia pointed out that Sherbert had only limited significance
for religious liberty even outside the realm of unemployment benefits, because “[a]lthough
we have sometimes purported to apply the Sherbert test in contexts other than [the denial of
unemployment benefits], we have always found the test satisfied.”42
Justice Scalia’s decision not to address the history of the Free Exercise Clause or its original
meaning has been assailed by scholars, like my fellow United States Circuit Judge Michael
McConnell of the Tenth Circuit, who believe that the clause envisioned legal exemptions in
cases where religious liberty could not be reconciled with civil laws. Even though other schol-
ars, such as Professors Michael Malbin and Ellis West, appear to offer different, and perhaps
more persuasive, arguments to the contrary, Justice Scalia engaged none of them. I suggest
that the Smith opinion’s failure to enlist historical analysis to support its decision weakens it
considerably. What is most surprising is that Justice Scalia did not offer any of the compelling
arguments made by scholars like Malbin and West, and later built upon by Professor Philip
Hamburger of Columbia Law School, despite the fact that they would have considerably
strengthened that decision in the eyes of many jurists, who would be appalled by the impact
of the decision on religious liberty. Attention to history and original meaning might at least
have placated those who despaired over the dim prospects it left for claims of religious free-
dom. Some critics would view the decision as an anomaly for a Justice who was known to
have decried other established precedents — such as Roe v. Wade— in favor of a more careful
reading of the constitutional text. Many have wondered why the conservative justice, normal-
ly so attentive to tradition and original meaning, would author a decision cutting back on reli-
gious freedom. 
The answer, and a reasonable one at that, appears to lie in Justice Scalia’s conviction that
the courts have limited competence and must remain above the religious fray. In addition to
citing precedent, Justice Scalia’s Smith opinion presents a pragmatic and structural argument
for a narrow reading of the Free Exercise Clause. He argues that “courts must not presume to
determine the place of a particular belief in a religion or the plausibility of a religious claim,”43
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for evaluating such matters in objective terms would prove “utterly unworkable.”44 Requiring
religious exemptions in some cases but not others would authorize judges to make impermis-
sible value judgments and would raise “the prospect of constitutionally required religious ex-
emptions from civil obligations of almost every conceivable kind.”45 Anarchy and arbitrariness,
in short.
This was neither the first nor the last time Justice Scalia would argue that such matters
could not be determined by the courts in a principled manner. Ten years after authoring Smith,
Justice Scalia wrote in a case involving the parental right originally articulated in Pierce. In
that case, Troxel v. Granville, the majority rejected a visitation-rights claim made by two grand-
parents. Citing Pierce, the Court stated that “the ‘liberty of parents and guardians’ includes the
right ‘to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control.’”46 The mother,
therefore, could deny the grandparents access to her child. Justice Scalia, in a powerful dis-
sent, assailed the substantive due process reasoning of the majority and argued that the “theory
of unenumerated parental rights … has small claim to stare decisis protection.”47 But he con-
ceded his own belief that “a right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children is among
the ‘unalienable Rights’ with which the Declaration of Independence proclaims ‘all men …
are endowed by their Creator,’” and suggested that this right was “among the ‘othe[r] [rights] re-
tained by the people’ which the Ninth Amendment says the Constitution’s enumeration of
rights ‘shall not be construed to deny or disparage.’”48
But of utmost importance, Justice Scalia finds the competence to define such right to rest
in the legislative and not the judicial branch. While it would be “entirely compatible with the
commitment to representative democracy set forth in the founding documents to argue, in
legislative chambers or in electoral campaigns, that the State has no power to interfere with
parents’ authority over the rearing of their children,”49 he had no power as a judge “to deny
legal effect to laws that (in [his] view) infringe upon what is (in [his] view) that unenumerated
right.”50 Justice Scalia’s Troxel dissent may give context to his approach in Smith. If Smith is
viewed as a part of Justice Scalia’s larger efforts to rein in what he views as the lawlessness of
substantive due process (particularly as defined in the abortion context), his Smith decision
may appear more palatable to advocates of traditional religious values. This argument sug-
gests that the Smith decision, like his Troxel dissent, can be read as a consistent approach to
the Constitution after all.
But in a fascinating twist, the Smith decision appears to place increased emphasis on the
role of substantive due process in vindicating religious freedom. For the Smith decision makes
clear that an observant claimant will not win a free exercise exemption from a neutral and
generally applicable law unless he or she can show an impermissible legislative intent to dis-
criminate against religion or otherwise invoke substantive due process. Justice Scalia’s Smith
opinion acknowledges in a remarkable way the doctrinal stature of substantive due process,
and seemed even to increase its importance for religious claims by stating: 
The only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment bars appli-
cation of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated action have
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involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in con-
junction with other constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech and of
the press51 or the right of parents, acknowledged in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, to
 direct the education of their children.52
In other words, Smith makes clear that only substantive due process could support religious
exemptions from the law that state legislatures did not choose to provide. This ruling leaves
the Cantwell door open, but means that few religious claims for exemption can cross its
threshold.  And if the Roberts Court follows the admonitions of its conservative justices and
continues its slow retreat from substantive due process, religious practitioners may have even
narrower grounds on which to base their claims. 
So where does that leave us? I suggest that as a result of its narrow reading of the Free
Exercise Clause, Smith ensures, for better or worse, that religious liberty will depend largely
on legislative action and not by judicial protection. Analysis of demographic trends adds in-
terest to the jurisprudential shift, for the religious views of voting citizens, and their connec-
tions to established churches, have changed considerably since the time of the founding and
even more so since Pierce. In 1925, religious liberty was attacked by a law passed on the initia-
tive of a sectarian, anti-Catholic majority. Today, a growing percent of Americans associate
with no organized religion at all. In recent decades, west-coast states have led a trend away
from established churches, and Oregon has often appeared at the helm.53
What do trends toward secularization and religious individualism mean for religious liberty
after Smith? I discern two primary concerns. First, restrictive laws may be passed with the
purpose of inhibiting religion. Fortunately, the Supreme Court has made clear that even after
Smith “[t]he Free Exercise Clause protects against governmental hostility which is masked, as
well as overt,” and “[o]fficial action that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment can-
not be shielded by mere compliance with the requirement of facial neutrality.”54 Second, and
perhaps more troubling, restrictive laws may be enacted — or simply enforced — out of sheer
insensitivity to religion. The latter may be a special concern in a time of increasing secularism
and preoccupation with self-centered and temporal pursuits. Third, even if the legislatures
are willing to pass laws to protect religious practices, there is a significant risk that such
statutes may be ruled unconstitutional by the courts. This third concern suggests that advo-
cates of religious freedom may be caught between a rock and a hard place, as both courts and
legislatures lose the ability to grant them shelter. 
Restrictions on faith-based activities will not affect only members of the Catholic Church,
as in Pierce, or the Native American Church, as in Smith. A look at current free exercise co-
nundrums shows that practices of diverse faiths may be endangered. Will Muslims be forced
to strip their heads of traditional garb required by their faiths?  France has required as much,
and while it has far outpaced even Oregon in its secularization, we may not be that far behind. 
But we need not look abroad to see how law has already limited the practices of various
 religious persons and organizations. Recently, several pharmacists in Illinois were fired from
their jobs for refusing on religious grounds to comply with state rules requiring them to dis-
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tribute the morning-after pill. They filed suit in federal district court, citing the Free Exercise
Clause. So far, the judge has denied the state’s motion to dismiss and allowed the pharmacists
to proceed on their claim that the state rules were motivated by anti-religious animus.55 It will
be interesting to watch the case unfold. 
In Massachusetts, state anti-discrimination laws have been enforced without an exception
that would allow Catholic adoption agencies to give children only to heterosexual couples. As
a result, the Church has concluded that it could not reconcile the practice with its faith and
withdrew from providing adoption services altogether. The Anglican, Catholic, and Lutheran
churches may face other conflicts as well: will prosecutors begin to press charges for violations
of underage drinking laws, when minors receive communion in both species at daily liturgies? 
Anti-discrimination laws protecting women from employment harassment might also be
applied to force churches with male clergies to hire female pastors or priests as well. And evi-
dentiary rules might be enacted that would apply to all persons, without exemptions for
priest-penitent communications.56 While such laws might serve otherwise worthy purposes
and be enacted without any intention of restricting religious freedom, they might be read in
ways that would severely constrain faith-related practices.  
As I have emphasized before — the concerns do not affect one church or a single faith. The
anti-Catholic sentiments that prevailed in Oregon in 1925 have been subsumed by indiffer-
ence and hostility toward other faiths as well. And while Pierce ensured that private schools,
including religious ones, retained a right to exist, they may face new threats. For example,
could anti-discrimination laws be invoked to require Jewish, Amish, Muslim, and other reli-
gious communities, to hire non-believers to teach in their schools? 
Smith does not offer much hope for exemptions from such state anti-discrimination laws. It
would be ironic — though certainly possible — for courts to find a discriminatory purpose be-
hind such laws. But without proof of such purpose, or the aid of another constitutional right,
religious claims for relief would fail. As these examples show, persons who care about free-
dom and faith must keep a watchful eye for animus. They must, however, turn their primary
efforts to persuasion, so that their fellow citizens and their legislators can share their concerns
and reach appropriate accommodations. 
Unfortunately, a third impediment to religious freedom may arise in the context of legisla-
tive action: Statutes designed to protect faith-based practices may be deemed unconstitution-
al. For example, in City of Boerne v. Flores,57 the Supreme Court struck down a provision of the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, in which Congress had sought to provide greater protec-
tion for free exercise. The Act rejected the limitations on free exercise allowed by the Court’s
opinion in Smith, and required federal courts to apply the more protective Sherbert test58
when analyzing religious claims.59 In City of Boerne, the Court rejected Congress’s attempt to
protect religious freedom, ruling that the Act exceeded the scope of congressional authority.60
The Court emphasized that Congress may not “enact legislation that expands the rights [enu-
merated in the Constitution],”61 or “define its own powers by altering the [Constitution’s]
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meaning.”62
Thus, the Court’s decision in City of Boerne undercut the assurance it had given in Smith
that legislative action could protect free exercise. In Smith the Court had presented structural
arguments emphasizing that legislatures could decide whether to expand religious freedom;
in City of Boerne the Court applied structural arguments to cabin Congress’s competence to do
just that. While both decisions may be defended for their fidelity to the separation of powers,
their interplay suggests yet a further hurdle for advocates of religious freedom. 
The troubling interplay of the Court’s free exercise decisions and its ruling in City of Boerne
were noted in a dissent to that decision. There, Justice Souter expressed reluctance to limit
Congress’s power to protect religious freedom, and urged the Court to dismiss the writ of cer-
tiorari as improvidently granted. He argued that Smith should not be applied to strike down
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act without closer analysis of the claims and “the historical
arguments going to the original understanding of the Free Exercise Clause… which raise[ ] very
substantial issues about the soundness of the Smith rule.”63 Justice Souter’s concerns did not
sway the majority, but his dissent underscored the problems for religious freedom that arise
from the intersection of the Court’s decisions.64
The future of religious freedom may now shift to the hands of voters and lawmakers.
Although the courts can continue to protect religious practices against laws motivated by dis-
criminatory purposes, or can grant relief when Free Exercise claims are made “in conjunction
with other constitutional protections,” most protective action must be legislative.  
Believers must learn to attract the support of legislators — a task that may well become
more difficult as secularism grows in the voting population. But at least the responsibility of
pursuing religious liberty rests with those most committed to its preservation. If they raise
their voices, I have no doubt that they will be heard and will eventually prevail in what is,
deep down, a tolerant and respectful society, such that their faiths and freedoms will be pro-
tected in a nation built upon those values. For despite trends toward secularization, most
Americans continue to profess religious faith, which, I suggest, enables them to understand
the importance of faith-based practices and the value of accommodation. As American socie-
ty and law remain grounded in moral norms and faith-based traditions, those asserting claims
grounded in religious freedom may strike sympathetic chords. But to strike such chords, they
first must speak. Only by the energy and perseverance of their voices can our nation retain in
its fullest form the freedom for which it was designed. 
* United States Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; A.B., St John’s University, 1957;
J.D., Harvard Law School, 1963; LL.M., University of Virginia, 1992; LL.D. (Hon.), University of Notre Dame, 2002;
LL.D. (Hon.), Lewis and Clark College, 2003. I would like to acknowledge, with thanks, the assistance of Marah Stith,
my law clerk, in helping to prepare this paper.
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THE SINKING WALL OF SEPARATION
THE SUPREME COURT AND 
THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 1947-2005
 B Y  E D WA R D  F.  M A N N I N O *
Religion and the First Amendment
The First Amendment deals with religion in two separate clauses. It prohibits Congress both
from enacting any “law respecting an establishment of religion,” or “prohibiting the free exer-
cise thereof.” This article analyzes the leading decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States under the first of these provisions, known as the Establishment Clause, insofar as they
discuss aid to parochial schools and school prayer.
It is the thesis of this paper that these decisions are products of the concerns of the times in
which they were decided, and were also impacted by the political and religious values of the
Justices who decided them. Thus, they reflect the following realities. First, the early cases ex-
amining varied forms of aid to religious schools reflected Protestant fears about the growing
influence of the Catholic school system, whose pupil population doubled from the end of
World War II to 1965. Second, there was a parallel recognition by the Justices of the increasing
pluralism of American society, which necessitated the transformation of the public school
system from purveyors of a Protestant civic morality based upon the King James Bible to a
more secular enterprise, which neither favored nor advanced organized religion. Third, the
first two factors led the Supreme Court to adopt an increasingly strict separation of church
and state in its opinions, erecting what Justice Hugo Black characterized as a “high and im-
pregnable” wall between them. This early phase of strict separation lasted from 1947 to 1985,
followed by a gradual transition period, characterized by the development of new tests, and
eventuating in a more frankly neutral and accommodationist stance towards religion from
the late 1990s through the present. Fourth, this neutrality can be attributed in part to the
recognition that the Catholic school system posed less of a threat than previously feared, with
that system declining from one that serviced twelve percent of American schoolchildren in
1965, to one that has a student population well under five percent of those children today.
Fifth, this newer stance of accommodation can also be traced to appointment of Supreme Court
justices by conservative Republican presidents from Ronald Reagan through George H. W. Bush.
The Establishment Clause: Erection of a “Wall of Separation”
The first major case in which the Supreme Court dealt with the Establishment Clause was
Everson v. Board of Education (1947).1 That case dealt with the controversial topic of reimburs-
ing the parents of Catholic school students the costs of their bus transportation to school. The
place of the Catholic schools in postwar America was a hot and divisive topic, and those
schools provoked a strong voice of opposition in the work of Paul Blanshard. Blanshard wrote
several books on what he called the “Catholic problem,” beginning withAmerican Freedom and
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Catholic Power in 1949. That book was on the New York Times best-seller list for seven months.
As Blanshard saw it, Catholicism was “antidemocratic,” “separatist,” and “un-American.” He
portrayed the religion as a threat to democracy on the same level as communism, devoting
his second book, in 1951, to Communism, Democracy and Catholic Power. He argued that
Catholics accounted for the majority of white criminals, and identified Catholic schools as
“the most important and divisive instrument in the life of American children.” One of
Blanshard’s principal points in his attack on Catholicism was the Catholic hierarchy’s long-
standing and philosophical opposition to the American principle of separation of church and
state.2
The Catholic school system looked particularly ominous to those who shared Blanshard’s
views at the time, because it was in a great growth mode from the 1940s to 1965, with its at-
tendance doubling during that period.
Predictably, in this context of public division and debate, the Supreme Court splintered in
the Everson case. By a five-to-four majority, it upheld the New Jersey school district’s reim-
bursement policy in an opinion by Justice Hugo Black. Black himself was an unlikely candi-
date to write an opinion upholding aid to the parents of Catholic schoolchildren. He had been,
at one time, a member of the Alabama Ku Klux Klan and Alabama’s Grand Dragon had said
that “Hugo could make the best anti-Catholic speech you ever heard.” Black’s own son, him-
self a noted lawyer, wrote that Black “suspected the Catholic Church. He used to read all of
Paul Blanshard’s books exposing power abuse in the Catholic Church. He thought the Pope
and bishops had too much power and property. He resented the fact that rental property
owned by the church was not taxed; he felt they got most of their revenue from the poor and
did not return enough of it.”3 Some historians have suggested that Black’s vote in Eversonwas
an attempt by him to dampen Catholic criticism, and that Black himself recognized that the
general principles his opinion enunciated would be detrimental to the Catholic school system
in future cases. 
Black’s opinion provided an overview from colonial times of how all religions had suffered
where one had been established in any colony, and focused particularly upon the use of tax
monies to support religious institutions. As Black saw it, “[t]he ‘establishment of religion’
clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government
can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer
one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away
from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No
person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for
church attendance or non- attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to
support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever
form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government
can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and
vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was
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intended to erect ‘a wall of separation between Church and State’.” 
Black wrote that the wall between Church and State “must be kept high and impregnable,”
but found that the New Jersey reimbursement of the costs of bus transportation for Catholic
schoolchildren did not breach that wall. In what has become known as the “child benefit” the-
ory, the majority ruled that it was permissible for New Jersey to extend “general State law
benefits to all its citizens without regard to their religious belief.” While he admitted that a
non-reimbursement policy “would make it far more difficult for the schools to operate,” Black
wrote that “such is obviously not the purpose of the First Amendment. That Amendment re-
quires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-be-
lievers; it does not require the state to be their adversary. State power is no more to be used so
as to handicap religions, than it is to favor them.”4
The four dissenting justices provided two dissenting opinions, one by Justice Jackson, and
the other by Justice Rutledge. In a slap against Catholicism, Justice Jackson’s opinion com-
mented that “[o]ur public school, if not a product of Protestantism, at least is more consistent
with it than with the Catholic culture and scheme of values.” In arguing against the constitu-
tionality of the reimbursement of the costs of school bus transportation for Catholic school
students, Jackson also observed that “Catholic education is the rock on which the whole struc-
ture rests.”5
The Everson decision evoked strong protest among Protestants, inspiring, in January of
1948, the organization of Protestants and Other Americans United for the Separation of Church
and State. That group, today rechristened as Americans and Others United, began a campaign
against aid to parochial schools. Some religious groups joined this campaign under their own
banners, with the Southern Baptists and Seventh-Day Adventists particularly prominent in
opposing aid to parochial schools in various cases. They often were joined in such litigation
by the American Civil Liberties Union and the American Jewish Congress. In an ironic twist,
several Catholic groups, and many Catholic law journals, also opposed the Everson ruling,
 recognizing the need for separation of church and state in their writings and court filings. 
The Wall Gets Higher: The School Prayer and Bible-Reading Cases
Fifteen years after the Everson decision, the Supreme Court had occasion to apply the
Establishment Clause to the question of prayer in the public schools. Engel v. Vitale (1962)
dealt with what Justice Brennan would later call a rather “bland” prayer composed by New
York state authorities, which was to be said aloud by the class at the start of the school day.
The prayer was not compulsory, and any student who wished not to say it would be excused.
The prayer read “Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg
Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our Country.”6
Prayers of this nature were becoming more common as a result of the Cold War. As part of
the fight against what was then known as “godless communism,” federal and state legislation
of the 1950s took steps to identify the cause of democracy in the United States with that of the
Almighty. In 1954, at the urging of the Knights of Columbus, a Catholic voluntary association,
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the words “under God” were added to the Pledge of Allegiance. Two years later, “In God we
trust,” which had appeared on currency since 1865, became the national motto. 
Once again, Justice Black spoke for the court in Engel. Writing for six members of the court,
he announced that the prayer was unconstitutional because “the constitutional prohibition
against laws respecting an establishment of religion must at least mean that in this country it
is no part of the business of government to compose official prayers for any group of the
American people to recite as a part of a religious program carried on by government.” Black
pointed out that the Anglican Book of Common Prayer had been mandated as the official
form of prayer and religious ceremony in England and in some of the colonies, and that the
First Amendment was aimed at prohibiting such an establishment of religion. He also found
that the voluntary nature of the prayer did not save it, explaining that “[t]he Establishment
Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not depend upon a showing of direct govern-
mental compulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws which establish an official reli-
gion whether those laws operate directly to coerce non-observing individuals or not.” Justice
Black concluded his opinion by attributing to the founders “an awareness that governments of
the past had shackled men’s tongues to make them speak only the religious thoughts that gov-
ernment wanted them to speak and to pray only to the God that government wanted them to
pray to. It is neither sacrilegious nor antireligious to say that each separate government in
this country should stay out of the business of writing or sanctioning official prayers and
leave that purely religious function to the people themselves and to those the people choose
to look to for religious guidance.”7
In a concurring opinion, Justice Douglas pointed to the fact that both the Supreme Court
and Congress opened their sessions with prayers, and that the majority opinion dealt with
only “an extremely narrow” point. As he saw it, the mere authorization of a prayer might not
violate the Establishment Clause, but “once government finances a religious exercise it inserts
a divisive influence into our communities.” Douglas again repeated that the First Amendment
mandates that the government be neutral in matters of religion. As he saw it, “[t]he First
Amendment leaves the government in a position not of hostility to religion but of neutrality.
The philosophy is that the atheist or agnostic — the nonbeliever — is entitled to go his own
way. The philosophy is that if government interferes in matters spiritual, it will be a divisive
force. The First Amendment teaches that a government neutral in the field of religion better
serves all religious interests.”8
Only Justice Potter Stewart dissented. Stewart’s dissenting opinion explored the tension
between the guarantee of “free exercise” and the prohibition against establishment, observing
that “I cannot see how an ‘official religion’ is established by letting those who want to say a
prayer say it. On the contrary, I think that to deny the wish of these schoolchildren to join in
reciting this prayer is to deny them the opportunity of sharing in the spiritual heritage of our
Nation.” Stewart found that “the uncritical invocation of metaphors like the ‘wall of separation,’
a phrase nowhere to be found in the Constitution” was not helpful. Instead, “the history of the
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religious traditions of our people, reflected in countless practices of the institutions and offi-
cials of our government,” including the prayers opening Supreme Court and congressional
sessions, the revised Pledge of Allegiance, and the use of “In God we trust” on coins since
1865, demonstrated that the New York prayer did not violate the Establishment Clause.9
The reaction to the Engel decision was fast and fierce. Former presidents Eisenhower and
Hoover, as well as former Vice President Nixon, denounced it. They were joined by a large
number of congressmen and religious leaders. Southern Democrats were particularly hostile,
linking the Engel decision to Brown v. Board of Education, with one congressman indicating
that the Supreme Court had “put the Negroes in the schools,” and “driven God out.” Others
saw the decision as giving “aid and comfort to Moscow.” The Roman Catholic Cardinal Francis
Spellman of New York, and several Protestant leaders, also denounced the decision, while
other Protestant leaders and most Jewish groups supported it. Legal commentary in law jour-
nals was almost evenly split, with a slight tilt against the Engel decision.
Notably, President John Fitzgerald Kennedy, the first Roman Catholic president, supported
the decision, pointing out that the church and the home were the proper places for prayer. In
the presidential election campaign of 1960, Kennedy had found great opposition to his candi-
dacy among Protestant ministers, who questioned, along the lines of Paul Blanshard, whether
a Catholic could faithfully execute the laws of the United States as President. In his speech to
the Greater Houston Ministerial Association during the campaign, Kennedy proclaimed that
he believed in the absolute separation of church and state, and opposed any public funding of
churches and church schools.
Kennedy’s support of Engel did not stem the tide of opposition. For over twenty years, pro-
posed constitutional amendments were introduced to permit public school prayer. In 1984, a
constitutional amendment proposed by President Ronald Reagan received the votes of 56 sen-
ators, a majority, but short of the two thirds required for constitutional amendment to be sub-
mitted to the people. That proposal provided that “[n]othing in this Constitution shall be
construed to prohibit individual or group prayers in public schools or other public institutions,”
while “[n]o person shall be required by the United States or by any state to participate in prayer.”10
One year after Engel, the Supreme Court reentered the controversy by striking down Bible
reading in the public schools by a vote of eight to one in Abington School District v. Schempp
(1963). The Schempp opinion was written by Justice Tom Clark, who concluded that the
Establishment Clause prohibited more than the preference of one religion over another. He
determined that a test had emerged from the prior opinions focusing upon “the purpose and
primary effect” of the challenged practice. Under that test, “to withstand the strictures of the
Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither
advances nor inhibits religion.” Since the Bible was “an instrument of religion,” under this test it
could be studied in the public school curriculum only “when presented objectively as part of a
secular program of education.”11
Concurring opinions were written by Justice Douglas, by the court’s lone Catholic, Justice
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William Brennan, and by the court’s only Jewish member, Justice Arthur Goldberg. The most
significant of these was that of Justice Brennan, who authored a lengthy opinion citing the ex-
perience in the United States from colonial times to the present and pointing out how particu-
lar religions had been the victims of discrimination. He noted that the early public schools
used the King James Protestant Bible as a “textbook of morals,” which was offensive to Catholic
students who were taught from a different version of the Bible. Brennan also emphasized the
importance of the changing composition of the American religious experience. He noted that
“our religious composition makes us a vastly more diverse people that were our forefathers.
They knew differences chiefly among Protestant sects. Today the nation is far more heteroge-
neous religiously, including as it does substantial minorities not only of Catholics and Jews
but as well of those who worship according to no version of the Bible and those who worship
no God at all.”12
Once again, only Justice Stewart dissented. He attacked the “sterile metaphor” of the wall
of separation, and reiterated his objection that “there are areas in which a doctrinaire reading
of the Establishment Clause leads to irreconcilable conflict with the Free Exercise Clause.” In
the case of Bible reading in the public schools, “there is involved … a substantial free exercise
claim on the part of those who affirmatively desire to have their children’s school day open with
the reading of passages from the Bible.” Stewart noted that the voluntary nature of school chil-
dren’s participation in the Bible reading exercise made the state neutral, and that a blanket
prohibition against Bible reading could be seen as “the establishment of a religion of secularism.”13
The Highest Wall: From School Books to Teachers’ Salaries
In 1968, the Supreme Court revisited the question of which boundaries were appropriate
under the Establishment Clause in extending governmental aid to religious schools. In Board
of Education v. Allen (1968), by a six to three vote, the court upheld a New York State program
under which textbooks were lent to children in grades seven through twelve in all schools, in-
cluding private and religious schools. In New York, this aid benefited principally schools oper-
ated by Catholic, Jewish, and Lutheran denominations. 
In an opinion by Justice Byron White, a moderate who had been appointed to the court by
President Kennedy, the majority upheld the program under the child benefit theory of Everson.
Significantly, the majority emphasized that “this Court has long recognized that religious
schools pursue two goals, religious instruction and secular education,” and that “private edu-
cation has played and is playing a significant and valuable role in raising national levels of
knowledge, competence, and experience.”14
Three justices dissented, each writing their own opinion. That of Justice Black was one of
outrage and apoplexy, characterizing the book-lending program as a “flat, flagrant, open viola-
tion of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.” In a veiled reference to the Catholics whom
he had denounced in his Alabama Klan days, Black wrote that “[t]he same powerful sectarian
religious propagandists who have succeeded in securing passage of the present law to help
 religious schools carry on their sectarian religious purposes can and doubtless will continue
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their propaganda, looking toward complete domination and supremacy of their particular
brand of religion.” Indicating that he opposed the use of tax dollars, “even to the extent of one
penny,” to support such sectarian schools, Black explained that “sectarian schools, which,
 although ‘secular,’ realistically will in some way inevitably tend to propagate the religious
views of the favored sect.”15
Justice Douglas aimed his dissent even more squarely against the Catholic schools, ignor-
ing the aid that went to Lutheran and Jewish schools under the New York statute. Distin guish -
ing Everson, he wryly commented that “there is nothing ideological about a bus.” He pointed
out that the Catholic schools were permitted to select the particular books to be used in teach-
ing secular classes, and that they would, under the guidance of “priests and nuns,” “select the
book or books that best promote its sectarian creed.” Douglas then went on to quote from vari-
ous textbooks that promoted Christian views, and cited Catholic authors, including Monsignor
John A. Ryan, for the Catholic Church’s view that the teaching of religion and secular subjects
could not be separated one from the other. He also quoted in full, as an appendix to his opin-
ion, a message from New York’s Cardinal Spellman which was read to all parishioners in New
York who attended Mass the Sunday before the vote on a proposed state constitution which
permitted aid to parochial schools.16
The narrow victory of the accommodationists in Allenwas short-lived. Reacting to a much
more controversial approach to aid to religious schools by the states of Pennsylvania and
Rhode Island, the Supreme Court enunciated a new standard under the Establishment Clause
in the often attacked, but still standing, decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971). While that opin-
ion dealt with several different aspects of aid to private schools, the most significant discus-
sion was devoted to similar attempts by Pennsylvania and Rhode Island to subsidize the
salaries of teachers of secular subjects in religious schools. Payments were made either to the
teachers or to their schools on the condition that the subsidized teachers could not teach reli-
gion and could only use teaching materials then in use in the public schools, or approved by
the state secretary of education. The states monitored compliance in various ways, including
a post-audit program to assure that religion was not taught, and written pledges by teachers
that they would not teach religion.
Chief Justice Warren Burger’s majority opinion found that both teacher reimbursement
schemes violated the Establishment Clause. Adding a third test to the criteria previously
enunciated in the Schempp opinion, Lemon erected three obstacles to providing any aid to
“sectarian” schools. These were “[f]irst, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose;
second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion
… finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion’.”
Here, the Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes flunked the new, third, test by requiring
monitoring of teacher compliance. As Burger put it, “[t]hese prophylactic contacts will involve
excessive and enduring entanglement between state and church.” Indeed, the statutes pre-
sented a “broader base of entanglement of yet a different character,” because they necessarily
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gave rise to “divisive political potential,” with different groups warring with each other over
state aid.17
As has been all too common in religion cases, separate opinions were written by most jus-
tices. In Lemon, Justice Douglas (joined by Justice Black), Justice Brennan, and Justice White
each expressed their separate views. Douglas’ opinion once again drew a bead on the Catholic
schools. He proclaimed that a proper adjudication of the constitutional questions “must start
with the admitted and obvious fact that the raison d’etre of parochial schools is the propaga-
tion of a religious faith.” Again, as in Allen, Justice Douglas quoted from many Catholic
sources to back up his view. He also focused upon the critical historical fact that “the major
force in shaping the pattern of education in this country was the conflict between Protestants
and Catholics. The Catholics logically argued the public school was sectarian when it taught
the King James version of the Bible. They therefore wanted it removed from the public
schools; and in time they tried to get public funds for their own parochial schools.” Finally, he
dismissed, with disgust, the argument that Catholic schools were saving the taxpayers $9 bil-
lion a year with the comment that “as if that were enough to justify violating the Establish -
ment Clause.”18
The lone Catholic on the court, Justice William Brennan, also invoked history in voting to
strike down the Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes. He documented in detail the bleak
history in which subsidies to one religious group or another had led to “bitter controversies”
from the beginning of the nation. Such controversies over funding of particular religious
schools led to some thirty-five states adopting constitutional prohibitions on the use of public
school funds to aid sectarian schools between 1840 and 1900. By 1971, only a handful of states
did not have such a constitutional prohibition.19
Justice White supported the decision of the court in the Pennsylvania case, but dissented
on the Rhode Island statute. He concluded that the court was “surely quite wrong in overturn-
ing the Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes on the ground that they amount to an estab-
lishment of religion.” Pointing out that there was no evidence that any teacher had actually
been involved in inserting religion into his or her teaching of any class, White perceptively
noted that the Lemon criteria created “an insoluble paradox for the State and parochial schools.
The State cannot finance secular instruction if it permits religion to be taught in the same
classroom; but if it exacts a promise that religion not be so taught — a promise the school and
its teachers are quite willing and on this record able to give — and enforces it, it is then entan-
gled in the ‘no entanglement’ aspect of the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence.”20
Professor Noah Feldman has characterized Lemon v. Kurtzman as “the high point of legal
secularism.”21 In the wake of its paradoxical approach, many legislative attempts to provide
aid to religious schools failed for the next twenty-plus years. During that time, the Supreme
Court struck down, among others, state statutes which would have permitted funding for re-
pair and maintenance of buildings, for tuition reimbursement, for tests prepared by teachers,
for other testing and guidance counseling services, and for the use of public school teachers
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in parochial schools.22 Attempts at accommodation were generally unsuccessful until the
1990s, when new justices and a strong evangelical political movement which united conser-
vative Catholic and Protestant groups tilted the Supreme Court back to an approach which
fostered accommodation in some areas.
The Beginnings of Change: New Justices and New Ways of Thinking
The decisions of the Supreme Court banning prayer from the public schools provoked a deep
and spirited opposition from evangelical Protestant groups beginning in the 1960s. These
groups, which traditionally had been apolitical, entered the public square through several
new vehicles, including the Moral Majority, which was founded in 1979. Gradually, evangeli-
cal Protestants also joined forces with conservative Catholics in speaking out against the
Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade (1973), which found that states could not absolutely
prohibit all abortions. Evangelical Protestants joined this fight most conspicuously through
Operation Rescue, founded by Randall Terry in 1987.23
The issues of school prayer and opposition to abortion united conservative Protestants and
Catholics. In the words of Francis Schaeffer, one of the intellectual leaders of this new conser-
vative political opposition, “[s]ixty years ago could we have imagined that unborn children
would be killed by the millions here in our own country? Or that we would have no freedom of
speechwhen it comes to speaking of God and biblical truth in our public schools?... Sadly we
must say that very few Christians have understood the battle that we are in. Very few have
taken a strong and courageous stand against the world spirit of this age as it destroys our cul-
ture and the Christian ethos that once shaped our country.”24
This coalition of evangelical Protestants with conservative Catholics was unprecedented,
and some evangelicals opposed it. Bob Jones Jr., head of a fundamentalist Christian College
named after his father, denounced cooperation with Catholics. Indeed, when Pope John Paul
II was nearly assassinated in 1981, Jones remarked that “[t]his could be God’s way of answering
the prayers of his people.”25 Despite such opposition from the lunatic fringe, the new coalition
attained some political success, and contributed to the election of Ronald Reagan to the presi-
dency in both 1980 and 1984. Reagan, in turn, made four Supreme Court appointments which,
over time, would form the basis for an eventual change to an accommodationist position in
the court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Reagan appointed three new justices —
Sandra Day O’Connor (the first woman appointed to the Supreme Court) in 1981; Antonin
Scalia, in 1986; and Anthony Kennedy, in 1987. Reagan also elevated William Rehnquist to
Chief Justice in 1986. Rehnquist originally had been appointed to the Supreme Court as an as-
sociate justice by Richard Nixon in 1971. 
The impact of these appointments over time is illustrated through the consideration of
opinions issued by the Supreme Court between 1985 and 1992, a time period over which two
of these new justices and two others were seated.
In Wallace v. Jaffree (1985), the Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional an Alabama
statute which permitted a one minute period of silence in public schools “for meditation or
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voluntary prayer.” Speaking for a six person majority, Justice John Paul Stevens, an appointee
of President Gerald Ford, found that the statute had “no other purpose” than return of prayer
to the public schools. As such, the statute was unconstitutional under the first criterion of the
Lemon test, which required a secular purpose for any legislation.26
Justice O’Connor, in a concurring opinion, noted that she had previously questioned the
Lemon test, which she felt had “proved problematic.” She had proposed instead a focus upon
whether a particular statute “actually conveys a message of endorsement “ of religion by the
government. That approach, she concluded, would support the constitutionality of moment
of silence statutes in the twenty-five other states which had passed them. O’Connor would be-
come the major pivot in the next twenty years in the court’s Establishment Clause decisions,
seeking to create new standards in the area.27
While O’Connor agreed that the Alabama statute violated the Establishment Clause, three
justices did not. Both Chief Justice Burger and Justice White wrote dissenting opinions. They
were accompanied by Justice Rehnquist, who wrote the longest and most reasoned opinion
in dissent. Rehnquist was perhaps the greatest historian ever to sit on the Supreme Court, and
he went on to write several influential books on the Supreme Court and several of its major
decisions in both politics and civil rights. In his opinion, Rehnquist referred to “hopelessly
 divided pluralities” in the previous opinions on the Establishment Clause, which were “neither
principled nor unified.” He stated that “stare decisismay bind courts as to matters of law, but it
cannot bind them as to matters of history.” With that premise, Rehnquist went on to criticize
the line of decisions starting with the Everson case for their “wall of separation” philosophy,
which he found reflected “a mistaken understanding of constitutional history.” Reviewing the
historical record, Justice Rehnquist concluded that the founders saw the First Amendment “as
designed to prohibit the establishment of a national religion, and perhaps to prevent discrimi-
nation among sects.” Based on the historical record, Rehnquist concluded that there was no
constitutional basis for a wall of separation between church and state. He also found no basis
for a requirement of “government neutrality between religion and irreligion nor did [the
Establishment Clause] prohibit the Federal Government from providing nondiscriminatory
aid to religion.”28
The Supreme Court returned to the question of prayer in the public schools in Lee v. Weisman
(1992). By then, four new justices had joined the court — Antonin Scalia in 1986; Anthony
Kennedy in 1987; David Souter in 1990; and Clarence Thomas in 1991. Kennedy had been
President Reagan’s last appointment to the Supreme Court, and was Reagan’s third nominee
for the position. His first choice, Robert Bork, a highly visible conservative hero and scholar,
was rejected by the United States Senate in a 58 to 42 negative vote, after an acrimonious and
bitter debate. His second nominee, Circuit Justice Douglas Ginsburg, another well-known
conservative, withdrew his nomination after it was revealed that he had smoked marijuana as
a young man. 
Justices Souter and Thomas were appointed by President George Bush, who had been
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Ronald Reagan’s Vice President. Souter was thought by liberals to be a “stealth candidate” for
the conservative Republicans since he had written little as a judge on either the New Hampshire
state courts or the Federal Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, and was not well known. He
took the place of the liberal Justice William Brennan, and his appointment was thought to en-
danger the continued viability of Roe v. Wade, a decision which he paradoxically turned into a
“super precedent” a few years later. Clarence Thomas, a Catholic African-American, who had
served previously as the Chairman of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and
then briefly on the Federal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, received
even more venomous treatment than Robert Bork had, because of Thomas’ extreme conser-
vative views. He was confirmed by the narrow vote of 52 to 48, after unproved charges of sex-
ual harassment had been aired in televised confirmation hearings, an experience which
Thomas described as “a high-tech lynching.”
Lee v. Weisman dealt with the constitutionality of a nondenominational prayer offered at a
Rhode Island public middle school graduation on public school property. By a vote of five to
four, the Supreme Court declared the Rhode Island prayer unconstitutional, with the majority
opinion written by Justice Anthony Kennedy, one of the court’s three Catholic members at
the time. Kennedy had originally voted to uphold the prayer, and circulated a draft opinion
doing so. Changing his mind because he felt that his draft opinion was “quite wrong,” he
changed the result as well.29
The prayer at issue in Lee v. Weisman had been composed by a Jewish rabbi, who had been
supplied by school authorities with “Guidelines” composed by the National Conference of
Christians and Jews. Those guidelines called for both “inclusiveness and sensitivity” and the
rabbi’s prayer was inoffensive to most, if not all, religious believers. Nevertheless, Kennedy
found that the prayer was unconstitutional. For the majority, the “dominant facts” were that
“[s]tate officials direct the performance of a formal religious exercise at promotional and grad-
uation ceremonies for secondary schools.” This was found to be “pervasive” governmental in-
volvement with religion, and the majority specifically declined the request of the United
States to reconsider the Lemon decision and its three criteria.30
A concurring opinion (originally written as a dissent before Justice Kennedy’s change of
mind) was written by Justice David Souter, who was joined by Justices O’Connor and Stevens.
Souter, in his first year on the court, demonstrated how he would be a great disappointment
to religious conservatives by writing an opinion which specifically rejected Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s view that the Establishment Clause was limited to establishing a religion or favor-
ing one religious sect over another, even though Souter conceded that “a case has been made
for this position.” He went on also to reject the concept that coercionwas a necessary element
to find a violation of the Establishment Clause; instead, he favored Justice O’Connor’s approach
that governmental endorsementwas sufficient. Based on these principles, and the Court’s pre-
vious “settled” case law, he found the graduation prayer to be “flatly unconstitutional.”31
Justice Souter’s vote was critical, since four justices found the graduation prayer to be per-
49
T H E  S I N K I N G  WA L L  O F  S E PA R AT I O N
missible. Writing for Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White and Thomas, Justice Antonin
Scalia, who was appointed to the court in 1986 by President Reagan, contended that the
 majority’s reasoning was flawed. First, reviewing many examples of public prayers in govern-
mental settings, Scalia accused the majority of “lay[ing] waste [to] a tradition that is as old as
public school graduation ceremonies themselves, and that is a component of an even more
long-standing American tradition of nonsectarian prayer to God at public celebrations gener-
ally.” He accused the majority of using as “its instrument of destruction, the bulldozer of its
social engineering,” a test of “psychological coercion.” This, in his view, was faulty, since an
objecting student was free to sit in silence, and the state had not actively involved itself in
composing the prayer in question.
Scalia also noted that the majority had not relied upon the Lemon test, and that “the internment
of that case may be the one happy byproduct of the Court’s otherwise lamentable decision.” 
Scalia ended by pointing out that the court majority had focused too narrowly on the inter-
ests of the objectors to the prayer ceremony, and not enough on the interests of the other
graduates. He observed that “[c]hurch and state would not be such a difficult subject if religion
were, as the court apparently thinks it to be, some purely personal avocation that can be in-
dulged entirely in secret, like pornography, in the privacy of one’s room. For most believers, it
is not that, and has never been.” By attempting “to banish” an expression of thanks to God
from graduation activities, the majority ignored “the age-old practices of our people.” Echoing
the views of conservative Protestants and Catholics, Justice Scalia — himself a Catholic —
concluded that “[t]he Baptist or Catholic who heard and joined in the simple and inspiring
prayers of Rabbi Gutterman on this official and patriotic occasion was inoculated from reli-
gious bigotry and prejudice in a manner that cannot be replicated. To deprive our society of
that important unifying mechanism in order to spare the non-believer what seems to me the
minimal inconvenience of standing, or even sitting in respectful nonparticipation, is as sense-
less in policy as it is unsupported in law.”32
By 1992, it had become apparent that the foundations of the Supreme Court’s approach to
questions raised by the Establishment Clause were being quickly eroded by the addition of
the new justices appointed by Presidents Reagan and Bush. The new Chief Justice, William
Rehnquist, Reagan appointee Antonin Scalia, and Bush appointee Clarence Thomas, were in
favor of a bright line position of accommodation. Reagan appointee Sandra Day O’Connor and
Bush appointee David Souter supported the prior case law, but called for a new test of en-
dorsement to modify the trinitarian approach of Lemon v. Kurtzman. Even Reagan appointee
Anthony Kennedy, author of two conflicting Lee opinions, would soon come to cast accom-
modationist votes in some Establishment Clause cases. 
The Wall Comes Tumbling Down — A Bit 
By the mid 1990s, the composition of the Supreme Court had been significantly changed as a
result of the election of William Jefferson Clinton as President. Clinton was the only Democrat
elected to the presidency in the twenty-eight years between 1980 and 2008. In his first term,
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he appointed two new justices to the Supreme Court — Ruth Bader Ginsburg in 1993 and
Stephen Breyer in 1994. Ginsburg replaced Justice Byron White, who had tended to vote to ac-
commodate religion in Establishment Clause cases. By contrast, Breyer replaced Justice
Harry Blackmun, the author of Roe v. Wade, who had taken a position of strict separation in
controversies involving religion and the public schools.
Both Ginsburg and Breyer had been academics and federal circuit court judges before their
elevation to the Supreme Court, and both came from a Jewish religious background. On the
Supreme Court, Ginsburg, a former General Counsel of the ACLU, became a strict separa-
tionist in Establishment Clause cases; Breyer’s approach was more nuanced, which resulted
in his usually voting with the separationists, but sometimes voting to uphold aid to religious
schools and public displays. The addition of Justices Ginsburg and Breyer led to the emer-
gence of Justices O’Connor and Kennedy as the key swing votes in this area.
Both Justice O’Connor and Justice Kennedy tended to vote to accommodate aid to parochial
school students and their parents, but against any type of public school prayer. Three cases
decided between 1997 and 2002 illustrate the key role played by Justices O’Connor and Kennedy
in cases involving aid to religious schools. The most dramatic of these cases was Agostini v.
Felton (1997). There the Supreme Court dissolved an injunction it had upheld twelve years
earlier in Aguilar v. Felton (1985) prohibiting the funding of a New York State program which
permitted public school teachers to go into private schools to teach remedial education to dis-
advantaged students. The schoolteachers were assigned on a voluntary basis and were sup-
plied by the state with a “detailed set of written and oral instructions” underlining the secular
nature of the services they were to provide.
Writing for herself, and for Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia, Kennedy and
Thomas, Justice O’Connor found that the Aguilar opinion was “not consistent with our subse-
quent Establishment Clause decisions,” in two specific ways. “First, we have abandoned the
presumption … that the placement of public employees on parochial school grounds in-
evitably results in the impermissible effect of state sponsored indoctrination or constitutes a
symbolic union between government and religion.” In addition, “[s]econd, we have departed
from the rule … that all government aid that directly aids the educational function of religious
schools is invalid.” The majority opinion also folded the entanglement inquiry into the second
Lemon criterion of secular effect, finding that it was simply “an aspect of the inquiry into a
statute’s effect.” As such, “[s]ince we have abandoned the assumption that properly instructed
public employees will fail to discharge their duties faithfully, we must also discard the as-
sumption that pervasive monitoring of Title I teachers is required.” 
Reviewing the state program in question, Justice O’Connor summarized her conclusion
that the state program “does not run afoul of any of three primary criteria we currently use to
evaluate whether government aid has the effect of advancing religion: it does not result in
governmental indoctrination; define recipients by reference to religion; or create an excessive
entanglement. We therefore hold that a federally funded program providing supplemental,
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 remedial instruction to disadvantaged children on a neutral basis is not invalid under the
Establishment Clause when such instruction is given on the premises of sectarian schools by
government employees pursuant to a program containing safeguards such as those present
here.”33
In dissent, Justices Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer contended that the New York
State program violated what they saw was a “flat ban on subsidization” of sectarian schools,
and also constituted an impermissible “religious endorsement” by the state.34
Three years later the Supreme Court reviewed a federal program under which “secular,
neutral, and non-ideological “ educational materials and equipment were lent to public and
private schools. This program was challenged in a Louisiana school district where private
schools received about thirty percent of the dollars distributed, with the majority of those
 dollars going to Catholic schools. In Mitchell v. Helms (2000), writing for four justices, Justice
Clarence Thomas found this federal program permissible under the Establishment Clause,
based upon “[t]he principles of neutrality and private choice.” In doing so, the plurality of
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas rejected contentions that
direct aid to a religious school’s educational mission was always impermissible, and that aid
which was “divertible” to religious use was prohibited. 
Justice Thomas’ opinion is particularly notable for its attack upon the dissenters’ views of
the dangers of “pervasively sectarian” schools. As Justice Thomas saw it, “hostility to aid to
pervasively sectarian schools has a shameful pedigree that we do not hesitate to disavow…
Opposition to aid to ‘sectarian’ schools acquired prominence in the 1870s with Congress’s con-
sideration (and near passage) of the Blaine Amendment, which would have amended the
Constitution to bar any aid to sectarian institutions. Consideration of the amendment arose at
a time of pervasive hostility to the Catholic Church and to Catholics in general, and it was an
open secret that ‘sectarian’ was code for ‘Catholic.’” Thomas concluded that “nothing in the
Establishment Clause requires the exclusion of pervasively sectarian schools from otherwise
permissible aid programs, and other doctrines of this court bar it. This doctrine, born of bigotry,
should be buried now.”35
Justice Thomas’ views did not command a majority, and the program was upheld by the
votes of Justices O’Connor and Breyer, who joined a concurring opinion written by the former.
O’Connor felt that the federal program was permissible because it offered aid on a neutral
basis and was secular in content. She went on to note that she still adhered to the endorse-
ment standard, but found that it did not apply where the aid was not directly given to sectarian
schools. Here, the program consisted of a lending of materials, with no money distributed
 directly to the schools.
In dissent, speaking through Justice Souter, Justices Stevens and Ginsburg saw the federal
program as violating the fundamental principle that there was to be “no aid to religious mis-
sion” under the strictures of the Establishment Clause. Justice Souter also contended that use
of the “pervasively sectarian” school model was justified, since there were heightened con-
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cerns under the Establishment Clause raised by the “religious indoctrination” practiced by
those schools.36
The third — the most controversial — of the cases in which accomodation prevailed was
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris (2002), which dealt with the political hot button issue of vouchers
given to public school parents for use in paying for private schools for their children. Zelman
reviewed an Ohio state program which provided aid for the Cleveland public school district,
which was then one of the worst in the entire country. Under the program, tuition aid was
provided to the parents of public school students in grades one through eight, with greater as-
sistance being provided to the poorer families. Some ninety-six percent of the participating
families chose religious schools, principally those affiliated with the Roman Catholic religion,
even though two out of three of the participating families were not Catholic. Part of the attrac-
tion of the Catholic schools was their lower cost, which fit within the program’s tuition cap.
This voucher program was defended publicly as designed to assist minority school chil-
dren, who were being denied an adequate education. This argument resonated with Justice
Thomas, the Supreme Court’s only African-American justice. In a concurring opinion voting
to uphold the Ohio program, Justice Thomas began and ended with quotations from the
African-American Civil War antislavery spokesman, Frederick Douglas, who equated educa-
tion for the emancipated slaves with emancipation itself. Thomas saw the voucher program
as affording “greater educational opportunity for underprivileged minority students” and
chided “the cognoscenti who oppose vouchers.”37
The majority opinion of the court upholding the voucher program was written by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, and joined by Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. Zelman
marked the triumph of Chief Justice Rehnquist in remaking the Supreme Court’s jurispru-
dence under the Establishment Clause. Beginning as a lonely dissenter in this area in his first
years on the Supreme Court as an associate justice, Rehnquist had reframed the concepts
which were to be utilized in deciding these questions. In Zelman, he characterized the vouch-
er program as one of government neutrality, with the allocation of moneys resulting from
“true private choice,” a phrase which appears repeatedly in the majority opinion. Since the
secular purpose of the Ohio voucher program was stipulated, the only issue before the court
was whether that program had the impermissible effect of advancing religion. Finding that
the role of the government in the voucher program “ends with the disbursement of benefits,”
Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that aid reached the sectarian schools “only by way of the
deliberate choices of numerous individual recipients,” whose choices could not be attributed
to the government. As such, the voucher program was “entirely neutral with respect to religion.”38
In separate dissenting opinions, Justices Stevens, Souter and Breyer focused on several fac-
tors which, in their respective views, rendered the voucher program unconstitutional under
the Establishment Clause. Stevens saw the program as advancing “religious indoctrination at
state expense” and as increasing the risk of “religious strife.”39 Souter saw the Establishment
Clause as imposing a flat ban on any aid for “religious teaching,” and predicted that the deci-
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sion would lead to a “scramble for money” among “contending sectarians,” which in turn would
lead to “expectable friction.” He explained that “[n]ot all taxpaying Protestant citizens, for ex-
ample, will be content to underwrite the teaching of the Roman Catholic Church condemning
the death penalty. Nor will all of America’s Muslims acquiesce in paying for the endorsement
of the religious Zionism taught in many religious Jewish schools, which combines ‘a national-
istic sentiment’ in support of Israel with a ‘deeply religious’ element. Nor will every secular
taxpayer be content to support Muslim views on differential treatment of the sexes, or, for
that matter, to fund the espousal of a wife’s obligation of obedience to her husband, presum-
ably taught in any schools adopting the articles of faith of the Southern Baptist Convention.”40
Finally, in the most thoughtful dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer raised the specter of “re-
ligiously based social conflict.” Reviewing the same Protestant versus Catholic conflicts
Justice Brennan had previously reviewed in his Establishment Clause opinions in the 1960s,
Justice Breyer wrote that those conflicts demonstrated the need for separation, as opposed to
what he termed “equal opportunity” for religions to contend one with the other to introduce
their brand of religion into the public schools. In his view, the existence of some fifty-five reli-
gions in the United States of 2002 made such an approach “not workable.” Moreover, Breyer
saw the voucher program as particularly dangerous because it involved “direct financing of a
core function of the church: the teaching of religious truths to young children.”41
After Zelman, as Justice O’Connor pointed out in her concurring opinion, the question of
whether the primary effect of a particular program which provided indirect aid to religious
schools was or was not religious depended upon consideration of two factors — “first, whether
the program administers aid in a neutral fashion, without differentiation based on the reli-
gious status of beneficiaries or providers of services; second, and more importantly, whether
beneficiaries of indirect aid have a genuine choice among religious and nonreligious organiza-
tions when determining the organization to which they will direct that aid. If the answer to
 either query is ‘no,’ the program should be struck down under the Establishment Clause.”42
Summary and Conclusion
Much of the confusion and backtracking which characterizes the Supreme Court’s evolving
Establishment Clause jurisprudence can be traced to societal pressures of the changing times,
as well as to the political and social concerns of the shifting membership of the Supreme
Court in the last sixty years. 
The earliest cases, starting with Justice Black’s opinion in Everson, manifest an underlying
concern of the largely Protestant judiciary at that time regarding the emerging power of the
Catholic school system in the United States. Justice Jackson, for example, in his Everson dis-
sent, referred to the public schools as more consistent with Protestantism “than with the
Catholic culture and scheme of values.” Indeed, Justice Black, in his 1968 Allen dissent, was
even clearer about his concerns, referring to “powerful sectarian religious propagandists,” whom
he viewed as “looking toward complete domination and supremacy of their particular brand
of religion.” Even Justice Clark referred to “powerful sects” in his in 1963 Opinion for the
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Court in Schempp. And Justice Douglas repeatedly cited Catholic publications in purported
support of his view that Catholic schools, under the influence of “priests and nuns,” would
 select those state-financed textbooks “that best promote its sectarian creed.” Indeed, Douglas
hand wrote an undated note to Black stating that “I think if the Catholics get public money to
 finance their religious schools, we better insist on getting some good prayers in public schools or we
Protestants are out of business.”43
Countering those views of Douglas, throughout the last sixty years, the Supreme Court’s
opinions have also manifested a recognition that the formerly largely Protestant public
schools now are composed of a more diverse, and plural, student body, representing a host of
Christian, Jewish, Muslim, and other religions, as well as atheists, agnostics, and those follow-
ing no religion at all. Erecting what Justice Black referred to in Everson as a “high and impreg-
nable” wall of separation between church and state, the Supreme Court sought to eliminate
divisiveness among religions combating for public funding, as well as foreclosing the use of
coercion to force public school children to participate in any religious activity at all, no matter
how watered-down or general. Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion in Schempp expressly
identifies the growing diversity of religion and irreligion among public school students to jus-
tify the strict separation of church and state in all public school activities, observing that
“[t]oday the nation is far more heterogeneous religiously, including as it does substantial mi-
norities not only of Catholics and Jews but as well of those who worship according to no ver-
sion of the Bible and those who worship no God at all.” Similarly, the opinions of Justices
Black and Frankfurter, in the earlier days, and those of Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer
today, advance the need to avoid “religious strife” among competing sects as justifying a com-
plete ban on “religious indoctrination at state expense.”
The early torrent of fear about Catholic schools began to recede in the 1950s. A different,
and more accepting, view of Catholics was fueled by Will Herberg’s observations about a
shared American Judeo-Christian religion in his influential Protestant, Catholic, Jew (1955), by
the enormously popular Catholic televangelist Bishop Fulton J. Sheen, by the best-selling
Catholic monk, Thomas Merton (whose autobiography, The Seven Storey Mountain (1949),
shared the best-seller lists with the anti-Catholic works of Paul Blanshard), and by a societal
embrace of Catholic anti-Communism in the years following World War II.
But it was not until the critical ten-year period between 1981 and 1991 that the doctrine of
strict separation of church and state began to be watered down, and gradually replaced by a
doctrine which sought more accommodation, particularly regarding the financing of religious
schools. Under Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush, the more conservative
Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas were appointed, and their equally conserva-
tive colleague, William Rehnquist, was elevated to Chief Justice in this period.
By the end of the 1990s, when the Catholic school population had diminished to less than
five percent of American schoolchildren, the Supreme Court overturned some of its former
precedent on aid to parochial schools. In its 1997 Agostini decision, for example, the Court
55
T H E  S I N K I N G  WA L L  O F  S E PA R AT I O N
held that there was no longer a presumption of indoctrination when public employees were
placed on the property of religious schools, nor an assumption that any aid that directly
helped the educational function of such schools was thereby unconstitutional. Indeed, by
2000, a four-member plurality of the Supreme Court inMitchell characterized the Court’s prior
treatment of “pervasively sectarian” schools as a doctrine “born of bigotry” which “should be
buried now” because of its “shameful pedigree,” tracing back to the anti-Catholicism of the
Blaine Amendment in the nineteenth century. Finally, over the vigorous dissent of four jus-
tices, who contended that there should be “no aid to religious mission,” Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas held constitutional a state
voucher program which targeted the underperforming Cleveland, Ohio public school system,
even though the vast majority of aid went to parents, both Catholic and non-Catholic, who
chose to use the voucher funding to send their children to Catholic schools.
By contrast, the Supreme Court maintained a strict separation between church and state
when it came to any sort of religious instruction, speech or symbols on school grounds or in
school activities. Protection of pluralism maintained a position of prominence in the Court’s
approach in this area.
*Edward F. Mannino is a partner at Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP in Philadelphia.
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TOO BRAVE TO FIGHT
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION 
DURING WORLD WAR I
 B Y  J A M E S  M C G OWA N *
In the midst of America’s involvement in World War I, the Supreme Court unanimously up-held the constitutionality of the Selective Service Act of 1917, the first draft legislation
since the Civil War. In doing so, the Court allowed to stand the Act’s provision restricting ex-
emption from combat duty only to members of “well-recognized” religious sects whose creeds
forbade participation in war. This stipulation, designed with groups like the Quakers in mind,
forced religious and secular conscientious objectors alike to take up arms or face harsh pun-
ishment. Because the governing bodies of most of the large churches in America supported
the war, adherents to mainstream religious creeds were readily denied exemption, while un-
affiliated religious and secular pacifists had little hope of any consideration. 
In his brief to the court, civil liberties lawyer Walter Nelles argued that such a narrow ex-
emption provision violated the First Amendment’s protection of the free exercise of religion.
Specifically, he took issue with the idea of measuring the sincerity of religious convictions
strictly in terms of their adherence to doctrinal coherence. Such a restriction was no longer
reasonable, he argued, since men’s religious convictions could no longer be submitted as a
matter of course to organized guidance.  As he argued in 1917,
There are wide differences among conscientious objectors. Some base their be-
liefs and conduct upon their duty toward God; others upon their duty toward man.
Underlying the differences, however, is a unity which permits the treatment of the
point of view of the conscientious objector as a single one. … The genuine intensi-
ty of belief is the one criterion of its religious character and that of the conduct it
induces. Conscientious refusal to take part in the war is an exercise of religion.1
In arguing that it was not merely the content, but the intensity of a belief that generated its re-
ligious character, Nelles anticipated by some fifty-two years the virtually identical reasoning
of the Supreme Court in Welsh v. United States, the final case concerning conscientious objec-
tion prior to the elimination of the draft in 1973. In that case, the court reversed the convic-
tion of draftee Elliot Welsh for refusing to submit to induction. Finding that Welsh’s admittedly
agnostic but profoundly moral beliefs were held with the strength of more traditional religious
convictions, the majority opined that “all those whose consciences, spurred by deeply held
moral, ethical, or religious beliefs, would give them no rest or peace if they allowed them-
selves to become a part of an instrument of war” were entitled to conscientious objector status.2
When it came to determining the legitimacy of conscientious objection, how did govern-
ment get from such a conservative and exclusive definition in 1917, to a rather liberal one that
effectively accommodated completely secular individual beliefs? It began during World War I,
when a relatively small group of objectors brought into sharp focus the intractable problem of
conscientious objection in modern America, and who set the stage for the unfolding of consci-
entious objector accommodation in American politics and law. The World War I objectors re-
vealed every problem addressed by major developments in draft policy from 1917 to 1970, but
it took American government half a century to catch up.
Again, for World War I, Congress defined legitimate conscientious objection in such a way
as to exclude from consideration all but traditional religious pacifists. Furthermore, it provid-
ed no alternative to service in the armed forces, instead obligating conscientious objectors to
accept whatever service President Wilson might define as “noncombatant.” This created some
difficulty for hundreds of recognized religious pacifists, who were declared eligible for non-
combatant service, but who nonetheless could not reconcile themselves to the idea of serving
the wartime military apparatus.
Congress tried to remedy this situation in World War II, opening work of national impor-
tance under civilian direction to drafted conscientious objectors who were opposed to mili-
tary service.  During the war, some 12,000 men worked in the Civilian Public Service camps,
run largely by the Historic Peace Churches. Furthermore, the 1940 draft law introduced the
more open-ended and individualized phrase “religious training and belief” as the standard def-
inition of valid conscientious objection, in contrast to restricting such to membership in a
well-recognized peace church.  Thus, it opened the way for individual religious pacifists
whose beliefs were rooted in, for example, mainline Protestantism or Catholicism to benefit
from conscientious objector protection. Roughly 50,000 draftees were classified as conscien-
tious objectors during the war, with over 90% claiming a religious affiliation.3
The draft was revived in 1948 as part of the escalating Cold War. This version was similar to
its predecessor, except that in terms of recognizing conscientious objection, it kept the phrase
“religious training and belief,” but expressly defined such as “an individual’s belief in a relation
to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation.”4 This
was an attempt on the part of Congress to limit conscientious objector eligibility to the explicitly
religious, while still allowing for some individual variation in the expression of faith. Through
several renewals the draft remained in effect right into the Vietnam War, explicitly recogniz-
ing religious pacifists and authorizing civilian alternative service.
A few Vietnam-era Supreme Court decisions traverse from the definition of conscientious
objection as it stood at the termination of the draft, and back in full circle back to Nelles’s
phrase “genuine intensity of belief.” In 1965, the Court decided three cases, all of which con-
cerned conscientious objectors whose claims were denied because draft boards found them to
be grounded in some unorthodox conception of universal morality, and not explicitly based
on a belief in God and the human obligations rooted in that belief. One objector derived his
beliefs from a “Supreme Reality,” another from a “universal power beyond that of man” and a
third, Daniel Seeger, for whom the case is known, from a “cosmic order” which commanded
an “intellectual and moral integrity” that did not allow for the willful destruction of human
life.  Ruling in favor of the objectors, the Court found unanimously that Congress’s own defini-
tion of “religious belief” as that which originated from a “relation to a Supreme Being,” meant
60
T H E  A M E R I C A N  E X P E R I M E N T:  R E L I G I O U S  F R E E D O M
that the test of such a belief should be whether it “occupies a place in the life of its possessor
parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualifies for the exemp-
tion.” Justice Douglas asserted that any contrary construction would violate the “‘free exer-
cise’ clause of the First Amendment by favoring one religion’s conception of a Supreme Being
over another’s.”5
Congress amended the section of the draft law relating to conscientious objection in 1967,
deleting the reference to belief in a Supreme Being, and relying only on the exclusion of “es-
sentially political, sociological, or philosophical views, or a merely personal moral code.”
Legal scholars disagree whether or not the change affirmed or overrode the court’s decision
in Seeger, but in any event the issue of a Supreme Being and conscientious objection was
legally put to rest a few years later in the Welsh case.  As Welsh wrote in his original applica-
tion for conscientious objector status,
I believe that human life is valuable in and of itself; in its living; therefore I will not
injure or kill another human being. …[The] ‘duty’ to abstain from violence toward
another person … is essential to every human relation. I cannot, therefore, consci-
entiously comply with the Government’s insistence that I assume duties which I
feel are immoral and totally repugnant.6
The court reversed Welsh’s conviction, finding that his deeply held moral and ethical be-
liefs, like Seeger’s, functioned as religion in his life, and therefore entitled him to conscien-
tious objector classification. As one prominent historian of the draft has observed, with its
decisions in Seeger and Welsh the Court “essentially rewrote part of the draft law to accept
completely secular COs.”7
Back in 1917, Nelles summarized his argument to the Court thus: “The Conscription Act,
by constraining the violation of conscience, prohibits the free exercise of religion to all consci-
entious objectors, whether their objection rests upon their duty towards God or man.”8 Chief
Justice White thought that proposal so unsound he dismissed it without comment. So the
draft and its narrow exemption provision stood, and by the war’s end hundreds of conscien-
tious objectors languished in military prisons. Their ordeal remains the starting point for the
gradual expansion of conscientious objector eligibility and the liberalization of military poli-
cies over the course of the twentieth century.
We don’t know how many conscientious objectors there were during World War I.
According to the War Department’s official statement on the matter, published in 1919, only
about 4,000 men in the Army camps claimed some form of exemption from military service
because of their conscientious objections and only 19% of the total number of inducted
draftees granted noncombatant status by their draft boards.9 But we do know the names of
582 conscientious objectors tried by court-martial and imprisoned during the war, and their
stories tell us much about the conscientious objector experiences.
The great difficulty for the Army in regard to conscientious objector issues in the early
months of mobilization stemmed from three related developments. First, many men arrived
in camp claiming conscientious objections of various sorts without any recognition from their
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draft boards. Second, many objectors, including those duly recognized as noncombatants,
once in camp, refused to accept duties assigned them beyond those relative to their own
maintenance. Third, some objectors rejected any participation in military affairs whatsoever;
refusing even basic chores relative to their upkeep, exercise under guard, or participation in
formalities such as signing their name or submitting to inoculations. 
The large majority of objectors arriving at camp in the fall of 1917 did so as members of
their local dispatches of draftees. Once there, their treatment varied widely, ranging from
courteous consideration to outright violence. Few objectors in those early months clearly un-
derstood their rights, and often found themselves at the mercy of newly-minted officers who
had little information regarding their obligations and little patience for such an apparently
unnecessary and decidedly unmilitary annoyance. Camp commanders had few if any orders
from the War Department, which had intentionally avoided formulating specific measures
and which had favored instead a policy of neglect and delay in the hope of attrition. Beyond
ordering the segregation of conscientious objectors from the rest of the camp, the War
Department remained silent on the matter.
Throughout the fall of 1917, sources from within the camps reported dozens of incidents of
the coercion and abuse of conscientious objectors, and civilian conscientious objector advo-
cates increasingly pressured the War Department to establish some sort of uniform policy.
Finally, on December 19, 1917, the Secretary of War directed that, until further instruction,
“personal scruples against war” would be considered as constituting ‘conscientious objections,’
and that such persons should be treated in the same manner as other conscientious objectors.
Secretary of War Baker’s several biographers agree that the decision reflected his long-
standing attitude that any American who objected on ethical grounds to killing his fellow man
deserved consideration. The order of December 19 did not solve the problem of what to do
with the objectors, but merely recognized and standardized a process already in place. It at-
tempted to correct the inequities produced by Congress’s inadequate resolution of the matter
and the wide disparity in the actions of the draft boards. By the end of 1917, it was apparent
that hundreds of men in the nation’s military camps held deep conscientious convictions
against war irrespective of any official recognition, and faced the possibility of coercion, vio-
lence, imprisonment, and even death at the hands of authorities for their beliefs. Further more,
leaving aside the issue of secular conscientious objection, the draft act’s reliance on local
knowledge to determine which religious sects qualified for exemption resulted in significant
inconsistencies, especially concerning marginal or socially derided religious groups, such as
the International Bible Students Association. In some Pennsylvania districts, for example,
members of the pacifist Fellowship of Reconciliation, a loose confederation of Quakers, secular
pacifists, and social workers, were granted noncombatant eligibility based on their member-
ship, while in other districts they were not.10 Neither Congress nor the Selective Service ever
delineated which religious sects qualified as “well-recognized,” instead deferring the question
to the judgment of local and district draft boards. Baker had a choice: allow the democratic
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process to run its course and watch hundreds of otherwise blameless Americans suffer some-
times outrageous hardship at the hands of the military, or defy a Congressional mandate and
assume sole authority over the question of conscience.
The liberalization and extension of conscientious objector protections removed many of
those without noncombatant recognition from a difficult situation to the relative safety of seg-
regation. Once segregated, though, they joined the hundreds of men already in a state of chaf-
ing idleness, some segregated now for many months, under a rotating staff of officers at best
indifferent to their position, at worst, callous and abusive. 
Not until March 20, 1918 did President Wilson issue an Executive Order defining noncom-
batant service and clarifying his policy regarding conscientious objectors. The order outlined
those branches of the service the President deemed noncombatant, namely, and limited to,
military support services such as those performed by the Medical Corps, the Quartermaster
Corps and the engineers. 
For those conscientious objectors unwilling to accept noncombatant service, the long-awaited
order directing commanders to continue the policy of segregation and await further orders
from the Secretary of War, only deferred resolution of the issue once again. Pending such di-
rections, the order instructed that all such conscientious objectors should not be punished,
but also not be allowed “any favor or consideration beyond exemption from actual military
service.” Finally, the order recommended courts-martial deal promptly with “persons who fail
to comply with lawful orders” by reason of alleged conscientious objectors.11
The terms of the Executive Order satisfied most of the conscientious objectors. Many con-
scientious objectors who had previously declined to formally accept noncombatant service
without a presidential definition reconciled their religious or personal scruples with the serv-
ice officially offered to them. For these men, the long-awaited Executive Order cleared the
way to the relative safety, security, and distance of unarmed support service, and hundreds,
perhaps thousands, of conscientious objectors served in this capacity for the duration of the
war.12 The problem remaining for the Army entailed the disposal of those conscientious ob-
jectors who refused noncombatant service. The order appeared to maintain their status as a
protected group, but failed to define the limits of that protection, while tacitly maintaining the
authority of courts-martial to deal with cases of disobedience. Facing a novel situation without
clear instructions, officers at some army camps embarked almost immediately on various dis-
ciplinary programs in irregular and unauthorized ways. 
By April 1918, officers at Camp Zachary Taylor, were among the first to implement their in-
terpretation of the Executive Order and they segregated as many as seventy-five conscien-
tious objectors. 13 Camp Taylor, near Louisville, drew most of its troops not from Kentucky but
from neighboring Indiana, and had among the eastern army camps one of the largest popula-
tions of Mennonite conscientious objectors, mostly young men from the farming communities
of the northeastern part of the state.14 The camp also had its share of Quakers, Dunkards,
International Bible Students, and men from the Holiness sects of east Kentucky. Most of the
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men had been in camp since late September or early October of the previous year, and had
gradually found their way to the segregated conscientious objector detachments, where they
awaited the final disposition of their cases. Many had, in the meantime, been working tem-
porarily around the conscientious objector barracks and the base hospital. But all, their fates
hinging on the government’s next decision, had awaited, for several cold and idle months, the
President’s final definition of noncombatant service. 
On April 13, 1918, the Civil Liberties Bureau received word of the arrest and confinement
of about forty objectors at Camp Taylor.15 Thus, they discovered the first systematic effort to
discipline uncooperative conscientious objectors at a given camp under the authority and
provisions of Wilson’s Executive Order. A month later, when the disciplinary episode had run
its course, forty-eight objectors awaited a trail by court-martial. Forty-eight brief and nearly
identical trials were held at Camp Taylor between May 16 and June 11, 1918. At the conclu-
sion of the trials, forty-six men, most of them recognized and certificated religious noncom-
batants, headed to Fort Leavenworth under sentences of at least ten but as many as twenty
years. Two of the men, Walter Sprunger, a Mennonite from Berne, Indiana, and Charles W.
Bolley, a Dunkard from Mongo, Indiana, would die there. The path leading from the consci-
entious objector barracks at Taylor to the disciplinary barracks at Ft. Leavenworth serves as a
model of the railroading that became the customary procedure the Army used to discipline
conscientious objectors throughout the war.
For fifteen days in April and May 1918, officers at Camp Taylor took details of, typically,
ten men from the conscientious objector barracks, marched them to the base hospital, and
 ordered them to work. The work in question consisted mainly of raking grass seed into pre-
pared ground, for the express and benign purpose (so officers stressed) of beautifying the area
for the benefit of the patients. Occasionally, some details were ordered to cut sod, or rake a
path, or level ground; in sum, all work relative to cultivating the area around the base hospital.
The officers involved were determined to put the conscientious objectors to useful work, and
the conscientious objectors, for their part, were determined to resist further military instruc-
tion, cost what it may. Both parties thought themselves justified by both the Executive Order
and their conscientious convictions.
The passage in the Executive Order that engendered so much confusion lay buried in the
third paragraph. It read,
[All] persons not accepting assignment to noncombatant service, shall be segregated
as far as practicable and placed under the command of a specially qualified officer
of tact and judgment, who will be instructed to impose no punitive hardship of any
kind upon them, but not to allow their objections to be made the basis of any favor
or consideration beyond exemption from actual military service which is not ex-
tended to any other soldier in the service of the United States.16
This passage, when taken in conjunction with the part of the order recognizing the “discre-
tion of courts-martial” in dealing with “persons who fail or refuse to comply with lawful or-
ders,” seemed to officers at Camp Taylor to authorize the discipline of conscientious objectors
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who refused noncombatant service and who subsequently demanded, through their refusal of
orders, exemption from more than “actual military service.” Evidence suggests that officers
deferred the question of whether or not work which amounted practically to light gardening
constituted “actual military service” to future authorities, and decided to put those conscien-
tious objectors who refused noncombatant service on such duty, at simple tasks that “any
other soldier” might be required to do.
With the exceptions of the exact work in question and the individuals involved, each day’s
episode played out nearly identically to the previous, the series assuming as time went by the
character of a farce. Each morning a corporal rounded up a group of men and marched them
to the hospital. There a lieutenant led them to the rear of the hospital headquarters, near a
porch filled with convalescing soldiers, where they found a number of tools, usually rakes,
laid out for their use. Each time, the corporal gave the group a “general command” to take up
the rakes and begin work. Typically a few of the men consented, but some, generally two or
three but as many as six, remained where they stood. Upon instruction from the lieutenant,
the corporal then proceeded to line the disobedient men up, and, presenting a rake to each
one at a time, order them individually to take the tool and commence work. After each man
refused the order, the superior officer took his turn and moved down the line, extending a
rake to each man and ordering him to work. Those conscientious objectors who refused both
officers were then arrested and confined in the guard house, while those who had consented
to work returned to the conscientious objector barracks. 
The first court-martial convened on May 16, 1918, hearing the trials of James Cook, a
Methodist from Shawneetown, Illinois, William Goppert, a Dunkard from North Webster,
Indiana, and James Murch, an International Bible Student from Indianapolis. Continuing
through early summer 1918, as many as nine per day, the trials concluded on July 11.  All
forty-eight men were tried under the 64th and 65th Articles of War, which covered disobedi-
ence, and all were found guilty of all charges and specifications.  Typically, the brief trials fol-
lowed a uniform pattern. After a perfunctory reading of the charges and the Articles of War,
three or four witnesses testified on behalf of the prosecution, after which the accused, who in
all cases refused military counsel, were given the opportunity to take the stand under oath or
to make an unsworn statement to the court. All but one of the men chose the latter. After -
wards, without the presence of counsel to argue, and in light of almost every conscientious
objector’s refusal to cross-examine the witnesses, there was very little left to do. The court
simply closed and reopened a few minutes later to deliver its verdicts and sentence.
At each trial, the accused was given a chance to explain his position and offer evidence in
his defense, sometimes with the court’s assistance. Few had anything to say other than quote
a few Bible verses to the court, and reiterate, apologetically, their virtual helplessness in the
matter, the work in question being undoubtedly, in their minds, unconscionable military
service. The conscientious objectors had waited for months, hoping for the President’s immi-
nent but delayed directive to release them from military custody into some sort of civilian
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service. When the Executive Order failed to do so, the only acceptable alternative was to settle
the matter finally by refusing further military direction and accept the consequences. Their
faith had, after all, prepared them for such martyrdom.
Of the forty-eight conscientious objectors tried at Taylor in May and July of 1918, more
than half belonged to various Mennonite denominations, united in 1918 by, among other
things, their marginalization in American society and alienation from the workings of govern-
ment. As inheritors of a long ethno-religious tradition of nonresistance and a “two-kingdom”
theology that rendered the wishes of the state irrelevant to matters of religion and conscience,
these Mennonite conscientious objectors justified their refusal in similar terms.17 Before quot-
ing several verses from the book of Matthew, Homer Curtis told the court, 
Our church, as is well known, is strongly opposed to all forms of military service,
and as I consider that work over there at the Hospital noncombatant work — in the
form of noncombatant work, although very simple in itself, I felt that I could not
do it in view of my convictions and my creed. … I do not wish to be a shirker; I
would be willing to do work of some kind that is useful and constructive, in some
way that would not violate my convictions.18
Jesse Brenneman, another Mennonite, believed noncombatant service “inconsistent for a
Christian to take, if he believes that combatant service is also wrong.” Brenneman recounted
for the court the story of the stoning of the martyr Stephen, from the book of Acts, and Paul’s
complicity therein, comparing the idea of noncombatant service to Paul’s guilt for standing by
and tending the clothes of those who were actually doing the work of stoning the martyr.
Brenneman, like the other Mennonite conscientious objectors, stressed his willingness to
work for the government “in any capacity that does not signify by the nature of the work that
it is military service.”19
Philip Pound, an International Bible Student from Leesburg, Indiana, echoed Brenneman’s
wariness of complicity, telling the court that, “in the sight of God … even beautifying the camp
I consider would be giving my moral support, at least, to the war.”20 For Lawrence Williamson,
a Quaker from Shirley, Indiana, kept in the Taylor Guard House for ninety-four days before
being brought to trail on July 11, 1918, the simple fact that the work was under “direct supervi-
sion of military officers” was enough for him to deem it unacceptable military service.21 Allen
Christophel, a Mennonite from Goshen, told the court he considered the work part of the
“military arm” of the government.22
Together, the conscientious objectors at Taylor determined that the “noncombatant” service
formally offered to them in March 1918 was part and parcel of what many conscientious
 objectors would come to call the “military machine.” Some regarded the work in question, as
trivial or agreeable as it seemed, as necessary to the operation of the army as the fighting it-
self. Others reasoned that consenting to perform it amounted to direct participation in the
machinery of combat. Still others simply could not formally submit to and cooperate with the
military, an institution whose practical purpose was the destruction of human life. These con-
clusions put them in the difficult position of investing such a trivial affair as raking dirt with
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powerful moral symbolism. As Lloyd Blickenstaff, a Dunkard from North Manchester, Indiana,
told the court, 
Now, it may seem foolish to you men for me to stand here before you and say
that I refused to cut sod because I am conscientiously opposed to war; but the reason
I refused is not because I thought cutting a few shovels of sod would help the war,
but by doing so, that is, taking part in what I thought to be noncombatant service, I
would give my moral assent to the thing which I think is wrong, and give it my
moral support.”23
Like Blickenstaff, the other religious conscientious objectors at Taylor, most adherents to cen-
turies-old creeds of nonviolence, could not give their “moral assent” to war by formally sub-
mitting to military direction, even though many of them had previously worked around camp
on a voluntary basis. Long accustomed to separating civic from spiritual obligations, while
awaiting the Executive Order they had justified their limited participation in the affairs of
camp from several worldly perspectives. So long as the hope that they might be released from
the military establishment into civilian custody remained, the Taylor conscientious objectors
cooperated as best they could. When the Executive Order finally required their full compli-
ance, in order to maintain their religious integrity they had little choice but to resist.
Confronting the rigidity of the religious conscientious objectors’ position, the military admin-
istration could only resort to specious rhetorical convolutions to undermine and dispose of it.
On June 13, 1918, reviewing jointly the records of eleven trials, including five Mennonites,
three Dunkards, two Pentecostals and one Methodist, Acting Judge Advocate General James
J. Mayes distilled the legal question, referring to the provisions of the Executive Order. “Did
the accused,” Mayes asked, “by declining to accept non-combatant service also acquire the
right to refuse to perform any work which they might be ordered to do which, in their judg-
ment, offended … their personal scruples against war? … It can not be seriously contended,
that the Government ever contemplated acquiescence in a course of procedure on the part of
conscientious objectors so subversive of military discipline.” But what course of procedure did
the Government contemplate in the terms of the Executive Order? The President therein in-
structed that all objectors “unwilling to accept” assignment to noncombatant service be segre-
gated and protected from “punitive hardship.” However, officers were explicitly advised “not
to allow their objections to be made the basis of any favor or consideration beyond exemption
from actual military service.” This final provision was paramount in determining the legality
of the proceedings. Accordingly, Mayes offered the following: 
An apparent misapprehension exists in the minds of the accused as to the
meaning of the words ‘actual military service.’ They argue that any work which
they may be ordered to do about the encampment is to their way of thinking ‘mili-
tary service.’ It may be conceded without argument that this is true, and it may be
admitted in addition, that any order given the accused by an officer or non-
 commissioned officer is perforce a military order. But this line of argument leads
nowhere. The accused are soldiers. The [Executive] order upon which they rely is
a military order, and it must therefore be interpreted in a military sense. 
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“The work which they were ordered to do was,” Mayes concluded, “according to military inter-
pretation, essentially non-military in character, though admittedly connected with the main-
tenance of the military establishment.”24 This remarkable interpretation, that work of an
“essentially nonmilitary” character, although “military service,” did not constitute “actualmili-
tary service,” was repeated throughout the war, in hundreds of cases, to sustain the findings
and sentences of the courts trying conscientious objectors. Reviewing authorities consistently
focused on the form of the work in question, and not, except in dismissal, on its function, the
characteristic of supreme importance to the conscientious objectors.25 Time and again, au-
thorities determined that the trivial and non-martial nature of the work in question — work
such as raking grass seed, planting flowers, shoveling garbage, or cleaning stables — did not
constitute the “actual military service” from which conscientious objectors who declined to
accept noncombatant service were exempted.
The Executive Order, intended to resolve the conscientious objector situation once and for
all, failed to extend a nonmilitary alternative, in wartime, to hundreds of drafted religious
pacifists whose creeds forbade participation in war. Although many would eventually accept
agricultural furlough when offered it later in 1918, for those men unfortunate enough to find
themselves at army camps where officers determined early on to discipline the conscientious
objectors, disobedience was the only acceptable course of action.  The government, for its
part, had already gone to considerable lengths to accommodate conscience. Subverting the in-
structions of Congress, the War Department extended conscientious objector protections to all
who applied, whether their objections rested on religious or personal scruples. With the
Executive Order, it offered the safety and geniality of unarmed noncombatant service to all of
them. However, its fatal mistake was in allowing the conscientious objectors to languish in
camp for months on end, under the false impression that they would eventually be released
into some form of civilian service.26 Beginning at Camp Taylor, belated demands, that those
conscientious objectors who had held out for long months formally accept the military serv-
ice for which they were drafted, were met with stubborn refusal. Placed in this difficult and
intolerable position, required by the Executive Order to assign conscientious objectors to non-
combatant service, but prohibited from imposing “punitive hardship” on those who would not
accept it, camp authorities generally acted as they saw fit.
On March 16, 1918, as part of a springtime reorganization of mobilization, and a specific re-
sponse to the rising chorus of rural statesmen complaining of labor shortages, Congress enact-
ed a law authorizing the Secretary of War to furlough enlisted men to engage in civil work in
the national interest. Within a few weeks, when upon the publication of the Executive Order
it became clear that a significant number of otherwise acquiescent conscientious objectors
would indeed refuse noncombatant service and possibly subject themselves to disciplinary
action, some saw in the furlough law a potential resolution to a decidedly difficulty problem.
So by the beginning of summer 1918, with two drafts completed, a trained, equipped and in-
dependent quarter-million strong army ready to mobilize fully against the Germans, nearly a
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year after the Americans landed in France and eight months since the first Americans dug
their trenches, the machinery of state was finally ready to accommodate the few hundred
conscientious objectors who would rather go to jail than shoulder a weapon or a tool for the
war. Approximately 1500 conscientious objectors were eventually furloughed to agricultural
service. Many of these, because they were literally farmed out as help to private citizens
under little supervision, were subject to abuse and exploitation. Some even choose to return
to camp to face a court-martial.
The Armistice of November 1918 did not bring an end to the conscientious objectors’ ordeal.
While many pacifist religious conscientious objectors were released in the weeks following
the war, many more, especially Socialists and other political objectors, remained in prison
well into 1920. Over a dozen conscientious objectors died in military custody. All of the con-
scientious objectors, the vast majority of whom were willing to serve their country in some
way they could reconcile with their consciences, sacrificed months and years of their lives to
maintain their religious or ethical integrity — sacrifices from which subsequent generations
of drafted men reaped significant rewards. 
* James McGowan is a graduate student in the Department of History at the University of California-Davis.
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DIVINE INSCRIPTIONS IN CONTEXT
IN GOD WE TRUST 
ON U.S. COINS AND CURRENCY
 B Y  B I F F  R O C H A *
Those opposed to religious words or symbols in public life, and especially on governmentproperty, frequently put forth the claim that the United States is a secular nation operat-
ing under an absolute separation of church and state. The account some have provided for
how the national motto, “In God We Trust” came to appear on U.S. coins and currency, sug-
gests the will of two religious people manipulated the system and injected religion into the
secular design. This paper rejects such a claim and attempts to show how the religious in-
scriptions that have become part of our national symbols are the result of popular demand
and general religious sentiment. By examining the history of how the motto “In God We Trust”
came to reside on both U.S. coinage and currency, I suggest that the motto is an expression of
the general popular desire for the country to recognize divine guidance and protection; in
other words, the motto reflects the sentiments and the workings of American democracy. 
This paper will focus on the testimony and Written Statement: God On Our Coins of Jon G.
Murray before the Congressional subcommittee on Consumer Affairs and Coinage on Sept.
14, 1988. As Mr. Murray relates the history of the United States, he states his central claim
near his conclusion. He writes, “two fanatically religious individuals separated by some nine-
ty-two years of history were principally responsible for the events that culminated in the plac-
ing of an unconstitutional religious motto on the United States coins and currency.” Yet as a
representative of those citizens who object to the use of a religious motto on public currency,
this battle is only one small scuffle in a larger cultural war. In a secular rendition of a
Jeremiad this story tells a tale of how this nation has wandered from its original nonreligious
moorings, and the explicit secular intention of the Founding Fathers. Over time, through
small concessions and manipulation by radical fundamentalists, religion has crept into the sa-
cred spheres of the public arena and government. Such infection of the civic and governmen-
tal spheres permits discrimination by the religious against minority religions and those of no
religion. In Murray’s view, while today the vast majority of Americans favor the secular gov-
ernment, they are inattentive, and need to be alerted by a prophetic voice, to the dangers of
creeping religiosity. Left unchecked the few fundamentalists of society will willingly turn
America into a theocracy. Ultimately, according to this story, this tolerance of the public ex-
pression of religion will lead to religious wars setting citizen against citizen in an all out holy
war. This story may be a minority position in our present day, but let us take a moment to
consider how stories grow.
So I ask you, what kind of tree did George Washington confess to chopping down? If you fit
within the majority of Americans you will remember that when he was a little boy, George
Washington was questioned about a certain hewed cherry tree. What is more, you might recall
that when questioned, George could have equivocated, but rather it was a sign of his noble
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character that the young boy responded with, “I cannot tell a lie. It was I who chopped down
that cherry tree.” While I do not have any statistical support I will, pardon the pun, go out on a
limb and suggest that within the two hundred plus years that America has existed as a nation,
there have been a number of cut trees. Why do we remember this one? Certainly there have
been a number of boys caught in questionable circumstances, many of whom told the truth
and many of whom squabbled over the precise definition of particular words such as “is” or
“chopped down.” How has this president become known for telling the truth? The power is in
the story. When it comes to stories it makes a difference how the story is told, where the story
is told and how often the story is told. Many modern cynics have commented that history is
simply the tale told by the winner. Or worse yet, some say that a truth is just a lie that has
been repeated often enough that a majority of people have come to believe it. 
Tucked away in the bottom corner of Ohio lies the tiny college town of Oxford which serves
as home to the red-brick wonder that is Miami University, America’s Public Ivy. It was a faculty
member of Miami University, William Holmes McGuffey, who situated the story of George
and the cherry tree within the pages of McGuffey’s Eclectic Readerswhich served as a sort of
classroom catechism for Protestants of 19th century America. McGuffey’s Eclectic Readerswere
among the first textbooks in America that were designed to become progressively more chal-
lenging with each volume. These graded readers told moral stories of virtue and character in
line with the popular view of public schooling which was to instill patriotism while providing
a moral education and spiritual formation. The McGuffey’s Eclectic Readers became the
American textbook and endowed William McGuffey with the title, schoolmaster to a nation.
He attempted to give the public schools a curriculum that would instill in their graduates
Christian beliefs and habits necessary for our emerging society. The tale of George Washing -
ton and the cherry tree has been read over and over again in schools across the nation by gen-
erations of students. The tale has become part of American history.
And now I must confess to a flaw. I am more of a fact checker than a story teller. As a
teacher of religion I encounter a number of students who are often easily enticed by the newest
movie or clip on YouTube. When Dan Brown’s infamous The Da Vinci Codewas published in
2003 I was hounded by a number of students to read the book which revealed dangerous secrets
the Vatican would prefer to hide. It indeed became very popular, selling over 64 million copies,
topping the New York Best Sellers list and now having been translated into forty-four different
languages. After a year of trying to avoid conversations about The Da Vinci Code I finally suc-
cumbed to the pressure and read the notorious piece of pulp fiction. While I would not catego-
rize it as great literature, my evaluation found it to be an entertaining and witty story. I felt,
however, that I had somehow failed my students who had entertained the book as a serious
interpretation of history. How could they know so little that they were unable to immediately
recognize that this self-identified work of fiction was built upon historical inaccuracies, liter-
ary inventions and outrageous theological and historical claims that were taken for granted as
fact? As a result I began to catalog some of the inaccuracies of the book. In class I would list
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the errors in history, theology, science and art criticism. But after forty-five minutes of admit-
tedly brilliant lecturing I would hear my students whispering to one another as they left the
class, “But what if the story is true?” There is power in the story, in where it is told, in when it
is told and in how often it is told. 
My concern today is the story of the American people. Did the pioneers come to these
shores to erect a massive wall separating society from the dangers of religion which needed to
be penned up or held back? Or was it a spiritual pilgrimage which brought the pilgrims here,
to settle colonies where religion and reality were seen as integrated and necessary?1 Obviously
I have chosen to represent the most contrary extremes of telling this tale, and a great deal of
variation and nuance could be added. But from a distance the stories are basically rivals.
Secular history emphasizes the aspects of America’s heritage and the Founding Fathers which
are not merely neutral but range from concerned to hostile towards religion. Meanwhile spiri-
tual history highlights aspects of the American culture which allow or even encourage belief
in the divine.
As stated at the outset, I wish to focus on the secular story as told by of Jon G. Murray in
his Written Statement: God On Our Coins given before the Congressional subcommittee on
Consumer Affairs and Coinage. I have selected Mr. Murray’s presentation for several reasons:
first, his comments are representative of many who oppose the use of the national motto, “In
God We Trust” being applied to government monies; second, Mr. Murray is rather straightfor-
ward and honest in his claims; and third, Mr. Murray’s congressional testimony is widely pub-
licized and cited by numerous sources in this debate. By examining the history of how the
motto, what Mr. Murray will elsewhere identify as “religious graffiti,” came to reside on both
U.S. coinage and currency, I will suggest the motto is an expression of the general popular de-
sire for the country to recognize divine guidance and protection; in other words, the motto re-
flects the sentiments of the democracy. 
Mr. Murray’s story will be given here in summary form but it is easily available in its fuller
version on the World Wide Web. Originally I discovered Mr. Murray’s testimony at www.
Infidels.org, but a quick search of the Internet revealed Mr. Murray’s statement was posted on
numerous atheist related websites such as www.skepticfiles.org, www.atheists.org, and www.
positiveatheism.org. Clearly Mr. Murray’s words resonate with organizations that are adhering
to a secular worldview and thereby advocating a strict separation of church and state. But
what many people may find disturbing is that Mr. Murray’s version of the story has found its
way into questionably neutral reference sites such as ReligiousTolerance.org and the online
encyclopedia, Wikipedia. 
The Written Statement opens with an outline suggesting Mr. Murray’s main points. After a
“Preface” and “Opening Statements” the paper discusses “E pluribus Unum,” “The National
Motto,” “Post Civil War Religious Fanaticism,” “An 1861 Letter of Correspondence,” “Theodore
Roosevelt Disapproved,” and finally “Lyndon B. Johnson’s 1955 Bill.” The statement ends with
a section entitled, “Conclusion,” followed by the notes. The primary claim put forward in this
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story establishes the United States as an intentionally secular nation. Early in the statement,
Mr. Murray begins: 
Our Constitution was a pioneer document among the founding documents of na-
tions in that it nowhere contained a single reference to a deity or divine inspira-
tion. Instead it began by rooting its authority in “We the People,” a direct and
poignant departure from the divine right of kings from which so many of our fore-
fathers fled to these shores. The importance of the doctrine of separation of state
and church for all Americans cannot then be overstated. It was the marriage of
church and state that compelled many of the settlers and immigrants to this coun-
try to flee their native lands and seek a country where religion was not integral
part of the government.2
As Mr. Murray introduces his section on the Civil War, he supports his claim of American sec-
ularity as evidenced by its coinage: “The coinage, at that point in history, was totally secular;
as clean from a mention of god as was the Constitution.”3 This transitional sentence should
clarify and answer for the audience the obvious question. If the will of the Founding Fathers,
and the majority of Americans, is for America to be a secular nation, how did mention of God
find its way onto the national coinage?
Mr. Murray describes an attempt by some very influential people, after the Civil War to
pass a constitutional amendment to acknowledge Jesus Christ as the source and authority of
our civil government. While the amendment failed, one of the backers of the amendment,
James Pollock, was selected by President Abraham Lincoln to become the Director of the U.S.
Mint in 1861. Mint Director Pollock created the new motto “In God We Trust” and submitted it
to Congress for approval. As Mr. Murray writes, “Mint Director Pollock had carte blanche and
could, at his discretion, Christianize our coins.”4 Note the directionality included in Mr. Murray’s
developing metaphor. The coins and the Constitution were initially “clean” and only later
were the coins soiled by “religious graffiti” and “Christianized.” Mr. Murray’s next sentence
makes the implied theme of trickery explicit. “What could not be done through the will of the
people was done through the scheming of several men.” With the Civil War Murray described
the impulse to put God on the national coinage as the work of “religious fanaticism.” 
Years later, with the rise of the Cold War, the desire for national expression of the spiritual
is attributed by Mr. Murray to “the hysteria of McCarthyism.” He describes the goal of the reli-
gious community to be the “capture [of] the symbols of the nation.”5 Drawing parallels to the
earlier legislative act, Mr. Murray writes, “Just as in the case of Rev. Watkinson in 1861, one
letter prompted the wheels of the executive branch into motion and on June 7, 1955, H.R. 619
Providing for the Inscription of ‘In God We Trust’ on all Unites States Currency and Coins, was in-
troduced to the House.”6 President Johnson signs into law a bill that requires the motto on
currency in addition to the coinage, as well as recognizing officially the motto “In God We
Trust” as an American national motto. 
As Mr. Murray comes to the end of his story he reaffirms his primary claim that America
intends to be a secular nation, and expands his secondary claim that a few tricked the many
to add religion to certain symbols of American society.
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We can see from the foregoing brief history that two fanatically religious individu-
als separated by some ninety-two years of history were principally responsible for
the events that culminated in the placing of an unconstitutional religious motto on
United States coins and currency. The issue of coin and currency mottoes was
never submitted to the electorate for any type of vote. It was not by the over-
whelming voice of the people that a religious motto was interjected into our coins,
currency, national motto, and pledge. The events of 1954, 1955, and 1956 in regard
to the establishment of religious mottos slipped through Congress almost unno-
ticed in the midst of the McCarthy reign of terror.7
Mr. Murray appeals to the committee as they consider redesigning the national coinage to
 select symbols that will not divide the country into “religionists and secularists.” 
Earlier in his testimony speaking for those against the divine inscriptions, Mr. Murray stated,
“We would like to propose the substitution of the phrase ‘E pluribus Unum’ for the motto ‘In
God We Trust.’”8 He accurately recounts that the Congress of 1776 appointed Benjamin
Franklin, John Adams and Thomas Jefferson to draft a design of the Great Seal of the United
States. The design ultimately displayed an eagle behind a heart-shaped shield holding an
olive branch in one claw and arrows in the other, while in its beak flowed a scroll bearing the
motto “E Pluribus Unum.” Mr. Murray goes on to affirm, “it can be clearly seen that the motto
‘E Pluribus Unum’ meaning ‘One Unity Composed of Many Parts’ is a fitting motto to describe
the Constitution of the United States as a document …”9 Today one may view the Great Seal of
the United States by examining the reverse side of any one dollar bill. 
While there is much which could be said in response to Mr. Murray’s Written Statement and
testimony, I will select a few key points to dispute in each of his two main beliefs: 1) America
was founded as a secular nation; 2) two fanatically religious individuals tricked the many. For
the first claim I will target the words “founded” and “secular” while in the second claim I will
explore the “two” vs. “many” issue, and examine the question of deception. 
The founding of the Unites States and the will of the Founding Fathers are tightly inter-
twined in Mr. Murray’s account. The way the author tells the story of the founding of the
United States, and describes the will of the Founding Fathers, suffers from the same mistaken
assumption of a unified position or plan. In his oral remarks Mr. Murray says, “The United
States was the first experiment in the Western World to set up a secular government … having
come from nations that were essentially theocracies, having seen theocracies develop among
the colonies, and noticing the abuse therein, all references to God and religion were deliber-
ately excluded from the Constitution.”10 I hope to deal with the absence of God from the
Constitution in a later article, but for now I wish to focus the reader’s attention to Mr. Murray’s
notion of progress and design. In his book, American Catholicism, historian John Tracy Ellis
addresses the limited perspective of many histories of the United States which tend to be built
onto a framework of purposeful progress.11 Such accounts start with the English colonization
of the Eastern shore, slowly and steadily progress westward developing the wilderness into
cultivated farming land and then building up the urban centers. Mr. Murray has his own secular
version of what, as Ellis points out, has been the dominant Protestant story. 
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In examining the settlement of North America the particulars of history illustrate that
there was no such unified grand design. Before the English permitted merchants and pilgrims
to visit the new world, Catholic Spain and France preceded Anglican England in establishing
permanent settlements by nearly a century. The Spanish explored Central and South America
while the French occupied most of what is Canada today. Within the borders of what is now
the United States, Spanish explorers Ponce de Leon and Vasquez de Ayllon opened Florida in
1521 with the intent of converting the natives to Catholicism, while the French, motivated by
similar concern, navigated the Mississippi and Great Lakes regions. By 1542 the plains of
Kansas gave way to missionaries such as Juan de Padilla. The settlement of America was ran-
dom and competitive, with settlements in the Florida, New Mexico and California moving
northward, while others from Michigan and Ohio following the rivers moved in a southerly
direction. Given the chaotic nature of America’s settlement it is difficult to ascribe one method
or perspective to the country. Likewise we should be wary when individuals state the “position”
of the Founding Fathers in the singular. 
The phrase “Founding Fathers” is generally applied to the governmental leadership that di-
rected the colonies through the American Revolutionary War. As signers of the Declaration of
Independence or delegates to the Constitutional Convention, these men set the political
course for what would become the United States of America. In modern times a great deal has
been written on the intellectual formation and political mindset of these men. Partly motivat-
ed as an attempt to draw out the original intent of the Founding Fathers for understanding the
relationship of religion and politics envisioned in the American democratic experiment.
Unfortunately the search for the historical founders suffers from a common plight of scholar-
ship, where the founders described frequently mirror their author. Authors on the modern
day political right sometimes describe the Founding Fathers as Born Again Evangelical
Christians who based our government solely on the Bible. This reading of history calls for a
return to America’s Christian roots and some seek a preferential treatment of Judeo-Christian
practices. Meanwhile, the Founding Founders of those on the modern day political left are
deists, atheists or secularists who allow no room for religion in the operation of the State. This
historical interpretation calls for the removal of any religious expression outside of the private
sphere. For example Mr. Murray states, “In 1776, our fathers endeavored to retire the Gods
from politics … to commemorate the intentions of the Founding Fathers [on the] new coinage,
the Constitution alone, secular in origin, secular in intent, secular in content should be com-
memorated.”12
Such scholarship on both sides suffers from a few problems which contribute to increased
polarization. First, treating the Founding Fathers as a group forces upon them a unified world-
view. As with any group there will be differences in education, philosophy and perspective.
Each individual should be studied and appreciated on his own. Second, there is frequently a
lack of balanced historical and literary contextualization. As political leaders many of these
men wrote a great deal, some articles, books, notes, papers, and speeches. It is fairly simple to
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select and list quotations for or against religion by the founders to give a predetermined im-
pression. For example, John Adams, the second President of the United States, is often quoted
as saying, “This would be the best of all possible worlds, if there were no religion in it!” which
Adams did indeed write in a private letter to Thomas Jefferson on April 19, 1817. But reading
the surrounding text changes the connotation of the quotation: 
Twenty times in the course of my late reading have I been on the point of breaking
out, “This would be the best of all possible worlds, if there were no religion at all!!!”
But in this exclamation I would have been as fanatical as Bryant or Cleverly.
Without religion, this world would be something not fit to be mentioned in polite
company, I mean hell. 
Not only are more extensive excerpts necessary for a proper understanding of the person’s in-
tent, but background research needs to set the specific person within an historical context.
Adams, for example, like many leaders of his day, viewed European Catholicism through both
a political and theological lens. This then affected his distaste for Catholic involvement in
governmental affairs. As such his comments on “religion” must be distinguished by the group
to which Adams refers. A third habit which may alter the mental picture of these men is the
tendency to focus on the famous few. The names Thomas Jefferson and Benjamin Franklin
are easily recognized and these men have been the subject of numerous studies and biogra-
phies. Yet their religious opinion differs significantly from one another, and furthermore both
differed from the numerous but less well known and similarly significant Founding Fathers
such as Charles and Daniel Carroll, Jonathan Dayton or Oliver Ellsworth. The Founding
Fathers were the cultural elite of colonial society. They were well educated and most engaged
in multiple careers simultaneously. Of the fifty-five Convention delegates, thirty-five were
trained lawyers. As such, many of these intellectuals were also trained theologically. Hugh
Williamson earned an official license to preach in Connecticut and James Madison pursued a
degree in Presbyterian theology. Abraham Baldwin was a minister and served as chaplain to
the Continental Army and was offered a prestigious teaching position at Yale as a professor of
divinity. Previously mentioned Oliver Ellswoth became the third Chief Justice of the U.S. and
was the person to coin the phrase, “The United States of America.” His degree in Theology
was earned after studies at both Yale and Princeton on the subject. These are just a handful of
examples showing that the label deist or secularist should not be used to describe the entire
collection of men we call the Founding Fathers. Finally, regardless of how one finally charac-
terizes their beliefs one cannot assume there to be corresponding beliefs within the general
population of the colonies. Even those Founding Fathers who held a skeptical view of organ-
ized religion recognized the “common man” was inherently and overwhelmingly spiritual. 
To make this new nation work it had to be shaped not just for an oligarchy of Enlightenment
elites, but rather it had to incorporate all of the many different people in the land into one
 national unity.
Continuing to question the position that America was founded as a secular nation I should
now like to turn our attention to the definition of the term secular. Mr. Murray does not pro-
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vide a dictionary definition for the term secular, but as we have seen earlier, he does provide
his audience with an operational definition of the concept: “The coinage, at that point in his-
tory, was totally secular; as clean from a mention of god as was the Constitution.”13 This defi-
nition requires a thing to contain an explicit reference to God to be regarded as religious. It
also assumes that anything not containing such an explicit reference to God is understood to
be secular. The effect of defining the term in this way is to produce a very narrow category
“religion” relative to an enormous category “secular.” When applying this operational defini-
tion, many items typically associated with religion (Byzantine icons of Saints, a nun’s habit,
rosaries, and even the Buddhist religion) become “secular” since none of these items contain
an explicit reference to God. Stepping back from my specific criticism of Mr. Murray’s defini-
tion, I would like to suggest generally that any definition of “religious” or “secular” that relies
on the pair operating as a dichotomy is going to be faulty. 
The word secular developed within the Catholic Church. The term originates from the
Latin saecularismeaning “of this present lifetime or generation.” Contextually ecclesial
 authorities were distinguishing between elements overseen by God. Secular designated the
temporal and earthly things, apart from the eternal and heavenly ones. The term secular was
then applied to the religious clergy that ministered out among the people in the parishes.
Today we could properly identify the diocesan priest as “secular clergy.” Such individuals are
distinguished from the men and women of monastic orders who live in religious communities.
From the faith perspective everything is inherently religious and the secular is a subclass of
religion (not an antonym) which refers to those things of the here and now which occur out
among the people. Let us take the common dictionary definition of religion: “1. of, pertaining
to, or concerned with faith or the divine; 2. beliefs and practices concerning the cause, nature
or purpose of life the universe or existence.” When distinguishing one item from another, the
task is not to place the item in the category of religious or secular, but rather to ask to what
 degree does the item display characteristics of religion. How religious (to what degree) is it?
Nature displays God’s glory in an implicit fashion, while impressive basilicas explicitly
 illustrate the work of God through murals, music, statuary, architecture, symbols and divine
inscriptions. 
We have briefly examined Mr. Murray’s belief that America was founded as a secular nation.
I have observed the Founding Fathers were not a unified group with one cohesive anti-
 religious worldview. The United States was not settled and formed in accordance with a grand
design or plan of the Founding Fathers. It is misguided to ask if America is secular or religious.
Rather one needs to consider in what ways and to what degree does America recognize and
acknowledge God/religion.
Momentarily adopting Mr. Murray’s hypothesis that America was founded as a secular or
religion-free society, consider his example of United States coinage. Incrementally over time
religion was injected or forced onto these clean coins, until today when one finds religious
graffiti on the penny, the nickel, the dime, the quarter, the half, the dollar and upon every de-
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nomination of currency. Mr. Murray uses the appearance of religion on coins to demonstrate
a hypothetical parallel encroachment of religion into the secular American society. If today,
from this point of view, religion is expressed publicly everywhere in society, then the hypoth-
esis would require the original historical situation to have been in Mr. Murray’s words, “totally
secular, as clean from a mention of god as was the Constitution.” To test the hypothesis, let us
return to the early period of United States history and observe if there are any signs of recog-
nition of God or religion.
Before the Civil War, and even prior to the American Revolutionary War, evidence indicates
a high degree of religious consciousness within the society. Let me elaborate on two religious
symbols mentioned by Mr. Murray, the Great Seal and Liberty. Other examples of American
religious symbols are too numerous such that present time and space do not permit me to re-
view them in greater depth. As mentioned earlier, the Congress of 1776 appointed Benjamin
Franklin, John Adams and Thomas Jefferson to draft a design of a Great Seal for the United
States. These Founding Fathers employed three Latin phrases within the design: “Annuit
Coeptis” (God14 has favored our undertaking), “Novus Ordo Seclorum” (a new order of the ages),
“E Pluribus Unum” (out of many, one). If we were to apply Mr. Murray’s measurement of secu-
larity, then one out of the three of the phrases contains a reference to God. This would be
highly unusual if society was an anti-religious as Mr. Murray wishes us to believe. Further,
Jefferson is the author of the phrase “separation of church and state” and is recognized by
many scholars to be one of the least Christian or religious of the Founding Fathers. Yet it is
Jefferson who creates and recommends to Congress this seal. On the other hand, if we reject
Mr. Murray’s definition of secular then we could instead ask: To what degree are these religious?
What we observe is not a far removed separation of Church/religion from State/government,
but instead we see phrases that contain both religious and governmental significance blended
together. 
All three Latin phrases retain both a religious and governmental connotation. A new order
of the ages (Novus Ordo Seclorum) implies that the American experiment of democracy is a
new way to approach government, but it also maintains the biblical notion that God works
with humanity in different ways in different “ages” or dispensations (see, Rom 16:25; 1 Cor.
10:11). For example the apostle Paul in the third chapter of his letter to the Ephesians speaks
of a mystery hidden to past generations (v. 5) but in this age of the Church is made known to
all of humanity (v. 9). In fact, an entire branch of study, dispensational theology, has arisen
from the biblical habit of dividing time into the age of the patriarchs, the age of the chosen,
the age of the gentile and the millennial age to come. Contemporaries of Jefferson would
have understood “a new order of the ages” to reference a partial fulfillment of biblical prophe-
sies of peace and prosperity. This is further supported by the other motto, “God has favored
our undertaking” (Annuit Coeptis). It is common among historians to acknowledge that many
of the colonists saw America as a new Israel, and American as the new people chosen of
God.15 What is more, Jefferson himself suggested an image for the reverse of the Great Seal of
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an Old Testament account of the Hebrew slaves fleeing the Egyptian Pharaoh. To make the
parallel identity of America as God’s chosen people more emphatic, Jefferson proposed adding
an additional motto “rebellion to tyrants is obedience to God.”16
Mr. Murray implies, but does not explicitly claim that the Founding Fathers drew the third
phrase on the Great Seal, E Pluribus Unum, from a poem, Moretum, attributed to Virgil. While
it is difficult to prove the derivation of the phrase, I wish to suggest two difficulties with his at-
tribution. First, H. Rushton Fairclough in his Loeb Classics edition, says Virgil’s Moretum “may
be a rendering of a Greek poem by Parthenius;” the poem describes early morning in the life
of an old farmer, Simylus, and his lone servant, Scybale. They get up before dawn, make some
bread, and prepare a “moretum,” which consists of garlic, parsley, coriander, rue, salt, and
cheese, all mashed together, and formed into a ball, and then drizzled with oil and vinegar. In
other words, this is basically an ancient salad or relish recipe. While many of the Founding
Fathers had received a classical education, how likely is it they were taught or recalled the
words of a salad recipe? The second difficulty is the actual phrase (at line 102 or 104 depend-
ing on which edition you use) is “color est e pluribus unus,” not “unum.”17 Another candidate
for the origin of the phrase, which Mr. Murray conveniently overlooks, is Saint Augustine.18
The meaningful phrase, “out of many, one,” is a classical Catholic ecclesialogical principle
stressing the universal nature of the Catholic faith. It is used by Saint Augustine to describe
the ties of brotherly love and friendship in book IV of his Confessions (397 AD). By just exam-
ining the three Latin phrases of the Great Seal, in both their likely sources and intended
meanings, one finds a high degree of religious reference and intent. The case is made only
stronger when one considers the multiple symbols employed in the design of the Great Seal
(such as the Eye of God, cloud of God’s glory or olive branch). While one might debate the lit-
erary source for the national motto, let us move to the symbolization of liberty where the
 origin is undisputed from which the Founding Fathers drew their inspiration.
The Founding Fathers spoke frequently of their love of liberty. Since no one can see liberty,
a bell was used to symbolize the notion of liberty as an integral American characteristic and
value. Most famously people remember July 8, 1776 when the Liberty Bell rang to announce
the first public reading of the Declaration of Independence. Originally ordered from White
Chapel foundry in England the bell cracked as soon as it arrived in Philadelphia. Local crafts-
men John Pass and John Stow recast the bell in 1753, thus their names appear on the front of
the bell, along with the city and the date. The bell hung in the tower of Independence Hall
and rang to gather people for public assemblies and announcements. It was first created by
order of the Pennsylvania Assembly in 1751 to commemorate William Penn’s 1701 “Charter of
Privileges” which was Pennsylvania’s first constitution. The bell was to be set in the seat of
the local government, the State House. While today there are many competing notions of lib-
erty, one has only to examine the Liberty Bell to find the origin of the word and the intellectual
worldview which contextualizes the meaning of true American liberty. The order for the bell
required that a Bible verse be placed on the bell, Leviticus 25:10, “Proclaim liberty throughout
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all the land unto all the inhabitants thereof.” For many of the Founding Fathers there was a
connection between liberty and the divine being; God was the author and source of Liberty.
Humans could chose to exercise this natural right given to them by God, but it took effort and
diligence. It should be self-evident that if our rights are derived from government, they can
also be removed by government. It was in fact the wisdom of the Founding Fathers to stand
in opposition to tyranny by acknowledging the source of human rights originated from God
rather than from King George III, or for that matter any legislature. In 1791, Alexander
Hamilton suggested the establishment of a national currency. Congress enacted this legisla-
tion following his recommendations the following year. The dollar was established as the
basic monetary unit, and the act also allowed for the creation of a national mint. That act stip-
ulated that United States coins should carry the word “liberty” or some symbol emblematic of
liberty.19 Along with bells, and the word liberty, female figures have frequently been used
symbolize this concept. The French who donated in 1886 the statue of Lady Liberty (la Liberté
éclairant le monde) were following this popular American tradition of representation. After
testing Mr. Murray’s hypothesis of an original religion-free society, we find there are signs of
recognition of God and religion in the Great Seal and the symbolic representation of liberty. 
Mr. Murray’s Written Statement and testimony requires the acceptance of two main beliefs:
1) America was founded as a secular nation; 2) two fanatically religious individuals tricked
the many. In responding to the first I have examined the danger of generalizing the character
and beliefs of the Founding Fathers, and I have challenged a simple definition of the term
 secular20. Now to focus on the second belief, I will explore the “two” vs. “many” issue, and ex-
amine the accusation of deception. In 2007 the United States Mint began producing the coins
for the new Presidential Series Golden Dollar Coins. With the success of the State Quarter pro-
gram, the Mint envisioned a series of new dollar coins commemorating each of the presidents
with a portrait on the obverse and the Statue of Liberty on the reverse. Numismatic journalist
Dom Yanchunas recounts that fifty-five thousand error coins were released from the Mint
which did not contain the legally mandated motto, “In God We Trust.” The public reacted with
outrage at the coins dubbed the “godless dollar.” Newspapers, blogs and chatrooms buzzed
with furor over the incident and the Mint’s initial design decision to move the divine inscrip-
tion to the rim of the coin. The error raised public attention to “God getting pushed to the
edge” which many citizens believed to be symbolic of His treatment in modern American
 society. Yanchunas writes “The blunder was one of the worst manufacturing mistakes in the
Mint’s history.”21 A later news article in the same issue of Coinagemagazine on page 83 notes
that Congress was besieged by citizen complaints. Representative Virgil Groode of Virginia
 introduced H.R. 2510 in May of 2007 in response to the public outcry. He explains, 
I introduced this legislation in response to the many citizens complaining that ‘In
God We Trust’ was on the side instead of being on the front or possible the back of
the new presidential dollar coins. I am pleased that we have 88 original cosponsors
on this measure. I hope the U.S. Mint will get the message.
Depending upon how “religiousness” is measured (church attendance, acceptance of doctrine,
81
D I V I N E  I N S C R I P T I O N S  I N  C O N T E X T
practices, etc.) most scholars find a decrease in the overall religiousness of the American
 society over the past two hundred years. Still, there is enough interest and support to move
numerous members of Congress to introduce legislation that will recognize the divine on
American coinage. 
Previous moments in history have experienced similar, if not greater, popular reaction to
divine inscriptions. Mr. Murray recounts how in 1905 President Theodore Roosevelt asked
sculptor Augustus Saint-Gaudens to redesign the coinage. Saint-Gaudens found the motto to
be “inartistic” cluttering his design, so he removed it. Mr. Murray concedes in passing “the re-
ligious community fell upon Congress … with numerous petitions demanding the restoration
of the motto.”22 Indeed both the House and the Senate introduced bills to restore “In God We
Trust” which passed as public law 120. Due to the overwhelming number of letters of citizen
protest the bill was signed by President Roosevelt on May 18, 1908. 
Likewise it was a popular movement which added the words, “Under God” to the American
Pledge of Allegiance and helped to introduce legislation to recognize “In God We Trust” as our
national motto.23 It began at the Board of Directors meeting in April of 1951 of the Catholic
fraternal organization known as the Knights of Columbus. The resolution initially was to add
the words “under God” after the words, “one nation” as the member knights recited the pledge.
Soon, state councils were following suit; Florida, New York and South Dakota all adopted reso-
lutions for their councils that the pledge be read as amended. The idea and practice increased
in popularity so that by August of 1952 the Supreme Council of Knights sent copies of their
resolution to Congress and the President.24 At nearly the same time, in 1953, Matthew Rothert
of Arkansas, presented the idea of extending the coinage motto “In God We Trust” to all paper
money, to a meeting of the Arkansas Numismatic Society. The favorable reaction by his audi-
ence prompted him to send a written proposal for such a change to Treasury Secretary
Humphrey; he also sent copies of the correspondence to Commerce Secretary and to Presi -
dent Eisenhower. Eisenhower enthusiastically supported the measures and signed the bill on
the Pledge into law on Flag Day, June 14, 1954, reportedly stating, “From this day forward, the
million of our school children will daily proclaim in every city and town, every village and
rural school house, the dedication of our Nation and our people to the Almighty. The divine
inscription “In God We Trust,” was formally adopted as the U.S. National motto on July 30,
1956. Recall that far from being the result of two fanatical individuals, all the legislation bear-
ing upon these divine inscriptions on American coinage and currency had to pass through the
legislative process of the U.S. Congress. In addition, these measures in each case were insti-
gated by citizens, writing letters, signing petitions and communicating with the House and
Senate representatives. 
There is power in the story, in where it is told, in when it is told and in how often it is told.
Mr. Murray’s tale has been told so often that it is moving from a few isolated websites for athe-
ists to more mainstream reference sites accessed by the general public. The public schools of
the United States, out of fear of upsetting groups advocating a strict separation of church and
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state, have ceased to tell the religious side of American history. These combined factors have
set the contemporary intellectual stage where the claim that America was founded as a secu-
lar and anti-religious nation, can receive a serious hearing and expect credence. The United
States today is pluralistic and multicultural, but the latest USA Today poll finds that 92% of
Americans express some form of belief in God.25 So evidence suggests that both historically
and presently a majority of U.S. citizens recognize the divine. The national motto “In God We
Trust” expresses a popular general sentiment that combines the patriotic and religious natures
of a majority of Americans. For those wishing to remove the motto there exist the same legal
procedures by which the motto came to reside upon currency and coinage. But like young
George Washington standing beneath the cherry tree, when challenged, we need to be able to
give an honest history.
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BIBLE CASE
 B Y  T I M OT H Y  C .  S H I E L L *
In May of 1890 the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled in the Edgerton Bible case (as it waspopularly called) that Bible reading in a public school for the purpose of religious instruc-
tion was unconstitutional.1 Wisconsin thereby became the first state to ban Bible reading
since prior decisions on this or a related issue in five other states had found the practice con-
stitutional.2 Given the jurisprudence of the day the decision was based on the state constitu-
tion rather than the federal constitution,3 but the decision had national significance4 and
marked a twenty-year nationwide decline in school Bible reading.5 Seventy-three years later
the U.S. Supreme Court came to the same conclusion as the Wisconsin court in Abington
School District v. Schempp.6 Beyond this historical significance, the arguments involved in the
case still figure prominently in contemporary debates concerning religion in public schools;
more broadly, in debates about religion and government; and even more broadly, in debates
concerning jurisprudence and constitutional interpretation.
I cannot fully explore the historical and contemporary significance of the case within the
confines of this short paper; therefore I limit my remarks here to: (1) describing a few of the
significant factors in the historic and argumentative setting of the case; (2) describing the major
elements in the reasoning of the court; and (3) outlining two significant issues embedded in
the case that remain at the forefront of our continuing experiment in freedom of religion.
I. The Historic and Argumentative Setting
Teachers in the Protestant-dominated common schools of the colonial era used the Protestant
King James Bible in class, at least in part with the intention of converting Catholic pupils to a
Protestant faith.7 Even after the colonies became the United States with freedom of religion
guaranteed in Constitution’s Bill of Rights, Catholic and Jewish students were expelled from
some public schools when they refused to read the Protestant Bible or participate in day
opening scripture readings. This continued in some states into the 20th century.8 In New
York, only Protestant schools were eligible to receive state funds and public school textbooks
contained anti-Catholic references.9 When members of minority religions protested state en-
dorsement of the majority religion, the majority reaction was sometimes violent: for example,
in 1834 an angry Boston mob burned down a Catholic convent after Catholics protested
Protestant Bible reading in public schools and in 1844 numerous people died during the
Philadelphia Bible Riots.10 Protestant bias received a legal stamp of approval when the Maine
Supreme Court ruled in Donahoe v. Richards11 that school authorities could lawfully compel
Catholic students to read the King James Bible.  
Protestant bias existed in Wisconsin too since Protestant Yankee immigrants dominated
the state and tended to believe their Protestantism was nonsectarian.12 Thus, their King
James Bible — but not the Catholic Douay-Rheims Bible — continued to be a state approved
textbook into the late 1880s even though the 1848 state constitution banned sectarian instruc-
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tion and an 1883 state statute banned sectarian textbooks.13 However, in 1888, six Catholic
parents with children in the Edgerton school district filed suit in Rock County circuit court
asking the court to force the school district to discontinue its practice of Bible reading during
class.14 Their argument was:15
P1: State law forbids sectarian instruction and textbooks. Article X, Section 3 of the
Wisconsin State Constitution (1848) forbids sectarian instruction in public schools16
and Sec. 3, Ch. 251, Laws of 1883 forbids sectarian textbooks. 
P2: Reading from the King James Bible is sectarian instruction and the King James Bible
is a sectarian textbook. These are sectarian because Catholics believe the King James
Bible wrongly translates the word of God and omits books from Scripture; they also
believe Scripture ought not to be read indiscriminately since they believe the Roman
Catholic Church is the only infallible teacher and interpreter of the Bible.17
Thus, State law forbids reading from the King James Bible.
However, Judge Bennett of the circuit court, following common practice and the legal prece-
dents in the five other states, rejected this argument.
The parents appealed to the Wisconsin Supreme Court and Humphrey Desmond, a widely
known Catholic lawyer and editor, joined their legal team. Desmond had supported the initial
petition by the parents in the Catholic Citizen, his Milwaukee-based, nationally influential
newspaper. Desmond added rhetorical flair and a sense of moral destiny to the cause, argu-
ing, for example, 
[I]f justice be our guide, we shall be as loyal to Christianity and the Bible as we are
to the secular schools … not by making the texts of Scripture modern stocks into
which the Catholic pupil is thrust …; but rather by believing and holding our
Christianity in the mild spirit of its founder…. The law that will most honor the
Bible and religion, is the law which most nearly follows the golden rule of each,
“Do unto others as you would that others should do unto you.” If you would not
have Catholics force the Catholic Bible and beliefs and conscience upon you, then
you should not force the Protestant Bible and beliefs and conscience upon them.
That is the true meaning of non-sectarian schools. 18
For its part, the Edgerton School Board offered at least seven reasons why Bible reading by
its teachers was constitutional.19 First, teachers cannot be banned from Bible reading without
violating their constitutional right of conscience. Second, students are not required to remain
in class during Bible reading and are not punished for leaving. Third, to enforce the Catholic
parental demand would be sectarian since other sects do not believe the Roman Catholic
Church is the only infallible teacher or interpreter of the Bible. Fourth, the Bible passages
read during class are not sectarian since they appear in the Catholic Douay and Rheims Bible
too,20 and nothing in state law prohibits non-sectarian reading from the Bible. Fifth, the King
James Bible is a state-approved textbook. From 1858 on, the Wisconsin state superintendent
of public instruction has included it in his list of recommended school textbooks. Sixth, the
decision to permit readings from the King James Bible was made in a lawful manner. The
school board was formed by lawful process and its Board members lawfully elected. They
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used lawful procedures in accordance with the will of the vast majority of children and par-
ents in the school district in deciding to allow teachers to read from the Bible during school
hours. And seventh, Bible reading is not sectarian instruction since instruction requires
teacher elaboration or explanation, and the teachers read Bible passages without explanation
or elaboration. Based on these reasons, the school board maintained that teacher Bible read-
ing does not violate state law.  
II. The Reasoning of the Court
The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the circuit court decision. Chief Justice William P.
Lyons, writing the unanimous opinion of the five-member court, focused on the sectarian
clause of the state constitution while Justice John B. Cassoday and Justice Harlow S. Orton
added concurring opinions.21 In this paper I present only the main points set forth in the
Lyons opinion.
The court concluded that Bible reading violated the state constitution because it was both
“sectarian” and “instruction.” Why was it “sectarian?” Lyons wrote: 
Sectarian instruction as understood by our constitution refers exclusively to in-
struction in religious doctrines that are sectarian in the sense that the doctrine is
believed by some religious sects and is rejected by others.  Hence, to teach the ex-
istence of a Supreme Being, of infinite wisdom, power and goodness and that it is
the highest duty of all mankind to love and obey Him is not sectarian because all
religious sects so believe and teach. The instruction becomes sectarian when it
goes further, and inculcates doctrine or dogma concerning which the religious
sects are in conflict …. Reading from the New Testament of the King James
Version of the Bible necessarily does go beyond this to become sectarian instruc-
tion at least because members of the Jewish sect reject the divine authority of the
New Testament and members of the Church of Latter Day Saints sect use the Book
of Mormon. Some of the portions read inculcate doctrines of the divinity of Jesus
Christ and the punishment of the wicked after death, which doctrines are not ac-
cepted by some religious sects. A most forceful demonstration of the accuracy of
this statement is to be found in certain reports of the American Bible Society of its
work in Catholic countries … in which instances are given … [where] reading of
the [King James Bible] converted Catholics to Protestants without the aid of com-
ment or exposition. In those cases the reading of the Bible certainly was sectarian
instruction. Therefore, it is sectarian also in Edgerton schools.22
What made it “instruction?” Lyons wrote: “[T]hat reading from the Bible in schools, although
unaccompanied by comment from the teacher, is ‘instruction,’ seems to us too clear for argu-
ment. Some of the most valuable instruction a person can receive may be derived from read-
ing alone, without any extrinsic aid by way of comment or exposition.”23
In response to the school board’s argument that Bible reading was permissible given the in-
tent of the constitutional framers and state legislators, Lyons maintained that any such intent
was outweighed by the fact that Wisconsin was founded by Catholics, Jews and adherents of
many Protestant sects and that, 
These immigrants were cordially welcomed, and it is manifest the convention
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framed the constitution with reference to attracting them to Wisconsin. Many, per-
haps most, of these immigrants came from countries in which a state religion was
maintained and enforced, while some of them were non-conformists and had suf-
fered … from their rejection of the established religion. What more tempting in-
ducement to cast their lot with us could have been held out to them than the
assurance that, in addition to the guaranties of the right of conscience and worship
in their own way, the free district schools in which their children were to be [edu-
cated] were absolute common ground, where the pupils were equal, where the sec-
tarian instruction [and intolerance] under which they had smarted in the old
country could never enter? The state constitution thus provided that the child of
the Jew, or Catholic, or Unitarian, or Universalist, or Quaker should not be com-
pelled to listen to the stated reading of passages of scripture which are accepted by
others …24
In response to the school board’s argument that objecting pupils were excused from the
Bible readings, Lyons stated, 
When, as in this case a small minority of the pupils in a public school are excluded,
for any cause, from a stated school exercise, particularly when such cause is appar-
ent hostility to the Bible which a majority of the pupils have been taught to revere,
from that moment the excluded pupil loses caste with his fellows, and is liable to
be regarded with aversion and subjected to reproach and insult …. [T]he practice
in question tends to destroy the equality of the pupils which the constitution seeks
to establish and protect, and puts a portion of them to serious disadvantage in
many ways with respect to the others.25
Thus, Edgerton public school teachers were not to read from the Bible during school hours for
the purpose of religious instruction; however, the court explicitly noted that Bible reading for
non-religious purposes, including the teaching of history, literature and good morals, was per-
missible.26 In conclusion, Chief Justice Lyons wrote, 
The priceless truths of the Bible are best taught to our youth in the church, the
Sabbath and parochial schools, the social religious meetings, and above all by par-
ents in the home circle. There, those truths may be explained and enforced, the
spiritual welfare of the child guarded and protected, and his spiritual nature direct-
ed and cultivated, in accordance with the dictates of parental conscience.27
III. Two Significant Arguments
The Edgerton decision has played a role in numerous legal cases in Wisconsin, including a
case upholding non-sectarian clergy-led prayer at public high school graduation ceremonies
held in local churches;28 a case striking down an ordinance banning organized religious speech
in county parks;29 a case striking down a state statute reimbursing Marquette University
$3,500 per dental student to operate a dental school;30 a case upholding a créche display on
city property;31 and a case upholding a school voucher program through which tax funds are
dispersed to private religious schools.32 However, rather than focus on specific cases in this
section, I shall introduce two broader issues and arguments, namely, the Legislative Intent
Argument and the Freedom of Religious Speech Argument.33
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1. The Legislative Intent Argument. The Edgerton School Board and its supporters34 ar-
gued that Bible reading should be permitted since the founding fathers and legislators of
Wisconsin were acting from Christian purposes. Put more formally: 
P1: Laws should be interpreted according to legislative and/or framers’ intent.
P2: The legislative and/or framers’ intent in Wisconsin was to permit Bible reading in
public schools because (a) the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 explicitly provided for
the establishment of free, public schools based in the Christian religion, including
Bible reading; (b) the preamble to the Wisconsin state constitution explicitly invokes
God as its ultimate foundation;35 (c) the Committee on Education during the 1846
Wisconsin Constitutional Convention unanimously rejected a ban on religious and
sectarian books;36 (d) the 1848 Convention, aware of the 1846 decision, proposed only
the prohibition on sectarian instruction, and this clause was accepted by the voters in
Wisconsin; and (e) the state legislature adopted the same language in creating the
state university, and the state university Board of Regents and faculty adopted the
practice of Bible reading.
Thus, Wisconsin Law permits Bible reading in public schools. 
However, the Weiss court rejected this conclusion. Justice Lyons emphasized a competing
and, in his opinion, a more compelling original intent, namely, to guarantee state neutrality
on religion in order to attract immigrants to the new and developing state37 whereas Justices
Cassoday and Orton argued that any original religious intent had been superceded by later
laws emphasizing the secular nature of state government. 
This kind of debate over original intentions arises in many cases involving freedom of reli-
gion as well as many cases beyond freedom of religion. Perhaps the most significant issue
concerning freedom of religion that involves original intent is whether the Establishment
Clause in the U.S. Constitution: (a) permits government to promote religion in general though
not any particular religion (a.k.a. “accomodationism”), or (b) requires the government to re-
main strictly neutral on religion in general and in particular (a.k.a. “separationism”). The U.S.
Supreme Court first explicitly announced (b) — strict government neutrality — in Everson v.
Board of Education.38 Writing for the majority, Justice Hugo Black stated, 
The “establishment of religion” clause of the First Amendment means at least this:
Neither a state nor the federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass
laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.
Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church
against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No per-
son can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs,
for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small,
can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may
be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a
state nor the federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs
of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson,
the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect “a wall of
separation between church and State.”39
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Despite this strong “separationist” wording, the court voted 5-4 to uphold a New Jersey law re-
imbursing parents for transportation costs incurred in sending their children to public schools
and private Catholic schools on the ground that the law had the secular purpose “to help par-
ents get their children, regardless of their religion, safely and expeditiously to and from ac-
credited schools.”40 The two written dissents did not dispute (b) — complete government
neutrality. Rather, they argued that the court failed to apply this standard correctly to the facts
of the case. They maintained that the transportation reimbursement program was a tax used
to support religious instruction.41 This “strict government neutrality” doctrine, said to be
drawn from earlier decisions,42 was supported in both the majority and dissenting opinions
through a review of the intentions of founding fathers Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. 
There are numerous criticisms of the Everson doctrine of complete government neutrality,
including dissents by former Justice William Rehnquist in Wallace v. Jaffree43 and by Justice
Antonin Scalia in Lee v. Weisman.44 These dissents appear to have prompted Justice David
Souter to restate the Everson argument in his concurring opinion in Lee v. Weisman.45 How ever,
the debate over the original intentions behind the Establishment Clause is further complicated
by the fact that many scholars oppose originalist jurisprudence in general,46 and others chal-
lenge the assumption that the right time period to look for Establishment Clause meaning is
the Founding era.47
Through the Legislative Intent Argument, then, we can see one clear way in which
Edgerton Bible case remains relevant. Is a court justified in overruling the religious intentions
of the framers of a law? How exactly should we determine what the intentions of the framers
were? How much weight ought future courts give to an earlier court’s holding on the inten-
tions of the framers? 
2. The Freedom of Religious Speech Argument. The Edgerton school board and its
supporters also argued that the board ought not to violate the teachers’ right of conscience in
expressing their religious views.48 That is:
P1: The Constitution guarantees the right of religious conscience.
P2: Teachers are exercising their right of religious conscience when reading from the
Bible during class. 
Thus, The Constitution protects teacher Bible reading. 
Although the board and its supporters used the language of the right of conscience, their argu-
ment is focused on a speech act (oral Bible reading); hence, my referring to it as the Freedom
of Religious Speech Argument. 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court did not respond to this argument in its decision. Their si-
lence will come as no surprise to those knowledgeable of the history of freedom of speech
since at that time freedom of speech was not protected by the extensive body of law that
shields it today. Here I will pass by the issue of whether or not the Wisconsin court should
have addressed the Freedom of Religious Speech Argument or what they should have decided
if they had addressed it in order to emphasize that given current legal precedents on religious
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speech courts today cannot remain silent on the legal weight afforded freedom of religious
speech where it may conflict with the Establishment Clause. Issues regarding freedom of reli-
gious speech have become increasingly common and prominent insofar as protecting reli-
gious expression has become an explicit part of the agenda of influential private organizations
like the American Civil Liberties Union, the American Center for Law and Justice, and
Foundation for Individual Rights in Education as well as the Bush administration.49 Today it is
an unavoidable and vital question how a teacher’s or a student’s right to religious expression
should be protected or accommodated in a public school or university.
Consider the example of school prayer. I suggest that courts tend to view this issue as the
Edgerton court viewed Bible reading: it is invalid when it appears to be state-sanctioned pros-
elytizing but permissible when it has a secular justification or is private speech. Thus, the
U.S. Supreme Court banned all clergy-led prayer at graduation ceremonies in Lee v. Weisman50
and banned student-led prayer at high school football games in Santa Fe Independent School
Dist. v. Doe 51 where the school retained control over the location, schedule, and content of the
student’s message. The court reasoned that under those conditions, the religious message car-
ries the imprimatur of the school and, thus, is an establishment of religion. This reasoning
also was employed in Cole v. Oroville Union High School District,52 in which the school retained
the right to review and modify a student’s comments. On the other hand, student prayer was
upheld in Adler v. Duval County School Board53 because the school used neutral criteria in se-
lecting a student speaker and provided a truly open forum for the student to express whatever
he or she wished. Under these conditions, the court reasoned that the school is merely ac-
commodating the student’s free speech rights. Courts have also upheld the student’s right to
pray during a private baccalaureate ceremony54 and school’s decision to delete “proselytizing
and sectarian” references from a student’s graduation speech while allowing references “to
God” as they related to the student’s personal beliefs and allowing the student to announce
that his speech had been involuntarily changed and that copies of his unaltered speech would
be available at the conclusion of the graduation ceremony.55
Of course the boundaries of school prayer in particular and state-neutrality in general will
continue to be tested; thus, the Freedom of Religious Speech Argument provides a second ex-
ample of a way in which the Edgerton case remains relevant. Under what conditions should
the state regard religious expression in public places or using public resources as a violation of
the Establishment Clause? 
Conclusion
Shortly after the Edgerton decision in 1890, the preacher William McAtee made this appeal to
the Protestant devout in the hope of stirring them to action against the decision protecting
Catholics from protestanized public education: “Courage, patriotism and religion are now ap-
pealed to as never before in our state’s history. Have we the virtue to save what has been so
dearly won and so carefully transmitted to us? The virtue to hand it on, untarnished and
unimpaired, to those who shall come after?” 56 Although the debate today is not so much be-
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tween Protestants and Catholics but rather between those who desire forms of state endorse-
ment of religion and those who resist it, there remain people — like William McAtee — who
ignore or strive to overturn legal precedents like Weiss, Engel and Schempp, in some cases ha-
rassing those who complain about the imposition of religious practices in public schools.57 To
be sure, there also are people who would (erroneously) stamp out all religious expression in
public schools if they could. Thus, I suggest that anyone who hopes to better understand what
courts have decided about freedom of religion, why they decided it, and what deeper legal is-
sues are involved would do well to study the issues and arguments arising in and developing
out of the Edgerton Bible case.    
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REMARKS FROM A PECULIAR LAMP-POST
OBSERVATIONS OF A CHRISTIAN TRIAL LAWYER 
ON FIFTEEN YEARS OF SUING THE CHURCH
 B Y  K E L LY  C L A R K *
Justice Scalia’s joke last night about the old Irish drunk saying in response to his wife’squestion “What do you have to say for yourself?” after he had stumbled home and fallen
flat on his face, “I have no prepared remarks, but am happy to take questions from the floor,”
reminds us that the best comments always occur in context.1 So I am keenly aware that my
comments today occur in a particular context: here we are at a prestigious Catholic university,
in the midst of a conference on religious liberty, in a city whose Archdiocese in the next forty-
eight hours is likely to emerge from a lengthy bankruptcy, at least the most immediate cause
of which was a torrent of childhood sexual abuse lawsuits filed by me and a handful of other
trial lawyers. Indeed, it was only three days ago that I testified as a central witness in the con-
firmation proceeding of that bankruptcy pursuant to a subpoena served on me by Mr. Levine,
attorney for the Archdiocese of Portland, and here I am on a panel with him.2 So this irony of
appearances is not lost on me. It is only one of many ironies I have lived with for nearly fif-
teen years now, since I had an interview with the first of what has come to be over one hun-
dred people I have represented for the abuse they experienced as children by Catholic clerics. 
It will be my purpose today to offer you some observations on several of those ironies,
some of which are quite personal, but all of which, I hope, will feed into, if not directly address,
the topic of civil law and canon law. For I am myself at a peculiar lamp-post at the intersec-
tion of canon and civil law, or more generally, of religious belief and civil law. This intersec-
tion of faith and law is my vocation — vocare, calling — and has been my calling ever since as
a young man in college, a convinced Christian, if a very flawed one then as now, reading C.S.
Lewis and Dietrich Bonhoeffer, G.K. Chesterton and Thomas Merton, Mother Teresa and later
a young, vibrant Pope called John Paul II. Ever since, I understood that my vocarewas to try
to serve Christ and His Church in the world, the only question for me being whether to an-
swer that call as a lawyer or Episcopal priest. 
Perhaps, then, you can already see some of the ironies that a person like me might face as I
have spent over a decade suing an institution for which I have great regard — indeed have
twice in my life very nearly joined. And, perhaps also, then, you will excuse me if some of
these remarks sound like John Henry Newman’s Apologia Pro Vita Sua — a defense of myself
and my actions in suing the Church. But I believe my best chance to offer some light on the
topic of this session and this conference is to reflect on some of these ironies, offered from the
peculiar lamp-post against which I lean and watch the world go by at the intersection of reli-
gious faith and civil law.
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I.  How I Got Here
Suing a church is not something that any person of Christian faith does lightly. The very idea
of Christians taking one another before secular authorities is something that Jesus himself, as
reported in the Gospel of Matthew, frowns upon.3 St. Paul also teaches the unity of the faithful
in such a way that makes it apparent that he would be troubled by believers asking the secu-
lar courts to solve problems of the Church.4 In this culture, this culture of narcissism and ma-
terialism — yes, in the phrase of John Paul the Great, this culture of death5 — bringing serious
and sustained legal action against one of the only powerful institutions, secular or faithful,
that regularly stands against the excesses of the era, is a sobering endeavor for any person of
goodwill, let alone a Christian — in my case, a high church, theologically conservative
Episcopalian who often looks with admiration and yearning from Canterbury toward Rome. 
Nor are the stakes lowered simply because I am a trial attorney, and so in some sense law-
suits are what I do. For I have known always and tried to practice consistently, the idea that
lawsuits are serious things; that such an event has significant consequences for the parties in-
volved, and almost always, directly or indirectly, for society as well. So I try to use this severe
weapon put in my hand by my profession not just as a hired gun, but to do justice as best I
can see it, and perhaps in some small way to bring the City of Manmore in line with the City
of God. Usually this finds me fighting on behalf of some David, trying to slingshot courtroom
stones at some Goliath. 
So it was that when fourteen years ago a young man, about my age, came to see me to tell
the story of what his priest had done to him twenty years earlier in his early teens, and when
I found myself searching his countenance and believing him — that was the only proof I
needed then, though my instincts were later validated when the priest admitted it — I knew
that I had to make a heavy decision. Apart from the fact that as a then-sole practitioner I knew
I was facing a long fight with a large, well-funded institution with the best insurance lawyers
around, more importantly I had to decide how I felt about suing the Church. It would not be
easy — not easy work or easy justice or easy sleep — not easy at any level.
When all was said and done, it came down to this: the man needed my help. The criminal
statute of limitations had passed, the priest was still in ministry at a large suburban church
with a school, my client desperately needed mental health counseling and alcohol treatment,
and the Church was balking at doing much about any of this. Finally, this quietly tough man
wanted some measure of restitution and justice for what had happened to him. It was pretty
clear to me that the only way to accomplish all these things was civil litigation. So it came
down to this: he needed my help and I felt I could help him.
Besides, helping people with legal problems was my job! As I thought about the case, why
would I not take the case? Why, apart from cowardice? Sure this was THE Church — even this
Episcopalian understood that — but I believed then and believe now, even as a Christian, that
while the Church of Christ exists within a secular and not always friendly order, yet, as St. Paul,
St. Augustine, Bonhoffer, Lewis, and John Paul the Great had all in their different ways taught
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me, God could use even secular powers for His Good Will. Is that not one of the lessons of Our
Lord’s Passion — that God can use even a hostile regime to accomplish His purposes? Surely
we can with sure confidence seek secular justice, political or legal, even in difficult times or
circumstances, trusting God in the outcomes. Indeed, as a lawyer I had staked my vocation on
that principle. Now when the spiritual and emotional stakes were high was no time to aban-
don it.
So I took the case. True to my guess, it was a hard fight. Seven years later, after a trip
through the appellate courts to the Oregon Supreme Court, on the morning the trial was to
begin, we settled the case. In truth my client would have taken a fraction of the amount he
was offered that morning at nearly any time during the litigation, but the Church never of-
fered. They were apparently sure the law was on their side. I was deeply disappointed and
have never forgotten that the night before the Supreme Court argument, when no one was
looking and the Church had a chance to do the right thing and offer a fair settlement for seri-
ous and admitted abuse — which they could have done with the one small insurance policy
they had — they offered him the princely sum of $5,000.00. 
Now, since the day that man first walked into my office in 1994, I have heard the stories
and the sobs, the anger and the addictions, and the faith and the futility of nearly 100 other
men and women who were abused as children by priests, nuns, and lay leaders they trusted
from a Church they loved. Franciscans, Paulists, Redemptorists, Jesuits, Benedictines, Holy
Cross Fathers, and priests of nearly a dozen dioceses around the country. Most of the people
who came to me had already decided to seek civil justice in the only form our system pro-
vides: monetary restitution. Some I discouraged. Several I had to turn away, not because I did
not believe them, but because they were so mentally or emotionally ill that I could not be
sure of the truth, or because they would not commit to my strict and uncompromising rule
that they work hard and consistently in mental health counseling and, even more important-
ly, that, if addicted, they must start and stay in recovery.
Often I have tried to offer them the reassurance that it was not the Lord Jesus Christ who
abused them. Indeed, I tell those who will listen that He suffers with them. Some I gently ask
if they would like me to seek a process and dialogue for them to be in reconciliation with the
Church. Most do not. All I tell is that they are still beloved in the eyes of God no matter how
guilty or unlovely they may feel. Many cannot even hear that. So I just try to love them as
best an advocate and counselor at law can do, and quietly offer my own feeble and inconsis-
tent prayers. 
II. The Ironies
So that is how I got here. Now let me just mention in overview some of the most difficult
ironies I have encountered in these cases. There are several I could talk about, and while time
today will only allow me to touch upon one or two, perhaps the full list is itself instructive.
1. The irony of me as a person of faith and a very great sinner asking a secular jury to “judge”
the mistakes of others.  
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2. The irony of an advocate for religious liberty like me suing a church.
3. The irony of asking a secular jury to evaluate faith-based decisions under that vague civil
law concept of “negligence.”
4. The irony of asking a secular jury to punish a church that by its very nature is, and must
be, self-repentant.
5. The irony of asking a civil judge to decide issues of religious property ownership.
I will start with the first one that occurred to me.
1. Asking a Secular Jury to Judge Faith-based Decisions under Standards of “Negligence”
The problem that I saw occurred in the following context. Let’s say you have a superior or a
bishop, evaluating the likelihood that a troubled priest or an employee was rehabilitated. I
have seen situations where that is precisely the case.6 Let us assume a priest, making sincere
confession, has repented and promised that he will not offend again. Perhaps he has even
 obtained some counseling. A bishop, let us say, sincerely believes that the priest’s metanoia —
conversion and then repentance, “about faith” — is complete. So the bishop reassigns the
priest. Later, the priest re-offends. The bishop’s decision was objectively a mistake. At a deep-
er theological level, could I as a Christian “blame him” for his thinking? How did I feel about
asking a secular jury to evaluate this decision? Am I not asking a jury to pass secular judg-
ment on religiously based decisions, to call as negligence that very theological concept at the
heart of Christianity, the idea of grace that is at the very core of my own life and salvation?
My first considered response has to do with the limits of religious liberty in a civil society.
Neither concepts of canon law nor grace can be applied infinitely as a social matter. This is
why we have stoplights. Civil libertarians, especially, such as the Oregon Supreme Court in its
jurisprudence, have forgotten this, pretending that civil rights are absolute. However, as
Justice Scalia says, that is braggadocio— a lofty but somewhat naive myth that does not reflect
the reality of our society or traditions.7
Last year, I was asked to debate the ACLU’s Charlie Hinkle before the Portland City Club on
the question: Do We Have Too Much Free Speech in Oregon. I took the position that we do, and
used as examples the issues of money in politics, billboards along our freeways, and Oregon’s
ubiquitous adult entertainment industry; all to show that the citizenry want to regulate free-
dom of expression in response to a problem that they perceive to be significant.8 We simply do
not have “absolute free speech” in Oregon, nor should we. We do not allow free speech as we
are walking through security at airports, or for fraud in real estate deals, or the classic exam-
ple of yelling fire in a crowded theater. There are simply limits to all civil liberties. In the reli-
gious context, consider the prohibition of polygamy for members of the Mormon community
— the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-day Saints (LDS);9 consider fundamentalists who
will not treat their children with medicine;10 or consider a hypothetical religion that might in-
sists on sacrificing virgins. Our society has always understood that when your religious beliefs
hurt me — or hurt my child — you should be held accountable. I would submit that this “soci-
etal insight” is itself a product of natural law. I am quite sure that Augustine and Aquinas
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would say so.
Now as it has turned out in my cases, I most often have had an easier time of it than I
thought. The reality I found, more often than not, was that the decisions to transfer or reassign
a priest, far from being pure, prayer-soaked, considered opportunities for redemption, were
usually driven by prudential or even ignoble concerns for avoiding scandal or hiding problems.
Most bad decisions I have seen were not because a bishop or superior thought a man redeemed,
but rather because he thought the man not redeemed, and so the question was how to hide
his problem or limit the Church’s exposure. So much of my worry on this point has been a
false alarm — but I do acknowledge and imagine situations where the reality is as I feared.
The LDS Church, for instance, believe that repented sin must be forgiven altogether, that the
person becomes “white as snow,” and that old sins cannot be held against him in any way —
including assignments in and around the church. So you see the issue and the irony.
2.  Asking a Secular Jury to Punish the Church
The second sticky irony I want to mention is this one about asking a secular jury to punish a
Church that is by its nature self-reforming.
The theory of punitive damages is of course that a jury is asked to make a separate deter-
mination and a separate award of money sufficient to punish the institution, quite apart from
how much money it will take to compensate the victim. Although one hears a great deal of
talk about punitive damages, the truth is they are rarely awarded, and even more rarely up-
held by the higher courts. But the fact is, they are an important part of our legal system, be-
cause punitive damages are the most powerful tool civil justice has for reforming wayward or
irresponsible institutions. 
Yet, the irony I faced was this: the Church is the Body of Christ, supposedly inspired and
led by the still small voice of the Holy Spirit. Can we really force it to self-examination by the
blunt instrument of civil punishment? 
The next question I had to ask myself was this — how do I as a trial lawyer decide how
much “punishment” to ask from a jury? One of the lawyers going into the Archdiocese of
Portland bankruptcy had been ready to ask a jury to award $125 million in punitive damages.
Was that too much? How much is enough? How much is too much? More fundamentally,
how ironic is it that the changes in the Church over the last ten or fifteen years have been
driven, I would suggest, not by the prayerful introspection of theologians and bishops, but by
the practical and unlovely demands of insurers and risk managers and public relations con-
sultants. Is that what we want? 
Well, here as elsewhere, I have taken some solace in the idea that we are not actually pun-
ishing a church for its religious beliefs; rather, we are punishing a church for failing to live up
to them — temporal punishment, I would submit, being the natural consequences of tempo-
ral sin. In that sense we are asking a secular jury to hold the Church accountable to its own
principles. After all, the Church has always told its families, “your children belong here, they
are safe here. You can leave them with us. You can turn to us in times of trouble; you, single
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mothers; you, broken families. We will provide leadership and role models and good men for
your boys and good women for your girls. Trust us.” If the Church wants to say that to the
world — not just the membership, for let us not forget that every Church of Jesus Christ is a
church of outreach — if the Church advertises itself to society as a safe place for kids, while its
leadership knows that this is not so, why should the Church be exempt from the civil law of
punitive damages?  
This brings me to the question of religious exemption from general laws. As Justice Scalia
pointed out last night, as a matter of constitutional law, as religious people, do not come to a
civil judge or Justice and ask for a judicially created exemption from the general laws; rather,
convince your fellow citizens through the legislative process that you deserve one!11 I would
say the same thing in the context of punitive damages: convince your fellow citizens on the
jury that you have been redeemed, and no longer need punishment.  
For I eventually came to realize that the full wisdom of our system in a punitive damages
case is that both sides get to appeal to the jury. The very fine Church lawyers will get to stand
up and make the case that monetary punishment is not just, not necessary, that given all the
good the Church does for society, or all the changes that have been made, “ladies and gentle-
men of the jury, fellow citizens, you should not impose this harsh penalty.” At that point, the
Church is in the dock, pleading for mercy like so many other individuals or institutions that
have broken society’s laws. Again, do we believe that all truth is God’s truth? That all justice is
God’s justice? Aquinas did. Do we?
But, there is one more difficulty and it is quite profound. I have not fully worked this one
out yet. What if we are in such a cynical society, so hostile to religion in general and the
Church in specific, that the Church could never get a fair hearing? Several years ago I tried a
case in Marion County involving the Jehovah Witnesses. It took us two days to finally get a
fair jury selection because so many people were so outspokenly — almost proudly — preju-
diced against the Jehovah Witnesses.12
Ah well, that is a problem. One that scares me, not just for the Catholic Church, but for all
churches, indeed for all institutions of religious faith. For it is certainly true that — as has
been noted by thinkers Catholic and Protestant, Jewish and evangelical, Richard John
Neuhaus and Martin Marty, Rabbi Heschel and C.S. Lewis — when society no longer values
the institutions of religion as social institutions, when society believes that all religion must
be not only personal but private, with no public presence desired or permitted, then outright
persecution is not far behind. While I do not have this worked out in its entirety, I am of the
hunch that the answer lies somewhere in the mysterious idea uttered by the French novelist
François Mauriac. When asked in the 19th Century about the Church’s increasingly active role
in French politics, he said, “The Church gets involved in politics when she ceases to produce
enough saints.”13
I suggest an analogous thought: the Church fears juries and seeks protection in the bank-
ruptcy courts, when she ceases to bear enough fruit and produce enough saints to convince
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her fellow citizens of her value to society. The remedy for society’s distrust of the Church in
the 21st Century, I suspect, is not that different from what it was in the 1st Century. Go spread
the Gospel and shine the light, and convince the society around you of what you are truly about.
And, never, ever, ever again, allow such a cancer in your midst as the child abuse scandal. 
III. Conclusion: All Right, Then, I’ll Go to Hell
This is not a conference on the child abuse cases, but one on religious liberty; and so my
focus has not been on the realities of the child abuse cases. However, my duty to the men and
women to whom I promised to be their advocate requires me to simply remind you of the
child abuse scandal: how bad it was; how easy to forget, or minimize, or deny. Every person of
goodwill is outraged when they hear of the manipulations and betrayals foisted upon my
clients. Court reporters — women and men who have heard it all and are as a rule pretty im-
mune to the emotions of depositions — time and again in my cases would come to me after-
wards in tears and anger. So do not let my remarks today suggest that I am any less outraged,
or angry, or determined to obtain some measure of secular justice for my clients than I was
the first day my first client told me his story.  
That I have grappled with what it means to be a person of Christian faith suing the Church,
an advocate for religious liberty going after an institution that does immense good for society,
that I have agonized about it along the way — none of that means that I would do it differently,
or not do it. Indeed, if I had to choose between fighting for justice for these horribly damaged
men and women, or succumbing to the scruples I often have about suing the Catholic
Church, I would tell the scruples to go to hell, even if it meant that I went along with them.  
I am reminded of the scene in Huckleberry Finn,14 when Mark Twain gives us perhaps the
most poignant insight into Huck’s character, and indeed Twain’s own. Huck is trying to decide
whether to follow his own instincts, which tell him he must free the Negro slave Jim, or to
bend to the scruples of convention, which would mean to turn him in. In his confusion over
the source of his conscience, and of his scruples, he decides to follow his conscience and free
Jim, even if that ends up being the wrong choice. “All right, then, I’ll go to hell,”15 he says, in
what surely must be the high point of all American literature. I guess I would say the same
thing. If it is a sin to sue the Church for the crimes committed against children in its name, all
right then, I’ll go to hell. But if that is so, then as I plead my case before St. Peter, I will remind
him that Our Lord was heard to say: “Suffer the little children to come unto me, and forbid
them not: for of such is the Kingdom of God”16 and “whoever causes one of these little ones
who believe in me to stumble, it would be better for him to have a great millstone fastened
around his neck and to be drowned in the depth of the sea.”17
* Attorney Kelly Clark is a partner at O’Donnell & Clark L.L.P. in Portland Oregon. 
1 Antonin Scalia, Justice, U.S., Keynote Address at the University of Portland Garaventa Center Conference — The
American Experiment: Religious Freedom (April 12, 2007).
2 Howard M. Levine, Partner, Sussman Shank, L.L.P., Speaker at the University of Portland Garaventa Center
Conference — The American Experiment: Religious Freedom (April 13, 2007).  
3Matthew, 5:20-26 (English Standard).
103
R E M A R K K S  F R O M  A  P E C U L I A R  L A M P - P O S T
4 See, e.g., 1 Corinthians 3:1-17 (English Standard).
5 Pope John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae (The Gospel of Life), Encyclical Letter Addressed at St. Peter’s, Rome, Italy
(March 25, 1995). 
6 See, e.g., Kelly W.G. Clark, Kristian Spencer Roggendorf, & Peter B. Janci, Of Compelling Interest: The Intersection of
Religious Freedom and Civil Liability in the Portland Priest Sex Abuse Cases, 85 Or. L. Rev. 481, 490-494 (2006) (a classic
case of re-assignment after the priest has repented).
7 Scalia, supra. 
8 Kelly Clark, Address to the Portland City Club (Jun. 16, 2006), available at
http://www.oandc.com/20060616_clark_oregonfreespeech.php.
9 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
10 See, e.g., Jehovah’s Witnesses in State of Wash. V. King County Hosp. Unit No. 1, 278 F.Supp. 488 (D.C. Wash. 1967) (par-
ents objected to blood transfusion for infant based on religious belief).
11 Scalia, supra.
12 Checkley v. Boyd, 170 Or. App. 721, 14 P3d 81 (2000), rev. denied, 332 Or. 239, 28 P.3d 1174 (2001), and appeal after re-
mand, 198 Or. App. 110, 107 P.3d 651 (2005), and rev. denied, 338 Or. 583, 114 P.3d 505 (2005).
13 A.W. Richard Sipe, The Crisis of Sexual Abuse and the Celibate/Sexual Agenda of the Church, in Sin Against the
Innocents: Sexual abuse by priests and the role of the Catholic Church, 61 (Thomas G. Plante ed., Praeger Publishing,
2004).
14 Mark Twain, The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, in Tom Sawyer and Huckleberry Finn, p. 237 (Alfred A. Knopf
1991) (1884).
15 Id. at 473.
16 Luke 18:16 (King James).
17Matthew 18:6-7 (English Standard).
104
T H E  A M E R I C A N  E X P E R I M E N T:  R E L I G I O U S  F R E E D O M
RELIGION AS SPEECH
THE GROWING ROLE 
OF FREE SPEECH JURISPRUDENCE 
IN PROTECTING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
 B Y  M A R K  W.  C O R D E S *
Introduction
Most discussion of religious liberty, at least from a constitutional perspective, primarily focus-
es on the two religion clauses of the First Amendment — the guarantee of free exercise of reli-
gion and the prohibition against establishment of religion.1 Focusing on these two clauses is
not surprising, since they make specific reference to religion — that is their only concern —
and they address two common threats to religious liberty, government interference with reli-
gion, protected by the Free Exercise Clause, and government promotion of religion, protected
by the Establishment Clause. And, indeed, the religion clauses have played and will continue
to play an important role in protecting religious liberty in the United States.
Less appreciated, however, is the critical role of the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause
in protecting religious liberty. Although free speech, unlike the free exercise and establish-
ment clauses, is not intentionally designed to protect religious liberty, as a practical matter it
has done so often. In fact, when it comes to protecting a person’s or group’s right to exercise
religion, the Free Speech Clause has been used much more frequently than the Free Exercise
Clause. And this paper maintains that will be even more true in the future.
This paper explores the role of free speech jurisprudence in protecting religious liberty. It
is the thesis of the paper that not only has free speech jurisprudence played a critical role in
protecting religious liberty, but it will play an increasingly important one in the twenty-first
century. This is partly due to the changing jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, which has in-
creasingly focused on free speech protections and less on free exercise to protect religion, and
partly due to the changing nature of American society and culture. This latter factor, the
changing nature of American culture, refers to the growing dichotomy between a highly reli-
gious people and a highly secular culture. This has resulted in growing pressure to privatize
religious belief, which in turn often results in excluding religion from a variety of forums on
public issues. And it is exactly that type of discrimination against religion and religious views
that the Court’s free speech jurisprudence addresses.
The paper begins by briefly examining the historic role free speech doctrine has played in
protecting religious liberty through the mid-1980s — the start of the Rehnquist Court. Part two
will then discuss how during the Rehnquist Court era free speech became perhaps the pri-
mary vehicle to protect religious liberty. Although the Rehnquist Court, for the most part, fol-
lowed earlier holdings regarding religious speech, it changed the analysis in two significant
ways: first, by characterizing the exclusion of religious speech from public forums as view-
point, rather than subject-matter discrimination, and second, by making neutral treatment of
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religion the defining feature of the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Finally, part
three briefly discusses what this increasing focus on free speech as the primary basis to pro-
tect religion signifies what role it might play in the twenty-first century.
I. The Historic Role of Free Speech in Protecting Religious Liberty
Free speech doctrine has long played a central role in protecting religious liberty. In fact, reli-
gion and free speech have long had a strong, even symbiotic relationship. On the one hand,
free speech doctrine has long protected religious liberty, providing a doctrinal basis to protect
various religious activities. On the other hand, religion provided building materials for the
construction of free speech doctrine, especially in the early years of its development, the
1930s, 40s and 50s. It is not an exaggeration to claim that religious speech contributed, during
those critical decades, as much as political speech to the emergence of modern free speech
protection.
This symbiotic relationship was largely attributable to the zeal of one particular sect, the
Jehovah’s Witnesses, which was a frequent party to early Supreme Court decisions. Pursuant
to the dictates of their religion, the Jehovah’s Witnesses aggressively took to the streets, often
rubbing against both the sensibilities of their listeners and the boundaries of local laws. As a
result, the Witnesses often ended up in court, and had remarkable ability to argue their cases
all the way up to the Supreme Court, being a party in about twenty Supreme Court decisions
from the late 1930s to the early 1950s.2 More often than not they won, and in doing so the
Jehovah’s Witnesses helped to build the foundation of modern free speech jurisprudence.
Two cases are illustrative of the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ early role in advancing free speech
jurisprudence. In Lovell v. Griffin,3 a 1938 decision, a city ordinance in Griffin, Georgia, re-
quired that before anyone could distribute circulars, handbooks, advertising or literature the
person had to get written permission from the city manager. Alma Lovell, a devout Jehovah’s
Witness, violated the ordinance by distributing pamphlets and magazines without first getting
permission. She did not deny she violated the ordinance, but said that she was “sent by
Jehovah to do this work” and that to even apply for permission would have been “an act of dis-
obedience to His command.”
The United States Supreme Court agreed with Ms. Lovell that she did not need permission
to distribute the literature, but not because it violated her religion. Rather, the Court observed
that the permit requirement constituted a prior restraint on Ms. Lovell’s right of free speech,
and was, therefore, unconstitutional.4 This was one of the early decisions solidifying the
Court’s commitment to scrutinize prior restraints, and reflected that protections against prior
restraints went not only to the institutional press, but also to individuals distributing literature.
A second case was West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,5 which involved a state
law that required students to recite the Pledge of Allegiance. Barnette was a Jehovah’s Witness
whose religion said that it was wrong to pledge allegiance to anything or anyone but Jehovah,
and so refused to participate. The Supreme Court, in a 1943 decision, agreed with Barnette,
but grounded its reasoning not so much on religion as on free speech principles, stating:
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“If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty,
can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith within.”6 With this case, the Court
established what is now known as the compelled speech doctrine, which provides that the
right to free speech includes the right not to speak, and therefore a person cannot be forced to
espouse beliefs against his or her wishes.
These are just two examples from a large number of cases illustrating how these early free
speech cases involving the Jehovah’s Witnesses helped to protect religious exercise on the
one hand, but how they helped provide the materials to build a strong free speech jurispru-
dence on the other. In doing so, these early free speech cases established two important prin-
ciples regarding religious speech. First, the decisions left no doubt that the protections of free
speech, only then beginning to be recognized by the Court in a meaningful fashion, extended
in full to a variety of religious speech activities, most of which involved proselytizing in some
manner. Thus, the distribution of religious tracts, open-air preaching, and selling of religious
literature were all protected forms of speech.7 To the Court, trying to convert someone to
one’s religious beliefs was no different from converting someone to a political position. In
fact, the Court appeared not even to think twice about the religious content of the speech, au-
tomatically giving it the same protection as political or other speech.
The second principle to emerge from these early decisions that has proved to be very sig-
nificant for religious speech was the idea that when regulating speech government cannot
discriminate against speech because of its content. Although the Court indicated that govern-
ment can impose reasonable time, place and manner restrictions on speech to further impor-
tant government interests, it was quick to strike down regulations that created the potential
for content discrimination. The Court was especially sensitive in these early cases to discre-
tionary licensing schemes which required that a speaker get a government permit before en-
gaging in various forms of expressive activities. This, of course, constituted a prior restraint,
which is problematic to begin with, but the Court was also concerned that if the process for re-
ceiving a permit lacked appropriate standards, permits would be granted or denied based
upon whether the person issuing permits favored or disfavored the particular speech in ques-
tion. The Court’s decisions made it clear that the First Amendment would not tolerate the po-
tential for such content discrimination.8
The second of these two concerns, that government cannot discriminate when it regulates
speech, emerged over the next several decades as probably the central principle governing
free speech jurisprudence. On the one hand, the Court continued to recognize that govern-
ment can impose reasonable time, place and manner restrictions on speech to serve substan-
tial government interests, as long as the restrictions did not overly suppress speech and did
not regulate speech based on its content.9 On the other hand, almost all restrictions based on
content, with only a few exceptions, were held invalid. This was famously reflected in a 1972
decision, Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, where the Court stated, “government has no
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power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter or its content.”10
Using this mandate of content-neutrality, the Court struck down a large number of restrictions
on speech that turned on the content of the speech.11 This was true even where the restriction
was relatively modest and left plenty of alternative ways to communicate the message. The
restriction was still invalid if it treated some speech contents different from other speech con-
tents. Conversely, the Court upheld most restrictions on speech that did not turn on content,
as long as the restrictions served important government interests and left ample alternatives
for communication.
This growing emphasis on content-neutrality in regulating speech can be seen in two 1981
decisions involving religious speech, Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness12
and Widmar v. Vincent.13 In Heffron the Court reviewed a Minnesota state fair regulation
which prohibited the sale or distribution of literature within the fairgrounds except from a
designated booth. The International Society for Krishna Consciousness challenged the regula-
tion, arguing that the restriction interfered with its ability to practice its religion by distribut-
ing literature. The Court rejected the argument, finding that the restriction constituted a valid
time, place and manner restriction. Emphasizing that the restriction applied equally to all
speech, no matter what its content, the Court applied an intermediate standard of review,
finding that the restriction served a significant government interest in controlling crowds at
the fair and was narrowly tailored to serve that interest. Further, the restriction left adequate
alternatives for speech, since the regulation allowed the Krishnas to distribute literature and
solicit funds from a booth within the fairgrounds, and the Krishnas were free to pursue those
same activities unrestricted outside the fairgrounds.14
Therefore, although the Court declined to protect the religious speech in question, its hold-
ing was based on the substantiality of the state’s interest, the minimal impact it had on the
Krishnas’ ability to spread its message, and, most importantly, the fact the same restriction
applied to all other speech, no matter what its content. This was a standard analysis that had
emerged for analyzing restrictions on speech in public areas, and the religious speech was
simply treated the same as other speech, no better and no worse. Indeed, the Court went out
of its way to stress that religious groups do not enjoy any greater rights “to communicate, dis-
tribute, or solicit on the fairgrounds” than any other group with “social, political, or other
 ideological messages to proselytize.”15 Since the Krishnas were not being discriminated
against, and since the state had a substantial interest in regulating speech activity within the
fairgrounds, the regulation was upheld.
In contrast, in Widmar v. Vincent, the second of the 1981 decisions involving religious
speech, the Court held that a public university could not prohibit a religious group from using
campus facilities when the use of such facilities was extended to non-religious groups. In that
case the University of Missouri had permitted over a hundred different student groups, re-
flecting a wide-range of interests and opinions, to have access to campus buildings to meet.
However, university policy prohibited the use of campus buildings “for purposes of religious
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worship or religious teachings,” believing such a prohibition was required by the Establish -
ment Clause. For that reason the university refused to grant similar rights to Cornerstone, an
evangelical student group whose meetings consisted of prayer, singing, and Bible study.
The Supreme Court, in an 8-1 decision, held for the students, saying that exclusion of a stu-
dent group based on its religious speech violated the Free Speech Clause, while inclusion of a
religious group on the same terms as other groups did not violate the Establishment Clause.
The Court began its analysis by noting that the university was not obligated to open up its
 facilities to student groups, but once it did so it had to make them available on a content-
 neutral basis. Unlike Heffron, where the state had regulated speech on a content-neutral basis,
in Widmar the university violated that principle by treating religious speech less favorably
than other speech, which violated Cornerstone’s free speech rights.16 The Court also rejected
the university’s Establishment Clause argument, saying that providing equal access to reli-
gious speech did not violate the Establishment Clause, since it treated religion neutrally and
as such did not place the state’s imprimatur on religion.17
In one way, Widmarwas not a particularly surprising or eventful decision, since it was a
logical extension of previously recognized principles concerning religious speech. As noted
above, the Court had long included religious speech within the protections of the free speech
clause. Similarly, concerns about content discrimination had informed free speech doctrine
since the 1930s and 40s, and had emerged in the 1970s as perhaps the Court’s foremost con-
cern. Thus, to find that a university’s discrimination against a group because of the religious
content of its speech was unconstitutional was quite predicable and consistent with precedent.
Nonetheless, Widmarwas significant for three reasons. First, Widmar clarified that the
 protections of free speech went not only to religious proselytizing and preaching, activities
designed to engage others in dialogue and thus similar to other types of speech, but also in-
cluded such core religious practices as prayer and worship. Justice White’s lone dissent in
Widmar had argued that prayer and worship do not constitute speech in its normal meaning,
but the majority specifically rejected that position, stating that, “UMKC has discriminated
against student groups and speakers based on their desire to use a generally open forum to
engage in religious worship and discussion. These are forms of speech and association pro-
tected by the First Amendment.” The majority elaborated on this in a lengthy footnote, saying
that “[t]here is no indication when ‘singing hymns, reading scripture, and teaching Biblical
principles’ cease to be ‘singing, teaching, and reading’ — all apparently forms of ‘speech,’
 despite their religious subject matter - and become unprotected ‘worship.’”18
Second, the Court reaffirmed the content-neutrality requirement, but did so in what is now
known as a designated or limited public forum context. In previous cases the Court had inval-
idated government procedures that required a permit before engaging in speech activity,
such as a parade, if permits might be granted or denied based on speech content, and had also
struck down content restrictions in traditional public forums like streets and sidewalks. But in
Widmar the Court held that even if government is not required to open its facilities to speech,
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once it voluntarily chooses to create a speech forum, it cannot discriminate against speech be-
cause of its content. This is significant, since the role of traditional public fora, such as streets
and parks, is declining as centers of speech activity, while in the future limited public forums,
voluntarily created by the state, are likely to play the greater role as facilitators of speech.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Court held that providing equal access to reli-
gious speech, as mandated by the Free Speech Clause, did not violate the Establishment
Clause, even when it resulted in religious worship on public property. Although the Supreme
Court had long protected religious speech, Widmarwas the first case where extending protec-
tion to religious speech began to rub up against the Establishment Clause. In finding that
granting equal access to a religious group would not violate the Establishment Clause, the
Court applied the three-part Lemon test, quickly noting that the first and third prongs were
easily met, since an equal access policy has a secular purpose of non-discrimination and
would avoid excessive entanglement with religion. Thus, the only issue was whether provid-
ing equal access to religious groups would have a primary effect of advancing religion. The
Court concluded it would not, for two reasons. First, an equal access policy would not confer
the state’s imprimatur on religion since it would simply be treating Cornerstone the same as
any other student group. Second, since over 100 student groups participated in the university’s
open forum, the forum’s primary effect was not to advance religion, absent a showing that re-
ligious groups would dominate the forum.19
Taken as a whole, Widmar reflected a strong emphasis on the need to treat religion neutrally,
with a certain symmetry between the Free Speech and Establishment Clauses. On the one
hand, content-neutrality is mandated by the Free Speech Clause, and therefore excluding a re-
ligious group from a state-created speech forum violates free speech. On the other hand, to
treat a religious group neutrally, giving it the same access as other student groups to a speech
forum, mitigated any Establishment Clause concerns that might exist when religious speech
occurs on public property. In particular, neutral treatment dissipates any perception of en-
dorsement and minimizes any primary effect of advancing religion when part of a larger
forum. Yet the Court did not apply a neutrality test per se in analyzing whether an equal ac-
cess policy would violate the Establishment Clause, and its analysis suggested that even a
neutral treatment of religion might be unconstitutional if religious groups dominated a
forum. This emphasis on neutrality, though only partial in Widmar, became central over the
next quarter century, particularly in the religion jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court. 
II. The Rehnquist Court, Neutrality and Religious Speech
By the 1981 decisions in Heffron and Widmar, content-neutrality had become a central focus
in analyzing free speech rights, including religious speech, and played a significant, though
not dispositive role in Establishment Clause analysis. During the Rehnquist Court this em-
phasis on neutrality became even more pronounced, with the Court largely taking a view of
religion as a co-equal participant in our nation’s public life, to be neither favored nor disfa-
vored. This resulted in an even more pronounced shift to free speech, and away from free ex-
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ercise, as the dominant protection of religious liberty.
The Court’s increasing protection for religion as speech is reflected in four primary cases:
Westside Board of Education v. Mergens, Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School
District, Rosenburger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, and Good News Club v.
Milford Central School. All four cases had generally the same fact pattern. Each involved a pub-
lic school, ranging from elementary to a four-year university, and in each case the school
 decided to create what could be viewed as a forum for speech purposes, in two cases only for
students themselves and in two others for community groups and organizations. In each case,
however, the school denied access to religious speech because of perceived Establishment
Clause problems. And in all four cases the Court said, as it had earlier said in Widmar, that to
deny access to a group because of the religious content of its speech violated the Free Speech
Clause, and to grant equal access to religious speech eliminated any Establishment Clause
concerns that might otherwise exist. Although Widmarwas certainly strong precedent for
each of the cases, the Court in fact extended the level of protection previously recognized in
Widmar.
The first case in which the Rehnquist Court employed this analysis was Westside Board of
Education v. Mergens,20 in which a high school permitted about thirty student clubs to meet on
campus, but denied permission to a Bible study club because school officials believed recog-
nizing a student religious group would violate the Establishment Clause. The students sued
under the “Equal Access Act,” a federal statue that in effect extended the protections of Widmar
to high school campuses. In essence, the Act said that once a school opened up a forum for
student clubs, it could not exclude a group based on its content, specifically mentioning reli-
gious clubs as one example. The Supreme Court held for the students, finding that exclusion
of the Bible study club violated the Equal Access Act, and that permitting the group to meet as
part of a broader forum of student groups did not violate the Establishment Clause.
Because the Court analyzed the students’ speech rights under the Equal Access Act,21 the
majority did not directly address constitutional free speech rights as such. As a practical mat-
ter, however, the case had strong constitutional overtones, in part because the Act itself was
largely based on the Court’s own analysis in Widmar. There was little doubt that the Congres -
sional purpose in passing the Act was to extend to high school students the same rights the
Court had recognized for college students in Widmar. This point was made clear by a concur-
ring opinion by Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, that said the Equal Access Act
simply codified what was already constitutionally required under the Free Speech Clause —
prohibiting discrimination against religious clubs on the basis of content.22 Justice O’Connor’s
plurality opinion also strongly hinted at the Free Speech overtones of the opinion.23
In regard to the second issue, whether granting equal access to the Bible study club violated
the Establishment Clause, the Court made clear what was suggested in Widmar: that neutral
treatment of religion in a public forum does not violate the Establishment Clause. No single
opinion commanded a majority of the Court on that issue, but a focus on neutral treatment of
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religion meeting the Establishment Clause ran through various opinions. Justice O’Connor’s
plurality opinion for four members of the Court stressed that the basic message of the Act was
“one of neutrality, not endorsement; if a State refused to let religious groups use facilities
open to others, then it would demonstrate not neutrality but hostility toward religion.”24
Justices Scalia and Kennedy, although not agreeing with the endorsement analysis used by
Justice O’Connor, nevertheless agreed that the neutral treatment of religion, in which reli-
gious speech was treated the same as other speech, met the dictates of the Establishment
Clause.25 Taken as a whole, Mergens clarified the premises implicit in Widmar: religious
speech must be provided equal access to speech fora, and such neutral treatment of religion
does not violate the Establishment Clause.
This same analysis was seen three years later in Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union
Free School District,26 when the Court again held that excluding religious speech from a desig-
nated forum violated the Free Speech Clause. In that case a school district policy permitted
use of school facilities for various community groups, but specifically excluded religious uses
on the grounds that it would violate the Establishment Clause. A church requested to use a
school building to show a film series on child-rearing, which would clearly have been a per-
mitted use of the building except for the religious content involved. For that reason the request
was denied, and the church sued. As it had in Widmar, the Court held that excluding the church
from a state-created speech forum violated the Free Speech Clause, and permitting the
church on equal terms as other community groups did not violate the Establishment Clause.
The Court began it analysis with the free speech issue, assuming, without deciding, that
the school’s policy only created a limited public forum. Even under that narrow understand-
ing of the school district policy, the Court said the church’s speech rights had been violated,
since denying access to the church constituted not just subject-matter discrimination, but also
viewpoint discrimination, considered the worst form of speech restriction and almost always
invalid. The Court rejected the idea the restriction was viewpoint neutral, even though it
treated all religious views on child-rearing the same. Instead, the Court noted that the subject
of child rearing was clearly permissible under school regulations, so the Church’s request was
denied solely because it planned to address the topic form a religious viewpoint.27
The Court further held, as it had in Widmar and Mergens, that permitting the church to use
the facility on the same terms as other community groups did not violate the Establishment
Clause. As it had in Widmar, the Court stressed that under the circumstances of the case there
was “no realistic danger that the community would think the District was endorsing religion
or any particular creed, and any benefit to religion or to the church would have been no more
than incidental.”28 In a very cursory fashion it also noted the Lemon test was met.
Two years later, in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia,29 the Court
again addressed exclusion of religious speech from a state-created forum. In that case the
University of Virginia provided funding for certain student publications, but specifically pro-
hibited religious publications from receiving any funding, stating that direct financial support
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for religion violated the Establishment Clause. In finding the policy excluding religious
speech unconstitutional, the Court began its analysis by noting that the university in effect
had created a public forum, which required that any restrictions be content-neutral, which
the policy violated. Moreover, relying on its analysis in Lamb’s Chapel, the Court viewed the
prohibition on funding religion as not just content-based, but viewpoint based, stating: 
By the very terms of the SAF prohibition, the University does not exclude religion
as a subject matter but selects for treatment those journalistic efforts with religious
editorial viewpoints. Religion may be a vast area of inquiry, but it also provides, as
it did here, a specific premise, a perspective, a standpoint from which a variety of
subjects may be discussed and considered.30
Earlier in the opinion the Court had labeled viewpoint discrimination as a “blatant” and “egre-
gious” form of content discrimination, and thus it was clear the student rights had been violated.31
The Court also found that providing equal funding to religious publications would not vio-
late the Establishment Clause, since it treated religion neutrally under such a scheme. The
Court began its Establishment Clause discussion by stating, “[a] central lesson of our decisions
is that a significant factor in upholding governmental programs in the face of Establishment
Clause attack is their neutrality towards religion.”32 The Court noted this principle also ap-
plied to free speech equal access cases, stating that it had “more than once” rejected the idea
that the Establishment Clause prohibited “extend[ing] free speech rights to religious speakers
who participate in broad-based government programs neutral in design.” On that basis the
Court held that including a religious publication in the funding program would not violate the
Establishment Clause, since it would simply be treating religion neutrally, rather than prefer-
entially. This was true even though it meant that government monies would go to an explicit-
ly religious activity, a traditionally sensitive area of Establishment Clause jurisprudence.33
A final and very recent case (2001) illustrating how content-neutrality protects religious
speech and at the same time avoids Establishment Clause concerns is Good News Club v.
Milford Central School.34 In that case a school district adopted regulations identifying several
purposes for which local schools could be open to public use, including “instruction in any
branch of education, learning or the arts,” and for “social, civic, and recreational meetings and
entertainment events.” Pursuant to that policy, a local “Good News Club,” a Christian organi-
zation for young children, sought permission to use the building after school. A typical meet-
ing would include learning and reciting Bible verses, singing songs (presumably Christian),
hearing a Bible story, and closing with a prayer. Although school policy permitted other
groups, such as the Boy Scouts, to use the building, the school refused permission for the
Good News Club to meet because of the religious nature of the meetings.35
As in the previous cases, the Supreme Court held that excluding the religious group from a
state-created public forum violated the Free Speech Clause, and permitting the group to use
the building on the same terms as other groups did not violate the Establishment Clause. The
Court began its free speech analysis by recognizing that at a minimum the school had created
a limited public forum, which required that speech restrictions not discriminate on the basis
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of viewpoint and be reasonable. Relying upon its previous analysis in Lamb’s Chapel and
Rosenberger, the Court held that excluding religious groups from the forum constituted view-
point discrimination and was thus unconstitutional. The Court stated that it was clear, under
the school’s guidelines, that any group that “promotes the moral and character development
of children,” such as the Boy Scouts, is permitted to meet. Therefore, the Good News Club was
seeking to address a subject otherwise permitted under the guidelines, moral and character
development, from a religious perspective. The effect of the policy was to exclude a particular
viewpoint (religious) on moral and character development, and, therefore, violated the
group’s free speech rights.36
The Court then addressed the Establishment Clause issue, concluding, as it had in previous
cases, that permitting the Good News Club to meet on the same terms as other groups would
not violate the Establishment Clause. The Court began by noting that the Establishment
Clause issue was essentially the same one addressed in Lamb’s Chapel and Widmar, both of
which clearly established that granting religious speech equal access to a school-created
forum did not violate the Establishment Clause. The Court also noted, as it did in Rosenberger,
that a significant factor in Establishment Clause analysis is neutrality toward religion, and
“because allowing the Club to speak on school grounds would ensure neutrality, not threaten
it,” the school “face[d] an uphill battle in arguing that the Establishment Clause compels it to
exclude the Good News Club.”37 Finally, the Court said there was no coercive pressure to par-
ticipate in club activities, since the decision to participate was up to parents, not children.
The Court’s decision in Good News Club, its most recent decision regarding religious
speech, largely reinforces the previous holdings of the Rehnquist Court: that excluding reli-
gious speech from state-created fora violates the Free Speech Clause, and giving religious
speech equal access to such fora does not violate the Establishment Clause. Indeed, as noted
earlier, the genesis of the free speech rights analysis can be traced back to the public forum
cases of the 1930s, 40s, and 50s, and the Court’s 1981 decision in Widmar,which essentially set
out the basic Free Speech and Establishment Clause analysis that was later affirmed in Mergens,
Lamb’s Chapel, Rosenberger, and Good News Club. These Rehnquist Court cases, therefore, did
not so much take the Court in a new direction as affirm and solidify earlier doctrine and
analysis.
In two important respects, however, the Rehnquist Court took religious speech rights a step
further and strengthened the protection given to religious speech. First, whereas Widmar had
treated the exclusion of religious speech as content-discrimination, the Court in Lamb’s Chapel,
Rosenberger, and Good News Club characterized it as viewpoint discrimination, a much more
problematic form of speech discrimination, and one that is almost inevitably unconstitutional.
It is important to emphasize how significant this characterization is. Although any type of
content discrimination is problematic, the Court has often stressed that viewpoint discrimina-
tion is a particularly troublesome type of discrimination. Professor Rodney Smolla, a leading
First Amendment scholar, puts it this way in his treatise: “The doctrinal difference between
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content-based discrimination and viewpoint discrimination is certainly significant. Content-
based discrimination normally triggers strict scrutiny (or some other form of heightened
scrutiny), often resulting in the law being held unconstitutional. But laws that engage in view-
point discrimination have even tougher going.”38 The Court in Rosenbergermade this same
point, stating that “[W]hen the government targets not subject matter, but particular views
taken by speakers on a subject the violation of the First Amendment is all the more blatant,”
and labeling viewpoint discrimination “an egregious form of content discrimination.”39
Thus, it is no small matter that the Court in these cases began characterizing the exclusion
of religious speech as not just exclusion of religion as a category of speech, but rather as exclu-
sion of religious viewpoints on a variety of broader social issues. The Rehnquist Court made
that change by viewing each of the fora in question as addressing particular social issues, but
excluding the religious viewpoint in each. In Lamb’s Chapel it was discussion of child-rearing,
in Rosenberger it was a variety of political and social issues, and in Good News Club it was char-
acter and moral development. Thus, what might be superficially seen as merely excluding a
particular speech content — religion — is reconceptualized as exclusion of particular view-
points — religious — on a broad set of issues addressing society. The consequence is to pro-
vide an even greater level of protection to religious speech than had previously existed.
The second way in which the Rehnquist Court solidified the use of free speech to protect
religion was in how it handled the Establishment Clause issue — an issue that is inevitably
presented in these types of cases. What was implicit in Widmar, that the neutral treatment of
religion would not violate the Establishment Clause, became more overt in the Rehnquist
Court years. This was particularly true in Rosenberger and Good News Club, where the Court
made neutrality the central factor in its analysis and which almost, but not quite, guarantees
the Establishment Clause is not violated if religion is treated the same as other speech, no bet-
ter and no worse.
Perhaps even more significant, however, were the fact-pattern in those two cases, which in-
volved areas in which the Court had often closely scrutinized government involvement with
religion. In Rosenberger this involved use of government monies to fund an overt, even blatant
religious message. In Good News Club it was overtly religious activity, such as prayer and
Bible study, in the context of an elementary school, where students are the most impression-
able. Both of these are highly sensitive Establishment Clause areas, in which both historical
understandings and the Court’s own jurisprudence suggest any government association with
religious activity should be closely scrutinized. Yet in both of these contexts the Court essen-
tially said the neutral treatment of religion, as required by the Free Speech Clause, would
trump any Establishment Clause concerns.40
Finally, in order to appreciate fully the ascendancy of free speech protection for religious
liberty, a brief word should be said about what was happening to Free Exercise jurisprudence
during this period. As previously stated, religious liberty has long been protected more under
the Free Speech Clause than under Free Exercise. Yet there was about a three decade period,
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beginning with Court’s opinion in Sherbert v. Verner in1963, in which the Court provided sig-
nificant protection under the Free Exercise Clause, reflected at first in Sherbert and later in
cases such as Yoder v. Wisconsin41 and Thomas v. Review Board.42 Under these cases, once a re-
ligious adherent showed that a government law or regulation resulted in a substantial burden
on religion, even if only incidental, then the government had to show a compelling interest in
not granting an exemption to the affected believer.
This analysis, which accommodated religious beliefs that would be uniquely burdened by
general rules, was rejected by the Rehnquist Court’s 1990 decision in Employment Division v.
Smith.43 In that case the Court held that an Oregon statute that made use of peyote a crime
could be applied against a Native-American even when used as part of a religious ritual. In
finding that the Free Exercise Clause was not even implicated under the facts of the case, the
Court reshaped its Free Exercise analysis by stating that neutral laws of general applicability
do not even trigger free exercise protection, even if the law imposes a substantial burden on
religion. Rather, the Free Exercise Clause is triggered only when government targets religion
as such.44
Although the Court characterized its analysis as consistent with prior cases, the reality was
that Smith dramatically changed the way the Court went about deciding free exercise cases.
Whereas, before the focus was on the burden on religion, now the focus is on the nature of the
regulation. Burdens on religious exercise that are incidental to general laws are not protected;
only when religion is targeted is it the case that there is a free exercise burden. For all practi-
cal purposes, this parallels the Court’s neutrality analysis in the free speech cases. As such, re-
ligion has no special constitutional claim to special treatment.
Although seen by most as a setback for religious liberty, the Smith decision arguably af-
firms the Court’s view of religion set out in the free speech cases, one in which religion is a
co-participant in America’s public life. The free speech cases say that as a co-participant,
 religion cannot be excluded from public life, but the Smith decision says religion, as a co-
 participant, is not entitled to special constitutional protection. Read together, they suggest
that religion must take the bitter with the sweet that neutrality brings; being a co-participant
in America’s public life means religion cannot be disfavored, but, after Smith, it also suggests
it is not constitutionally given preferential treatment. 
III. Reflections on What This Might Mean
Let me conclude by offering a few thoughts on what the Court’s increasing use of free speech
doctrine to protect religious liberty might mean, briefly touching on two issues: (1) what
these cases say about how the Court views the role of religion in American life; and (2) how
the Court’s increasing focus on free speech, rather than free exercise, fits with the challenges
religion will face in the twenty-first century.
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A. How the Court Views Religion
In his keynote speech at this conference on Saturday, noted constitutional scholar Douglas
Kmiec concluded his remarks by imagining that a visitor from another galaxy is given Supreme
Court cases on religion and, based on what those cases say, asked to describe religion. Kmiec
suggested that this visitor would likely conclude, based upon those cases, that religion is divi-
sive, coercive, irrational and empty. And indeed, there is language and ideas in various
Supreme Court opinions that would lend support to each of those views.
But let’s assume that our visitor from another galaxy is instead given the Rehnquist Court
cases regarding religious speech, and in particular Mergens, Lamb’s Chapel, Rosenberger and
Good News Club, and asked how the Court views religion. The answer would be very different
from the description given by Kmiec. Rather than seeing religion as a threat to American
 values, the visitor would likely conclude that religion should be a full co-participant in
America’s public life, to be received on the same terms as any other world view or value sys-
tem. This general view of religion, which clearly flows from the Rehnquist Court’s religious
speech cases, would include the three following corollaries: 
(1) religion is not intended to be merely a private affair, but has a public dimension to it;
(2) religious views have the same right to influence society as any other view; and 
(3) as long as government treats religion equally and neutrally, religion is not a danger or
threat to society.
This, of course, differs dramatically from Kmiec’s description of how the Court views reli-
gion, but I believe is more in line with the Court’s actual view of religion’s role in American
society. Although the Court remains skeptical about government involvement in and promo-
tion of religion, it is much more positive about religion per se and its role in American life.
Religion is a valued co-participant in America’s public life, and has the same right to influence
the direction of the nation as any other belief or value system.
This view of religion as co-participant in America’s public life is reflected in two aspects of
the Rehnquist Court jurisprudence. First, by characterizing the exclusion of religious speech
as viewpoint discrimination, the Court not only increased the level of protection given to reli-
gious speech, but sees that speech through a slightly different lens. Rather than viewing the
cases as merely excluding religion as a subject, the Court has consistently seen the exclusion
as excluding religious views on various societal concerns: child-rearing, character and moral
development, and social issues. From this perspective, government is creating speech fora for
the purpose of discussing various issues, and the impact of denying access to religious speech
is to exclude the religious viewpoint on those issues. The Rehnquist Court made clear, however,
that religion has an equal right to participate in those debates.
The second way the Rehnquist Court strongly reinforced religion’s right to be a co-participant
was by not allowing the Establishment Clause to shut the door to religion’s participation in
such debates. Many people, including some scholars, latch on to the concept of separation of
church and state as in fact shutting the door to religion’s participation in broader societal dis-
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cussions, at least to the extent such discussion is taking place under the rubric of government
sponsorship, as in public schools. But the Court, by emphasizing a neutrality analysis, eliminated
the idea of the Establishment Clause as a barrier, saying the Constitution’s basic concerns are
addressed by treating religion the same as everyone else — in other words, allowing it to par-
ticipate on the same terms. As mentioned before, there is a nice symmetry here — the neutral-
ity that is mandated by free speech is sufficient to mitigate Establishment Clause concerns.
Finally, the Rehnquist Court’s view of religion as a full co-participant in America’s public
life came with a cost, which is some sacrifice of protection under the Free Exercise Clause. As
noted earlier, the Smith case essentially applied the same neutrality analysis to Free Exercise
as was being applied in the Free Speech and Establishment Clause contexts. But here the effect
was to provide less, not more protection for religious liberty. Still, Smithwas arguably consis-
tent with viewing religion as a co-participant in America’s public life, simply recognizing that
religion must take the bitter with the sweet.
B. Religion’s Challenges in the Twenty-First Century
Finally, I want to discuss how the Court’s emerging use of free speech doctrine to protect reli-
gious liberty fits in with the challenges religion faces in the twenty-first century. For a sub-
stantial part of our nation’s history, religious liberty faced two primary threats — government
attempts to interfere with religion and government attempts to establish or promote religion.
Although both concerns remain to some extent today, neither one poses the substantial threat
that it did in the past. This is largely a result of our nation’s increased sensitivity to religious
diversity and tolerance on the one hand, and the extent to which the ideal of separation of
church and state has been engrained in the American consciousness on the other.
For example, although government interference with religion still occurs, it is attenuated
compared to previous periods in our history. There are few instances today where govern-
ment intentionally interferes with religion;45 our societal emphasis on toleration and diversity
precludes that for the most part. The more likely type of interference occurs from general
laws which have incidental, yet substantial burdens on religion, such as occurred in Smith.
Even here, however, our societal emphasis on tolerance and respect for religious diversity
make it likely that legislation itself will accommodate unique religions, an option that the
Smith Court said was permissible and consistent with the Establishment Clause. Indeed, after
Smith the state of Oregon itself passed an exemption for the religious use of peyote.
Similarly, concerns about government promotion of religion, though certainly very real
today, are but a shadow of what they were in earlier periods of American history. There are
no serious efforts to establish official state churches, as existed at our founding and for several
decades thereafter and there are no efforts to recognize Christianity as our official religion, as
periodically occurred throughout the nineteenth century. Even efforts to pass a serious con-
stitutional prayer amendment have largely run out of gas, and the type of civil religion that
government identifies with is so void of meaningful substance as to not make it a threat to
anyone. Even the religion in public school issues that continue to plague the courts, and will
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undoubtedly do so for years to come, today tend to be quite nuanced and at the margins, a far
cry from the earlier cases of children reciting state-composed prayers. 
What is likely to be the real challenge for religion in the twenty-first century is government
and societal efforts to privatize religion. As suggested above, American society has certainly
reached the point where it respects, or at least tolerates, a variety of religious faiths, and is not
inclined to deliberately interfere with any of them. At the same time, however, there is a
growing sense on the part of many people that religion is and should remain a private matter,
and in particular kept away from influencing America’s public life. This is in part a result of
the growing dichotomy in the twentieth century between a highly religious people and an in-
creasingly secular culture, with American cultural values being less and less influenced by
the religious values of its people. As a consequence, many people believe that religion, though
important, should be a private matter. This perception finds reinforcement in misunderstand-
ings of the Establishment Clause and the related idea of separation of church and state.
This growing movement to privatize religion has been well-documented by others, with
perhaps the leading voices being Richard John Neuhaus and Stephen Carter. Neuhaus’s 1983
book, The Naked Public Square,46 detailed and discussed the growing tendency to privatize
faith in this country, to make the public square devoid of religious influence. A decade later
Carter repeated this theme in The Culture of Disbelief,47 using the phrase “God as a hobby” to
describe societal attitudes toward religion: religion is fine as long as it is kept to yourself.
Central to both writers is the idea that society sees religion as irrelevant to broader societal
concerns and is increasingly excluding religion from the public square.
Even if Neuhaus’s and Carter’s claims are a bit overstated, I think their basic point has
 validity: there is a growing sense in this country that religion should be a private matter. It is
perhaps displayed most prominently in the current debate over the role of religion in politics,
with many suggesting it is inappropriate for people of faith to bring their religious values into
the political arena. But it is also seen in the types of cases the Rehnquist Court reviewed, in
which government created a forum for speech but excluded religious speech.
In this context, I believe that the Court’s growing emphasis on free speech jurisprudence is
particularly appropriate for this new century, because it addresses what might well be the pri-
mary threat to religious liberty: efforts to privatize religion, resulting in discrimination against
religion in public life. Not only is free speech doctrine well-designed to protect against the
specific types of discrimination that might take place, as seen in the school forum cases, but it
also sets a tone and communicates a broader message to society, that religion should be
viewed as a full co-participant in America’s public life. It serves as a reminder of who we are
as a people and the constitutional commitments that we embrace, which include a commit-
ment to treat all value systems, including religious ones, with equal respect and dignity. 
Conclusion
Protection of religious liberty and the development of free speech doctrine have long been in-
tertwined, dating back to the 1930s and 1940s when modern free speech jurisprudence began
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to emerge. The central role of free speech jurisprudence in protecting religious liberty came
to full fruition in the Rehnquist Court years, however, when the Court adopted a strong neu-
trality analysis for religion issues. While this resulted in diminished protection under the Free
Exercise Clause, it solidified the protection given religion under free speech. In particular, in a
series of cases the Court consistently characterized exclusion of religious speech from public
speech fora as viewpoint discrimination, thereby providing religious speech the highest pro-
tection possible. At the same time, the Court consistently held that the neutral treatment of
religious speech avoided any Establishment Clause concerns, even in contexts which the
Court has traditionally considered highly sensitive.
This emphasis on neutrality is well positioned to address many of the challenges religion
faces in the twenty-first century. While America is now increasingly tolerant of different reli-
gious faiths, there is also a perception by many that religion remain private and out of public
life. The Court’s free speech jurisprudence makes clear, however, that religion is a co-partici-
pant in America’s public life, and attempts to exclude religious views from public discussion
and debate are unconstitutional.
*Mark W. Cordes is a law professor at Northern Illinois University College of Law.
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AMERICAN CIVIL RELIGION 
IN AN AGE OF
RELIGIOUS PLURALISM
 B Y  A N N  W.  D U N C A N *
I. Introduction
Few would deny that September 11, 2001 changed the United States of America in fundamen-
tal ways. Countless books in fields such as religious studies, sociology, political science and
history have been written in the past five years in an attempt to help the American public,
and perhaps the authors themselves, understand the reasons for this attack and how to pre-
vent similar attacks in the future. For scholars of religion, this has brought into clear focus the
vital importance of recognizing and reckoning with the growing religious diversity within our
country and the increasing globalization which brings America into conversation with other
cultures, and, therefore, other religions throughout the world. This type of interaction re-
quires not only knowledge and understanding of these other religions but also understanding
of the aspects of American culture, and even Judeo-Christian religion, which are seen as an
affront to many of the cultures with which we seek to cooperate. September 11th was an attack
on America in a real and a figurative sense. Though Osama bin Laden and his cohorts form
only a small fraction and an extreme minority of the Islamic faith and Arab world, their criti-
cism of American politics and ideology must be taken seriously. The ability of the United
States to overcome the ideological and cultural conflicts that led to September 11th and to play
a role in international and inter-religious cooperation towards a peaceful world depends first
on its ability to find such harmony within American borders.
Numerous scholars of religion have addressed the growing religious diversity and plural-
ism within the United States, even before 2001. Arguing for various ways in which this diversi-
ty can be welcomed and integrated it into our national ethos, these scholars present rather
optimistic views of the future and a clear belief in the possibility of cooperation. Yet, one must
also consider the effect of this growing diversity and 9/11 on the national creeds and mytholo-
gies that shape our view of our own country and the world. This paper attempts to examine
these effects and put various theories of pluralism and civil religion into conversation with
each other in the context of our present circumstances. Beginning with the proposition that
there exists an “American civil religion,” I will detail Robert Bellah’s articulation of this idea in
his work from the 1960s. I will then survey scholarship on the subject of pluralism and civil
religion since Bellah and discuss the state of pluralism and the American civil religion in the
post-9/11 world. In a country increasingly aware of its unprecedented religious diversity and
a country changed by the events of September 11, 2001, which was perceived to be a religious
attack by the perpetrators, the America civil religion described by Bellah in 1967 is inevitably
shifting and must fundamentally change in order to continue to give the United States a sense
of identity and purpose in the modern world. Only with a new understanding of the myths of
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America can the United States put forward an identity accessible to all its citizens and not
 fatally objectionable to its enemies. With such a change, new questions inevitably arise about
the continuing relevance or possibility of a unified civil religion.
II. The Theory of American Civil Religion
A. Bellah Revisited
Though scholars and religious individuals have articulated similar theories in the past and
since, perhaps the clearest and most enduring articulation of the concept of the American
civil religion comes from Robert Bellah.1 In his 1961 book, The Broken Covenant: American
Civil Religion in a Time of Trial, Bellah defines civil religion as “that religious dimension, found
I think in the life of every people, through which it interprets its historical experience in the
light of transcendent reality.”2 The American civil religion is thus the means by which
Americans understand, in light of the transcendent, American history, purpose and action.
According to Bellah, the founders clearly understood the United States to be a country chosen
by God but in a conditional manner that required faith and virtue and responsible use of
power.3 Finding examples of this rhetoric throughout American history, Bellah quotes
Herman Melville who writes, “we Americans are the peculiar, chosen people — the Israel of
our time; we bear the ark of the liberties of the world” and points to Lincoln’s second inaugu-
ral address as the single greatest expression of this understanding of covenant and judgment
in American history.4
In 1967, Bellah elaborated on this concept of the American civil religion in an article enti-
tled “Civil Religion in America” published in the journal Daedalus. This civil religion, he
writes, “exists alongside of and rather clearly differentiated from the churches” and thus
should be studied in much the same way as more traditional religions.5 As a religion, the civil
religion contains rituals and symbols, which combine religious language with American polit-
ical ideals and principles. Bellah points to Rousseau’s understanding of the social contract as
one of the first articulations of civil religion and he cites political documents such as the
Declaration of Independence and presidential speeches for evidence of civil religious language.
Bellah argues that the president acts as the primary figurehead for the religion and thus has a
duty to both his people and to God. Beyond the president, all Americans have “the obligation,
both collective and individual, to carry out God’s will on earth.”6
Bellah anticipates and addresses concerns that this civil religion constitutes a violation of
the separation of church and state. Though this separation makes more specific religious ref-
erence unconstitutional, Bellah writes, “The separation of church and state has not denied the
political realm a religious dimension.”7 This religious dimension necessarily manifests in a
rather generic and nonspecific language, consistent with the understanding that more specific
articulations of faith are appropriate in the private realm. Bellah describes the God of the civil
religion as fitting this general model. The word God does not refer to a particular religion but
becomes “a word that almost all Americans can accept but that means so many different
things to so many different people that it is almost an empty sign.”8 Bellah describes this God
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as “not only rather “Unitarian,” he is also on the austere side, much more related to order, law
and right than to salvation and love … He is actively interested and involved in history, with a
special concern for America.”9 Thus, the non-specificity of this God does not diminish belief
in His real presence within and care for the lives of Americans. Moreover, this special con-
cern translates into a sense of “chosenness” and responsibility for the American government
and its citizens.
In The Broken Covenant, Bellah moves beyond simple description of this theory and ad-
dresses the status of this civil religion in the 1960s. Addressing demographic changes in the
country, Bellah argues, “if we are to survive our third time of trial, encouragement of a broad
range of experiments with cultural symbols and styles of community may be essential.”10
“Yet,” he continues, “we have broken our covenant with God by allowing our greed to drive us
and by denying freedom to portions of our citizenry.”11 This failing has become increasingly
clear to Americans, leading Bellah to conclude, “The illusion that our power allows us to be
the world’s policeman is now gone and there is the growing realization that our relative power
in the world is in decline.”12 Though Bellah argues that the civil religion “is still very much
alive,” he cautions against dangerous trends that may lead to the end or perversion of this sys-
tem.13 In his later Daedalus article, Bellah describes the 1960s as the third time of trial since
the nation’s founding. The first trial was the struggle for independence, the second, the de-
bate over slavery and the present conflict being to determine America’s role in the world.
Bellah cautions, “Gradually, but unmistakenly, America is succumbing to that arrogance of
power which has afflicted, weakened and in some cases destroyed great nations in the past.”14
He calls for a greater sense of humility and awareness of “higher judgment” to keep the power
of the civil religion in check.15
Despite these potential abuses of the power and moral righteousness possible through civil
religion, Bellah remains optimistic and finds hope for America in the very diversity that chal-
lenges its sense of identity. He argues that to emerge from this time of trial, America requires
a “new set of symbolic forms” which would draw inspiration from traditions other than exclu-
sively Judeo-Christian religions. Since the civil religion appeals to a transcendent reality
rather than the America government, changes in American reality do not necessarily mean a
disruption or end of the civil religion. Thus, Bellah advocates “a world civil religion,” which
“has been the eschatological hope of American civil religion from the beginning.”16
B. Post-Bellah Perspectives
Writing in the 1960s, Bellah naturally drew from his perception of the America of his time —
an America facing the civil unrest of the 1960s and a new awareness of and interest in non-
Western religious and cultural traditions. As America has continued to change politically, de-
mographically and otherwise, perceptions of civil religion naturally have changed as well. In
1994, the American Academy of Religion gathered a forum of four historians of American reli-
gion to respond to a series of questions regarding the applicability of Bellah’s thesis for the
modern day. Their responses were published in the journal, Religion and American Culture
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and provide a telling array of perspectives and critiques of Bellah’s ideas. Phillip E. Hammond,
who played a large role in the initial conceptualization of civil religion, argues for the exis-
tence of “legitimizing myths” rather than “civil religion” because the former “invites the ques-
tion ‘How do you understand it?’ rather than ‘Does it exist?’”17 Amanda Porterfield argues that
Bellah was more effective in influencing a generation of religious studies scholars than in de-
scribing reality.18 Suggesting that Bellah’s theory has lost its utility, James Moseley argues that
events such as the Vietnam War, the Watergate scandal, the end of the Cold War and growing
economic and environmental concerns have increased public distrust of the government and
weariness about any sense of divine destiny or providence.19 Finally, Jonathan Sarna argues
that despite the deserved and enduring influence of Bellah’s work on religious studies, many
of his claims were overstated. He sees Bellah’s essay as more expressive than analytic, mani-
festing a desire for unity in a fractured America. Though Sarna concedes that Bellah’s princi-
ples continue to have relevance, he feels they do not take into account the large-scale social
clashes more aptly described in Robert Wuthnow’s The Restructuring of American Religion.20
While these scholars portray Bellah’s ideas as a relic of the 1960s and more idealistic than
practical, other scholars find his theory to be as applicable today as when it was first articulat-
ed. Perhaps the most systematic and substantial post-Bellah treatment of the American civil
religion comes in Richard T. Hughes’s 2003 book, Myths America Lives By. In this book, Hughes,
integrating the experiences of minorities such as African Americans, looks at the evolution of
American myths over time.21 Currently, Hughes argues, Americans are faced with the chal-
lenge of understanding the events of 9/11 in a way that makes sense within the framework of
civil religion. For Hughes, the answer lies in understanding our past. In what he construes to
be the most recent phase in an evolution of understandings of American myth, post-World
War I America has been characterized by a belief in its own blamelessness. Hughes writes, 
Americans are committed to creating for themselves a perfect world in a golden
age that has little to do with the messy contents of human history with which so
many people in so many other parts of the world must deal every day, especially
the realities of tragedy, suffering, and death.22
He points to the examples of Mormonism and the Disciples of Christ, as case studies of those
who when challenged by catastrophes of the last two centuries, attempted to restore a golden
age and innocence. Hughes finds political manifestations of this idea in President Wilson’s
characterization of the United States as the pinnacle of civilization and a force against evil and
in President Roosevelt’s similar rhetoric in World War II. Furthermore, movements such as
the Civil Rights Movement represent attempts to expand the American creed to include a
greater segment of the population.
Though he recognizes the potential pitfalls of such an ideology, Hughes argues that these
myths “hold great potential for good.”23 Particularly during times of war and national stress
and catastrophe, Americans naturally and necessarily “absolutize” those myths that give
meaning to the national identity.24 Thus, while America certainly needs to reevaluate national
myths to reconcile them with failures in the past and changes in the nature of the nation, the
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civil religion can be salvaged and used for good. Hughes writes, “A true revolution of American
values will not call on Americans to scuttle their national myths. Rather, a true revolution of
values might well ask Americans to embrace the myths in their highest and noblest form.”25
Hughes’s portrait of myth making throughout American history provides a tidy and opti-
mistic counterpart to Bellah’s account of the 1960s. In fact, Bellah wrote the forward to
Hughes’s book. Yet, neither Bellah nor Hughes fully addresses the dramatic increase in reli-
gious pluralism and globalization that have characterized the past century generally and the
past decade in particular. While American failings, such as denying African-Americans access
to the American creed, have been addressed and overcome through internal social move-
ments such as the Civil Rights Movement, current challenges to the creed are more global
and widespread than before and, in some ways, beyond the grasp of American citizens’ efforts
at grassroots, political and social revolution. 
Moreover, such a smooth transition from Bellah to Hughes fails to account for real changes
in the nature of civil religious language. While Hughes refers to turning points in understand-
ings of the civil religion, he fails to adequately account for the fact that fewer and fewer
Americans now ascribe to the somewhat puritanical understanding of a God who stands in
judgment over His people. Greater religious diversity combined with political disruptions
such as Vietnam and Watergate complicated this understanding of covenant. Even the Civil
Rights Movement appealed to a God different from that of the founding fathers. This God was
more loving and inclusive rather than judgmental and this led to a very different type of rela-
tionship than that suggested by Bellah. 
III. Theories of Religious Pluralism and Globalization
A. Early Theories
While diversity has certainly been a constant throughout American history, public percep-
tions of this diversity have changed dramatically. Whatever the limitations on modern toler-
ance and pluralism might be, the general public of the modern United States allows for great
diversity of belief, appearance and culture than even fifty years ago. As illustrated in Josiah
Strong’s 1885 book, Our Country: Its Possible Future and Its Present Crisis, nativist sentiment
has pervaded American history, particularly during times of increased immigration and
 diversification. Fearing the negative moral, economic and demographic effects of immigration,
Strong advocated for a reassertion of Anglo-Protestant values and hegemony throughout the
nation. After outlining the “perils” of immigration, “romanism,” and Mormonism, among others,
Strong discussed the role of the Anglo-Saxon race in bringing to the world the twin values of
liberty and “pure spiritual Christianity [italics original].”26 By combining civic and religious
language in this way and pointing to American Anglo-Saxon Protestants as the caretakers of
the world’s future, Strong tied his calls for homogeneity to civil religious ideas. He used his
text to demonstrate “that such dependence of the world’s future on this generation in America
is not only credible, but in the highest degree probable.27
By the mid-20th Century, it was clear to most Americans that the United States was no
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longer an exclusively Protestant or even Christian nation. The world wars played a sizable
role in moving the country past the polarizing tensions between nativists and immigrants. As
American troops, aid agencies and religious congregations mobilized for the war efforts, pre-
viously isolationist or foreign-labeled groups proved their loyalty to America in words and ac-
tions and the country united against a common enemy. In the context of the Cold War and
growing concern over “atheistic communism” a greater toleration of religion-in-general
emerged. Will Herberg’s Protestant-Catholic-Jew aptly exemplified this change in perceptions
of diversity. Cited by virtually every recent account of religious diversity in America, this
book has served as a counterpoint to broader, more inclusive studies in the late 20th and early
21st centuries.
Herberg centered his thesis on the premise that “both the religiousness and the secularism
of the American people derive from very much the same sources,” namely a biblical,
Abrahamic tradition with a similar vision of God and morality.28 Responding to early theories
of America as a “melting pot,” he pointed to a melting along three separate veins, thus creating
three melting pots — Protestant, Catholic and Jewish.29 As more and more non-Protestants
are American-born, these individuals have clung to their religious identity as a mark of dis-
tinctiveness.30 As a result, Herberg argued, America has developed a unique type of plural-
ism: “While the unity of American life is indeed a unity in multiplicity, the pluralism this
implies is a very special kind. America recognizes no permanent nation or cultural minori-
ties.”31 The three faiths hang in balance, held together by a common belief in the “American
Way of Life,” which Herberg defines as “a spiritual structure, a structure of ideas and ideals, of
aspirations and values, of beliefs and standards [which] synthesizes all that commends itself
to the American as the right, the good, and the true in actual life.”32
Herberg speaks indirectly of a structure or ideology analogous to Bellah’s civil religion. He
writes, “Insofar as any reference is made to the God in whom all Americans ‘believe’ and of
whom the ‘official’ religions speak, it is primarily as sanction and underpinning for the
supreme values of the faith embodied in the American Way of Life.”33 In this way, regardless
of specific religious affiliation (though within the boundaries of his three categories), the cen-
tral and overriding “religious affirmation” of Americans remains the belief that “religion is a
‘good thing,’ a supremely ‘good thing,’ for the individual and the community.”34 For Herberg,
this “faith in faith” becomes as important or even more important for Americans than any
specific creed. This common belief allows disparate groups to coexist and find unity in spite
of religious difference.
Herberg goes further to argue that because religious belief is vital to being an American, it
is unsurprising that religion plays a larger part in any construction of national purpose.35 This
pattern of decrease in foreignness with affirmation of religion and interfaith cooperation
based on the act of faith alone paints a rather harmonious picture of inter-religious relations.
However, Herberg discusses the concerns and disruptions within Protestantism as it moves
from being the single dominant faith to one of three. Herberg ultimately has faith that
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Protestants will be able to overcome the uneasiness in support of the national cause. Largely
as a function of the demographic particularities of his time, Herberg does not seem con-
cerned in including “God-centered” as an inoffensive and inclusive marker for this generic
faith.36 Certainly, this is a reflection of the emphasis on theistic religion as opposed to “god-
less” communism during the 1950s. As non-theistic religions become more visible and popu-
lar, such an assumption becomes problematic.
B. Pre-9/11 Theories
Several sociologists and historians of American religion responded to the greater scope of reli-
gions differing in conceptions of God as well as practice and ethnicity in the years between
Protestant-Catholic-Jew and 9/11. Robert Wuthnow’s The Restructuring of American Religion ex-
emplifies this literature on religious pluralism that seeks to address the effects of these demo-
graphic changes in the pre-9/11 world. During this time, the conflicts that arose between
religious groups were often local or of small scale and thus seemed more able to be overcome.
In his study, Wuthnow argues that religion remolds and reshapes itself to respond to the
world rather than being a stable force shaken by changes around it. From this understanding,
Wuthnow defines religion as a social institution, motivated by theological and philosophical
beliefs, which maintains a mutually influential relationship with the world in which it func-
tions. He denies that religion is either secularized or stagnant but argues that it is a dynamic
force, which changes in response to immigration, war, growing diversity and social and politi-
cal debates. The primary catalyst in religious change is the emergence of cross-denomination-
al groups with specific goals and purposes that bring religious individuals together to cooperate
in ideologically charged liberal and conservative organizations. 
Wuthnow indicates that this “restructuring” within American religion and politics will nat-
urally have an effect on American myths. He writes,
The tenets of America’s legitimating creed naturally bear some relation to the reli-
gious opinions and practices of the American people. If religion is deeply valued in
the private sentiments of its people, the nation’s public culture is also likely to re-
flect the value attached to these sentiments. And if organized religion undergoes a
series of restructuring events — if it becomes polarized — then the legitimating
myths of the nation at large my also be subjected to certain tensions and modifica-
tions.37
Wuthnow suggests that greater changes in demographics have led to changes in the American
civil religion. Rather than a force of unity, “It has instead become a confusion of tongues
speaking from different traditions and offering different versions of what America can and
should be.”38 The primary competing civil religions are first, a liberal mythology based upon
common beliefs about humanity and, second, a conservative mythology based upon refer-
ence to the Bible or God. What continuity Wuthnow sees in the civil religion lies in principles
such as freedom — a theme that is hard to affirm or disaffirm.39 However, descriptions of the
undeniability of the principle of freedom combined with Wuthnow’s suggestions of a more in-
ternational civil religion fail to anticipate problems that arose in the post-9/11 world. It has be-
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come clear that America’s international enemies find this type of internationalizing identity
and mission and as well as claiming of values such as freedom to be imperialistic and hypo-
critical.
Discussing similar demographic changes but focusing on the concept of pluralism, Diana
Eck has contributed substantially to this conversation. As director of the Pluralism Project at
Harvard University, Eck remains one of the most vocal and well-known advocates of greater
awareness of American religious pluralism and a more rigorous and active embodiment of
pluralistic ideology throughout the country. In the Pluralism Project literature as well as her
2001 book, A New Religious America, Eck begins with a description of the very diversity upon
which she bases her prescriptions for America. Rather than focusing on Judeo-Christian faith
communities, she presents stories of weekly worship in Buddhist meditation centers and
Hindu temples throughout the American heartland and describes the freedoms and chal-
lenges that these groups have faced in living as religious minorities. Eck also profiles the
neighbors of these religious communities, thus attempting to show the greater awareness of
Asian religions, in particular, throughout the country.
The result of numerous surveys, sociological and demographic studies and field work with-
in these religious communities, Eck’s conclusions about the existence and depth of religious
diversity in the United States lays the groundwork for her real argument in this project. Her
main concern is how Americans should and, in reality, do react to this diversity. Though she
does not dwell on negative reactions to diversity (as this would get in the way of her other-
wise optimistic perspective), Eck does outline some of the difficulties in integrating these
new faiths and perspective into American society. In particular, she notes the difficulty with
Muslims who, for Christian and Jewish Americans are “cousins and neighbors” — tied togeth-
er by a common Abrahamic heritage but also differing on the most fundamental of beliefs.40
She points to “visible difference” as the key problem for Americans who are hesitant to accept
these new communities though whether this problem is anything new in America is up for
debate.41 Yet, Eck believes the nation can overcome any hesitancies or prejudices that might
exist. 
As Eck rightly notes, to truly become a harmoniously diverse nation, toleration is not
enough. Moving beyond toleration, true pluralism means, “Great diversity is not simply toler-
ated but becomes the very source of our strength.”42 Regardless of how our nation has been
perceived in the past, Eck suggests,
The twin principles of religious freedom and non-establishment provide the guide-
lines for something far more valuable than a Christian or Judeo-Christian nation.
They provide the guidelines for a multi-religious nation, the likes of which the
world has rarely seen. The presence of new neighbors of other faiths in America
has made crystal clear both the strength of these twin principles and the need to
reaffirm them again and again.43
While Eck appropriately recognizes that religious freedom, as defined in the Constitution,
 allows for a wide variety of religious expressions beyond Judeo-Christian faiths, the reality of
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the application of this principle in the past is also important to recognize. The visible differ-
ence Eck cites as the source of much intolerance has been a continual problem in America
and one that the public has heretofore not been able to overcome. Whether or not theorists or
even governmental officials choose to adopt a broader and more inclusive application, public
opinion determines the ways in which these principles are understood within the very
American cities and towns profiled in the Pluralism project. Moreover, recent studies such as
Phillip Jenkins’s The Next Christendom have show that most new immigrants to the United
States are conservative Christians. 
C. Post-9/11 Theories and the Challenges of Pluralism
Certainly, Eck’s work has become all the more relevant in the years following September 11,
2001. While Eck finished this book prior to the attacks, her book includes a preface written
after the attacks, which essentially reaffirms the vital importance of pluralism. Joining the
conversation, numerous other historians and sociologists have described the changing land-
scape of American religion and what this means for our national identity. William Hutchinson’s
Religious Pluralism in Americamirrors Eck’s position in some ways as he addresses the need
for an appropriate response to the fact of greater diversity. Presenting a more complex situa-
tion than Eck’s however, Hutchinson distinguishes between pluralism and toleration, and
openly recognizes the difference between the existence of diversity and how we deal with this
diversity. Surveying American history, he notes three steps to pluralism: “pluralism as tolera-
tion,” “pluralism as inclusion” and “pluralism as participation.”44
Hutchinson suggests that Americans will have to offer the same toleration they require for
themselves, let go of ideas of “chosenness” in a narrow Judeo-Christian sense and allow for a
broader definition of what it is to be an American and what behaviors and beliefs are accept-
able within that definition. Yet, Hutchinson also recognizes that such a change can be “deeply
traumatic.”45 To make the transition less traumatic we must not only accept these changes but
also ingrain pluralistic ideas within our national identity. Though we have evolved as a nation
from the extreme nativism of Josiah Strong, nativist fears and resistance to new religious
trends and communities will always constrain our acceptance of pluralism. Noting this reluc-
tance, Hutchinson writes, “Americans today are being dragged — sometimes kicking and
screaming, sometimes in a state of calm and genuine persuasion — into the realities not just
of today, but of the early nineteenth century. We are playing catch-up.”46
In this way, despite his realism concerning the lack of pluralistic perspectives in the country’s
past, Hutchinson does seem to follow Eck in finding a basis for pluralism and toleration with-
in the religious ideals that have been used to limit toleration. He argues that pluralism must
become not “a practical necessity” but “an allowable, perhaps a necessary, element in theistic
religion.”47 He directly references Bellah’s description of the American civil religion and
writes, “a renewed civil religion cannot be constructed without a frank and strong affirmation
of pluralism as a major principle, even if it is not the only principle involved.”48
Also calling for a renewal of civil religion, Barbara McGraw’s 2003 book Rediscovering
131
A M E R I C A N  C I V I L  R E L I G I O N
America’s Sacred Ground: Public Religion and Pursuit of the Good in a Pluralistic America recog-
nizes that America has moved from a melting pot of assimilation to a society which embraces
multiculturalism and tends toward moral relativism in an effort to be inclusive. In the face of
these trends, McGraw advocates a return to John Locke’s idea of social contract as “America’s
Sacred Ground.” Thus, McGraw finds the sacred not only in the transcendent or otherworldly
but also in the basic rights, values and principles that bind our society together. The danger
today is a failure to recognize these values and abide by them. She writes, “Our political
framework is a fragile one; its survival depends wholly on a people who recognize that our
enemy is not so much a force from outside our boundaries, but our own ignorance about what
grounds the American system.”49 Thus, McGraw sees a real possibility of a renewed American
myth accessible to Americans in all their diversity and as powerful as its more explicitly reli-
gious manifestations.
Focusing more on the problem than possible solutions, sociologist Robert Wuthnow’s re-
cent book America and the Challenges of Religious Diversity surveys American responses to
 diversity. Like William Hutchinson, Wuthnow argues that the recent change in America has
not been an increase in diversity but rather a change in American’s perceptions of diversity.
A greater awareness of difference is due to “mass communications, immigration, and our na-
tion’s role in the global economy.”50 In pointing out this awareness, Wuthnow admits he is not
attempting to resolve this tension but to show that it is a “significant cultural challenge” that
cannot and, perhaps, should not be overcome.51 However, he does find many elements of the
current situation troubling. Through extensive surveys of public perceptions of diversity,
Wuthnow finds that, in the wake of 9/11, “many Americans regard religions other than their
own as fanatical, conducive to violence, close-minded, backward, and strange.”52
Acknowledging the challenges of diversity and the continued reluctance of others to truly
engage with and accept varying belief systems, Wuthnow makes prescriptions for future im-
provements. He argues that the current problem is not the existence of difference but the fail-
ure of our population to really confront and deal with these differences. Thus, he argues
America needs to adopt a “reflective pluralism” which moves beyond “shallow” statements
about belief in toleration or a desire to see religious leaders work together. Instead, “for a soci-
ety truly to make informed decisions about how pluralistic it wants to be, its leaders and citi-
zens must devote time and energy to thinking about the question.”53
While the key figures in discussions of civil religion and pluralism in the pre-9/11 years
have not written extensively after this attack to fit this event into their arguments, Robert
Bellah and Diana Eck have offered comments in prefaces or forwards to more recent works
by other authors. Neither, however, suggests real changes to their previous articulations of the
problems and possibilities of civil religion or pluralism in the wake of September 11. As
Robert Bellah articulates in his forward to Hughes’s Myths America Lives By, “America is the
center of a new kind of empire and responsible for the whole world. Our reaction to
September 11 suggests we are far from ready for that responsibility.”54 Thus, in the present sit-
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uation, we must ask “To what extent can we help America become a responsible empire and
to what extent must we stand against empire altogether?”55 In many ways, the present conflict
is, for Bellah, a continuation of the third time of trial he first described in the 1960s.
Also showing remarkable continuity in response to an event some might see as proof of
the overly optimistic nature of her theory, Diana Eck weighed in on the issue of pluralism
after 9/11. Eck provided the preface to Barbara McGraw’s and Jo Renee Formicola’s 2005
Taking Religious Pluralism Seriously: Spiritual Politics on America’s Sacred Ground, a collection of
essays framed around the ideas articulated in McGraw’s 2003 book. For Eck, the primary
 effect of September 11 on American pluralism was that it brought “a new consciousness of the
transformation of American society.”56 She sees this event as an opportunity to learn more
about other religions, particularly Islam, which would then lead to greater cooperation be-
tween Muslims and other Americans. She also sees this event as a rallying point, a unifying
event that encourages Americans to work together to disavow “indiscriminate violence
against neighbors of any faith or culture.”57
In stark contrast to Eck’s continuously optimistic tone, which continues to allow for a posi-
tive role for religion and religious cooperation in the future, Sam Harris’s controversial book,
The End of Faith, finds such a positive role impossible. Directly responding to the violent seg-
ments of Islam which dominate the modern news and were responsible for the 9/11 attacks,
Harris argues that religious toleration in the modern age is not only unwise but harmful. He
begins his argument with the simple suggestion that the primary problem with faith in gener-
al is its inability to be proven. While, in theory, peacefully, uninvolved faithful individuals are
not a problem for society, the fact that religions can be so destructive means that they are not
acceptable in the modern world and must be justified through appeal to fact. Harris writes,
I take it to be self-evident that ordinary people cannot be moved to burn genial old
scholars alive for blaspheming the Koran, or celebrate the violent deaths of their
children, unless they believe some improbable things about the nature of the uni-
verse. Because most religions offer no valid mechanism by which their core beliefs
can be tested and revised, each new generation of believers is condemned to in-
herit the superstitions and tribal hatreds of its predecessors.58
In contrast to scholars such as Eck who advocate the freedom to worship in private and a
duty of all Americans to tolerate, learn about, respect and cooperate with those of other faiths,
Harris argues that faith is no longer a private concern. These violent manifestations mean
that society has a duty to challenge rather than accommodate.59 This accommodation is espe-
cially problematic in relations between the Abrahamic faiths. Instead of recognizing common
heritage and seeking to learn about the Muslim extremists who act against America, Harris
writes, “It is time we acknowledged that no real foundation exists within the canons of
Christianity, Islam, Judaism, or any of our other faiths for religious tolerance and religious
 diversity.”60 This rather extreme perspective contrasts sharply with the vast majority of schol-
arship on these issues but points to the important problem of negative manifestations of reli-
gion in the modern world and the question of whether religious motivations, no matter how
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generic or inclusive, can be, for political action, inherently and fundamentally dangerous.
IV. American Civil Religion in an Age of Pluralism and Globalization
Scholars writing in the period between Bellah’s essays and the modern day interpretations have
created innumerable shades of gray in addressing the relevance of civil religion in a pluralistic
society. However, putting these different theories into conversation with one another and
with the current political and international situation illuminates certain holes in these argu-
ments and further complexities in finding an answer. On a basic level, many elements of Bellah’s
civil religion remain in our political reality today. For example, Bellah points to inaugurations
as prime examples of civil religious language and “an important ceremonial event in this reli-
gion [that] reaffirms, among other things, the religious legitimation of the highest political au-
thority.”61 Demonstrating the prevalence of religious language found throughout his public
speeches, President George W. Bush, ended his second inaugural address by remarking 
America, in this young century, proclaims liberty throughout all the world, and to
all the inhabitants thereof. Renewed in our strength — tested, but not weary, — we
are ready for the greatest achievements in the history of freedom. May God bless
you and may He watch over the United States of America.62
Beyond basic reference to God, Bush frequently refers to the sense of divine providence and
responsibility for the world, particularly in reference to the “War on Terror.” In his 2006 state
of the union address, Bush juxtaposed this vision of America with the competing vision of ter-
rorism and concluded, “The only alternative to American leadership is a dramatically more
dangerous and anxious world.”63
While the language of providence carries over from the early years of America, the nature
of this providence has changed. In The American Jeremiad (1978), Sacvan Bercovitch describes
the understanding of providence prevalent in early articulations of civil religion. He defines
the American Jeremiad as a system of thought prominent in both political speeches and ser-
mons in early America, which focused on the humility and fallibility of the people, the power
of God and the covenantal relationship between the country and its God. From the first immi-
grants and continuing into the nineteenth century, political sermons and public speeches de-
cried the woes of a backsliding people and the sure punishment they would face. This
promise of castigation for wrongdoing was combined with an intense and “unshakable opti-
mism” of the promise of the country.64 Combining Hebrew Bible understandings of God’s
judgment and covenantal promise for a chosen nation, these jeremiads provoked both humility
and a sense of duty. While modern articulations of American providence certainly carry on
this idea of divine mission and duty, the element of humility and human fallibility has been
lost. This central feature has ramifications, not only for a nation to self-monitor its religious
and political actions but also for a nation to promote a positive international image.
In addition to changes in the meaning of providence, the use of the term “God” has changed
as well. While the same word is used, it is important to ask the nature of this God and the
generic character of this language. Several scholars note the tendency toward non-specificity
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but few have truly noted the problems that arise when non-theistic religions and increasing
numbers of those with an interest in “spirituality” over organized religion become a viable
presence in America. No matter how generic this God may be, those who do not subscribe to
a single deity or any deity at all will not find value in such a myth. Perhaps, in a more pluralis-
tic world, Phillip Hammond is right in suggesting that it is now more appropriate to talk about
a “legitimating myth” rather than a “civil religion.” This change in language would allow for
non-religious myths and remove the rather sticky and uncomfortable problem of creating a
religious language acceptable to all Americans. In many ways, this is what Barbara McGraw is
suggesting as well in finding the basis for a renewed, modern civil religion in political and
moral values, which do not have specific religious content.
While this seems an attractive answer in light of the current problems of pluralism and in-
ternational relations with the Islamic world, it seems unlikely that such a set of values would
be enough to mobilize and inspire individuals and create a sense of national identity in the
same way as religious language. Bellah emphasizes the importance of a deity for the system
of civil religion through his reference to Abraham Lincoln’s second inaugural address as the
most poignant and lasting articulation of the civil religion. Bellah points to Lincoln’s descrip-
tion of “covenant and judgment” as two central aspects of the civil religion — two aspects un-
explainable without a deity with which the country has made a binding agreement and to
which the nation must answer for its misdeeds.65
It is this lack of awareness of judgment and fallibility that Bellah recognizes as the central
problem in the “third time of trail.” While this continues to be a substantial problem in modern
America, Bellah’s view towards the future falls apart with his assertion that belief in American
hegemony is fading rapidly. He writes, “the illusion that our power allows us to be the world’s
policeman is now gone and there is the growing realization that our relative power in the
world is in decline.”66 While the United States has lost much of the sense of divine judgment
vital to a constrained and responsible civil religion, this space has been filled by an overem-
phasis on the idea of divine providence. As Bush’s statement in his second inaugural address
illustrates, America’s political leaders often describe America, in political rhetoric, as the
good, the fair and the just while the enemy is described as the antithesis — evil, depraved and
barbaric. Just five days after the 9/11, Bush outlined his plan to catch and punish the perpe-
trators of the attacks and terrorists in general by appealing to their opposition to American
values. He remarked, “they can’t stand freedom; they hate what America stands for.”67
Similarly, other theorists have failed to anticipate the current political climate in America.
In 1994, James Mosely argued, “the end of the Cold War removed any sense of a common
enemy — without the jubilation of an earned victory — leaving only unfocused remnants of
belief in American destiny.”68 Clearly, this statement is no longer relevant in the wake of
9/11. Bush frequently talks explicitly of the enemies of America and transparently seeks to
rally Americans against this enemy. In his September 16, 2001 speech, Bush ended by saying
that “we’ve never seen this type of evil before.”69 He clearly sets up a dualism between the
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United States and evil, thus elevating the United States and turning the “War on Terror” into a
battle between good and evil.
Forgiving Bellah for not being able to see forty years into the future, his cautionary re-
marks remain important both in demarcating the appropriate limits of modern civil religion
and in the way some of his concerns have been realized. The dualistic rhetoric outlined by
Bellah further reinforces the question of appropriate exercise of power and responsibility.
Anticipating the problem’s inherent in irresponsibility and arrogance, Bellah writes,
The civil religion has not always been invoked in favor of worthy causes … With
respect to America’s role in the world, the dangers of distortion are greater and the
built-in safeguards of the tradition weaker … The issue is not so much one of impe-
rial expansions, of which we are accused, as of the tendency to assimilate all gov-
ernments or parties in the world that support our immediate policies or call upon
our help by invoking the notion of free institutions and democratic values.70
This description will likely be eerily familiar to modern Americans who witness American in-
volvement throughout the country and an aggressive agenda to spread democracy and other
American ideals to other countries.
While scholars such as Robert Wuthnow argue that the civil religion needs to have a more
international focus, it is this internationalism that many see as a problem. Perceiving this in-
volvement as undesirable, increasing numbers of individuals throughout the world, particu-
larly in extreme segments of Islam, are reacting against America’s actions motivated by the
American civil religion. For individuals such as Osama bin Laden, the religious elements of
American identity, perceived or real, combined with this evangelization of democracy are in-
herently offensive and imperialistic. Speaking even as early as March 1997, bin Laden articu-
lated his criticisms of the United States. He argued that the collapse of the Soviet Union,
“made the U.S. more haughty and arrogant, and it started to see itself as a Master of this world
and established what it calls the new world order.” He goes to say, “wherever we look, we see
the U.S. as the leader of terrorism and crime in the world.”71 While bin Laden certainly does
not hold a majority opinion in the Islamic world, recent history testifies that his influence is
substantial and his ability to affect American lives and security remains unquestionable.
Moreover, his is not the only voice against America. The existence of such a sentiment in
even a minority of the world’s population raises questions as to the positive use or perhaps
perversion of civil religion in modern America. 
If such a perversion is, in fact, the current reality, what then is the solution? Robert Wuthnow
has suggested a “reflective pluralism” which involves an emphasis on respect and “a principled
willingness to compromise.”72 While this certainly seems a reasonable goal for American indi-
viduals and small communities dealing with the growth of new religious communities as
 detailed in Eck’s book, the global application becomes more troublesome. In the current ex-
ample of the “War on Terror,” the language of good and evil has limited the possible outcomes
of the conflict and limited the possible actions of the government. A fundamental and dramatic
change in the way civil religion manifests in political language and international relations
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would be needed in order for this level of respect and compromise to be realized. 
If such a change were possible, what would American civil religion look like? On a national
and international level, Americans would need to embrace a “cultural pluralism” such as
Jewish-American philosopher Horace Kallen articulated in the 1950s. According to Kallen,
 diversity must be recognized and valued to avoid cultural conflict. “Cultural pluralism,” then,
“designates the orchestration of the cultures of mankind which alone can be worked and
fought for with least injustice, and with least suppression or frustration of any culture, local,
occupational, national or international, by any other.”73 Thus, both recognizing and respecting
difference in religion and culture becomes the cornerstone for a national and international
identity for America. 
Yet, successful recognition of diversity is not enough. In his description of the challenges to
civil religion, Robert Bellah called for a new “Great Awakening” which he characterized as
“The inward reform of conversion, the renewal of an inward covenant among the remnant
that remains faithful to the hope for rebirth.”74 Perhaps, this focus on “inward” belief and con-
viction must form the center of a renewed civil religion. The non-religious values posited by
McGraw could form the basis for a new type of civil religion inasmuch as these values, estab-
lished at the founding and articulated in our central political documents, are firmly rooted in
America’s history. Yet, Americans would need to ascribe to these principles in a real, personal
and inward way and, to do this, would likely need to tie these values to their specific religious
beliefs and moral frameworks. Doing so on an individual level would mean that innumerable
civil religions could exist within a larger unified whole. However, in order for widespread in-
dividual commitment to these values to occur, the American public must believe that its gov-
ernment is also living by these principles and seeking to apply them to the larger world. If the
American public were able to see this, perhaps the rest of the world would as well. For, at the
center of this system would be respect for and protection of the rights of all manner of people,
faiths and cultures, and would thus be an ethos both completely American and universal and
thus an ethos Americans could seek to spread throughout the world without worries of impe-
rialism or irresponsible use of the resources, power and influence. In this way, if Sam Harris
is wrong and all religions, at their core and in their pure forms, seek a world of peace, Bellah’s
hope for “a world civil religion” may, in fact, be a possibility and “the eschatological hope of
American civil religion” could be finally realized.75
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ARE YOU THERE GOD? 
IT’S ME, THE CONSTITUTION
SEARCHING FOR THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
 B Y  S A B Y  G H O S H R AY *
Lord please forgive me, I have committed sins for our freedom.
-Sergeant Mathew Gonzalez1
Insofar as a member of Congress taking an oath to serve America and uphold its values
is concerned, America is interested in only one book, the Bible. If you are incapable of
taking an oath on that book, don’t serve in Congress.
-Radio and TV host Dennis Prager2
They say they want more religion in the public square, but it’s clear they mean only
their religion.
-Reverend Barry Lynn3
I. Introduction
When a religious minority accuses a governmental agency of having ignored her constitu-
tionally protected freedom of religious exercise, is her sincere prayer of religious liberty4 a
hypocritical opportunism or a simmering disconnection within the body of the First Amend -
ment?5 Answers to questions like this reside within the very essence of the Establishment
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. Confusion, complexity and lack of clarity in understand-
ing these clauses, however, have added to the fog of misapplication in various cases involving
religious rights. Despite a litany of cases developed both at the Supreme Court and lower
courts level, obstacles remain in developing a coherent analysis of the freedom of religious
exercise in the U.S., as diverging interpretations have been provided by the scholars on two
fundamental issues. The first emanates from not having a solid demarcation between the
freedom to believe and the freedom to act within the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amend -
ment.6 The second comes from the inability of both the judiciary and legislative policy mak-
ing bodies from fully grasping the connotations of religion within a multi-cultural
cosmo politan fabric. I intend to illuminate both issues in this article.
Constitutional interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause indicates that the freedom to be-
lieve is absolute with no curtailment of its reach prescribed by the Supreme Court. On the
other hand, the freedom to act has historically gone through diverging interpretations, where
the trajectories of freedom have either been expanded or shrunk.  This is where the protec-
tion regarding Free Exercise Clause for religious conduct has become complicated as some re-
ligious activities have been accepted while some others rejected. Along the way, no absolute
protection mechanism has been developed. The pertinent question is, therefore, why is it im-
portant to revisit the Free Exercise Clause of religion? Let us consider a few incidents that re-
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quire us to consider the dynamic nature of religion and the sincerely held beliefs by those of
different faiths.
A.Ground Realities
1. The Soldier 
A former military soldier in Bakersfield, California placed a decal on his truck which begs,
“Lord, please forgive me, I have committed sins for our freedom.” The Iraqi vet said he proud-
ly served “to protect my children” and he would do it again, but had to reconcile what he did
in Iraq with his Catholic faith. Sgt. Mathew Gonzalez was one of the first Army Rangers in Iraq
and served over 13 months in country. He said if necessary he would return to Iraq. He began
speaking out about the decal after some people called into a radio show and complained
about the sticker His decal is a statement to acknowledge that as a Catholic he believes he did
sin by killing in Iraq. Other veterans disagreed with Gonzalez’s beliefs by saying that killing
on the battlefield is not a sin. Gonzalez said the message is in no way meant to dishonor the
military or other soldiers. It only serves as a reminder of the killings and death he and all sol-
diers partake in. The decal sparked controversy as people expressed their shock, disbelief,
and a sense of betrayal by a fellow soldier asking for forgiveness for killing on the battlefield.7
2. The Muslim Clerics
Six Muslim Clerics returning home from a Islamic Religious conference in Minnesota were
handcuffed and removed off an US Airways Flight 300 based on accusations by fellow passen-
gers and flight personnel that the men were acting suspicious. The six Islamic religious lead-
ers have filed suit against US Airways for having them removed from a flight in November
2006. The clerics believe they were guilty of nothing more than “flying while Muslim,” ac-
cording to a national Muslim advocacy group. Police escorted the U.S. residents off the plane
in Minneapolis, Minnesota. The men were questioned, released and never charged. Further
the men alleged when they tried to book another flight on US Airways, the airline declined to
sell them new tickets. The men said the arrest was degrading and a violation of their civil
rights. The executive director of the Council on American-Islamic Relations Nihad Awad said,
“We cannot allow prejudice and fear to determine our actions as a nation. If the civil rights of
one American are violated, the civil rights of all Americans are threatened.” In a statement re-
garding the incident, US Airways defended the flight crew. “Our position on this matter has
not changed,” it said. “We continue to back the actions of our crew and ground employees.
This was not about prayer, but rather about behavior on the airplane that led to a decision by
our crew members — backed by local law enforcement — to remove these customers from
the airplane for further questioning.” The Clerics are also suing the Minneapolis Metropolitan
Airports Commission.8
3. The Courtroom Oaths 
In early 2007, the Senate filed a bill that would give people a choice over how they make their
courtroom oaths. The bill will allow the choice of sacred text, if any, that could be used when
in court. In a similar situation, Congressman Keith Ellison made history by being the first
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member of Congress to choose a Quran at his swearing in ceremony. The issue of courtroom
oaths also made its way into the North Carolina courtroom in 2003 when Sydiah Mateen,
asked to offer her oath by placing her hand on the Quran instead of the Bible. She was denied
her request. In 2005 a lawsuit followed that argued favoring Christianity over other religions
is unconstitutional. The lawsuit was dismissed in part because the presiding judge felt Sydiah
Mateen had other options including not using the Bible and just making an affirmative state-
ment such as “so help me God,” especially when the law only requires that the Bible be used
if a holy book is used. However, in January of 2007 the Court of Appeals ruled that the lawsuit
should go forward.  The new bill, if passed, would allow the person taking the oath by placing
their hand “upon the Bible or any text sacred to the party’s religious faith.” The bill also noted
that the sacred books would not be supplied by the court, but would be accepted by donations.9
4. TSA and the Hindu Ornaments
Most passengers know the drill once they stand in the security line in preparation to board
the airplane. In robotic rhythm, rows of people begin the undressing procedure. Remove all
belts, shoes, watches, phones, wallets, laptops and jewelry. But then the line halts, the stream
of compliant passengers is slowed. A passenger won’t remove the objects from her wrists as
demanded by Transportation Security Administration (TSA) personnel. The passenger details,
“These are not bracelets you buy in the store and wear for show and tell. But are very intimate
Hindu religious ornaments that have never been removed from my wrists.” The passenger
continues, 
You are first ordered to remove the bracelets, then you try to inform TSA agent that
they are not simple bracelets, but they are not removed for religious reasons. Then
you are pressed about your religious identity and why you refuse to remove ‘jewelry’
from your wrists. Then they usually compare you with other Hindus who don’t
wear such things on their wrists or who agree to remove them. Then, I am compelled
in just a few minutes time, to educate them on the philosophy, of Hinduism, in
 efforts to make my screening process fairer. I usually tell them, these ornaments
represent an important component to a Hindu woman’s life, in particular Hindu
marriage. Since having them placed on my wrists I have never removed them. To
remove them, is an insult to my religion and my family. I simply can’t remove
them, but feel free to wand me, pat me down, and even visually inspect me.
The passenger has never been denied to board or fly, but she has had to face extraordinary
long delays and various quips from the different agents frustrated by her refusal to comply
with their demands including the threat to be arrested and denied boarding privileges.10
B. Examination of the Realities 
No doubt these stories provide a snapshot of the expansive plurality of religious identity in
America. America has evolved from a country, whose national identity was originally based
on Judeo-Christian fundamental philosophy, to a rich mosaic of ethnicities, whose national
identity is currently being shaped through a kaleidoscope of crisscrossing multi-ethnic reli-
gious practices.11 To solidify this multi-national identity, it is therefore time to look into the
Free Exercise Clause of religion from an emerging viewpoint. This viewpoint must include
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not only the Judeo-Christian principles, but also the faiths and beliefs of the many divergent
religious sentiments now commonplace in the United States. In this article, I will examine the
evolution of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment,12 while weighing the conflicts
of interests of the state on one hand, and the religious minority on the other. I shall also em-
bark on charting the trajectory upon which the Supreme Court has changed course while de-
ciding the landmark case of Employment Decision v. Smith.13 Further, I will explore the
post-Smith constitutional landscape and how it has given rise to the environment in which the
interests of diverging religious entities are crisscrossing against greater national interests.
With this objective in mind, my paper is segmented as follows. Part II delves into the histori-
cal backdrop to examine how the frontiers of free exercise clause of religion have evolved
while tracing the historical contours of religious pluralism against constitutional interpreta-
tion by the Supreme Court. In Part III, I examine some of the significant constitutional devel-
opments surrounding religious liberties in the pre-Smith era in an attempt to identify the
Court’s rationale in making a retreat from providing expansive protection to religious free-
dom. In Part IV, I analyze the legacy of Smith in deciding the cases in the post- Smith era. This
leads to my discussion in Part V where I, while tracing the contours of the shrinking Free
Exercise Clause of the religion, explain why Smithwas erroneously decided. In Part VI, I ex-
tend my discussions on the expansive meaning of religion, which without fully comprehend-
ing the meaning of religion, any discussion on free exercise in the current era is simply
unattainable. Finally, I conclude in Part VII, with the assertion that we must protect the reli-
gious freedom of every American if we want to live up to the promise of religious freedom
and protection enshrined in the Constitution.  
II.The Free Exercise Clause against a Historical Backdrop
The history of religious persecution in both Europe and the colonies led to the creation of the
religion clauses of the First Amendment to ensure guarantees of religious freedom within a
constitutional framework.14 In this context, the early colonial history in carving out religious
freedom for all believers can provide a necessary backdrop upon which the doctrinal develop-
ment of the religious clauses of the First Amendment took place. 
Let me briefly recapture the history of struggle for religious freedom in America as re-
vealed through the prism of separation.15 On one side of this dividing wall, is the conception
of unbridled religious liberty, borne out of a broader conception of human rights, which al-
lowed the conscience of the Free Exercise Clause to emerge. On the other side of the separa-
tion, is the bounded rationality of established religion, which cringed at the audacity of
religious pluralism and preferred to remain confined within its dogmatic constriction. Conflict
between the fidelity to religious conservatism and the yearnings for religious divergence fos-
tered the development of Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Since the early days
of the Constitution, its texts have been debated and interpreted based on how the scholars
and Justices saw it fit within the realm of their personal viewpoints and political ideologies.
The central theme of the Clause remained unperturbed, while keeping Congress at bay from
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making any laws prohibiting the free exercise of religion. The difficulty in developing a con-
sistent doctrinal analysis of the religious clauses of the First Amendment comes from the ab-
sent demarcation between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. Invocation
of Free Exercise Clause inevitably brings the test of whether state regulation imposes any
undue burden16 on the religion. On the other hand, an Establishment Clause analysis revolves
around whether the state gets excessively entangled17 in the exercise of religion. The difficulty
in correctly adjudicating cases based on the religion clause surfaces due to frequent failures in
properly distinguishing between burden and entanglement. These issues of burden and en-
tanglement caused confusion in decision making in religion cases, which the Court sought to
rectify by formulating a three part test for identifying the unconstitutional establishment as
developed in Lemon v. Kurtzman.18 For the first time, the Supreme Court’s decision estab-
lished this three-pronged Lemon Test19 to determine under what conditions the state’s action
is deemed unconstitutional. If the test results prove that the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment has been violated, then the action is deemed unconstitutional, as the Court
noted: “First the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or pri-
mary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally the statute must
not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.”20 Scholars have noted that the concept of
entanglement21 and its lack of clarity is the root cause of this confusing conundrum surround-
ing the Free Exercise Clause. Additionally, an expansive reading of the phrase, “neither ad-
vance nor inhibit religion,”22 could mean that any measure that inhibits religion in any way
raises an issue regarding Establishment Clause of religion. This then points to a weakness in
the Free Exercise Clause, as it cannot stand on its own, as a free standing separate but equally
viable clause of the religion clause. Rather, in the constitutional scholarship on First
Amendment, there seems to be a tendency for the Establishment Clause to be subsumed by
the Free Exercise Clause. While in the year 2000, the Court applied the Lemon Test in deciding
Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe,23 the issues of inconsistency and lack of clarity
have rendered the future of Lemon rather uncertain, especially given the conservative bent
exhibited by the current Supreme Court. Let us examine the constitutional trajectory of the
Free Exercise Clause in a bit more detail.
Most Free Exercise Clause cases involve laws that prohibit an individual from engaging in
conduct required by religious beliefs or required conduct prohibited by religious beliefs. In
most cases, these laws are not directed at any specific religion, but are designed to deal with
some secular problem that incidentally affects individual religious practices. The controlling
enquiry in this context is to determine whether an individual’s legitimate invocation of the
Free Exercise of religion requires the law to give the individual an exemption from the stipu-
lated governmental requirement, or state mandated action.  Therefore, it is central to deter-
mine whether the state’s interest in uniformity and universal compliance holds sway over
individual’s religious interests, which is a driver for the determination of a Free Exercise
Clause exemption for an individual. 
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The above discussion indicates that the Free Exercise Clause has become a contentious
issue within our First Amendment jurisprudence, for various reasons. First, there is a tension
between the Establishment and the Free Exercise of religion. The Supreme Court, over the
years, has handed down several benchmark decisions in an attempt to define the frontiers of
religious liberty. The narrow decision-making by the Supreme Court has continually kept us
guessing as the frontiers kept vacillating under the weight of inherent complexity in the text.
Second, the tension between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause of the
constitution has left wide latitude in the interpretation and circumstances for which religious
practices are to be given constitutional protection.
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment requires the federal government to ob-
serve careful neutrality towards all places of religious practice or worship. The state or the
governmental agencies therefore, must avoid aligning toward any individual Church or similar
place of worship, or system of belief or non-belief. In other words, no governmental agency
should favor one religious entity over any other. Religious activity is therefore, to be kept free
from governmental aid or promotion, as the government can neither promote nor inhibit. 
On the other hand, the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment prohibits the federal
government from interfering in the rights of individuals or groups to practice publicly the
 religion of their choice or to practice no religion at all.  As the case laws evolved, the list of
 allowable activities under the protected activities of religion has expanded to include preach-
ing, teaching, gathering for public worship, and printing and disseminating religious publica-
tion. The only caveat is that these activities not interfere with the government’s rights to
maintain civil order and to maintain peace. One of the structural difficulties however, is the
difficulty at times for the Clauses to exist distinctly without the Establishment Clause sub-
suming the Free Exercise Clause.  
The ground realities described in the introduction section of this article exposes the strug-
gles affecting persons of faith and presents a snapshot of the deep schisms that surfaced over
the last several years for varying religions. Thus, we are compelled to take a deeper look into
the limits of the Free Exercise Clause, as it is the most enduring constitutional protection
against restriction of religious liberty. Reflecting back on the Muslim Imams, the Iraqi veteran,
or the Hindu airline passenger, many poignant questions arise. How far can a religious
 minority go to exercise his religious belief against the strong tides of public sentiments sur-
rounding him? How far can a minority woman go, even when her religious beliefs are at odds
with the authority’s comfort level while she poses no threat? I would trace these difficulties in
the post-Smith legal landscape, which has narrowed the expansive ambience of religious plu-
ralism evidenced in the pre-Smith era.
Ironically, the issue of religious freedom that most Americans take for granted has received
little attention from the press and virtually no outcry from the public, despite the gradual reli-
gious restrictions since 1990. In my view, the Court’s departure in Smith from its liberal rule-
making is the result of its inability to deal with the proliferation of numerous beliefs, each of
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which supports multiple social conducts. The Court’s own apprehension in dealing with the
constitutionally sanitized religious behaviors with some other fundamental rights, prompted
the Court to depart from its compelling state’s interest test, which I shall examine in Section
IV. During the period before Smith, the Court’s interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause
opened up a wide range of religious activities, which resulted in a plethora of possibilities.
However, the corrective course the Supreme Court took in Smith by erasing long standing pro-
tections for religious pluralism is definitely not in tune with the spirit of the free exercise of
religion in America. Through its 2005 Ohio ruling of Cutter v. Wilkinson,24 the Court may have
attempted to shift course away from its trajectory of shrinking limits of the Free Exercise
Clause. The last two years have been a mixed journey of convoluted legal arguments over the
meaning of free exercise. Ignored by a media which has little patience on arduous complexi-
ties, and submerged in public apathy, findings in the most recent cases like Van Orden v.
Carey25 have been muted and rendered insignificant in public forum. But, before I delve into
the development in Smith, let me take a step back and understand the pre-Smith expansion of
religious freedom.  
III. Understanding the Legal Landscape before Smith 
My rationale in the previous section that the Smith decision is borne out of the Court’s desire
for a corrective maneuver can be better understood by recognizing its efforts in the earlier
cases in which the Court had constructed constitutional trajectories encapsulating allowable
religious conducts.  One of the earliest cases was Reynolds v. U.S.,26 where the Court upheld a
federal law prohibiting polygamy as applied to a Mormon in which his religion required him
to engage in that practice. The Court distinguished between belief and conduct and conclud-
ed that the government had broad authority to prohibit religious conduct. The Court’s opinion
is important because it delineated the boundary between belief and conduct. For example, we
can believe in a multitude of things with no limits whatsoever. But, whether that can translate
into acceptable behavior or conduct within the boundaries of civilized society is something of
a different nature. This is an important area to probe further. The enquiry revolves around de-
termining whether belief can be translated into acts and whether the umbrella of protection
offered from the Free Exercise Clause can be extended automatically to religious acts devel-
oped because of religious beliefs. The difficulty in reconciling with the Court’s logic can be
understood better in a simple construct. Consider the following.
Suppose that individual A harbors a sincerely held belief in religion X. This belief compels
him to follow actions a, b, c and d, all which forms part of his religious observance. Now, fur-
ther suppose actions b and c comport to the life style or sociological practices of the majority
religion, or prevailing order of the society. But actions a and d do not. According to the Reynolds
Court, individual A could be prohibited from observing actions a and d, as the government
has broad authority over such conduct. If the government officials making determination on
the allowable conduct for individual A, have only a nonage understanding of religion X, could
they still be allowed to make that determination? The situation described here has uncanny
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resemblance to the scenario with the Hindu airline passenger depicted earlier. It demon-
strates the dangerous minefield the Court must traverse if broad authority is provided over
the allowable religious conduct. This slippery slope of restricted actions only descends into
restricting the freedom of religious expressions for minority religions. 
The history of religious practice or the evolution of human civilization tells us that doctrinal
development in religion owes its framework to the continuous chain of conduct and action.
When a governmental authority prohibits some conduct, it begins the process of chipping
away at the core of certain beliefs, culminating in eventually alteration of the core value of a
religion. This is especially so when religious practices belonging to the minority religions are
concerned. I would argue, instead of giving governmental authority wide latitude as pre-
scribed in Reynolds v. United States,27 the test should center on fundamental values of ethics
and morality. In Reynolds the Court held: 
Laws are made for the government of actions. And while they can not interfere
with religious beliefs or opinions, they may with practices … Can a man excuse his
practices to the contrary because of his religious belief. To permit this, would be to
make the professed doctrines of religious beliefs superior to the law of the land.
And in effect, permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. Government
could exist only in name under such circumstances.28
The Court affirmed the development of Reynolds in Davis v. Beason.29 It stated that, “it was
never intended or supposed that the First Amendment could be invoked as a protection
against legislation for the punishment of acts amicable to the peace, good order and morals of
the society.”30 While continuing on the journey to solidify the limits and frontiers of the Free
Exercise Clause of the religion, the Court, in Cantwell v. Connecticut,31somewhat rejected the
belief-conduct construct by trying perhaps to expand the belief construct. There the Court
held: 
The 1st Amendment embraces two concepts freedom to believe and freedom to
act, the first is absolute but in the nature of things, the second can not be.  Conduct
remains subject to regulation for the protection of society in every case the power
to regulate must be so exercised as not in attaining a permissible end unduly to in-
fringe the protected freedom.32
A state may not by statute wholly deny the right to preach or to disseminate religious views. It
is equally clear that, the state may by general and non-discriminatory legislation, regulate the
time, the places, and the manner of soliciting upon its streets, and holding meetings thereon
and the state may, in other respects, safeguard the peace, good order and comfort of the com-
munity without unconstitutionally invading the liberties protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.33
The period between 1960s till the later part of 1980s saw revisionism as the Court began to
strike down laws infringing on divergence in religious beliefs. In those early cases, the Supreme
Court seemed to balance the religious interests with the governmental interests in deciding
whether to grant an exemption on a case by case basis. Not only did this result in incremental
infusion of clarifying dimensions, but also posed lack of definitional consistency in few cases.
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For example, in Sherbert v. Verner,34 the Court applied strict scrutiny for laws burdening reli-
gion. An important aspect of the Sherbert opinion was the Court’s decisions to apply height-
ened scrutiny while finding that the standard of heightened scrutiny was not met. The Court
asserted that fraudulent claims by unscrupulous claimants invoking religious objections to
Saturday work was insufficient, while prescribing those alternative forms of regulations
should combat such abuses. Despite providing a threshold as to how far claims of allowable
religious conduct can be entertained, Sherbert addressed a newly opened Pandora’s Box of def-
initional complexity. This complexity questioned whether granting a religious exemption to a
law that is applicable to everyone else fosters an establishment of religion. The majority in
Sherbert found no Establishment Clause problem because the exemption involved neutrality
in issues of religious difference. In this case, it was not unanimous, as the Justices approached
the question from diverging perspective. For example, Justice Harlan joined by Justice White,
dissented. While arguing that the Court’s holding requires the state to provide benefits to those
who refuse to work for religious reasons but deny benefits to those who are not religiously
motivated. Concerned with the possibility that this treatment is a special treatment, Justice
Harlan, however, kept open the possibility by opining on whether this is indeed a violation of
the Establishment Clause.35 This vacillation within the Supreme Court jurisprudence on the
free exercise of religion kept open a wider array of possibilities when it came to determining
allowable conducts within some broad-based ground-rules.  
IV. What Does Smith Mean for Religious Liberty?
The most enduring legacy of the 1990 Employment Division v. Smith36 is the Court’s attempt to
provide perhaps a more definitive guidance on the boundary in law. This legacy includes
defining where the free exercise protection of religion ends, while greatly reducing that pro-
tection. In Smith, two Native Americans were denied unemployment benefits by the State of
Oregon. The Court denied those benefits because they were fired for using peyote37 in their
worship. Under a test used by the Supreme Court decades before Smith, Oregon would have
been required to show a compelling state interest for denying Native Americans a religious
exemption from the anti-drug laws. But in deciding the Oregon case, the Court changed the
test. No longer would the government have to show a compelling state interest before deny-
ing the request for accommodation for a law the applied to everyone. Again a caveat: that the
law did not target religion, is appropriate. Thus, as long as Oregon bans peyote use by every-
one, not just Native Americans, the state does not have to grant or consider an exemption for
religious use.
In Justice Scalia’s opinion, the Court marked out the parameters of the free exercise. The
Court held: 
But the “exercise of religion” often involves not only belief and profession but the
performance of (or abstention from) physical acts: assembling with others for a
worship service, participating in sacramental use of bread and wine, proselytizing,
abstaining from certain foods or certain modes of transportation. It would be true,
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we think (though no case of ours has involved the point), that a State would be
“prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]” if it sought to ban such acts or absten-
tions only when they are engaged in for religious reasons, or only because of the
religious belief that they display. It would doubtless be unconstitutional, for exam-
ple, to ban the casting of “statues that are to be used for worship purposes,” or to
prohibit bowing down before a golden calf.38
Here we witness sharp distinction in the standards of tests while comparing Smith’s standard
with those used by the Court in earlier cases. The respondent in Smith sought to extend the
meaning of Free Exercise Clause by seeking justification to use peyote. The respondents in-
voked the allowable religious conduct doctrine, despite the criminal law banning the practice.
The Court perhaps was apprehensive of the proliferation of allowable religious conducts that
are contrary to various criminal and civil laws. Thus, a new test was devised. The Court’s jus-
tification in disallowing the use of peyote emanated from the recognition that the practice
was not specially directed at their religious practice, and was within allowable rights for those
who use the drug for other purposes, like medical marijuana usage. In deciding the Smith
case, the Court specifically refused to apply Sherbert’s compelling government interest test.
The Court viewed Sherbert to be applicable only in unemployment compensation issues and
thereby prohibiting Sherbert’s expanded meaning to be applicable in criminal law. This was
driven by Court’s lack of recognition towards the compelling government interest standard
which may be too restrictive for promoting equality in areas involving speech, race and religion. 
The central argument of Smith produces a constitutional anomaly if taken in isolation to
prove consistency in applying the free exercise segment of the First Amendment. The sudden
restriction of religious freedom in Smith obviously did not prove popular with the legislatures,
evident by Congress’s attempt to invalidate the decision by passing the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA).39 The Court, however, struck down the Act in the case of City of
Boerne v. Floures.40 There the Court held that the broad power of Congress is under the en-
forcement clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and therefore, RFRA contradicts vital principles
necessary to maintain separation of powers and the federal balance.41
Further complicating the Smith aftermath, the lower courts jumped on the bandwagon by
suddenly shifting towards a more restrictive view of the Free Exercise Clause. In Cooke v.
Tramburg42 the Court took a more restrictive view of the Free Exercise Clause. As the Cooke
case reveals that the respondent members of the Islamic faith at the New Jersey prison
sought to challenge prison policy by alleging that due to the restrictive prison policy they are
unable to attend the weekly Muslim congregational services regularly held in the prison facil-
ity. Thus, Muslim prisoners were being denied their right to religious worship. They sued
seeking an accommodation. The Court summarily rejected on the Free Exercise claim. Noting
that imprisonment necessarily brings with it a restriction of privileges and also recognizing
that prison officials were entitled to exercise discretion. However, Justice Brennan, joined by
three others Justices, dissented, and noted the importance of prayer and the government’s
failure to show that alternatives were not workable.
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The restriction of religious freedom continued untrammeled as seen in the landmark deci-
sion in Ling v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association.43 By denying the claim of
Native Indian respondents, the Court in Ling held that the accommodation of Native Indian
practices was not required. In denying the claim of the Native Indian tribes against the United
States Department of the Interior’s forest Service’s destruction of sacred ancient sites, the
Court invariably signaled the onset of an alarming trend of the lack of religious protection in
federal land. The Court categorically stated that the Free Exercise Clause affords an individual
protection from certain forms of governmental compulsion, but does not afford individual
rights to dictate the conduct of the government’s internal procedures. Justice Brennan, joined
by Blackman and Marshall, dissented and noted the respondents were required to show cen-
trality before the government was required to show a compelling justification for the pro-
posed action. Why didn’t the Court recognize the respondents’ beliefs to be sincere? Would
the government’s proposed action have severely affected the religions practices of the minority
religion? While there have been other discrimination against religion cases that involved ten-
sion amongst the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, I will however, fast forward to
2005 and the Cutter v. Wilkinson44 aftermath.
V. Unanswered Questions of Smith in an Era of Shrinking Religious Liberty
Having reviewed the evolution of religious rights granted by the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment I want to focus on the how the concept of the shrinking Free Exercise
Clause has evolved since the landmark case of Employment Division v. Smith.45 The first issue
to analyze is whether the legal approach taken by the government is based on a special neu-
tral statutory requirement that is in a direct collision course with the Free Exercise Clause.
The second issue is to determine if that special neutral requirement bypasses the individual’s
religious protection granted under the Free Exercise Clause. With thirty years of lower courts
decisions and several landmark Supreme Court cases as precedent, it is crucial to develop a
standardized procedure to detect how much the Free Exercise Clause is shrinking in favor of
governmental interest. The Supreme Court, in findings as in Smith, has reversed course from
their previous findings that, whenever an individual claim for relief from procedural burden
based on Free Exercise Clause comes. There a substantive determination of the individual en-
titlement has to be made. Two distinguishing factors make this determination. In the first
place there is an analysis of whether the individual claim is based on a facially neutral re-
quirement and as such, is not interfering with the legislative purposes. In the second place, it
has to be determined whether a sincerely held religious objection to the requirement and that
the fulfillment of that requirement serves a compelling governmental interest. If it is deter-
mined that the fulfillment of that requirement does serve a compelling governmental inter-
est, the process must find a less restrictive alternative. This alternative must not burden the
administrative process nor can it be against the facially neutrally law of general applicability.
If the determination further finds that the individual religious accommodation is against the
compelling governmental interests, then the Court might rule that the Free Exercise Clause
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provides substantial protection for lawful conduct grounded in religious belief. However, the
state may justify curtailing that religious liberty if it can show that curtailment is essential to
accomplish a compelling or overriding governmental interest. 
My exigencies analysis is put forth to resolve the conflict between compelling government
interests and sincerely held religious beliefs. The test has to be whether sincerely held reli-
gious beliefs can be accommodated without disturbing or shrinking the governmental inter-
ests. If, the individual religious accommodation comes in direct conflict with the fulfillment
of governmental interests, the procedures should be to find a less restrictive means to accom-
modate that individual religious belief. If no less restrictive means exists, that compelling gov-
ernmental interests prevails under the test. I characterize this as the tipping point. How can it
be determined that the tipping point has been exceeded? The enquiry should consider whether
accommodating that sincerely held religious belief will severely and unduly interfere with
the fulfillment of the governmental interests. If there comes a point at which granting that in-
dividual religious accommodation radically restricts the operating latitude of the legislature,
then it can be concluded that the tipping point has arrived and the individual religious inter-
ests must give way to the governmental procedure. 
But, where does the legislative determination comes into play? Legislative determination
of individual exemption would undermine the purpose of the general applicability of law, be-
cause the impropriety of ignoring such legislative determination would undermine the state’s
goal of providing a facially neutral law of universal applicability. Therefore, one of the key
prerequisites of advancing the compelling governmental interests of a facially neutral appli-
cation resides in developing a determined and specific procedure to detect whether legisla-
tive determination is in conformity with granting individual exemption. Where does the
shrinking of the Free Exercise Clause come into focus? I would argue that the right to free ex-
ercise of religious beliefs shrinks as the number of individuals requiring accommodation for
their sincerely held belief increases. However, there are limits to the accommodation that the
government can oblige. Viewing each case in isolation would unduly burden the government.
If the state is bound to accommodate the demands, it could do so in a handful of instances but
not if the number of such cases dramatically increases. But, again, where is the threshold?
How to develop a test for a threshold? Could there be a good cause test for individualized ac-
commodation that can be incorporated in the analysis? Is there a substantive determination
that could be based on precedent cases? Let us consider the responses to these questions.
The response could be advanced in two steps. In the first, I recognize that imposition of
purely procedural requirements can restrict religious freedom, which could embolden the
case for a shrinking Free Exercise Clause. In the second, applying an open-ended frame of ref-
erence could bring in uncertainties as the numbers of individuals seeking exemptions on the
basis of religion could creep, and the government could be hard pressed to determine how
and under what basis to grant exemption. Therefore, how does this analysis differ from the
Court’s findings in Smith that a compelling state interest test can be abandoned? This is a very
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perplexing scenario, and requires a great deal of analysis to present a coherent and workable
solution. 
By delving into the framework of the constitution’s rule making, particularly within the
context of the Madisonian46 doctrine of separation, we can trace the origins of the First
Amendment where we find the constitutional thought process based on non-preferentiality.
The doctrine of non-preferentiality contends that the framers had no intention of prohibiting
government aid to all denomination or religions on a non-preferential basis. This is a plausi-
ble but fundamentally defective interpretation of the establishment clause. Therefore, we
could not develop a framework to understand Smith as it does not produce a workable solution. 
While the seminal case of Sherbert v. Verner47 significantly opened the scope of free exercise
protections for individuals, the post-Smith legal landscape involved various Supreme Court as
well as lower court decisions, where the central tenet of the Smith Court’s holdings have been
solidified. This therefore, invites enquiry as to whether the constitutional trajectory is show-
ing signs of shrinking the Free Exercise Clause of religion.  Although many commentators
hail the Supreme Court decision in Smith as the most relevant guidance towards situations
when individual exemptions towards universal laws cease to apply, I would present several
flaws in the Smith analysis. 
The central theme of Smith is that individuals are no longer entitled to special exemptions
on account of neutral laws burdening individual religious practices. The Court held that Free
Exercise Clause, “does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and
neutral law of general applicability.”48 Clearly, the Court intended Smith to be the guidepost
for religious rights of individuals under the dual doctrines of neutrality and general applicabil-
ity. However, my reading of Smith reveals that adherence to “neutral laws of general applica-
bility”49 is narrowly tailored to only protecting free exercise rights of individuals belonging to
the majority religions, and thus, was erroneously decided. 
Further examining the guiding principles of Smith, several questions remain unanswered.
The answers to these questions will form the central core of understanding the post-Smith era
and its impact on the shrinking constraints witnessed in individual religious exercise free-
dom. While Smith permits government regulation of individual religious practices, there re-
mains a fuzziness surrounding what is neutral law, or, whether the concept of neutrality
could be universally applicable to all religious sects. Obvious questions arise. Could law ever
lose its neutrality? Is an individual’s search to define sincerely held religious belief, mutually
exclusive with the governmental definition of neutral laws of universal application? The
Supreme Court has been clear in its qualified proclamation in Smith. The Court presented an
authoritative declaration that compelling state interest is no longer the test to determine the
viability of free exercise claim. The new test is based on satisfying both the dual issues of neu-
trality and universal applicability. In my view, the free exercise right of religion rises and falls
with a determination of both these components and, therefore, requires a thoughtful analysis.
The legitimacy of adjudicating free exercise right is best pursued by determining whether the
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neutrality and universal applicability principles are valid by themselves. 
First, let us consider, what is neutrality? Again, could law ever cease to be neutral or stop
becoming applicable universally? The government’s characterization of neutral laws of uni-
versal applicability could be construed as upholding the majority religious, or a law that can
support or sustain the interests of the majority religious beliefs. If this is the case, then the
law purports to be deemed universally applicable. Herein lies a problem. The constitution
was written more than two hundred years ago when a single predominate religious thread
was the governing religion of the land. Therefore, all the possible scenarios that the framers
of the constitution could have envisioned revolved around various implications of one single
religious doctrine. Even if we take for granted the possible doctrinal changes or doctrinal evo-
lutions and its implications of individual beliefs, we cannot grasp their ability to encapsulate
the protection of diverging religious practices witnessed in the 21st century. 
For example, various religious practices, as was described earlier in our ground realities
sections, require the sincere believer of that religion to decorate external objects.  The TSA
 intrusion into a religious practice comes into conflict with religious exercise due to specific
federal regulations related to security and to travel restrictions. Therefore, we must address
whether or not that federal law’s universal application applies to those religious practices
which are in conflict with the religious practices of the majority religion. The answer is un-
equivocally no. Therefore, our enquiry should center on the issue of whether neutral laws of
universal applicability are mutually exclusive of an individual’s search for her Free Exercise
Clause guarantee in regard to her religion. This is where I would argue that the justification or
the test proposed in Smithwas erroneously constructed. Furthermore, the Smith opinion did
not take into consideration when law could eventually cease to be neutral or stop becoming
universally applicable.  The recognition of the full scope of this possibility requires us to have
a good understanding of what religion means, particularly within the broader context of dy-
namic constitutionalism, an area of research I have detailed elsewhere.50
VI. Religion: Where Art Thou? 
Understanding the realm of protections, that the constitution’s religious clauses might be
called upon to provide to U.S. citizens, is incomplete without fully recognizing the expansive
reach of the word religion in today’s context. From a nation built on strictly Judeo-Christian
religious principles, America has evolved into a nation containing multiple religious strands.
This prompts us to examine and expand on the Framers’ views on the meaning of religion.
Historical records of the constitution reveal the founders’ theistic view of the religion. This is
evident in the commentaries of George Mason and James Madison, who in their characteriza-
tion of religious obligation, state, “the duty which we owe to our creator, and the manner of
discharging it.”51 This abiding belief in a creator was further revealed by Benjamin Franklin
as, “… the essentials of every religion [to be] the Deity; [and] that he made the world, govern’d
it by his Providence …”52 Do these early writings necessarily provide a broader recognition to
all existing religions, something perhaps the framers did not anticipate to be part and parcel
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of the American social fabric?
Thomas Jefferson perhaps provides the clearest answer to this question. He indicates the
Framers’ intention to include all religions, even the faith of Muslims and Hindus and to pro-
vide them all the protective umbrella of the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause, as re-
flected in Jefferson’s comments in the Virginia Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom. There
Jefferson said, “The bill [was] meant to comprehend, within the mantel of its protection, the
Jew and the Gentile, the Christian and Mahometan, the Hindoo, and infidel of every denomi-
nation.”53 This is probably the closest the framers have come in opining whose religious rights
ought to be protected, despite being mute on what protection should be accorded to other
non-orthodox, and atheistic religious practices. I will argue that this explicit recognition of all
available orthodox religions of their time gives us a definitive indication of the framers’ inten-
tion on inclusion and religious neutrality. 
The Framers’ objective was to insert a neutral definition of “religion” that includes believers
of all kinds. The detail in Jefferson’s writing on the passage of the Virginia Bill provides ample
evidence of the inclusive mindset with which the Framers of the constitution intended not to
discriminate against any religion. In light of what the Framers conceived more than two cen-
turies back, it is remarkable and, in my view, it provides broad protection to believers of all
kind. The same sentiment has been echoed by Justice Harlan who averred that the Free
Exercise Clause of religion protects the non-believer, by affording equal protection to both the
believer and the non-believer. As he held:
[T]he State cannot constitutionally pass laws or impose requirements which aid all
religions as against non-believers, and neither can (it) aid those religions based on
a belief in the existence of God as against those religions founded on different be-
liefs.54
Therefore, the dual rationality ensconced in neutrality and inclusion provides us with the
meaning of religion. The definition must protect the right of the Hindu to wear religious arti-
cles on her person in public places, as well as protect the right of Native Americans to perform
religious rituals on sacred grounds. As James Madison observed more than two centuries
back, that right is encapsulated within the explicit recognition that, 
This right in its nature is an unalienable right. It is unalienable; because the opin-
ions of men, depending only on the evidence contemplated by their own minds,
cannot follow the dictates of other men: It is unalienable also, because what is
here a right towards men, is a duty towards the Creator.55
His words eloquently remind us that in spite of our differences on religious views of religion,
we would be remiss to forget that:
That Religion or the duty which we owe to our Creator and the Manner of dis-
charging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or vio-
lence. The Religion then of every man must be left to the conviction and
conscience of every man; and it is the right of every man to exercise it as these
may dictate.56
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VII. Conclusion
The Framers of the American Constitution envisioned a multi-cultural and multi-ethnic soci-
etal fabric, sustenance of which depends on the spiritual vibrancy of religious pluralism. This
spiritual vibrancy is at stake today. It is dogged by the dogmatic constrictions of the majority
religion, gradually eroding the exuberance of free exercise of minority religions. Despite the
explicit guarantee of religious liberty by the First Amendment’s Religion Clause, we are sud-
denly confronted by the profound realization that the proliferation of religious pluralism
might not go very far after all. The central enquiry here, is whether the highest court of the
nation drifted away from its earlier promise of guaranteeing religious liberty for all? If this is
indeed the case, then we are indeed experiencing a gradual shrinking of the Free Exercise
Clause of Religion. My article has established that the shrinking of the Free Exercise Clause is
predicated in validating the fundamental argument of Employment Division v. Smith.57
The Smith Court was decided by invoking the constitutionality of universal application of
neutral laws. My arguments questioned that framework by showing that it is not sustainable
legal reasoning and therefore, the Smith Court’s rational must be invalidated.  Instead of in-
voking other legal doctrines, such as, equal protection, or resorting to social rights based argu-
ments, this article examines the inherent inconsistency in the two basic premises.
The Smith Court’s rational was developed under the twin premises that, it is possible to
bring in neutrality in legal paradigm, and this can be applied universally on issues dealing
with religious pluralism. My assertion here is that achieving both true neutrality and univer-
sal applicability is untenable within the existing framework.  Therefore, the constitutional de-
velopment based on Smith indeed opens up the possibility of the shrinking Free Exercise
Clause. This is due to its inability to insulate the religious minorities from being swallowed by
the overpowering social current of the established religion. 
Finally, the kaleidoscope of America’s multiple religions must be enmeshed within the
protective umbrella of the constitution’s First Amendment, and insulated from the zealous
imposition of administrative burdens on harmless religious practices. If the constitutions can-
not guarantee the Hindu woman’s religious ritual of wearing religious ornaments while fly-
ing, if the Constitution cannot allow the Muslim defendant to place his hand on the Quran
while taking an oath in a court of law, and if a Catholic soldier cannot freely express his reli-
gious antipathy against state sanctioned killings in the battlefield, then America is not living
up to the promise delivered by James Madison more than two hundred years back. He pro-
claimed: 
It is a duty of every man to render to the Creator such homage, and such only, as
he believes to be acceptable to him. This duty is precedent both in order of time
and degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil Society. Because if religion be ex-
empt from the authority of the Society at large, still less can it be subject to that of
the Legislative Body. The dictation is both derivative and limited: it is limited with
regard to the co-ordinate departments, more necessarily it is limited with regard to
the constituents.58
156
T H E  A M E R I C A N  E X P E R I M E N T:  R E L I G I O U S  F R E E D O M
Burdened by legal reasoning and prompted by providential prudence, I am therefore com-
pelled to issue a clarion call. Let us deliver on the promise of James Madison. Let us exorcise
the exclusionary spirit of Smith. Then and only then, can we confidently embrace the mean-
ing of the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom — a freedom  represented in the mo-
saic of beliefs, non-beliefs and traditions we call religion. All are most certainly worthy of
protection under a never shrinking Free Exercise Clause. 
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9. general prohibitions against the abusive use of peyote, without an exception for the bona fide religious use of pey-
ote by Indians, lead to discrimination against Indians by reason of their religious beliefs and practices; and 
10. as applied to the traditional use of peyote for religious purposes by Indians, otherwise neutral laws and regula-
tions may serve to stigmatize and marginalize Indian tribes and cultures and increase the risk that they will be ex-
posed to discriminatory treatment. 
This bill eventually passed as the American Indians Religious Freedom Acts Amendments of 1994 and is available at
http://mojo.calyx.net/~olsen/RELIGION/airfaa.html (accessed on Jan. 03, 2008).
38 See supra note 35. 
39 The Religious Freedom Restoration Act or RFRA (42 U.S.C. § 2000bb) is a 1993 federal law designed to prevent
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41 Id. 
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FAITH, SOCIAL REFORM 
IN THE INNER CITY, AND 
THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
 B Y  H O N .  V I R G I N I A  M .  K E N DA L L *
A City in Crisis
In 2001, the City of Chicago was facing a crisis. For the seventh year in a row, it had been
ranked as having one of the highest murder rates in the country compared to other cities of
its size.1 In 2001 alone, there were 665 murders committed on the streets of Chicago. In the six
years prior to 2001, the Chicago Police Department had recovered between 10,000 and 14,000
firearms each year from the city’s streets.2 The State’s Attorney’s Office for Cook County, the
county within which the city sits, had secured approximately 40,000 felony convictions in
one year, a significant portion of which were related to the possession and use of firearms. A
closer look at the statistics revealed that the murder rate in certain neighborhoods located on
the near west side of the city was three times that of the city average; those neighborhoods
also accounted for the highest concentration of homicide and gun recoveries in the city.3 The
Chicago Crime Commission identified eighteen independent street gangs operating within
the borders of two police districts within that ten-mile square area.4
This paper will address how two separate groups worked to better the lives of the residents
in the high crime areas of the near west and near southwest sides of Chicago — “hot zones” of
violence, gang activity, and poverty. The two groups approached the problem from entirely
different motivations and perspectives: one group, the Society of Jesus, or the Jesuits as they
are commonly called, focused on Pilsen and Little Village in order to serve the poorest fami-
lies in those immigrant Mexican neighborhoods. Historically, the Jesuits are educators, and in
keeping with their tradition and mission, they chose to address the issue by opening a school,
the Cristo Rey School. The other group, the Department of Justice, through the United States
Attorney’s Office in Chicago, chose to address the gun violence that plagued the streets with a
law enforcement initiative aimed at reducing the murder rate. The Jesuits’ program was en-
tirely privately funded. The DOJ Program, dubbed “Project Safe Neighborhoods,” was entirely
publicly funded. 
Both groups were successful due, in significant part, to their progress in changing expecta-
tions in the community and in changing behavior in the community. Both programs were
non-traditional. The Jesuits’ Cristo Rey model recognized the inadequacy of relying solely on
Catholic donations to keep its school solvent and reached out to the larger corporate commu-
nity to aid its mission. The Project Safe Neighborhood (PSN) model recognized the inadequa-
cy of traditional law enforcement techniques such as increased arrests and increased penalties
for crimes and expanded to include community education, awareness and rehabilitation pro-
grams. As such, both programs involved both religious and secular components, embraced
their secular and religious counterparts in the struggle, and by bridging the gap between
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church and state, improved the lives of the people they sought to aid. 
Of course, when we talk about bridging the gap between church and state, we know that
the Establishment Clause comes into play. And in spite of the effectiveness of these programs,
the Establishment Clause could be invoked to challenge aspects of either program. I will con-
clude by saying that cumbersome legal tests such as the Lemon test are ill-suited to address
the practical and real issues of inner city reform. I will encourage any future discussion of the
Establishment Clause as it pertains to the inner city to include a basic understanding that
 social reform is generally most effective when the church and state cooperatively address
 society’s problems.5 I will also add, as at least one other commentator has proposed, that cur-
rent Establishment Clause jurisprudence can be used to support such programs in certain
contexts.
A Tale of Two Communities
In 2001, 84% of all inmates released from Illinois prisons were released to Cook County, and
within that County, 34% of all inmates were released to six neighborhoods on the near west
side of the City, including the neighborhoods of Austin, Englewood, and North Lawndale.6
These three neighborhoods are home to some of the most socio-economically disadvantaged
groups in the city. Englewood, for example, was, in 2001, nearly 98% African-American and
the average annual income of a household within the community was less than $20,000.7 54%
of the community lived below the poverty level and 25% of the community was unemployed.8
In Englewood in the year 2003, the crime rate exceeded the city average by 115%.9 And in
2001, 1,681 inmates were released into the small west side community of Austin.10
A few miles to the south and east of Austin, Englewood and North Lawndale, lie two more
Chicago neighborhoods, Pilsen and Little Village. These communities were also gang-ridden
with no less than 20 street gangs actively operating in the community.11 Pilsen and Little
Village were primarily Mexican-American and the average income of a household within
those communities was $28,000 per year.12 In Pilsen, 49% of the community members are for-
eign born and 75% are not citizens.13
Although only three miles apart, these two distinct geographic communities were in many
ways polar opposites culturally — Pilsen comprised primarily first and second generation im-
migrant Mexican families who settled into a community where their native Spanish language
was spoken freely and where their Catholic faith was practiced regularly; and Austin com-
prised primarily African American families and a variety of pastor-based Christian churches.14
Both communities were plagued with crime. Gang activity and gang crimes characterized
their daily lives and random shootings rocked the communities on a steady basis. Both com-
munities were also dotted with churches: primarily Catholic in Pilsen and Little Village and a
variety of Protestant and Baptist churches on the near west side. The children in these neigh-
borhoods shared some common characteristics with children living in poverty across the
country: 48% knew someone who was shot with a gun; 17% heard gun shots in their neigh-
borhood at least once a week; and 39% worried about being shot some day.15
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Against this bleak backdrop, the Jesuits and the Project Safe Neighborhoods Task Force de-
cided to change the course of this inner city devastation. Notably, the privately-funded initia-
tive benefited significantly from its unique partnership with the public community; and the
publicly-funded initiative benefited significantly from its partnership with community organi-
zations including churches and faith-based social service groups. The results of both programs
have been and continue to be impressive, suggesting that programs seeking to address the sig-
nificant social ills of the inner city must inherently take into account the specific and unique
characteristics of the community within which the initiative is implemented. Understanding
and embracing the role that churches and faith-based groups play within inner city communities
enables certain reform programs to prosper. Any analysis of inner city reform programs under
current Establishment Clause jurisprudence should also take into account the unique
relation ships between faith-based groups and the state unless we are to doom such effective
programs to failure. 
Cristo Rey Jesuit High School — A Private Catholic High School
In Pilsen in 1996, the Jesuits opened the first new Catholic high school in Chicago in 40 years
in the middle of this poverty-stricken community and named it, “Cristo Rey Jesuit High
School.” Pronouncing that it would be a “new passion in Pilsen,” Cristo Rey chose to serve the
residents of Pilsen by offering an alternative to inadequate public schooling in the area.
Recognizing that the local public school program was substantially over-crowded and that the
closest local high school, Benito Juarez High School, suffered from an abysmal drop-out rate
of over 65%, the Jesuits chose to establish a program committed to graduating Latinos from
high school and preparing them for college. This new program would require students and
parents to apply for admission to the school; but rather than relying on traditional academic
testing to place students, the school focused instead on an assessment of a student’s economic
need (no student would be accepted unless his family’s income was at or below poverty level)
and the expressed commitment of the student and family. Each prospective student must ex-
press a desire to participate in the program and all students would be required to affirmatively
accept the school’s mission statement. In addition, the student’s family was required to express
a commitment to the program. Furthermore, all students and parents would be required to
sign a contract espousing the mission and rules of the school. The school’s rules included random
drug testing and zero gang tolerance — no gang affiliation, no gang colors, symbols or attire. 
The goal of the school was simple: to give hope and support to the Mexican American com-
munity in Pilsen by providing opportunities for its youth. The school would accomplish its
goal by giving young Latinos and Latinas access to a working community they had traditionally
not entered for reasons both personal and external and it would do so in a Catholic setting —
more specifically, a Jesuit Catholic setting. The school provided an environment that invoked
Jesuit principles such as “men and women for others” and “cura personalis.” These traditional
Jesuit ideals focused on seeing each student as an individual in order to develop her talents
and to encourage her to use those talents to give back to the community.
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The unique characteristic of Cristo Rey, however, was not necessarily in its Jesuit mission
(there were, for example, more than forty-four Jesuit high schools in existence at the time
that Cristo Rey was opened in 1996), but rather the means by which the Jesuits sought to
reach their goal of educating the very poor. The Jesuits chose to fund their mission in a novel
way: through employee salaries paid to the students for their work in private companies and
public entities throughout the City. Cristo Rey’s work/study program sent students to work
one day per week in law firms, hospitals, banks, consulting firms, advertising agencies, and
government agencies. The employers, in turn, paid the students a salary, but made the salary
payment directly to the school, to pay for the student’s education. Rather than hire a full-time
clerical employee, for example, many law firms in the city agreed to hire Cristo Rey students.
The firm paid $22,000 per year for a full-time job; four Cristo Rey students who alternated
days at the firm filled each job. The program exposed each student to one day each week at a
law firm and introduced her to firm life in “The Loop” — a professional environment not nor-
mally accessible to young Latinas growing up in Pilsen. This exposure included on-the-job
training by professional human resources officers, job and skills training, mentoring from
supportive employers and co-workers, and, again, the general exposure to a work environ-
ment that she would not normally be able to access.
Cristo Rey was entirely supported by private dollars. In 2002 alone, the school raised more
than $1 million from private donations to aid the school. Beyond these private donations, the
school required an additional $2.5 million to remain open and to educate its students. That
money came from one source only — the school’s innovative work/study program. 
Project Safe Neighborhoods
A Federally Funded Program through the Department of Justice
Meanwhile, a few miles to the west, another organization attempted to change the climate of
gun violence on the west side. The local United States Attorney’s Office, through a federally
funded program called Project Safe Neighborhoods, sat down at a table with researchers from
Columbia University, local police, federal law enforcement, the local and federal prosecutors’
offices, the Chicago Crime Commission, the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (common-
ly referred to as “CAPS”), the Illinois Department of Corrections and twelve community based
organizations (“the Task Force”) and discussed how to spend federal funds in the most effec-
tive way to combat gun violence on Chicago’s streets.16 The task was daunting: in the previous
year, 74 murders had been committed in the 11th and 15th police districts alone — an area merely
nine miles square. 
Traditionally, federal gun programs had focused on reducing gun crime by increasing the
number of federal prosecutions and focusing on repeat offenders who would receive increased
sentences due to the strict federal recidivist statutes passed by Congress.17 For the first time,
the federal program did not dictate the precise manner in which funds could be spent, but in-
stead encouraged communities to design the most effective programs for their unique issues,
problems and resources.18 This seemingly minor alteration in traditional federal programs
164
T H E  A M E R I C A N  E X P E R I M E N T:  R E L I G I O U S  F R E E D O M
aimed at reducing crime provided the Task Force with the necessary level of autonomy to
craft initiatives that would take into account all aspects of the problem, including the type of
crimes being committed, the kinds of offenders, the law enforcement tools currently em-
ployed, the resources being used other than law enforcement, and the effectiveness of previ-
ous programs. 
In Chicago, this autonomy led the PSN Task Force to the conclusion that the problem could
not be analyzed by law enforcement alone; instead, it required input from community
groups; religious groups operating in the “hot zones,” including churches and schools; and
grass roots organizations. As a result, the Task Force that was established comprised both local
and federal law enforcement officers and reached out to members of the affected communities
who were in touch with the issues and concerns of their neighborhoods. Three unique initia-
tives emerged from this collaboration: parolee forums, an integrated juvenile program, and a
public awareness campaign. 
Before reviewing these components of the program, it is important to note that the program
included some traditional prosecution efforts for repeat offenders. Each month, for example,
a federal prosecutor, a local prosecutor, an agent from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms, and a representative from the City of Chicago’s Drug and Gang House Enforcement
Unit met to review every gun case in the city from the previous month. Repeat offenders with
a history of drug, gang and/or gun violence were culled from the local prosecutors office to be
prosecuted in federal court by the United States Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of
Illinois, where they would face stiff federal sentences.19 Also, gun teams were formed to seek
out the source of illegal weapons entering the city. These teams included local and federal
law enforcement officers who developed information gained in part from community inform-
ants and used that information to perform undercover operations and “sting operations” to ar-
rest offenders who transported weapons into the city.20
These traditional prosecution efforts were supplemented by the three community program
components that relied on less conventional methods to reduce gun crime: parolee forums, a
public awareness campaign, and an integrated juvenile program. The offender notification
 forums began in January of 2003 and were held twice a month in the city’s “hot zones” — the
targeted areas selected by the Task Force as having the greatest need for intervention.
Offenders who had been recently released into the community after serving a sentence for a
crime that involved either gun violence or gang participation were selected to participate in a
forum held at a public place within their neighborhoods. These forums were designed to pro-
vide two strong and equally significant messages: first, that an ex-offender arrested in the
 future for a gun crime would face federal prosecution and its corresponding harsh sentence;
and second, that a number of social service organizations existed in the community to help
aid the offenders with re-entry into the community. The first part of each forum began with
the harsh message delivered from local and federal law enforcement officers. The second part
of each forum consisted of a string of social service providers who offered their aid in resume
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writing, job interviewing, vocational training, drug rehabilitation efforts, faith counseling, and
skills training. Sandwiched between the carrot and the stick approach was the presentation of
an ex-offender who spoke of his own personal experience of overcoming the challenges fac-
ing a recently released offender and excelling in spite of those challenges. Each forum ended
with opportunities for the ex-offenders to approach both sides of the forum’s panel — law en-
forcement personnel and community members — to ask questions, gather printed informa-
tion, and sign up for services. Many times, these forums lasted long after their scheduled
stop-times as prosecutors, ex-offenders and social organizers worked together, discussed issues
and gathered information.
The second unique component of the program designed for Chicago was a public aware-
ness campaign. This campaign was a traditional media campaign consisting of billboards, bus
placards, and public service announcements letting the community know that PSN existed
and that it was targeting ex-offenders with guns. This traditional campaign was supplemented
by the CAPS program which distributed fliers to the community with the photo of an offender
who had been culled for federal prosecution, was convicted and was sentenced to hard feder-
al time. “Don’t Let this Happen to You,” announced each flier. CAPS posted the fliers in the
neighborhoods where the offender lived prior to his arrest. The flier included the offender’s
street name and photo so that neighbors knew exactly who had been arrested and under what
circumstances. The flier concluded with a pronouncement of the harsh sentence imposed.
These fliers were also posted at area police stations on walls and bulletin boards and in pro-
cessing areas.
Finally, the Task Force used federal funds specifically set aside for juveniles to create a
 juvenile awareness program called “Hands without Guns.” This program was designed to
move beyond previous federal initiatives with a single message, such as the “Just Say No” anti-
drug campaign. Instead, the program was designed to build self-esteem and to help students
identify social situations where healthy choices could be made and independent thought
could be exercised rather than reverting to the social pressures of gang involvement. The
course, which spanned a full eight weeks of education, was designed in conjunction with a
private social service organization, Uhlich Children’s Advantage Network, an organization
started by St. Paul’s Evangelical Lutheran Church — now the United Church of Christ. The
program was integrated into literally all of the high schools and junior high schools in the
 targeted PSN areas. The program included developing student leaders in each of the schools
to continue the program beyond the initial eight-week plan. Individual student leaders then
opted to initiate other activities to expand on this self-esteem/non-violence program such as
rallies, marches, vigils and school support groups. 
As the Task Force moved into its fourth year in 2006, plans were laid to expand the juvenile
program to reach juvenile offenders. Juvenile ex-offender forums much like the adult model
were being designed; a juvenile probationary program with both student support and parental
contracts was also drafted in conjunction with the Chicago Police Department and CAPS. This
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comprehensive juvenile program would then span the course of a juvenile’s potential life to
crime: a student would hear the message within school not to become involved in violence or
gangs; if the student engaged in some conduct that did not result in a serious criminal convic-
tion, he could then participate in the probationary period, and finally, if the student became a
convicted juvenile, prior to being released, he would attend a community forum. The com-
munity involvement and awareness programs would theoretically span his entire formative
years from preteen through adulthood. 
The Common Theme — Community Involvement and Support
Soon both the Jesuits and the PSN Executive Board began to address the realities of effectuat-
ing their plans. The Jesuits recognized the need to coordinate with the employers who hired
their students. Many of the employers were governed by a variety of state and federal regula-
tions regarding employment including the laws set forth by the IRS, OSHA, Title VII and the
Department of Labor. Before long, the coordinator of the work/study program began to ad-
dress the needs and concerns of the employers (the ones providing the tuition for the school’s
students) regarding everything from inappropriate student/employee conduct to inappropri-
ate employer conduct. In doing that work the coordinator necessarily became versed in the
state and federal laws and regulations applicable to the work place, which regulations required
the work environments into which Cristo Rey students had been placed to remain devoid of
all Catholic elements of education. This is not to say that the work/study program was sterile
of any faith-based educational focus. To the contrary, numerous courses at the school during
the remainder of a student’s week addressed both ethical and faith scenarios in addition to
practical learning moments. Yet when the students were in the workplace, they were treated
as all other employees and the Catholic elements of the program were de-emphasized to the
extent required by applicable laws and regulations. That is to say, with respect to those laws
and regulations, no exceptions were made for the Cristo Rey student/employees: the same
demands made of all other employees were placed upon them and the same benefits and re-
spectful treatment provided to all other employees was provided, in turn, to them. 
Parents of the students were also required to understand that the workplace required a dif-
ferent treatment for their students. It was not as easy to take a day off for a school assembly
for the Feast of Our Lady of Guadalupe — a traditional feast involving an early morning mass
and breakfast holding a place of prominence in the Mexican/Catholic’s faith — instead, the
students who worked on the feast day were still required to leave the festivities and attend
their jobs. Following proper dress, demeanor and behavior in the workplace was demanded of
all students in the workplace regardless of the student’s age or level within the high school.
Students who did not successfully complete their work days were held to the same standards
as students who skipped too many school days. 
A remarkable development occurred during this process: the community of supporters ex-
panded. The network of role models and caregivers now included supervisors in the work-
place and colleagues in the office. No longer did the school need to rely entirely upon the
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parents — or even fellow students or teachers — to keep their children on track; instead, sud-
denly, Cristo Rey students were exposed to a new realm of social influence: role models of
professionalism in the form of co-workers in the workplace. Pulling these students further
from their milieu of poverty, gang affiliation, and street violence into a world of hard work,
respectful treatment of peers, and the complete absence of violence had a social impact on
the students that could not be provided to them even within the walls of the Catholic high
school where respect for others was taught and monitored. Here, in this new world of the
workplace, governed by rules of the state, professionals operated side by side with students
from the inner city and the students learned firsthand that this state and federally protected
world prohibited certain social behaviors of their neighborhood. And they were rewarded for
adopting the social conventions of the professional environments in which they found them-
selves — they were paid for their positive behavior. 
Soon, Cristo Rey students began to receive job offers in the summers after their school
years had ended from employers who deemed it difficult to give them up for the short break.
Employers served as mentors and numerous one-on-one relationships began between the
Mexican immigrant students and their professional counterparts. Before long, meeting a
Cristo Rey student on the streets of Chicago and discussing college prospects as he or she ma-
neuvered the streets with confidence became the norm rather than the aberration.
Similarly, Project Safe Neighborhoods began to seek out partners to appear at ex-offender
forums and to gain insights into the social programs serving the communities. Within a short
period of time, the Task Force repeatedly was directed to churches and faith-based organiza-
tions as the groups that were established in the community, respected by its residents, and
knowledgeable about what previous efforts had failed. These groups offered insights to the
Task Force regarding potential projects and in some instances provided the information that
either spawned or aborted various initiatives.
One anecdotal example occurred in spring of 2005 as the Task Force expanded its initiative
into the 10th police district of Chicago. The 10th district was geographically divided between
the Hispanic community and the African American community along a single street. Two
members of the Task Force met with some community outreach organizers in Pilsen just
weeks before the first ex-offender forums were scheduled to begin. When the Pilsen commu-
nity leaders learned that the forum was to be held at Garfield Park in the predominantly black
neighborhood of the district, they candidly informed the Task Force that no Latino would
cross that street to reach the forum. It was simply too dangerous for a Hispanic to enter the
black community where African American gangs governed the streets. Nor would any
African American cross that same street to come to a forum in the predominantly Hispanic
side of the district for the same reasons. You can hold the forums there if you like, the mem-
bers stated, but no Latinos will come.
As a result of this insight, an elaborate program of shifting ex-offender forum sites was de-
veloped where forums were held in alternating locations — one at Garfield Park, the other at
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the West Side Technical Institute — and offenders were selected to attend based on their prox-
imity to the location, in an effort to accommodate their cultural and safety concerns. This
piece of critical information would not have been provided to law enforcement prior to this
non-traditional approach of seeking out religious and social leaders in the community for in-
sight; instead, the forums would have been held at the sites selected by law enforcement per-
sonnel, the offenders would not have come, and the forums would have failed leaving the law
enforcement officers scratching their heads as to the cause.
The PSN Task Force met regularly with religious groups, local grass roots groups, and social
organizations who were tied into the fabric of the communities in order to address potential
issues in the programs before they were initiated and to spread the word to the community
through their unique network of communication afforded only to those linked through the
church.
Determining What Works
The Project Safe Neighborhoods Task Force was guided through its mission by Professor
Tracey Meares of Yale Law School. Prof. Meares, who had been studying the behaviors that
lead individuals to commit crime and the manner in which communities attempt to combat
crime, shared her expertise with the traditional law enforcement-minded group of professionals.
This research component was another unique feature of the program that was made possible
by the absence of specific spending requirements tied to the federal funds that were allocated
to various cities through the PSN initiative. 
Identifying certain normative behaviors and social influences that can impact a community
had proven to be successful in strategies for fighting street gangs in Chicago in the past.21
Meares provided the Task Force with insights from prior research in the field that showed that
when social organizations are present in a community, such as small community support
groups centered around social programs or churches, the community is better able to resist
crime and delinquency.22 This concept of social influence suggests that individuals tend to
imitate those around them and, as such, individuals in high-crime areas create a self-perpetu-
ating local norm.23 In order to reduce crime, these social organizations need to reinforce
norms of order.24 As Prof. Meares has written: “Taking social norms into account increases not
only the power to explain inner-city crime but also the power to control it.” 25
An interesting social norm identified as critical by the Task Force was the community per-
ception of criminal activity and the perception of those offenders with high status within the
community. Social influence theory, as described to the Task Force, revealed that individuals
were more likely to commit crimes when they perceived that others were engaged in crime
that was tolerated within the community.26
Armed with this knowledge, the Task Force began to influence the community’s percep-
tion of itself by showing that crime would not be tolerated and that proper behavior would be
rewarded. The Task Force emphasized a visible presence of law enforcement within the
neighborhoods. Gun teams wore jackets emblazoned with PSN GUN TEAM when they effec-
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tuated warrants; posters with arrested offenders flooded the fences and lamp posts in the
areas of arrests; and billboards could be seen every few blocks within the hot zones. The Task
Force partnered with the U.S. Marshals to conduct fugitive sweeps on entire city blocks with-
in the neighborhood at once in order to send a strong message to the community that all
 offenders would be weeded out from the community. A common theme at PSN Task Force
Meetings was to remind the partners that the Task Force was not working in the hot zones to
make a splash and leave, but to remain as a steady presence within the community.
Church leaders responded by holding vigils and prayer services when a shooting took
place on the streets. Community leaders spoke out at informal press conferences to denounce
the violence within their neighborhoods and then sat down at the Task Force table to inform
the police where the gang activity was occurring. 
Meanwhile, without having the benefit of a research partner, the Jesuits continued to grow
Cristo Rey. Starting from a one-room former roller rink, the Jesuits changed Pilsen’s public
perception by erecting a new state of the art facility at a corner where just months earlier
gang members had congregated. The Cristo Rey students proudly walked to buses in their
professional attire (dress pants, white shirt and tie) to head to their jobs for the morning.
Walking past both young and old members of the community, they visibly sent the message
to the community that the community was safe, that they were professionals, and that they
did not participate in street crime.
Far from the classrooms in Pilsen, students from Cristo Rey worked side by side with pro-
fessionals in office buildings in the city’s white-collar district, discussing plans for their futures.
This social organization of the workplace may have been the single most effective tool used
by the Jesuits in changing the perception of residents of Pilsen. By changing the normative
behavior through social support of young working college-bound professionals working in a
safe space, the perception that Pilsen had become a safer neighborhood that produced profes-
sionals who did not participate in street crime became the reality. 27
The Results
PSN-targeted areas experienced a 37% drop in murder rate during the time that the researchers
were observing the program.28 Research showed that the strongest PSN dimension associated
with a decline in the homicide rate was the percent of offenders who attended an ex-offender
forum.29 For example, increasing the percentage of ex-offenders who attended a forum by
only 1% was associated with an approximate 13% decrease in the murder rate in that area.30
Cristo Rey now graduates over 100 students each year and is in its tenth year. The average
percentage of student graduates from Cristo Rey who attend college is 98% compared to a
drop out rate at the local public high school down the street of 67% annually. The success of
the work-study program has been so impressive that in 2004, the Cristo Rey Network was
formed in order to aid other communities in starting schools within the inner city using the
Cristo Rey model. Currently, there are twelve new Cristo Rey schools operating across the
country in twelve urban communities all serving the poor, and seven more schools are ex-
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pected to open within the year. 
Community Involvement in Changing Inner City Violence
Meares posits that in order to realize the full potential of a norm-based vision of law enforce-
ment, law enforcement must look beyond traditional institutions designed to merely control
crime; it must embrace other non-traditional institutions in the inner city — including the
church.31 Because the African-American community on the west side of Chicago relies heavily
upon the social structure of its churches for social support and to affirm positive behaviors,
any law enforcement strategy that eliminates the church from its analysis is bound to be less
effective at best and, at worst, may be destined to fail.  If communities are able to bridge the
gap between the church and police, social organization theory suggests, and one researcher
asserts, that considerable crime reduction benefits should follow.32 As an example of this suc-
cess, Meares describes a prayer vigil — organized by the police — that took place on the streets
of the west side of Chicago. The police commander in one of the police districts discussed in
this paper organized the vigil by inviting pastors of the community’s churches to attend a
planning meeting. While on neutral police property, as opposed to the church of any one pastor,
the religious groups and police were able to organize a thousand-member vigil that included
groups of ten standing on known drug corners singing and praying for an end to violence. 
This concept is, of course, inherent in the philosophy of the Jesuits, who would state that it
is only through the grace of God that their school has excelled. An outsider with some research
training, however, might add that the school is excelling because it has incorporated one par-
ticular social community — the Catholic Church (of which the majority of Pilsen’s residence
are members) — with another positive social community — the professional working world of
Chicago. Regardless of whether one credits the grace of God or the influence flowing from the
partnership of positive social communities, one thing is clear: the link between the church
community and the secular community in these impoverished, crime-ridden Chicago neigh-
borhoods has produced a less violent, more prosperous and more hope-filled community. 
Establishment Clause
Recognizing that both of these programs have been very effective in addressing one of society’s
moral obligations: breaking the insidious cycle of poverty, crime, and lack of hope within the
inner city, we must consider whether they can each exist comfortably within the First
Amendment’s Establishment Clause. The “softball question,” pertains to Cristo Rey Schools
and the simplest answer is, “of course” because they are entirely funded by private dollars.
The harder question is whether a Cristo Rey school can receive government funding for its
work/study program? The other question is whether the PSN initiative can partner with
church and faith-based organizations to continue its work in reducing crime? 
The answer, I believe, to both questions, is yes. Current Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence provides for a framework to address both programs. The Lemon test33 set forth by the
Supreme Court for determining whether a violation of the Establishment clause exists requires
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that a statute must have a secular purpose; it must not have as its primary purpose the ad-
vancement or inhibition of religion; and it must not have excessive government entangle-
ment with religion. However, this cumbersome test does not take into account any competing
societal needs. Can there be a time when society’s needs are so great that the entanglement is
acceptable? What level of entanglement is permissible when our society is so troubled that a
young man of color actually believes that his life ends automatically in his 20s? 
When I was working on the PSN Task Force, there seemed to be a general reluctance to
mix any faith-based organizations into the PSN strategy for fear of violating a generalized and
nebulous belief that church and state must be separate in all manners. In a somewhat knee-
jerk reaction at times, plausible solutions to some of the issues presented were rejected be-
cause of this common misunderstanding of Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 
Yet, the Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld government aid programs that are neutral
with respect to religion and which provide assistance directly to a broad class of citizens who
then direct such aid to religious schools as a result of their own genuine and independent pri-
vate choice. The Court held in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris that a previous trilogy of cases,
Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest supports the proposition that the incidental advancement of a reli-
gious message that is not attributable to the government is permissible when aid is distributed
due to the deliberate choices of numerous individual recipients. Zelmanwas the case that up-
held the City of Cleveland’s voucher program for students in the inner-city who were signifi-
cantly harmed by an inadequate public school system. As then Chief Justice Rehnquist stated
in the opinion: “Any objective observer familiar with the full history of and context of the
Ohio program would reasonably view it as one of a broader undertaking to assist poor children
in failed schools, not as an endorsement of religious schooling in general.”34
Similarly, any objective observer familiar with the full history of Chicago’s hot zones would
know that PSN and similar programs are working to stop the violence and bring peace to the
streets and hope to the next generation as opposed to endorsing any faith program.
When inner city communities face crisis as Chicago did in 2001, all effective initiatives
must be considered — including providing the inhabitants of impoverished communities with
a realistic choice for education. Voucher programs like the one upheld in Zelman provide such
an opportunity. Although some commentators have argued that the Zelman opinion will have
less impact over time due to federal initiatives such as the No Child Left Behind initiative;35
that position does not take into account the effectiveness of the particular program. The two
models discussed today — the Cristo Rey model and the PSN model in Chicago — are effec-
tive. As long as effective initiatives exist, individuals within these communities will have the
power of choice provided that governments recognize that these programs can change the
lives in these targeted zones.
The concept of providing choice to the impoverished by enabling the underprivileged in
that community to choose to spend a small allotment of money on tuition in a private school
is a concept that takes into account the unique factors of the community. Those factors in-
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clude race, poverty, lack of adequate programs, and churches that are operating within these
communities to break that continued pattern of poverty and crime. 
But what about a program that is entirely separate from a Catholic school — a program like
the Cristo Rey work/study program? Can government aid be provided to support such programs
in private schools? Granted, the Cristo Rey work/study program is affiliated with a Jesuit
school. But once in the workplace, the student is an employee governed by all of the same
laws and obligations of his co-workers. He is being monitored in the work place by a supervisor
from the business, not by a teacher from the school, and no religion is being taught, discussed,
or supported. If the success of a school like Cristo Rey depends upon the success of the
work/study program, can the government support such an initiative in order to alter the
 pattern of poverty in Pilsen? One commentator suggests that is exactly what the Court should
be doing in these cases — balancing the competing state interests.36 Since the Court has re-
peatedly accepted the role of interest weighing with respect to other constitutional rights
(freedom of speech, substantive due process, equal protection, to name a few), she argues,
why not balance the interests in establishment clause cases?
If a balancing test were to be used in these cases, judges would have an opportunity to hear
the factors that I set forth at the beginning of this paper and could assess whether the partner-
ship with certain faith-based groups outweighs the interest in avoiding entanglement between
church from state. 
Conclusion 
Regardless of the test to be applied to Establishment Clause cases, it is becoming increasingly
more apparent that if educators, social activists, and law enforcement want to change the
lives of the inner city community, they need to do so by partnering the church and state to co-
exist as pro-social community support. The unique nature of the Catholic church to the near
southwest side Mexicans in Pilsen demands that their deep-seated faith be taken into account
when seeking to reform social behavior. Similarly, the unique deeply-rooted faith of the near
west side African American communities demands that law enforcement in that neighbor-
hood must acknowledge the unique tool for change that the church can provide. 
The Cristo Rey School and the PSN initiative in Chicago were successful and continue to be
so because they were not afraid to embrace faith as a component for successful change. Any
analysis of future inner city Establishment Clause cases will need to do the same.
* The Honorable Virginia M. Kendall is a federal district judge in the Northern District of Illinois.
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OUR FREEDOM DEPENDS 
ON THE RULE OF LAW
 B Y  S E N ATO R  PAT R I C K  L E A H Y *
It is wonderful to be here today in beautiful Portland with so many accomplished theolo-gians, scholars and jurists. Over the past several days you have been discussing the great
American Experiment and the many freedoms that are encompassed by our national endeavor.
Certainly our freedoms — including religious freedom — are affected by things such as our
immigration laws, our healthcare priorities, and our anti-terrorism efforts. These are issues
that test our commitment to the rule of law.  
When we restrict the rights of those least among us, we not only diminish our role on the
global stage but we threaten the very Blessings of Liberty that our Founders tried to secure in
our Constitution. In the end, freedom as we know it depends on the protections that come
from a consistent and healthy rule of law. 
Defense of the Rule of Law
In times like these, I’m reminded of Sir Thomas More’s line from A Man for All Seasons. When
Saint Thomas’s family implored him to arrest a dangerous man, he responded that even the
devil should have the benefit of the law. When his son-in-law suggested that he would “cut
down every law” “to get the devil,” Saint Thomas warned, “when the last law was down and
the devil turned round on you, where would you hide … the laws all being flat … do you really
think you could stand upright in the winds that would blow then?” (A Man for All Seasons, Act
1, scene 7, Robert Bolt, 1954). 
As the patron saint of statesmen and politicians, Saint Thomas’s defense of the rule of law
as a fundamental protection against evil reminds us that when politicians change the legal
landscape for partisan advantage or narrow ideological benefit — or when we let fierce but
fleeting political winds uproot us, however briefly, from our nation’s enduring principles — it
threatens all of us. Whether it is limiting the Great Writ of Habeas Corpus or denying immi-
grants full due process rights, cutting down these protections weakens the rule of law that is
fundamental to whom we are as Americans. 
As the only elected official speaking at this conference, I thought it appropriate to share
with you my perspective, as Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, on some recent ex-
amples of attempts to cut a path through the law to fight what some have termed evil doers.
The Judiciary Committee handles much more than its share of the most sensitive and con-
troversial issues that come before the Senate — from countering terrorism and fighting crime,
to protecting the civil rights of all Americans, and everything in between. The Committee has
a special stewardship role over our national charter and over our most cherished rights as
Americans. We consider nominations, legislation and constitutional amendments that bear
directly on our liberties and freedom.
I came to the Senate during the political ebb tide of Watergate and Vietnam, but in my thirty-
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two years in the Senate, I had never seen Congress so willfully derelict in its duties as it was
from 2002 through 2006. During this unfortunate chapter in the history of Congress, our
Constitution was under assault, our legal and human rights were weakened, our privacy and
other freedoms were eroded. The recent election sent a strong message. The American people
rose up to take away Congress’s rubber stamp, and to demand a new direction with more
 accountability and, I believe, a renewed respect for the rule of law.
Habeas Corpus: A Keystone of American Liberty 
In the wake of September 11th, our government rightly reexamined threats to our national
 security. However, just as we cannot allow ourselves to be lulled into a sense of false comfort
when it comes to our national security, we cannot allow ourselves to be frightened into hiding
our liberty in a blind trust. Our freedom is the foundation that makes us strong as a nation.
We must remain vigilant on all fronts or we stand to lose all that is precious — our liberty,
along with our security.
A lesson in how not to legislate was the adoption of the Military Commissions Act in the run-
up to the last election. Congress was wrong to suspend the Great Writ of Habeas Corpus— a
keystone of American liberty. That law needlessly undercut our freedoms and values, and
 allowed the terrorists to achieve something they could never win on the battlefield. It was act-
ing from fear rather than strength to undercut our Constitution. Congress squandered an op-
portunity to write a good law, to set enforceable guidelines for fighting and winning the war
on terror, without sacrificing American values and leadership on human rights.  
Justice Scalia emphasized in the Hamdi case that “[t]he very core of liberty secured by our
Anglo-Saxon system of separated powers has been freedom from indefinite imprisonment at
the will of the Executive” (Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (03-6696) 542 U.S. 507, 2004, Scalia, J., dissent-
ing). But the bill written by the White House and passed by the last Congress was designed to
ensure that this Administration is never again embarrassed by a United States Supreme Court
decision reviewing its unlawful abuses of power.
I look forward to restoring these fundamental protections and the checks and balances on
which the Constitution and our freedoms rest.
Torture: A Tragic Change In American Conduct
Another example of legal protection being eroded in the fight against so-called evil-doers in-
volves our treatment of detainees. This Administration ignored the rule of law on the issue of
torture. Unfortunately, Congress failed to respond properly to this landmark departure.
This tragic change in American conduct, permitting tactics that shock the conscience, no
doubt led to the nation’s embarrassing involvement in Abu Ghraib and the continuing prob-
lem in Guantanamo Bay. Despite the objections of military veterans who fear for the future
treatment of American detainees, we were told that in the age of terrorism and in the course
of war, a change in the traditions and laws of detention was necessary. 
Not only did the President redefine “torture;” his policies effectively allowed for the out-
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sourcing of torture through a process known as “extraordinary rendition.” Through this policy,
our nation delivers individuals to other countries with terrible human rights records. 
The Department of Justice has also been using a “material witness” law as a sort of general
preventive detention tactic to hold people — including U.S. citizens — whom there is insuffi-
cient evidence to charge with a crime. One individual snared under this tactic was local
Portland attorney Brandon Mayfield, who was wrongly identified by the FBI as involved in
the Madrid train bombing.
Immigration: Our Country Is A Nation of Immigrants
The rights of migrants are a matter of fundamental human rights. In our current system,
however, many immigrants living within the United States are living outside the boundaries
and also outside the protection of our legal system. How America treats its undocumented
workers is a reflection of our respect for the rule of law.
We all must recognize that our country is a nation of immigrants. I hope that we can ad-
vance American interests and American values by making further progress on comprehen-
sive immigration reform.  We made some bipartisan progress in the Senate last year only to
be stymied by those who sought partisan political advantage by adopting a fence along our
Southern Border as a reflection of their values.
Comprehensive immigration reform means much more than making our land borders
more secure and enforcing immigration violations in our interior. It includes addressing the
millions of people who are here in an undocumented status, and finding a mechanism to
match willing foreign workers with employers who need them. We can and must work together
to bring individuals out of the shadows, to treat hardworking people with dignity and respect
rather than disdain and discrimination.     
International Human Rights: A Responsibility to Fulfill
Our common humanity requires us to look at how American laws affect freedom beyond our
borders. I also serve as Chairman of the State and Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the
Appropriation Committee. In this role, I am familiar with the power America has to help de-
veloping nations and encourage democracies. Unfortunately, I am also familiar with the on-
going atrocities that plague the world and threaten human rights on an epic scale. 
Despite promises of “never again,” we are witnesses to acts of genocide in the Congo, Rwanda
and now Darfur. The lawlessness in these countries cries out for a renewed international
movement to respond to blatant violations of human rights. 
One of the first things I did as Judiciary Chairman was create a new subcommittee dedicat-
ed to human rights to elevate these issues in the context of American laws. Within months of
the formation of our new Subcommittee on Human Rights and the Law, the Senate passed the
Genocide Accountability Act, which closes a loophole that allowed those who commit or incite
genocide to seek refuge in our country without fear of prosecution for their actions. This bill
is an important next step in working to do all we can to combat genocide throughout the world.
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Too often, we in this country, the richest and most powerful nation on Earth, have done
too little to stop human rights atrocities in Sudan and elsewhere around the world. Many
more lives could have been saved if we and other nations had shown stronger leadership.  
Global Health: An Opportunity To Make A Global Difference
American laws that can dramatically affect individuals in the global community involve
health care. We live in a wealthy country with unmatched medical professionals and facilities,
and we should not ignore the obvious suffering beyond our borders.
The Judiciary Committee has jurisdiction over patents, which include many life-saving
medicines. As Chairman I intend to amplify efforts to reexamine our patent laws in the hope
that by making thoughtful and practical changes we can greatly increase access to essential
medicines throughout the world. We can help struggling families in developing nations, while
improving U.S. relations with large segments of the world’s population.
The current global health crisis is one of the great callings of our time. Whether it is the Avian
Flu, AIDS, SARS, West Nile Virus, or the approaching menace of multi-drug resistant bacteria,
we need to recognize that the health of those half-way around the world is not only morally
compelling but affects our security here in the United States. Through Judiciary Committee
actions, we hope to make life-saving medicines more readily available around the world.  
Conclusion
The American Experiment can be a bright, inspiring light to other nations or a starkly differ-
ent perception — a dark, foreboding threat. The ability of America to serve as an example to
civilizations across the world is compromised when we fall short of our own values. I think
we can all agree that our freedoms are better protected when we are admired and respected
by other nations than when we are merely feared. 
Catholics are all called to work for the common good, and to live in solidarity with the least
among us. Catholic teaching relating to the common good is broad in scope. The common
good is not limited by political boundaries. It has universal application. The purpose of all
laws is to advance the common good of the entire human family.
Curtailment of rights through rash, defensive actions threaten the greater human family
and the stability of the rule of law. Laws that are selectively ignored or cut down to eradicate
so-called evil-doers will make us all more, rather than less, vulnerable.
I hope that American values regarding the common good will again be reflected in our
laws. The rule of law allows us to transcend self-interest and momentary fears to achieve a
stable, lasting peace in which human dignity can flourish. The American Experiment is
 designed to create a society in which all people can flourish and express the truths they hold
most dear. 
Upholding the rule of law — whether it be for the devil or someone who disagrees with our
beliefs — is the best way to protect ourselves, our freedoms and our values. It is our responsi-
bility to one another, and to the generations that follow, to do so. 
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RESTORING THE INTRINSIC 
VALUE OF HUMAN LIFE
A FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL 
TO EUTHANIZE PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED KILLING
 B Y  W I L L I A M  WAG N E R *
Thou Shalt Not Kill
(Exodus 20:13; Deuteronomy 5:17 KJV) 
Oregon law authorizes physicians to prescribe and dispense a lethal dose of drugs, for thepurpose of assisting in the killing of a human being. The Oregon law expressly provides
a physician cannot “be subject to civil or criminal liability or professional disciplinary action”
for engaging in the conduct authorized by the law.1
The United States Supreme Court recently struck down a federal drug-control strategy
 designed to neutralize the Oregon law authorizing physician-assisted suicide.2 The Court’s
 decision, in Gonzales v. Oregon, prohibits enforcement of the nation’s drug laws against Oregon
doctors who dispense drugs to assist in the killing of a human being.3 To reach this result, the
Court invalidated an official federal Executive Branch interpretation of the Controlled
Substances Act (CSA)4 authorizing such enforcement.5 Predictably, after the Court’s decision,
state legislators in other states started introducing legislation similar to the Oregon law.6
The purpose of this paper is to suggest a federal legal strategy that is constitutionally
sound, likely to survive scrutiny by the United States Supreme Court, and, moreover, capable
of contributing to the restoration of the protection of human life rooted in the claim that
human life, including the vulnerable, has intrinsic value. The paper begins with the presenta-
tion of God’s standard in the protection of human life. Then the paper discusses how laws
 authorizing physician assisted-suicide reject God’s inviolable moral standard and create grave
implications for society. The second part of the paper recalls that “righteousness exalts a
 nation”7 and presents a federal legislative proposal designed to restore the intrinsic value of
human life. This part of the paper explains why the proposal will, unlike the federal strategy
in the Gonzales case, survive scrutiny by a majority of the United States Supreme Court. The
final section of the paper presents a challenge: if this proposal is to become public policy, citi-
zens must put their fundamental rights to free expression and religious conscience into action.  
I. Introduction: God’s Inviolable Standard: You Must Not Kill. 
God created man in his own image, in the image of God he created him; male and female he
 created them. 8
God saw all that he had made, and it was very good. 9
For I know the plans I have for you, declares the LORD. 10
For we are God’s workmanship, created in Christ Jesus to do good works, which God prepared in
advance for us to do. 11
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These are the very words of God.  In these words, he tells us that the life he creates has
worth, value, and significance.  He declares his creation of human life good and intimately
communicates that he has a plan and purpose for each life he creates. Since God creates
human life, only He can authorize the taking of it. Nowhere in His Word does he authorize
suicide or assisting someone to commit suicide. God’s inviolable standard expressed in his
command, “You must not kill,” thus applies. 
The Lord’s command not to kill is entitled to the reverent respect by those he created.12
The Hippocratic Oath written during the fifth to fourth centuries B.C. begins as a prayer and
declares the dedication of the cult of physicians including the proscription, “I will neither give
a deadly drug to anybody if asked for it, nor will I make a suggestion to this effect.”13 Such a
standard is consistent with God’s inviolable standard and proceeds from a premise that human
life has intrinsic value and purpose at all stages. It is also consistent with the positive law of
forty-nine of the fifty states — leaving Oregon standing alone in its radical departure from
 accepted medical practice. Indeed, numerous states, by law, prohibit physician-assisted
 suicide.14 Conversely, Oregon’s law (and currently pending legislation in other states) rejects
God’s inviolable standard present in the natural law, divine law, and most positive law. In its
place, proponents of physician assisted suicide favor the approach of moral relativism embed-
ded in a radical and inherently contradictory notion of autonomy — an approach where each
individual chooses, as a matter of personal preference, when and whether a human life has
positive value or purpose and who shall be made to serve that choice. 
II. Rejecting God’s Inviolable Standard: the Implications
The prescribing and dispensing of federally controlled drugs for assisting suicide proceeds
from the fundamentally erroneous premise that human life in certain conditions no longer
has positive value or purpose. That premise has incalculably grave implications for all of us.
When we abandon God’s moral absolutes today, it becomes easy tomorrow to choose death in
other ways, for other people, in other situations, since the positive value of life has become a
relative individual choice in particular circumstances. In a book edited by Kathleen Foley, and
Herbert Hendin, The Case Against Assisted Suicide, For the Right to End-of-Life Care15 numerous
scholars document that while Oregon’s law may be the next step toward the precipice it cer-
tainly was not the first step taken down the slippery slope. Prior to the enactment of the
Federal CSA, euthanasia societies grew during the late 19th and early 20th century as part of
the eugenics movements in the United States and Europe.16 Thirty states passed sterilization
laws embraced by both Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson.17 The Nazis first
legalized non-voluntary euthanasia of the elderly, then proceeded to kill hundreds of thousands
of the mentally ill — all prior to the unspeakable tragedy of the holocaust.18 Both euthanasia
and sterilization were viewed as appropriate instruments of eugenics. As late as the 1940s,
this country’s leading euthanasia proponent, Dr. Foster Kennedy, advocated compulsory
 euthanasia for retarded children on eugenics grounds.19 By the 1970s, the euthanasia move-
ment’s focus shifted to easing the “burden” of caring for the elderly, and then to easing suffer-
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ing.20
The Dutch experiment in physician assisted suicide — as noted by the United States
Supreme Court in its 1997 decisions — has failed frighteningly. Doctors consistently violated
unenforceable Dutch legal requirements.21 Sixty percent of Dutch assisted suicide cases go
unreported.22 Most non-reporting involves cases in which physicians failed to follow estab-
lished guidelines for voluntariness or consultation.23 Worse, in several thousand cases, each
year physicians ended patient’s life without the patient’s consent.24 Twenty-five percent of
physicians terminated one or more patient’s life without request.25 In the 1995 study year, the
Remmelink Report indicated almost one thousand cases in which physicians actively inter-
vened to cause death without an explicit request from the patient.26 Each major Dutch meas-
ure enacted to control and regulate physician-assisted suicide (including informed consent,
consultation, and reporting) largely failed or was modified or was violated.27
The Supreme Court in Washington v. Glucksberg recognized that “what is couched as a limit-
ed right to ‘physician-assisted suicide’ is likely, in effect, a much broader license, which could
prove extremely difficult to police and contain.”28 Indeed, what we sowed yesterday, we are
reaping today. A Dutch health care facility now concedes it euthanized newborn infants and a
physician who killed the disabled babies unapologetically asserted that his conduct is proper.29
So society continues, as Judge Robert Bork observes, to slouch toward Gomorrah — and at an
increasingly faster pace as it replaces God’s inviolable moral standard with an a relative indi-
vidual standard of personal convenience.30
The American Medical Association, and more than forty other national and state medical
and health care organizations, affirms that “the ethical prohibition against physician-assisted
suicide is a cornerstone of medical ethics.”31 According to the AMA, physician assisted suicide
is “fundamentally incompatible with the physician’s role as healer.”32 State legislation such as
the Oregon Statute rejects this position and the underlying inviolable standard which serves
as the foundation of the practice of medicine. The grave implications for our nation that ac-
company such a choice are clear. 
Foundations do matter. Oregon’s assisted suicide law (and similar legislation pending in
other states) grieves millions who know God made us in His image, and that therefore life is
sacred. It is time to remind ourselves of the ancient Biblical truth that “righteousness exalts a
nation.”33 We must not be deterred by those who, as they strive to secularize this country,
seek to exclude only the religious from participating in the democratic promulgation of public
policy. We are, by His grace, a nation where everyone, including the religious, may freely con-
tribute to the marketplace of ideas and to the development of public policy. What follows
therefore, is a federal legislative proposal to restore the intrinsic value of human life — a pro-
posal that is both constitutionally sound and, unlike the Executive Branch strategy in the
Gonzales case, one that will survive scrutiny by a majority of the United States Supreme Court.
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III. A Federal Legislative Proposal to Euthanize Physician-Assisted Suicide
A. Background
The Controlled Substances Act (CSA) currently regulates the manufacture, distribution, dis-
pensing, and possession of controlled substances.34 Enacted by Congress in 1970, the CSA
 consolidated previous drug laws into a comprehensive statute, thereby strengthening law
enforce ment tools against international and interstate drug trafficking.35 The conventionally
understood purposes of the act were to combat drug abuse and to prevent diversion of con-
trolled substances into illegal channels.36 The current CSA makes it a federal crime for physi-
cians and pharmacists to prescribe and fill prescriptions inconsistent with these purposes.37
Under the CSA it is a crime for a physician to “dispense” a controlled substance without a
 legitimate medical purpose in the usual course of medical treatment.38
Preliminarily, it is worth noting that current federal policy on physician-assisted suicide is
inconsistent because of the failure of the CSA to expressly proscribe the dispensing of con-
trolled substances for assisting suicide. On the one hand, Congress expressed disapproval of
physician-assisted suicide in its Assisted Suicide Funding Restriction Act of 1997.39 There,
Congress expressly stated the principal purpose of the Act was “to continue current Federal
policy by explicitly providing that Federal funds may not be used to pay for items and services
(including assistance) the purpose of which is to cause (or assist in causing) the suicide,
 euthanasia, or mercy killing of any individual.”40 On the other hand, the current state of the
CSA operates in a way that endorses physician-assisted suicide. Because physicians register
with the federal government under the CSA, and because they must write prescriptions only
for a legitimate medical purpose to be valid under the CSA,41 physicians writing prescriptions
for lethal doses of controlled substances results in a federal policy that endorses physician-as-
sisted suicide as a “legitimate medical purpose.”42
Attorney General Ashcroft believed the CSA authorized him to establish, through an inter-
pretive rule, that dispensing controlled substances to assist suicide violates the federal drug
law.43 The Attorney General, therefore, promulgated an interpretative rule to officially clarify
that assisting suicide is not a legitimate medical purpose under the federal drug law.44 The in-
terpretive rule reconciled the inconsistency in current federal policy by providing a federal
enforcement strategy capable of neutralizing a state law like Oregon’s authorizing physician-
assisted suicide. Unfortunately, in Gonzales v. Oregon, a majority of the Supreme Court rejected
the Attorney General’s argument and struck down the Executive Branch’s interpretive rule.45
In striking down the interpretive rule authorizing federal enforcement of the CSA to pro-
tect life, the Court quashed the only existing federal strategy capable of stopping doctors from
dispensing drugs with the intent to take life. The Court did not, however, uphold physician-
 assisted suicide — it only held that the Attorney General lacked legal authority to promulgate
the official interpretation. Nor did the Court address the issue whether Congress, under the
Constitution, may regulate federally controlled drugs in a way that prohibits the dispensing of
such drugs to kill a human being. It is the thesis of this paper that Congress can — and must.  
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B. Remedy: A Legislative Proposal
As part of a constitutionally authorized federal regulatory scheme, Congress should amend
the CSA to expressly prohibit the dispensing of federally controlled drugs to assist in the
killing of a human being.46 A proposed amendment appears at the end of this paper as an
Appendix. 
Congress may act to regulate the dispensing of drugs to assist in the killing of human life if:
1) empowered to do so under some provision of the United States Constitution; and 2) no
other part of the Constitution limits such regulation.47 If authority exists under the Constitution
for Congress to regulate, and no other part of the Constitution limits such regulation, then the
Supreme Court should uphold the law when it is rationally related to any legitimate govern-
mental interest. Most importantly, under the Supremacy Clause, such a federal law pre-empts
any conflicting state law (like Oregon’s) that cannot consistently stand together with the fed-
eral regulation.48
1. The Constitutional Power of Congress to Regulate Controlled Substances 
Article I of the United States Constitution vests in Congress the power “[t]o regulate Commerce ...
among the several States,”49 Additionally, the “Necessary and Proper” Clause empowers
Congress to enact laws reasonably necessary to carry out its power under the Commerce
Clause.50 Supreme Court precedent interprets these provisions as empowering Congress to
regulate inter alia “things in interstate commerce” and activities that “substantially affect” in-
terstate commerce.51 Article I empowers Congress, therefore, to regulate dispensing of con-
trolled substances with the intent to assist suicide if either: 1) the drugs are things in interstate
commerce or 2) the activity substantially affects interstate commerce.
a. Regulating as a Thing in Interstate Commerce
Drugs dispensed “for assisting suicide have likely traveled in interstate commerce.”52 Such
drugs are, therefore, ‘things’ in interstate commerce. Because the controlled substances are
‘things’ in interstate commerce, Congress, has the power under the Commerce Clause, to reg-
ulate by amending the CSA as proposed. 
b. Regulating as an Activity Substantially Affecting Interstate Commerce
Congress may also regulate activity concerning controlled substances if the activity sub-
stantially affects interstate commerce.53 In determining whether a substantial effect on inter-
state commerce exists, a court can aggregate the regulated activity if it is economic activity.54
“[A]ctivities regulated by the CSA are quintessentially economic” since they involve “the pro-
duction, distribution, and consumption of commodities.”55
Doctors dispensing federally controlled drugs actively participate in the interstate con-
trolled substances market.56 Since this economic activity concerning controlled substances
substantially affects interstate commerce, Congress may regulate it.57 When Congress enacts
comprehensive legislation to regulate the interstate market in a fungible commodity, it acts
“well within its authority to ‘make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper’ to ‘regulate
Commerce among the several States.’”58 For example, in Raich, the Court held Congress pos-
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sessed the power to regulate even the intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana for
personal use, since such economic activity substantially affected interstate commerce.59
Justice Stevens, writing for the Court stated, “When Congress decides the total incidence of a
practice poses a threat to the national market, it may regulate the entire class.”60
c. The Current Scope of the CSA’s Comprehensive Regulatory Regime
In Raich the Court expressly held that “the CSA is a comprehensive regulatory regime specifi-
cally designed to regulate which controlled substances can be utilized for medicinal purposes,
and in what manner.”61 Seven months later, however, the Gonzales v. Oregon Court character-
ized the CSA’s comprehensive regulatory regime more restrictively (i.e., limiting “doctors
from using their prescription-writing powers as a means to engage in illicit drug dealing and
trafficking as conventionally understood”).62 The majority stated Congress should use “explic-
it language in the statute” if it desires to prohibit physicians from dispensing drugs to assist
suicide.63 In view of the Court’s language, Congress must expressly amend the CSA to do so.
Since Article I of the Constitution provides an appropriate power source for Congress to enact
the proposed amendment — either because the drugs are things in interstate commerce or be-
cause the activity substantially affects interstate commerce — the next issue is whether any
other part of the Constitution limits Congress from exercising its Article I powers.
2. Nothing in the Constitution Limits Congress from Using its Article I Powers to Regulate the
Dispensing of Federally Controlled Drugs that Assist in the Killing of a Human Being   
No constitutional provision limits Congress from exercising its Article I power as proposed in
this paper. Some may, however, attempt to misconstrue the proposed amendment to the CSA
by suggesting that it concerns a state’s right to regulate the practice of medicine — and that it
therefore alters the usual constitutional balance between the states and federal government.
The problem with such a federalism analysis is that the proposed amendment here is not
about the regulation of medical practice; it is about the right of the federal government to reg-
ulate controlled substances in a uniform manner. That is, the proposed amendment, as part
of a constitutionally authorized federal regulatory scheme, prohibits the dispensing of federal-
ly controlled drugs to assist in the killing of a human being. In any case, no constitutional pro-
vision limits Congress from using its powers under Article I to regulate commerce in
connection with medical matters; no question exists that Congress can establish uniform na-
tional standards in the areas of health and safety.64
In the past, some also contended that a fundamental right to assisted-suicide exists under
the Due Process Clauses, and that laws proscribing assisted suicide violate the Equal
Protection Clause. The United States Supreme Court soundly rejected such contentions.65
Since no fundamental right limiting Congress’s power exists, Congress may regulate feder-
al drugs as long as its legislation is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.66
The government has a legitimate interest in preserving human life, stopping suicide, and pre-
venting a moral slide toward euthanasia.67 A statute prohibiting the dispensing of federally
controlled drugs to assist suicide is rationally related to these legitimate state interests. In
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amending the CSA, therefore, Congress should clearly articulate that its intent to comprehen-
sively regulate the market of controlled substances includes regulation of such substances
used to assist suicide. 
Moreover, Congress properly can conclude that regulation of drugs, and drug-dispensing
activity assisting suicide, is a reasonably necessary way to achieve its purpose of comprehen-
sively regulating the interstate market in controlled substances as amended.68 As noted, drugs
dispensed for committing suicide are “things” in interstate commerce Congress may regulate
under the Commerce Clause.69 If a primary purpose of the CSA is to control the controlled
substances market,70 then regulating such a commodity in interstate commerce is rationally
related to the government’s legitimate purpose. Likewise, since doctors dispensing drugs for
suicide actively participate in the interstate controlled substances market, Congress can
 rationally conclude that, in the aggregate, leaving suicide drugs outside the regulatory
scheme substantially influences price and market conditions. Such is the case even if the
manufacture and dispensing of controlled substances for assisting suicide is purely intrastate,
since such economic activity, in the aggregate, substantially affects the larger interstate drug
market. Congress should provide clear legislative history establishing this fact.71
Congress properly, therefore, can conclude that regulation of drug-dispensing activity is a
reasonably necessary way to achieve its purpose of comprehensively regulating the interstate
market in controlled substances — especially as amended. Including improper drug-dispensing
activity for lethal purposes within the CSA’s coverage furthers its legitimate objective. Indeed,
leaving such activity excepted from regulation will undermine a clear legislative intent to reg-
ulate the drug market comprehensively in a manner which protects public health and safety.72
Under a “rational basis” standard, broad deference is due to congressional judgments con-
cerning whether drug dispensing economic activity by physicians substantially affects inter-
state commerce.73 Likewise, such broad deference applies to whether Congress’s regulation of
drugs is reasonably necessary to carry out its amended legislative purpose under the
Commerce Clause.74
C. Effects of the Proposed Legislation
As amended, the Federal Controlled Substances Act will preempt Oregon-type laws authoriz-
ing doctors to dispense drugs to assist killing human beings. The relevant Oregon law in this
case authorizes physicians, in certain circumstances, to prescribe and dispense a lethal
amount of drugs for the purpose of assisting in the killing of a human being.75 The Oregon law
expressly provides that a physician cannot “be subject to civil or criminal liability or profes-
sional disciplinary action” for engaging in the conduct authorized by the Oregon law.76 The
drugs dispensed in the lethal conduct authorized by the Oregon law are controlled substances
regulated under the federal CSA.77 Generally, such substances are among those listed in
Schedule II of the CSA.78 The conduct now authorized as legitimate and immune from prose-
cution under Oregon law will become a prosecutable crime carrying serious penalties under
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the amended provisions of the CSA.
Currently under the CSA, it is a federal crime for a physician to “dispense” a controlled sub-
stance without a legitimate medical purpose in the usual course of medical treatment.79 If
amended as proposed here, the CSA will specifically proscribe the dispensing of drugs to as-
sist in the killing of a human being. Moreover, as under the current provisions of the CSA,
when “death … results from the use of such substance” dispensed, the dispensing physician
will face significant penalties under the CSA.80 Where federal and state provisions conflict,
Article VI of the United States Constitution controls:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United Stateswhich shall be made in
Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the … laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.81
And in its Raich decision, the Supreme Court recently reiterated: 
The Supremacy Clause unambiguously provides that if there is any conflict be-
tween federal and state law, federal law shall prevail. It is beyond peradventure
that federal power over commerce is superior to that of the States to provide for
the … necessities of their inhabitants …. No form of state activity can constitution-
ally thwart the regulatory power granted by the commerce clause to Congress.82
As amended, the CSA will expressly preempt any state laws to the extent “there is a positive
conflict between [a provision of the CSA] and that state law so that the two cannot consistently
stand together.”83 Under conventional conflict preemption principles, therefore, the CSA as
amended will clearly preempt Oregon’s statute authorizing the dispensing of controlled sub-
stances to assist suicide. The CSA as amended will proscribe the dispensing of controlled sub-
stances by physicians to assist in the killing of a human being — and provide severe penalties
when “death … results from the use of such substance ….”84 Oregon’s law, on the other hand,
expressly authorizes — and immunizes against prosecution — the lethal dispensing proscribed
and severely penalized by the CSA. Thus, the two statutes here will conflict to such an extent
that they cannot consistently stand together.  
Moreover, even if a court could some how construe the CSA as amended to not expressly
preempt the Oregon statute, implied preemption exists where “compliance with both federal
and state regulations is a physical impossibility.”85 The mutually exclusive provisions of an
amended CSA and Oregon law governing the dispensing of controlled substances make it im-
possible for a dispensing physician to comply with both. In such situations, the Supreme
Court has deemed the state law preempted — even where a distinctive state interest is at stake.86
The proposed amendment to the CSA will end the dispensing of federally controlled drugs
to assist in the commission of suicide. Because the proposal is constitutionally sound it will,
when challenged, survive scrutiny by a majority of the United States Supreme Court. While
the proposal holds the potential to restore the intrinsic value of human life, its promulgation
into public policy depends on the will of a morally motivated citizenry. It is with this final
point that I conclude, and present the reader with a challenge.
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IV. Conclusion: A Challenge to Those Who Seek to be an Instrument of His Peace
Legitimizing the killing of human beings merely creates an illusion of a nation willing to pro-
tect fundamental freedoms. Such a course inevitably erodes essential foundations of a country.
Those who came before us built our constitutional democratic republic upon a fundamental
foundation of decency. That foundation is under attack by those who seek to transform our
pluralistic nation (where everyone may freely participate in public policy development) into
a secular nation (where everyone except the religious may do so). Although structural institu-
tions of free government may stand for a time, the essence for which they stand can eventually
cease to exist. 
Under our watch, proponents of doctor-assisted killing attacked a sacred standard — and
we lost important ground. Worse, these same proponents continue to seize upon the Gonzales
v. Oregon case to justify expanding the practice to other states. God’s inviolable standard that
life has positive value at all stages is a fundamental standard — not morally relative. For the
legislative proposal discussed in this paper to become public policy, citizens must put their
fundamental rights of free expression and religious conscience into action. This requires par-
ticipating in the policy-making process. If we do so, we can retake lost ground and halt
 advances against the inherent value of life. Urge Congress to use its constitutional power to
amend the CSA — and permanently euthanize assisted-suicide. 
Appendix — Proposed Legislation
A BILL
To amend title 21, United State Code, to prohibit the dispensing of controlled substances for
assisting in the commission of suicide.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in
Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ‘Controlled Substances Regulation to Preserve Life Act of 2007’.
SEC 2. PROHIBITION ON THE DISPENSING OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES FOR AS-
SISTING IN THE COMMISSION OF SUICIDE. 
(a) Title 21, United States Code, section 841(a) is amended by inserting the following new sub-
section (3):
Unlawful acts
Except as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or in-
tentionally — 
(3) to dispense a controlled substance to assist an individual in killing himself or herself.
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THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
AND THE LIMITS OF PURE HISTORY
 B Y  K Y L E  D U N C A N *
Introduction
For the Supreme Court, history has always been the key to understanding the Constitution’s
command that “Congress shall make no law … respecting an establishment of Religion.”
Proponents both of mainstream and revisionist histories of the Clause would together affirm
with former Chief Justice Rehnquist that the “true meaning of the Establishment Clause can
only be seen in its history.”1 History also continues to be a major preoccupation of Establish -
ment Clause scholarship.2 This paper does not contest the premise that historical study
should be a major ingredient in any compelling account of the Clause’s meaning. Rather it
asks whether another ingredient has been neglected, and whose refinement would help disci-
pline how justices and scholars employ history to interpret the Clause. Ironically, as this paper
argues, the missing ingredient is a coherent account of the how the words of the Establishment
Clause themselves work to clarify the Clause’s meaning and its function within the overall
constitutional structure.
Wide disagreements about the historical meaning of the Clause are nothing new, but my
attention to the subject was renewed by the testy exchanges among Justices Souter, Stevens
and Scalia in the 2005 Ten Commandments cases, McCreary County and Van Orden.3 In partic-
ular, Scalia’s McCreary County dissent has drawn overheated criticism that misses what Scalia
is attempting to do out of an understanding of history.4 My own view is that Scalia wants to re-
fine the typical originalist use of Establishment Clause history by treating a public tradition of
religious practices as an amplification of original meaning across time.5 Scalia, that is, seeks to
use history in a more concrete and disciplined way than the Court has in past anti-establish-
ment cases.
But Scalia’s historical experiment cannot deliver fully on its promise, primarily for the
same reason that the Court itself has never been able to draw consistent lessons from history.
Neither approach has developed an account of what tangible legal limits are set by the text of
the Establishment Clause. Thus even Scalia’s more disciplined approach likely will not reli-
ably channel the use of historical materials in future cases.
The basic problem seems to be this: the circle of government actions forbidden by the
Clause has been drawn too vaguely and too broadly — around something perhaps described
as “bad relationships between religion and government.” The circle needs to be far tighter —
drawn in terms of “establishment” as a legal construct and less as a cultural, sociological or
theological construct; drawn in terms that restrain distinct institutional relationships between
the state and actual “churches,” instead of policing the vague boundaries between the “reli-
gious” and the “secular.”
This paper will use the disagreement among the Justices in the Ten Commandments opin-
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ions to discuss the limits of pure history in Establishment Clause jurisprudence. It will then
sketch what is needed to discipline the use of historical materials — a better textual account
of what legal limits the Establishment Clause places on government.
I. Historical Januses
The Establishment Clause’s text should be understood as placing a specific kind of “frame”
within which to process the bewildering mass of historical materials that vie for an inter-
preter’s attention.6 First, to understand why any frame is inevitably necessary, it will be use-
ful to review a few iconic pieces of historical evidence and show how they could easily stand
for diametrically opposed meanings of the Establishment Clause. These bits of history are
“Janus-faced,” that is, depending on one’s frame of reference, they look in two directions —
 either toward an expansive, aggressive Clause or a narrow, modest Clause.7 What is missing is
a well-defined frame within which to interpret such evidence.
The central conceit of modern anti-establishment jurisprudence is a good example. Everson
unanimously read the Clause as an act of collective repentance, wrung from the “consciences”
of “freedom-loving colonials” that had been “shock[ed]” into a “feeling of abhorrence” by their
own oppressive religious establishments.8 Everson takes this evidence — the persistence of re-
ligious establishments in the colonies and early States — and creates a frame for interpreting
the Clause. The Clause becomes an instrument designed to purge certain unpalatable church-
state relationships from our civic memory. It is an agent of aggressive, secularizing change.
But, with a minor viewpoint adjustment, the very same evidence cuts the opposite way. The
state establishments, after all, survived the ratification of the Constitution and in some cases
persisted well into the Nineteenth Century.9 The Establishment Clause did nothing to alter that
situation, but instead maintained the political conditions under which state establishments
could flourish or wither of their own accord. Thus, Gerard Bradley describes ratification of the
Religion Clauses as “deeply conservative in its celebration of the present and immediate past
and in its insistence that the prevailing regime need be preserved inviolate.”10 Now, the same
historical fact means that the Establishment Clause is an agent of conservation and stability,
promoting the church-state status quo, and sublimely agnostic about the value of establish-
ments.
Much the same can be said for another historical pillar of Clause meaning: the Virginia
Assessment Controversy. Everson deemed it an interpretative watershed and, consequently,
canonized Madison’s and Jefferson’s views of the Controversy for interpreting the later
Establishment Clause.11 On this view, the Establishment Clause is a transformative provision,
hardwired to propel us out of the thickets of state-fostered religion and to salve taxpayer con-
sciences from even “three pence” of clergy taxes.12 And yet, at the time of Everson, a commen-
tator as astute as Father John Courtney Murray jeered at the historiography of Justices Black
and Rutledge. “The tricks,” Murray wrote in a famous article, “that they play on the dead are
astonishing.”13
For Murray (and other scholars since), the context of the Assessment Controversy showed
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Madison’s and Jefferson’s views of the Virginia tax were foreign to the content of the Estab -
lishment Clause. As a Virginia legislator, Madison had championed avant garde church-state
views, but things changed when he became a federal congressman. Madison explicitly set
aside his personal church-state views when he shepherded the Religion Clauses through the
First Congress, precisely because the object was to make them non-controversial and politi-
cally palatable.14 The text of the Clauses hints at this — it is nothing remotely like Madison’s
Memorial and Remonstrance or Jefferson’s Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom. On this view,
the Madison of the federal Religion Clauses simply sought non-controversial measures that
would not forestall ratification of the new Constitution — a far cry from the Madison champi-
oning progressive church-state views in Virginia.15 And, as a final irony, Murray indicates that
“the First Amendment met sharp and serious objection in the Virginia senate, on grounds of
its inadequacy in comparison to the Virginia statute.”16 In sum, on this view of the evidence,
the inference to be drawn from the Virginia Controversy is that, whatever the Establishment
Clause was designed to do, it was something deliberately different from what Madison and
Jefferson had sought to accomplish in Virginia.
Examples could be multiplied, but I will close with two pieces of evidence that are typically
cited for one view of the Clause, but that, on closer inspection could well stand for the oppo-
site view. They are Janus-faced par excellence. The first is James Madison’s 1822 letter to Edward
Livingston.17 It is often cited as evidence that the Establishment Clause, properly understood,
creates a strictly secular government and would rule out legislative chaplains or executive
proclamations of thanksgiving and fasts. After all, in the letter Madison reaffirms his commit-
ment to “[t]he immunity of Religion from civil jurisdiction,” distances himself from paid leg-
islative chaplains, and laments his own (albeit toned-down) proclamations while President.
Surely this is evidence of what the Establishment Clause means? Yes, but only if one’s frame
for Clause meaning is something like “The Establishment Clause rules out the kinds of religion-
and-government interactions that James Madison privately condemned.”18 It is a very differ-
ent story if one’s frame is: “The Clause does not reach those religion-and- government
interactions that were commonly thought at the time to be a matter of politics, or at least were
not commonly thought to present any constitutional question.” It is important to see that,
under this frame of reference, Madison’s letter is strong evidence that the practices at issue
were perfectly constitutional. After all, in the 1822 letter Madison affirms that he “found it nec-
essary on more than one occasion to follow the example of predecessors” with regard to
proclamations. The inference is that such practices were commonly thought to be unprob-
lematic for purposes of the Establishment Clause. Indeed, Madison’s own scruples shrank be-
fore the political realities created by such a common understanding. His own reservations,
whether felt at the time or expressed decades later, are at best evidence that his own philosophy
of church-state relationships was out-of-step with the times.
Finally, passages from Justice Story’s Commentaries on the Constitution are often cited  as -
evidence of an original understanding that the Religion Clauses were meant to protect
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Christianity only.19 After all, goes the argument, didn’t Story write that “[t]he real object” of
the Religion Clauses “was, not to countenance, much less to advance Mahometanism, or
Judaism, or infidelity, by prostrating Christianity; but to exclude all rivalry among Christian
sects ….”?20 This quote not only appears to buttress a pro-Christian original understanding of
the First Amendment, but also makes Story a prototypical Judge Roy Moore and the antithe-
sis of such forward-thinking figures like Madison or John Locke. This, then, is evidence for
what the Clauses “meant” to the founders, if, again, one’s reference point is their personal reli-
gious predilections or perhaps their predictions about the effect of the Clauses.
But some further reading in the Commentaries reveals Story’s point is exactly the opposite:
the Clauses denied federal power to patronize any religion, including Christianity. Story rec-
ognized that the “general, if not universal sentiment, in America” at the founding was “that
Christianity ought to receive encouragement from the state,” but he immediately went on to
write that confiding such a power to the nascent federal government would have been court-
ing disaster. Given the “dangers from ecclesiastical ambition, the bigotry of spiritual pride,
and the intolerance of the sects,” Story explained that in the Religion Clauses “it was deemed
advisable to exclude from the national government all power to act upon the subject.”21 Thus,
if we change the frame of reference from Story’s assessment of the founding generation’s
 personal religious predilections to their legal methods in crafting the Religion Clauses, the
Commentaries reveal a starkly different view about the substantive content of the Clauses.
One evolves from the unjustifiable caricature of Story the “Christian nationalist,” to the Story
who wrote — again, in the same Commentaries held up to buttress a pro-Christian original un-
derstanding — that the Religion Clauses meant that “the Catholic and the Protestant, the
Calvinist and the Arminian (sic), the Jew and the Infidel, may sit down at the common table
of national councils, without any inquisition into their faith, or mode of worship.”22 And whom
did Story cite to support his view of universal religious freedom and anti-coercion, which he
thought was enshrined in the Religion Clauses? None other than the progressive political
philosopher, John Locke.23
But someone will say, “So what? It isn’t news that historical ‘facts’ can be made to stand for
contradictory propositions.” Quite so, but the point here is that one’s understanding of what
the Establishment Clause is supposed to do (what I have been calling the “frame”) strongly in-
fluences the inferences one pulls out of historical facts. One who sees the Clause as repenting
for illiberal establishments, and another who sees it as stubbornly clinging to those establish-
ments, will infer very different Clause meanings from the persistence and contours of state
establishments after the framing. One who sees the Clause as embodying collective notions
about what church-state relationships were beyond the pale, and another who sees it as em-
bodying James Madison’s experimental church-state philosophy, will read the Assessment
Controversy very differently as regards Clause meaning. The fundamental point is that histor-
ical materials cry out for a frame of reference within which to assess them. We will now turn
to a recent controversy over the use of history and see if the Justices have made any progress
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toward such a goal.
II. The Clause’s Historical Meaning: Typical Treatments and Scalia’s Experiment
In the Justices’ sharp debates in the Ten Commandments opinions, one can see two strikingly
different approaches to the derivation of Establishment Clause meaning from historical mate-
rials. In Justice Souter’s McCreary Countymajority opinion, and in Justice Stevens’s Van Orden
dissent, what one might call the typical or mainstream approach is on display.24 But Justice
Scalia’s McCreary County dissent appears to be attempting something new — a refinement of
how historical data should be deployed to illuminate Clause meaning.
The Court’s mainstream approach to history — going back to Everson— involves drawing
abstract lessons from key historical events and applying those lessons to a modern world the
Justices perceive, in crucial aspects, to have moved on from the religious worldviews of the
18th century. Souter’s statement in McCreary that the command of “neutrality” emerges from
a “sense of the past” captures this perfectly.25 Historical data are either too inconclusive or too
rooted in uncongenial religious outlooks to furnish precise answers to today’s religious con-
troversies, and therefore must be treated only as signposts. From the mists of the past, they
point in broad directions toward a religious future unknown to the founding generation. This
is a form of highly abstracted originalism, from which the Court has derived principles such
as “neutrality,” “non-endorsement,” “non-coercion,” and (increasingly making a comeback)
“non-divisiveness.”
Take “non-endorsement,” for instance. Drawing on a congeries of historical religious ac-
knowledgments and symbolism — and perhaps despite such a history — the Court has divined
the principle that the Establishment Clause forbids the government from thereby making “re-
ligious outsiders” of some of its citizens.26 While any strictly original version of this “outsider”
principle would operate only in concrete civil and political terms — such as in a denial of vot-
ing rights or access to public services — today’s non-endorsement principle functions in the
realm of a “reasonable observer’s” perception of his place in civil society. This approach obvi-
ously creates a broad arena for judicial discretion and creativity in “updating” the operation of
the Clause for (what at least the Justices perceive as) a religiously-altered modern society.
In his McCreary dissent, Justice Scalia launches his most forceful rejoinder yet to this typical
treatment of history. Scalia’s project is “new” in the sense that he is applying to the Estab lish -
ment Clause his approach to legal traditionalism in other areas. But, at bottom, Scalia’s ap-
proach to the Clause is a refinement of the usual “accomodationist” historical answer to a
“separationist” Clause — of the kind seen, for instance, in the legislative chaplain case, Marsh
v. Chambers.27 More importantly, however, Scalia is attempting to invert the usual relationship
between history and general principle in the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
Scalia’s use of historical materials to interpret the Clause must be understood in light of his
constitutionalism. Scalia sees the Establishment Clause as a time-bound limit on governmen-
tal power and majoritarian change. Like other guarantees in the Bill of Rights, the Clause “pre-
vents the law from reflecting certain changes in original values” and is “designed to restrain
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transient majorities from impairing long-recognized personal liberties.” Historical materials,
in the form of a persistent tradition of official actions, projects the contours of those constitu-
tional limitations across time. An “open, widespread, and unchallenged” legal tradition serves
to “validate” or “clarify” the common, public understanding of what limits the Clause was sup-
posed to place on government and ensuing majorities.28 History thus becomes a kind of run-
ning commentary on original understanding.
On this view, historical materials in the form of legal traditions are more likely to say what
governmental actions the Establishment Clause was not intended to restrain. Why? Tradition,
for Scalia, concretely reflects society’s on-going resolution of “the basic policy decisions gov-
erning society,” revealing the “accepted political norms” that lie outside the Constitution’s
areas of exclusion. Consequently, persistent legal traditions will sketch areas of policy-making
freedom, untouched by the prohibitions of the Clause. By the same token, tradition tends to
cabin judicial power. Scalia says that long-standing traditions “are themselves the stuff out of
which the Court’s principles are to be formed,” and “the very points of reference by which the
legitimacy or illegitimacy of other practices is to be figured out.”29
What hermeneutic of history emerges from Scalia’s traditionalism? First, history helps
Scalia sketch the central purpose of the Establishment Clause. The Clause is, at its most basic,
intended to identify two mutually-exclusive forms of government “religious” actions. The con-
stitutionally off-limits area contains actions that history instructs us were commonly under-
stood at the framing to be beyond governmental power. These are the easy cases: if the
United States founded an entity called the “Church of the United States” or if it made the 1928
Book of Common Prayer normative in all Episcopalian Churches, history would clearly teach
that such actions were placed beyond the pale by the Establishment Clause. In McCreary,
Scalia himself affirmed that if the government promulgated an “official” version of the Ten
Commandments, such an action would easily fall within the anti-establishment prohibition.30
But the flip-side of the “constitutionally off-limits” area is the area of political prudence.
Government religious action is plainly constitutional where historical materials show unam-
biguously that “government conduct that is claimed to violate the [Establishment Clause] …
[was] engaged in without objection at the very time the [Clause] … was adopted.”31 In these
easy cases, a public consensus on founding-era practices is virtually conclusive evidence for
Scalia on the common, public understanding of the reach of the Clause — either placing a
practice firmly in the forbidden area or in the political prudence area.
Scalia, of course, recognizes that hard cases will often arise where historical materials do
not speak to a contested practice — either because the record is thin or inconclusive, or be-
cause the practice itself was unheard of. There would consequently be a zone of uncertainty
between the areas of clear prohibition and clear political prudence. For Scalia, a post-adoption
tradition of laws or other official actions may clarify the parameters of the Clause by helping
to narrow that zone of uncertainty. As to particular governmental religious practices, the
reach of the Establishment Clause may be uncertain, because of shortcomings in the original
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historical materials, but post-enactment traditions may help develop the contours of the origi-
nal reach of the Clause. That this is no easy task is revealed by the question Scalia would then
pose about the disputed governmental action: is that action “consonant with [the original]
concept of the protected freedom?”32 As discussed later, here is where cracks begin to appear
in Scalia’s method, even taken on its own terms.
At this point, however, we can draw some broad comparisons between the Court’s typical
approach to history and Scalia’s approach. Most generally, for the Court, the Establishment
Clause itself is a source of general abstract norms that superintend historical traditions. Even
longstanding public traditions fall under the sway of such norms, which give the Court a
broad revisionary authority when scrutinizing the present manifestations of those traditions.
Scalia’s approach is diametrically opposed. For Scalia, it is persistent, public traditions them-
selves that clarify the contours of the Establishment Clause. Provided those traditions are suf-
ficiently indicative of a relatively uncontested public understanding of a particular practice’s
permissibility, those traditions amplify across time what the Clause originally permits and
prohibits to majorities.
On a more specific level, the Court tends to draw abstract norms from historical materials,
norms that are relatively detached from the historical circumstances from which they emerge.
The paradigm example is “neutrality.” Having drawn that norm from controversies such as
the Virginia Assessment Act, the Court has not limited the contours of “neutrality” to the his-
torical dynamics surrounding the controversy. In other words, the Court’s “neutrality” is not
necessarily Madison’s or Jefferson’s, nor is it a public understanding of “neutrality” circa 1787.
Instead, “neutrality” becomes a relatively free-floating principle to be elaborated by the
Justices themselves according to their own notions of how the concept ought to apply in mod-
ern situations. Much the same could be said for the Court’s notion of what counts as “secular.”
Scalia’s derivation of norms from historical materials appears to be less abstract and more
wedded to the particular milieu out of which the norm arose. The overarching point of
Scalia’s McCreary dissent, for example, was to contest the one-size-fits-all application of a
“neutrality” principle to an issue on which historical traditions appeared to paint a starkly dif-
ferent picture. As Scalia controversially argued, neutrality may well be a sensible principle in
the area of funding religious institutions, but that does not necessarily mean it works for gov-
ernment religious symbolism. Scalia does not explain the basis for that distinction, but as I
have argued elsewhere, the basis that immediately comes to mind is the idea that historical
traditions outline different contours for the Establishment Clause when it comes to funding,
as opposed to symbolism.33 Much the same can be said for Scalia’s treatment of a broad norm
like “secular purpose.” The kind and degree of secularity that the Establishment Clause im-
poses on the government depends for Scalia on the particular practice at issue — and the
 matrix of legal traditions underpinning it — rather than on what a priori definition of “secular”
or “religious” should be derived from the Clause.
Finally, it should be said that the Court’s typical use of history has led it to make rather
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broad conceptual distinctions in its Establishment Clause jurisprudence, for example, “reli-
gious” purpose versus “secular purpose”; “endorsement” of religion versus “acknowledgment”
or “accommodation” of religion. On this basis, the Court has crafted a Clause that often forces
Justices to theorize about the possible motivations or effects of a law and how those fall on a
conceptual spectrum with “religious” at one end and “secular” on the other. By contrast, the
Clause Scalia discerns from historical materials, appears more concerned with the relation-
ships between government and religion as institutions. Thus, Scalia is not interested in asking
to what degree the Ten Commandments displays are motivated by “secular” or “religious” pur-
poses, or whether they send messages of “endorsement.” On the other hand, he admits that if
the government legally promulgated an “official” numbering or interpretation of the Command -
ments themselves, then the anti-establishment prohibition would be triggered.
Scalia’s use of history would produce an Establishment Clause strikingly different from the
mainstream Clause — both in overall purpose and particular results — and so it is worth ask-
ing what would be the pros and cons of Scalia’s approach to Clause history. One benefit of
Scalia’s approach is that it rejects a one-size-fits-all Clause. The subject of “religion and public
life” in this country assumes so bewildering an array of forms that it seems sensible to posit a
Clause that adapts to different situations. “Neutrality,” as Scalia points out, may work in some
areas and fail in others. Yet, on the other hand, would Scalia’s flexible Clause produce an even
messier jurisprudence than the Court’s already convoluted one? Would it be intolerably un-
predictable and, more importantly, inherently malleable? For instance, in the Ten Command -
ments cases, Scalia and Souter adopted starkly different understandings of what symbolic
content the displays had. Were the displays generalized affirmations of the importance of reli-
gion to American legal traditions or rather were they official state encouragement to follow
the Commandments (or to become a Christian or a Jew?)? Such diverging perceptions will
surely influence how one uses history to determine what the Establishment Clause says
about such a display. If Scalia’s historical method is susceptible to that kind of manipulation,
it may be no better than the “non-endorsement” test, or Justice Breyer’s “no test-related sub-
stitute for legal judgment” test.
Another plus to Scalia’s approach is that it would explicitly avoid the “founder intention”
problem that has plagued so much Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Too often, disputes in
the case law have seemed to turn whose intention or church-state philosophy served the deep-
er policy goals of a particular opinion. Thus, James Madison (or at least Madison the 1785
Virginia Legislator) is recruited to underwrite a separationist ideology that, if openly pressed
in 1791 at the federal level, would have torpedoed the Establishment Clause itself. In
McCreary, Scalia disclaims any reliance on private opinions or private writings, but would in-
stead mine historical materials only for commonly-held public understandings of the Clause’s
content. This presumably meets the objection raised by Souter and Stevens that over-reliance
on history raises the problem of “what religion?” or “which God?” was secretly privileged by
the founding generation. Scalia’s method is not interested in the problem, because it is not in-
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terested in secret intentions.
But by restricting his historical palette to public understandings, has Scalia thinned the his-
torical record too much? If it is difficult to come up with theMadisonian intention about the
constitutionality of legislative chaplains, imagine how daunting it would be to piece together
a compelling account of the overall public understanding of that issue. Such an understand-
ing, if it existed, may not be discernible from any existing public record of the time. At best,
the process might lead to all manner of tenuous inferences, particularly in borderline cases.
So, again, does Scalia’s method actually promise to relieve us from the kinds of flighty extrap-
olations the endorsement test forces upon the Justices?
Whatever the balance of costs and benefits, there is a deeper problem with Scalia’s historical
method. Scalia’s key move is to say that post-adoption tradition provides an extended gloss on
the Clause’s original meaning. But, as Scalia would recognize, tradition cannot simply con-
struct a free-floating “meaning” for the Establishment Clause, building up gradually like a
pearl in an oyster shell. Tradition, even as Scalia understands it, is too unwieldy: it must be
channeled by some legal standard laid down by the terms of the constitutional provision. The
Establishment Clause cannot plausibly function as an empty vessel for tradition as, for in-
stance, “due process” does in Scalia’s jurisprudence, in which longstanding public legal tradi-
tions are by definition the baseline for “due process of law.” The Establishment Clause must
have a more concrete referent than simply the “law of the land regarding religious matters.”
While the Clause is not likely to have as much “counter-traditional” content as Scalia’s Equal
Protection Clause, it must have some degree of concrete, textual specificity.
For Scalia, constitutional provisions are super-majoritarian instruments for placing some-
thing beyond the reach of ensuing “transient majorities.” But what does the Establishment
Clause place beyond majoritarian reach: certain kinds of “long-recognized personal liberties”;
a particular historical class of church-state relationships; certain prohibited intersections be-
tween government and “religion”? On its own terms, Scalia’s method requires an answer to
these questions, because otherwise tradition has nothing solid with which to interact. So, what
is really missing from Scalia’s use of history to interpret the Establishment Clause? Perhaps it
is an adequate account of the textual meaning of the Clause itself. This comes as no small
irony for Scalia the arch-textualist.
An example will show this more clearly. Suppose the State of Mississippi decides to adopt
as a motto, “In Jesus We Trust”? Would Scalia’s historical method avoid the problems of other
approaches? Would it give us a firmer ground on which to say Mississippi is constitutionally
forbidden from adopting this motto? Presumably a majority of the Court today would apply
some form of the endorsement test and conclude, unsurprisingly, that the motto impermissibly
endorsed Christianity and alienated non-Christians. Of course, in doing so the majority would
have to face the usual pitfalls of the non-endorsement analysis. It would, for instance, have to
explain34 why our national motto, “In God We Trust,” does not just as unequivocally endorse
monotheism and alienate atheists, Buddhists, and Hindus. It would have to explain why a
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motto, which people could blithely ignore, was more of a religious alienation of non-believers
than prayers said by paid legislative chaplains before every legislative session. It might also
offer to explain how a secular Court can make such distinctions without essentially deciding
theological questions and violating the Court’s own doctrine forbidding governmental entities
from making religious decisions. Would Scalia’s legal traditionalism promise a cleaner solu-
tion to this problem?
The answer depends on the very thing that Scalia has not sufficiently elaborated: that is,
what is the textual referent of the Establishment Clause prohibition? If the Establishment
Clause merely forbids a certain kind or degree of “government religiosity,” then Scalia would
have to deploy historical traditions to figure out what kind and what degree. In other words,
Scalia would have to ask whether “In Jesus We Trust” was in the same sort of symbolic ball-
park as other religious manifestations our governments have typically made. This could easily
lead to the sort of outcome that Scalia’s critics have vociferously accused him of wanting to
reach — namely, a constitutional privileging of a sort of generalized “monotheism.” Or per-
haps Scalia’s parsing of historical traditions would only set a baseline of permissible govern-
ment symbolism, theoretically permitting “In Jesus We Trust” or “In Zeus We Trust.” As I have
argued elsewhere, I think that is a far more plausible reading of how Scalia is deploying tradi-
tion in these cases.
But that would still not answer the question of the constitutionality of the motto. According
to Scalia’s own method, he would then have to ask whether Mississippi’s use of the disputed
motto were “consonant with the [original] concept” of the “freedom” protected by the Estab -
lishment Clause. Not an easy question, to say the least, and particularly if you have not decid-
ed ahead-of-time what manner of “freedom” is supposed to be protected by the Clause. This is
to say, simply, that Scalia’s method needs an adequate account of what the text of the Estab -
lishment Clause is doing. Without it, he will likely end up having to say why “In Jesus We
Trust” is or is not constitutionally similar to “In God We Trust” or “God save this honorable
Court.” In other words, without a textual anchor, Scalia’s method may well force him to make
theological determinations that no judge ought to make, that he himself would say judges have
no competence to make, and that the Establishment Clause itself probably forbids judges
from making. 
In the next section, we will return to the “In Jesus We Trust” problem and see if Scalia’s
method, supplemented with some textual help, might after all reach a reliable constitutional
outcome. But for the time being, it is worth noticing that Scalia has apparently been unwilling
to embrace another possible solution to Establishment Clause meaning that would solve the
motto problem. That is the jurisdictional/federalism understanding of the Clause, elaborated
by scholars such as Steven D. Smith and adopted in some form by Justice Thomas.35 This
view does confront the problem of textual Clause meaning and gives a controversial answer:
what the Clause originally placed beyond the reach of “transient federal majorities” was the
entire subject-matter of state religious establishments. That would cleanly solve our motto
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problem. The Establishment Clause is agnostic about the motto: if you like it, Mississippi, go
with it! Something tells me, however, that many people would feel unsatisfied with this solu-
tion. Not to mention the fact that the jurisdictional thesis needs to explain in what way the
Establishment Clause also restrains the actions of the federal government itself. And then
there’s the delicate problem of incorporating such a provision against the States. But that goes
well beyond the scope of this paper. It is enough to note here that Scalia has thus far shown no
enthusiasm about embracing a purely jurisdictional account of the Clause’s textual meaning.
So, does Scalia’s historical method simply fail to deliver on its promise, or can it be helped?
Is there a way of specifying the textual range of the Establishment Clause so that Scalia’s use
of legal traditions can be more reliable and less manipulable? More broadly, can we find an
Establishment Clause that, together with the disciplined use of historical materials, will allow
judges to reach reliable, predictable legal outcomes based on objective non-theological princi-
ples? Or are we stuck with a Clause, smack at the head of the Bill of Rights, that inevitably
leads to a jurisprudential Babel, constructed from the clashing of individual Justices’ hunch-
es, guesses, predictions, and religious worldviews?
III. Tightening the Circle
The Babel just alluded to rises on the following questionable, but almost never questioned,
foundation: that the Establishment Clause is a source of judicial solutions to all “religion and
government problems.” Imagine a vast sphere, representing the length and breadth and
height of all those problems in our dizzyingly pluralistic American society. Then comes the
Clause, dividing light from darkness in that sphere, creating the firmament, segregating land
from sea. “It shall be secular.” “It shall be neutral.” This must be the intuitive view of the
Clause taken by Justices when they warn that departing from the Court’s jurisprudence will
transform middle America into Northern Ireland, Mississippi into Beirut.36
But surely this is not the only view one can take. Can we instead read the Clause as operat-
ing within our vast void, not to catalogue and categorize every problem, but rather to specify a
narrower field of “religion and government” problems? Call them “religious establishment
problems,” and understand the word “establishment” as so many other well-chosen words in
our famously reticent Constitution — as a legal term of art, clothed with all the historical and
conceptual finery of such terms.37 The field of religion-and-government problems specified
by the Clause would begin from those history teaches were present to the minds of the fram-
ing generation as being susceptible of legal resolution.
The power the Clause denies to government would thus be akin to a clause forbidding gov-
ernment from entering into an definable legal arena (such as coining money or issuing
“Letters of Marque and Reprisal”), or to one inviting government to occupy an arena (such as
the power to construct a uniform rule of bankruptcy, or to rule on admiralty and maritime
matters).38 If we could understand the “anti-establishment” prohibition of the First Amend -
ment as withdrawing governments from such matters, then perhaps that one gesture might
strip the Establishment Clause of its most unappealing adornment — its tendency to invite
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flights of cultural, sociological, and theological fancy. Instead, Justices could concentrate on
the idea of an establishment of religion as a legal and not a cultural construct — as a demarca-
tion of institutional human relationships, and not as a Maginot Line between clashing concepts
or theologies or states of mind. This would tighten the circle of the Clause’s prohibitions from
cultural, sociological, and theological matters to legalmatters. If possible, perhaps the most
immediate benefit of doing this would be to discipline the way historical materials are used to
interpret the Clause. Restricting the target, the “object,”39 of the Clause to concretely identifi-
able relationships between institutional government and institutional religion would give in-
terpreters a matrix within which to process history.
For instance, in trying to solve the modern riddle of government religious symbolism, no
longer would we be forced to speculate endlessly and pointlessly about the kind and degree of
theological content, or lack thereof, in George Washington’s Farewell Address or in the motto
“In God We Trust.” Instead, we would ask whether the use of such religious language present-
ed to the generation that framed the First Amendment a species of relationship between state
and church — between the real institutions of government and religion — that they sought to
outlaw by ratifying the Amendment. Such evidence in American history appears to be sparse,
which is why even separationist scholars commonly observe that government religious lan-
guage or symbolism would have been thought by the founding generation to present no con-
stitutional issues, as opposed to issues of political prudence. This historical datum ought to
have significance about the reach of the Establishment Clause. It ought to mean that the
Clause simply does not speak to the issue of government religious speech and symbolism —
not because of some particular kind of theological content or message in the symbols, but be-
cause the symbols typically do not betray the presence of any form of historically prohibited
institutional relationship between church and state.
Consider how this simplifies the “In Jesus We Trust” problem from the previous section.
For both the Court majority and for Scalia, the solution to that problem comes down to analyz-
ing the theological-symbolical content of the motto in light of some broader principle — for
the majority, the motto’s “endorsement” value, and for Scalia, its theological fit with our legal
traditions. Thus, in a way, Scalia and the majority are both analyzing, inappropriately, the
theological content of the motto, albeit at different levels of abstraction. But if the Establish -
ment Clause is not concerned about semiotics or theology, but instead about concrete, legally-
 discernible institutional relationships, the problem becomes soluble by conventional legal
standards. Now we can ask whether the motto betrays some kind of forbidden institutional
 relationship between the state and an actual religious institution. There are historical an-
tecedents for such an inquiry. For instance, during the Elizabethan phase of the English
Reformation, the government legally mandated certain changes in public religious symbol-
ism — for instance, replacing images of the Blessed Virgin Mary with images of Elizabeth — 
in order to cement the increasingly stringent Anglican establishment. Or, again, in the late
Fourth Century A.D. the Roman emperor Gratian very publicly renounced his traditional title
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“Pontifex Maximus” and transferred it to the Pope, demonstrating a withdrawal of the Roman
state from religious governance.40 In these cases, the government’s deployment of religious
symbolism was in the service of strengthening (or dismantling) a concrete legal relationship
between state and church. Such examples at least furnish a starting point for thinking about
how “In Jesus We Trust” might function in a genuine religious establishment, and would
therefore be prohibited by the Establishment Clause. Of course, this also means that if the
motto is pure window-dressing then its deployment might be insensitive or blasphemous, but
not constitutionally forbidden. More importantly, however, the analysis of the constitutionality
of the motto does not turn on spurious distinctions between the “sectarian” motto and the
“monotheistic” motto, or between the “endorsing” motto and the merely “solemnizing” one. It
cannot be said too many times that, even were inquiries of that nature coherent (which is
doubtful), judges are not equipped to make them.
But at this point, it will be objected, what we have is mere intuition. Granted, the prohibitory
circle of the Establishment Clause must be tightened from cultural-theological constructs to
institutional-legal constructs. Granted, this would have the likely effect of disciplining
Justices’ use of history in solving anti-establishment problems by channeling historical mate-
rials into a concrete legal matrix. Granted, the resulting anti-establishment jurisprudence
would probably be more consistent and coherent because it would now be keyed to concrete
institutional relationships — and judges are better equipped to analyze such things as opposed
to semiotics and theology. But, even granted all that, how can the proposed “legal-institutional”
recasting of the Establishment Clause be justified or defended? Is it a pure preference, foisted
on the Clause by those (like me) who are dissatisfied with the Court’s jurisprudence and who
want to find a way to discipline and regularize it?
The obvious place to begin is with the text of the Clause. Any account of the Clause as
keyed to institutional legal relationships — and not to cultural-theological concepts — ought
to tie itself to the words. Both Court and scholars have appeared to shy away from the words
of the Clause, particularly the key phrase “establishment” of religion.41 Indeed, it is possible
that in the Court’s jurisprudence the word “respecting” functionally determines the reach of
the Clause more than what must obviously be the central focus of the Clause — “an establish-
ment of religion.” That is, by interpreting “respecting” to mean something like “leading up to”
or “tending towards” establishing religion, it is as if interpreters have absolved themselves
from doing the hard work of defining what the term of art “establishment of religion” actually
means as a legal concept. After all, if the phrase “respecting an establishment of religion” sim-
ply means, at the end of the day, “somewhere within shouting distance of a religious estab-
lishment,” then we are excused from having to be too precise about what the Clause actually
prohibits. A convincing jurisprudence of the Establishment Clause cannot rest on such verbal
laziness.
Looking at the words of the Clause with fresh eyes, isn’t it plain, isn’t it obvious, that the
term “establishment of religion” is a legal term of art, just as much phrases in other parts of
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the Constitution such as “Letter of Marque and Reprisal” or “Bill of Attainder” or “Corruption
of Blood”? This certainly doesn’t make “establishment of religion” easy to define, but it would
discernibly change the whole approach to specification of what is prohibited. It would change
it from a mystical to a legal inquiry. It would dispense with the historically implausible as-
sumption that “establishment of religion” really just means “bad religious characteristics in a
secular government”? Nor would this approach mean that the concept of “establishment of re-
ligion” is somehow frozen in time. Leading scholars have asked whether the concept of “estab-
lishment” or “separation of church and state” could somehow evolve over time, or indeed be
transformed by the Fourteenth Amendment.42 But the premise of such scholarship is that the
original concept of an “establishment of religion” must have a fairly concrete, definable legal
architecture. Otherwise, how could anyone — not to mention a judge — even begin to chart
how the concept would change over time, or be transformed from what into what. It would be
as if the evolutionist were trying to account for the development of homo sapienswith no fossil
record at all.
Conclusion
Thus the re-imagination of the anti-establishment prohibition does not promise easy answers,
but it does furnish a starting point in relatively definite legal categories. Foundational as-
sumptions for a jurisprudence as volatile as the Establishment Clause are — to say something
utterly banal — critical. We should not be content to start building on generalities such as
“neutrality” and “non-endorsement,” because we will keep circling the problem, endlessly
 restating it in terms of vague principles that do not promise objective solutions. “Does the reli-
gious symbol unconstitutionally endorse religion to the reasonable observer by sending the
message that he is a second-class citizen and political outsider, or does the religious symbol
merely acknowledge citizens’ religious convictions?” Who knows? Merely posing such ques-
tions fatigues the mind and heart.
Are there scholarly foundations already being laid for such a re-thinking of the Establish -
ment Clause? I think so. Michael McConnell’s magisterial taxonomy of founding-era estab-
lishments in the first part of his Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding is a good
example.43 McConnell tackles the problem of religious establishments as if they were com-
posed of a discernible, definable matrix of legal characteristics such as the following:
 government control over church doctrine and structure; mandatory church attendance and
prohibitions on non-official forms of worship; certain forms of public financial support, and so
on. McConnell’s stated intention in that article is not to revolutionize the jurisprudence, but
instead to call it back to a kind of historical realism.44 In my view, this is only way forward in
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Our three-part tests have become untethered from the
historical milieu in which the anti-establishment prohibition was generated, and are flailing
in mid-air. It is no response to say, “That is as it should be. The constitutional guarantees are
supposed to evolve.” It is no response because, if the jurisprudence lacks roots in historical
 reality to begin with, the evolution of the jurisprudence is unreliable and directionless, virtu-
210
T H E  A M E R I C A N  E X P E R I M E N T:  R E L I G I O U S  F R E E D O M
ally by definition. We need to revolutionize Establishment Clause jurisprudence by reading
the Clause in a revolutionary way — as a legal prohibition, and not as a theological manifesto.
Otherwise, interpreting the Clause will continue to lead us toward such sentiments as the
Psalmist felt when pondering the omniscience of God: Such knowledge is too wonderful for me; 
It is high, I cannot attain to it.45
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HEMLOCK AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
TRACING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM FROM 
THE TRIAL OF SOCRATES TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
 B Y  Z A C H A RY  F O R E M A N *
Socrates was tried and executed by the democratic citizens of Athens on charges of impietyand corruption of youth in 399 B.C. Why has this trial captured the imagination of so
many for so many centuries? What lessons were learned, and can be learned, about religious
freedom from the story of the first democracy’s executing the first philosopher? 
First, I shall summarize the trial of Socrates, highlighting its religious aspect. Then, I shall
briefly trace the legacy of democracy to the founding of America and discuss how the
Framers learned from the mistakes of Athens. I will also focus on the important place they
had for religion in their plans for a new nation. Finally, I will contrast the situation at present
with the intentions of the Founders, and examine what implications both the trial at Athens
and the convention in Philadelphia have on the debate on religious freedom today, focusing a
great deal of attention on the scourge of relativism and the loss of a sense of the necessity for
public virtue. 
The trial and death of Socrates highlights the inevitable tension between the “one and the
many,” the one as truth and the many opinions of the demos. How can truth have the same
weight as falsehood? Benedict, when he was still Cardinal Ratzinger, rhetorically asked
whether truth is determined by majority vote. What happens when the authority of the ma-
jority is contradicted by a true philosoph?
The Trial of Socrates
Athens was the world’s first democracy, a democracy in the purest sense, not representative
but direct. Athenian democrats treasured two things above all: isegoria, equal opportunity to
speak, and parrhesia, freedom of speech. Athenians were fiercely proud of their unique tradi-
tion of liberty and equality. It is in this context that we must consider the trial of Socrates.
Socrates was the first person in recorded Athenian history to be executed for impiety and
corrupting the youth. To the citizens of Athens, he threatened the health of the state because
he was impious and he was impious because he threatened the health of the state. Athenian
leaders, as did all Greeks of the time, believed that not recognizing the gods of the city could
imperil the city. Among the possible dangers was leading others to question the acts of the
gods; this threatened the authority of the city. 
In fourth century Athens, there was a resolution in the form of a particular democratic con-
struct. A private citizen would bring a charge against another and a public official (in the case of
Socrates, the King Archon, because it was a religious matter) would decide if it was a true
breach of law. Then the accuser and defendant would appear before a jury of citizens, chosen
by lot. This number, usually between 200 and 1000, was so large that it would be difficult to
bribe them. Little is known about his primary accuser, Meletus, who charged Socrates with
213
impiety. His position as accuser is recorded in the following: “This indictment and affidavit is
sworn by Meletus … against Socrates: Socrates is guilty of refusing to recognize the gods rec-
ognized by the state, and of introducing other new deities. He is also guilty of corrupting the
youth. The penalty demanded is death.”1
Socrates himself, in responding to the charges, summed them up in his defense, “Socrates
does wrong because he corrupts the youth and doesn’t believe in the gods that the city be-
lieves in, but believes in other new divinities.”2 The charge did not specify particular youths
Socrates is alleged to have corrupted or any specific event or subject matter. This was likely
because no one could be charged for crimes committed before 403 B.C., when a general
amnesty was proclaimed, in order to end the cycle of civic strife between democrats and oli-
garchs in Athens.3 Since specific acts could not be addressed, the only attack (and defense)
could be the overall character and behavior of Socrates himself. It was not his deeds, but his
disposition that was on trial.
Although politics undoubtedly played a role in the indictment of Socrates, the
prosecution may have determined that because, under the terms of the amnesty,
Socrates could only be charged with crimes allegedly committed during the period
from 403-399 B.C., they had a better chance of succeeding with the more vague
charge of impiety, expecting that the prejudiced and superstitious minds of many
jurors would supply the precision that the written indictment lacked.4
To further complicate matters, sophists were suspected of corrupting the youth who later
were involved in the oligarchic rebellion of 411 B.C. and the rule of the Thirty. As alluded to in
The Clouds of Aristophanes, Socrates had to defend himself against charges that he himself
was a sophist. In addition, he was linked to some key figures involved in the oligarchic coup
against the democrats during the war.
There was no separation of church and state, of the religious and secular spheres, in
Athens, or, in fact, anywhere in the ancient world. Thus the relationship between religious
freedom and political freedom was quite different from what it is today.
A distinction between gods and state would have been inconceivable in either
Athens or Rome in the classical period …. Whereas in modern times religious tol-
eration is a necessary precondition for political liberty, S.L. Guterman suggests
that in the ancient world political freedom was the parent of religious liberty.
When the Romans persecuted or repressed a religious group, it was for essentially
political reasons, whereas medieval opposition to dissenting groups was explicitly
religious.5
Denying the authority or existence of the gods, meant defying the authority of the polis.
However, while the accusers may have had political reasons for indicting Socrates, the reli-
gious reasons were no mere pretext. The jurors, as well as Socrates and Plato, took the impi-
ety charge itself quite seriously. “The ancient Greeks understood piety (eusebeia) principally
as reverence or respect for the gods and the religious rituals of the polis … Piety encompassed
all virtuous action, and impiety (asebeia) was regarded as a threat to the foundations of civic
life…. The legal penalty for impiety was usually death or exile”6
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Greek religion was more one of orthopraxis than orthodoxy, that is, it placed more emphasis
on ritual observances than belief. “Nevertheless, while it is no doubt true that impiety was pri-
marily a matter of behavior, an offense against established religious customs or rituals, it also
included unorthodox beliefs about the gods and atheism … the impiety charge in Socrates’ in-
dictment probably referred not to some failure to conform to religious ritual but rather to un-
orthodox beliefs.”7 More precisely, Socrates was indicted for his words rather than his deeds. 
The trial defense was in three parts: the first a defense against the charges; the second was
a proposal of a just penalty; and finally concluding remarks after Socrates was sentenced to
death. Socrates was factually guilty of the charges and didn’t try to deny them, however, his
defense became an attack on the authority of the city to try him. These are his words: “I shall
obey God rather than you, and while I have life and strength I shall never cease from the
practice and teaching of philosophy.”8 Socrates, in that proclamation, saying that he had no
choice but to follow his conscience (or daimonion), placed himself firmly against the state. 
Most outrageously, Socrates says that Athens is the one really on trial; Socrates is hoping to
save the city from sinning by killing him. He forced the jurors to choose between Socrates and
Athens. Socrates himself was surprised that the vote (280-220) was so close. Moreover, as just
penalty, he asked for one of the city’s highest honors, to receive free meals for life at the
Prytaneum, usually given to Olympic athletes or war heroes. Socrates would rather die than
give up philosophy.
The trial of Socrates was a trial of philosophy. He died as a result of a tragic con-
flict between himself and Athens, each committed to antithetical principles. While
the Athenians permitted him to conduct his philosophic life for years, in 399 B.C.
Socrates compelled them to choose between philosophy, with its radical question-
ing and uncompromising ethical principles, and the prevailing politics of the city.
Essentially, the conflict was between the good man and the good citizen…. For
Socrates to be a “good citizen” he would have had to surrender his moral autonomy
to popular notions of justice and goodness. 9
Socrates, in a sense, forced them to execute him. He refused to play the political game of
rhetoric and compromise. Although he was a famous citizen, a war hero and husband and fa-
ther of three, he refused to defend himself by using these facts to gain sympathy. Every at-
tempt at compromise was met with counter-proposals bordering on the absurd. Rather than
admit impiety, he said that he was following a divine command. Rather than admit that he
was a corruptor of youth, he admitted that he was the only educator of youth in Athens.
Rather than offering to pay a fine, he offered to be supported by the state as a hero. Finally, he
even said that if he were fined, he would continue his work, and if exiled, he would simply
continue his work in another city. Socrates presents Athens with a dilemma: 
To kill Socrates meant that the Athenians, who prided themselves on their value
of free speech, could not bear criticism. They could not tolerate the idea that all
beliefs should be open to question. To acquit Socrates would bestow legal sanction
upon his mission, permitting the gadfly to persist in his critical activities.10
Still, Socrates cannot be seen as an advocate of religious freedom in the modern sense
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(though one could argue that he was the first practitioner of civil disobedience). Paul Rahe un-
derscores the difference between the Athenian constitution of the fourth century B.C. and the
American constitution of the twenty-first century. 
No one — not even Socrates — ever dared to suggest that a man’s religious be-
liefs and behavior were of no concern to the body politic, and no one argued that
the city should concede full sexual freedom to all consenting adults. Not even in
an emanation from its penumbra can one discern in the constitution of Athens a
fundamental right to privacy. In that city, there were no effective institutional con-
straints on the exercise of popular will against those whose private demeanor had
inspired public distrust; and to the best of our knowledge, none were ever even
contemplated.11
Democracy on Trial
The question, however, remains: was Athens right to condemn Socrates? Was Socrates bound
to obey his daimonion? Could both have been right? Clearly, Athens had the right and duty in
principle to defend itself against its enemies. The two most influential Catholic political
philosophers of the twentieth century, Jacques Maritain and John Courtney Murray, both
have written about the potential necessity of the state’s defending itself against a gadfly such
as Socrates, against a political heretic, an enemy of democracy. 
In an essay on censorship, Murray begins with the theoretical principle: “Every govern-
ment has always claimed what is called police power, as an attribute of government. This
power in itself is simply the principle of self-preservation and self-protection transferred to
the body politic.”12 In fact, Murray sees the case of the self-defense of the polis as impinging
on the central problem of social science: balancing freedom and restraint. He says,
The issue that is central in the whole problem is the issue of social freedom.
More exactly, it is the issue of striking a right balance between freedom and re-
straint in society. This is the most difficult problem of social science, to such an ex-
tent that all other difficulties are reducible to this one…. First, in society constraint
must be for the sake of freedom.13
This seems paradoxical but constraining freedom in one way can and should enable free-
dom in another. Murray uses the example of traffic regulations, which restrain behavior be-
cause one cannot, for example, drive on the wrong side of the road. However, it enables
citizens the freedom to drive to the grocery store without a high probability of being maimed.
But, Murray points out, there are always unforeseen, unintended consequences, in addition
to the more obvious trade-offs. 
America, in comparison with most other societies in history and in the world, has decided
to err on the side of freedom, rather than order, as indicated by the freedoms enshrined in the
Bill of Rights. However, not all that is legal is moral; and Murray emphasizes the distinction
between the two and the importance of the distinction in discussing censorship. “The law,
mindful of its nature, is required to be tolerant of many evils that morality condemns.”14
Ignoring this difference can cause grave harm to society. A common observation is that as the
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general level of morality in a society falls, the laws of that society multiply (and one might add,
so do the lawyers, legislators, law enforcement officials, prisons, private security companies
and other various personnel as well as detecting and protective technologies like CCTV, DNA
analysis, etc). Since we citizens can no longer restrain ourselves by our interior virtues, we
must be restrained by the state and its latest investigative and penal technologies. 
Maritain, in Man and the State, in a section entitled, “The Political Heretics” also discusses
the problem of how a free society deals with its internal enemies. “In a lay society of free men
the heretic is the breaker of the ‘common democratic beliefs and practices,’ the one who takes
a stand against freedom, or against the basic equality of men, or the dignity and rights of the
human person or the moral power of law.”15
Maritain sees flaws in the common debate on the subject. He neither absolutizes the right to
free expression, but also, though he recognizes the right of a state to protect itself, is skeptical
of the probability that it will succeed, since censorship and repression are likely to backfire. 
The question of freedom of expression is not a simple one…. On the one hand,
it is not true that every thought as such, because of the mere fact that it was born
in a human intellect, has the right to spread about the body politic. On the other
hand, not only censorship and police methods, but any direct restriction of free-
dom of expression, though unavoidable in certain cases of necessity, are the worst
ways to ensure the rights of the body politic to defend freedom and the common
charter and common morality.16
Thus, though Maritain recognizes the rights of states to defend themselves against heretics,
he sees many practical considerations against it. Primarily, that it is virtually impossible to
stamp out ideas with laws and prisons (as totalitarian regimes can attest). He, therefore, sees
education as the best practical means of protecting society, a similar conclusion that the
Greeks came to, which is why corruption of the youth was such a serious charge (and why
Plato’s Republic devotes so much space to discussing the system of education). For Maritain,
the aim of education is unity, but unity in pluralism. The democratic faith must be fostered,
but in a variety of ways, tailored for each situation and community.
Even though it seems obvious that even a democracy must place its own survival as its first
priority, enemies of democracy (or of Athens, and there were many of both) pointed to the ex-
ecution of Socrates as the worst of hypocrisies. They sought to show that democracy either
would fall into anarchy because it couldn’t control those who would undermine it (even if not
deliberately) or it would betray its founding principles of freedom and thus its claim to a high-
er morality. Democracy was accused of priding itself on freedom but not being able to tolerate
criticism of democracy itself, or even allow anyone to question its principles. 
The Long Legacy of Socrates
In general, the West inherited an anti-democratic view of Athens, spurred, perhaps most of all
by the execution of Socrates. Thucydides, sympathetic to the broad oligarchic model, is very
critical of democracy in his History of the Peloponnesian War, highlighting the irrational deci-
sions of the citizens and the problems of keeping secrets or having a consistent foreign policy
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during time of war. The fact that oligarchic Sparta defeated democratic Athens also served to
dim the attraction to democracy (as well as the fact that Athens saw no moral problem with
conquering fellow Greeks and demanding tribute).
Plato’s Republic can be interpreted as an extended defense of Socrates, or rather, of the
place of philosophy in the polis. Like Socrates, who countered the charge that philosophers
were enemies of the state with the idea that in fact they were the most virtuous in the state,
Plato said that only when kings were philosophers or philosophers were kings would a truly
good republic exist. His republic deliberately bears little resemblance to Athens and he offers
a scathing and influential examination of democracy and democratic man in book XIII of the
Republic. 
Aristotle — believing that society was best ruled by the virtuous and only those with suffi-
cient leisure to cultivate it, that is, those who owned property should rule — was also an oppo-
nent of democracy. Plutarch, though he lived 500 years after Socrates, was the most widely
consulted source concerning ancient Athens until the nineteenth century. He favored the
conservative factions and was therefore not often sympathetic towards the democrats.
The next serious treatment of Athenian democracy had to wait until Machiavelli, nearly a
millennia and a half later. He considered Rome and Sparta to have been far more successful
than Athens, which only lasted a short time as a democracy under Solon and then again less
than 100 years during the fifth century, B.C. Virtually all other Italian Renaissance thinkers,
drawing on the majority opinion of the classical sources available to them, also favored the
mixed governments of Sparta and Venice over the democratic regimes of Athens and Florence.
Oligarchies were seen as stable and peaceful; and democracies were seen as highly unstable.
Not surprisingly, the majority of French and English political thinkers of the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries were most favorable toward monarchy and least toward democracy. 
Democracy in Athens; Democracy in America
Americans of the revolutionary generation, on the other hand, needed to show that their
struggle was not an act of treason or radical revolution, but one of fidelity to the great western
tradition and, fundamentally, of conservation. They did this by invoking the great names of
the past, especially those great republicans.
For Americans the mid-eighteenth century was truly a neo-classical age — the
high point of their classical period. At one time or another almost every Whig pa-
triot took or was given the name of an ancient republican hero, and classical refer-
ences and allusions run through much of the colonists’ writings, both public and
private…. Such classicism was not only a scholarly ornament of educated
Americans; it helped to shape their values and their ideals of behavior.17
But most of these early Americans learned about the classical world through translation
and popularizations in the Whig tradition, most especially those Latin authors writing about
the earlier age of Republicanism in longing tones. They learned that Republics are not con-
quered from without but decay from within, weakened by love of luxury and other vices. 
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The first half of the eighteenth century saw a great burst in interest in both Greece and
Rome in England and France. It was dominated by an anti-democratic tone, drawing exten-
sively on Plutarch (second only to the Bible in popularity in colonial America). The writings
concentrated mostly on the decline of Athens — its imperialism, its corruption and vices, and
its descent from manly virtue to effeminate vice. In contrast, Sparta was held up as an exam-
ple of stability and virtue.
What Americans heard about classical Athens would inevitably carry a special
valence, for unlike eighteenth-century Europeans concerned about the possible
decadence of their large nation-states, Americans shared with the inhabitants of
Renaissance Italy a real opportunity to resurrect the classical polis. They decided
against it … Under scrutiny, however, the eventual collapse of all the ancient
states was alleged against them, most particularly in Greece, and still more partic-
ularly in Athens.18
The founding fathers, too, most citing its lack of checks on the potential of the tyranny of
the majority, wrote about Athens in the lowest of terms. In the Federalist Papers, Madison
wrote, “In all very numerous assemblies, of whatever characters composed, passion never
fails to wrest the scepter from reason. Had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates, every
Athenian assembly would still have been a mob.”19
But they believed that they could avoid the fate of Athens, by avoiding the most obvious
pitfalls of democracy. In fact, contrary to popular opinion, the founders never intended a
democracy at all. It only seems so because the successful American example literally rede-
fined democracy to all generations to come.
The American foundation would radically alter the connotations of democracy.
Three very different men — Hamilton, Adams, and Madison — recoiled with force
from the Athenian example and from the notion of direct democracy with which it
was inextricably associated. By co-opting republican principles for liberal ends,
Madison sought to detach the democratic impulses from republicanism; but he
also engineered in his writings a deliberate redefinition of terms whereby an aris-
tocratic theory of politics was couched in sufficiently democratic language that the
founders would soon be claimed as the authors of American democracy by men
whose beliefs were very different.20
Even the more democratic aspects of the Constitution, such as the House of Representatives,
were not easy to put through, so strong was the anti-democratic example of Athens. It seems
clear that many of the democratic elements contained in the Constitution that we so admire
were included in spite of the fact that they are democratic, not because they were democratic.
Historian Susan Ford Wiltshire observed this resistance to democracy:
At first, some delegates such as Roger Sherman of Connecticut, resisted the idea
that the people should have any part in electing the national legislature, because
they ‘want information and are constantly misled.’ Others, including Elbridge
Gerry of Massachusetts, wished to preserve republicanism while avoiding the
 ‘excess of democracy’ and the ‘danger of the leveling spirit.’ George Mason and
James Madison expressed the prevailing view, which recognized the necessity of a
democratic branch in the legislature to represent ‘the different parts of the whole
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republic,’ like the English House of Commons. America ‘had been too democratic’
but should not ‘incautiously run into the opposite extreme.’21
But other than the negative example of Athens, what practical influence did the classical
world have on the founders? Carl Richard, in his book The Founders and Democracy, neatly
sums up the importance of the classical world upon the founders:
Classical ideas provided the basis for their theories of government form, social
responsibility, human nature, and virtue. The authors of the classical canon offered
the founders companionship, solace, and the models and anti-models which gave
them a sense of identity and purpose. The classics facilitated communication by
furnishing a common set of symbols, knowledge, and ideas, a literature select
enough to provide common ground, yet rich enough to address a wide range of
human problems from a variety of perspectives…. The American Revolution was a
paradox: a revolution fueled by tradition.22
Even more than simply being models and moral support, however, “the ancients were in-
voked at every level of debate — at the Constitutional Convention and at state ratifying con-
ventions, concerning general political theories and regarding specific clauses of the
Constitution — by Federalists and by Anti-federalists.”23 Richard points out that this reliance
on classical authors heavily favored the Federalists, as there were many more authors who
supported mixed government than simple democracy. In fact, “Direct democracies, like
Athens, bore the stigma of instability, violence, corruption, and injustice which the ancient
historians and political theorists had so brilliantly fastened upon them. Many friends of
democracy avoided using the word, preferring to use the term ‘republic.’”24
Virtue and Democracy
Nevertheless, the founders knew that no matter how many fine institutions they founded or
how many checks and balances they included, their experiment would fail if the virtue of the
citizenry failed. “Such an order [worthy of free persons] seeks the public good through build-
ing institutions and forming communities both to nourish the requisite habits of the heart
[virtues] and to check the excesses to which the human heart is prey.”25
Unfortunately, the fears of the Founders have come true, at least in part. The virtues re-
quired to make sure our institutions continue, that buttress our liberties, have eroded. Nihilism,
which swept Europe earlier, has crept into the sphere of the elites in America.26 The differ-
ence between the Athenians and the Founders is in the institutions, especially the checks and
balances they constructed, and in the influence of religion in supporting the morality and
civic virtues of society. We are threatened with the loss of both unless we recognize their criti-
cal importance to our society.
Some disagree that democracy depends on morality. In fact, they say, democracy is most
compatible with relativism, not truth and therefore democracy is essentially amoral. Pope
John Paul II describes this point of view in the encyclical Centisimus annus:
Nowadays there is a tendency to claim that agnosticism and skeptical relativism
are the philosophy and the basic attitude which correspond to democratic forms of
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political life. Those who are convinced that they know the truth and firmly adhere
to it are considered unreliable from a democratic point of view, since they do not
accept that truth is determined by the majority, or that it is subject to variation ac-
cording to different political trends. It must be observed in this regard that if there
is no ultimate truth to guide and direct political activity, then ideas and convictions
can easily be manipulated for reasons of power. As history demonstrates, a democ-
racy without values easily turns into open or thinly disguised totalitarianism.27
Pope Benedict, of course, has become famous for his phrase “Dictatorship of Relativism,” in
a homily just before he was elected pope. However, years before he became Benedict,
Cardinal Ratzinger gave a speech titled, “Relativism: The Central Problem for Faith Today.” In
it he spoke primarily of relativism in theology, but he did briefly discuss political relativism,
surprisingly in mostly positive terms:
Relativism has thus become the central problem for the faith at the present
time…. In turn, relativism appears to be the philosophical foundation of democracy.
Democracy in fact is supposedly built on the basis that no one can presume to
know the true way, and it is enriched by the fact that all roads are mutually recog-
nized as fragments of the effort toward that which is better. Therefore, all roads
seek something common in dialogue, and they also compete regarding knowledge
that cannot be compatible in one common form. A system of freedom ought to be
essentially a system of positions that are connected with one another because they
are relative as well as being dependent on historical situations open to new devel-
opments. Therefore, a liberal society would be a relativist society: Only with that
condition could it continue to be free and open to the future.
In the area of politics, this concept is considerably right. There is no one correct
political opinion. What is relative — the building up of liberally ordained coexis-
tence between people — cannot be something absolute. Thinking in this way was
precisely the error of Marxism and the political theologies.
However, with total relativism, everything in the political area cannot be
achieved either. There are injustices that will never turn into just things (such as,
for example, killing an innocent person, denying an individual or groups the right
to their dignity or to life corresponding to that dignity) while, on the other hand,
there are just things that can never be unjust. Therefore, although a certain right to
relativism in the social and political area should not be denied, the problem is
raised at the moment of setting its limits.28
Benedict is a very careful thinker. His use of the term “dictatorship of relativism” is akin to
“tyranny of the majority” (the founders weren’t afraid of majorities but tyrannical majorities).
He is not condemning relativism in toto. Rather he is condemning relativism when it becomes
tyrannical, when it becomes “total relativism.” He is clearly not opposed to limited political
relativism.
If all were relative, then it would be useless to say that democracy is any better than oli-
garchy or that liberty is better than slavery. Far from reinforcing one another, relativism ulti-
mately undermines liberty as it does everything else. Even more fundamentally, without
morality, all liberty is empty because our choices are empty. We can only choose between
one meaningless thing and another meaningless thing. All meaning is sucked out of our lives. 
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In contrast, liberty and truth are mutually reinforcing. “The rationale for defending liberty —
especially ‘the free marketplace of ideas’ — is to come closer to the truth. The rational for de-
fending truth is that it makes us free.”29 But truth and liberty are not sufficient. They are
 dependent on virtuous citizenry, and virtue is incompatible with relativism (and exists in
 tension with democracy and liberty).
From the Declaration of Independence through The Federalist, and in every wise
document of our realist revolutionary tradition, it is confidently asserted that the
possibility of self-government rests upon the virtue of its citizens. Were the citizens
of a republic to seek to remain teenagers forever, “one of the kids,” such virtue
could never come to maturity, and self-government would fall…. The flight into il-
lusions about their own virtue would trap them in insatiable hypocrisies, by which
they would endlessly boast of their superior morality, liberation, and sensitivity,
while manifesting in their lives a noteworthy self-absorption. For such citizens,
virtue would less and less entail personal suffering, self-discipline, and hard per-
sonal choice, (that is, self-denial), and would more and more consist in identifying
themselves with enlightened opinion.30
Although, theoretically, religion (at least as more narrowly defined in the contemporary
world) is not necessary to acquire and maintain a body of virtuous citizens (after all, virtue
ethics originated in a pagan world), practically speaking, virtue is strongly supported by the
Judeo-Christian heritage. This was a missing ingredient in the ancient world. The Judeo-
Christian tradition is a far better school for virtue than the Homeric gods or even Stoicism.
Alexis de Tocqueville in his travels through America saw the importance of religion (he
considered it the first political institution of American democracy) and voluntary associations
in the civic life of America. He also foresaw the danger of America falling into tyranny, when
the lust of democrats for equality led them to demand such an extensive governmental net-
work of services to remove the insecurities, edges, and hardships from life that they would
fall into the honeyed grip of a new “soft despotism.” 31
But Tocqueville was not alone in his judgment of the important influence religion had on
American civic life. George Washington, considered by his contemporaries to be the paragon
of virtue, said, in his Farewell Address to the nation that popular government depends on
virtue and virtue depends on religion. 
Where is the security for property, for reputation, for life, if the sense of reli-
gious obligation desert the oaths which are the instruments of investigation in
courts of justice? And let us with caution indulge the supposition that morality can
be maintained without religion. Whatever may be conceded to the influence of re-
fined education on minds of peculiar structure, reason and experience both forbid
us to expect that national morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principle….
It is substantially true that virtue or morality is a necessary spring of popular gov-
ernment. The rule, indeed, extends with more or less force to every species of free
government.32
Tocqueville speaks similarly when he says that the spirit of freedom and the spirit of reli-
gion “work in harmony and seem to lend mutual support…. Religion is considered as the
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guardian of mores, and mores are regard as the guarantee of the laws and pledge for the main-
tenance of freedom itself.”33
If religion is so important to the existence of democracy should it be protected and encour-
aged? George Weigel in his essay “Religious Freedom: the First Human Right” posits freedom
of religion, or freedom of conscience, as the “one absolutely fundamental human right.” This
is because human persons are fundamentally truth-seekers; indeed, the right to freedom of
conscience entails the obligation to seek the truth. Freedom of conscience recognizes limits to
the power of the state, establishing a fundamental barrier between the person and the state. 
It is no coincidence then, that the first ethicist, the first philosopher, to consider the effect of
actions upon the soul would also be the first to consider the realm of conscience sacrosanct. 
Weigel states that democracy protects religious freedom and religious freedom protects
democracy. (The founders would have used the term “republic.”) First, the fundamental free-
dom of conscience prevents the tyranny of the majority, that is, it protects minority rights,
thus preventing democracy from turning into mob rule or anarchy. Moreover, this freedom
fosters an environment in which public virtues, which are necessary for the functioning of
democracy can thrive. This environmental protection is more than simply procedural.34 As
was true of ancient Athens, the founders shared the belief that religion supported the public
virtues necessary for the flourishing of the society. 
Religion and Democracy Today
If this is the case, we twenty-first century Americans have cause to worry. First, a foundational
element for a thriving republic, a limited political system, is being undermined by the intru-
sion of politics into both the cultural and economic spheres. Second, the suppression of the
energies of civil society is accelerating because of reduced incentives to work and create and
a loss of the sense of excellence. Third, the separation of powers is in danger of crumbling;
threatened by legislation by the judiciary (exemplified in Roe v. Wade), separate foreign policies
by the legislative branch and other things. Finally, the carefully constructed checks on the
tyranny of the majority have been discarded, such as indirect election of senators, lowering of
the voting age, enlargement of the franchise to women and to blacks, and the erosion of
states’ rights.35 There even is a movement to abolish the Electoral College in presidential elec-
tions. Our educational institutions have replaced teaching virtue with teaching relativism and
the elites in the free press are becoming increasingly alienated from the populace. At the
same time demagogues on TV, the radio and the Internet seek to manipulate the masses
through emotional appeals and taking advantage of the ignorance of their audiences. Finally,
in some instances we seem to have a direct democracy because of the importance placed by
politicians on opinion polls, so that 1000 people chosen at random powerfully influence the
decisions of a nation.
Conclusion
There was never a “golden age” of liberty. Every age had to fight for liberty. That is the example
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that the Founders give us. It is certainly not inevitable that the democracy decay or that rela-
tivism triumph or that religion be banished from public life. These difficulties, however, do
show why it is important to be aware of the history of liberty, from its roots in Athens and
Jerusalem, through Rome and Christianity and to the age of the Founders of the United States
of America.
But then why is it important to understand the trial of Socrates? It is important because it
strips the debate of all essentials in two ways. First, the Athens of Socrates is a foreign place
and time to 21st century Americans. In discussing religious freedom, we can get bogged down
in the details: specific cases, people, events and words. Religious freedom is a larger issue
than Locke v. Davies or Jefferson’s letter to the Danbury Baptists or even the First Amendment.
Looking at liberty versus the interests of society in a very different context compels us to ex-
amine the essence of the issue. Second, contemporary hot button issues, such as prayer in
schools, intolerance, abortion, are difficult to talk about unemotionally. Since no one has a
personal stake in the fate of Socrates (who after all has been dead for two-and-a-half millennia),
perhaps it is possible to discuss the elements in his trial more dispassionately than we can dis-
cuss what is currently on the docket of the Supreme Court.
The final valuable element of discussing the trial of Socrates comes from Socrates himself,
who doesn’t allow us to avoid the essence of the issue. He constantly brought the jury back to
what was at stake: the good citizen vs. the good man. He forced Athens to follow through on
its principles to the bitter end: forcing him to drink hemlock, rather than brokering some
compromise that might let them avoid seeing the full implications of their democratic stance
toward the philosophical life. 
* Zachary Foreman is a graduate student in the School of Philosophy at The Catholic University of America in
Washington, D.C.
1 James Colaiaco, Socrates Against Athens: Philosophy on Trial (New York: Routledge, 2001), 15, quoting Diogenes
Laertius, writing 700 years later. I have not the space to go into the controversy over sources. Suffice to say, I relied al-
most exclusively on the early Platonic accounts of Socrates: the Euthrypo, Crito and most especially the Apology but
also Xenophon’s Apology. For our purposes, the actual details of Socrates trial are not as important as the ideas and
the legacy.
2 Plato, Apology of Socrates 24a. All quotations from the Apology are from The Trial and Execution of Socrates: Sources
and Controversies. Edited by Thomas Brickhouse and Nicholas Smith (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2002).
Note that this is an inversion of the original charge. Some speculate that this is because Socrates saw the most impor-
tant aspect of the charge as corrupting the youth, thereby, endangering the future of the polis.
3 For example, Socrates could not have been indicted on the grounds that two of his students had been members of
the Thirty Tyrants, who failed to overthrow the democracy of Athens. Nor could he be indicted on charges that anoth-
er student, Alcibiades betrayed Athens and was involved in the oligarchic revolution of 411 BC. See Colaiaco, 110-111. 
4 Colaiaco, 112.
5 Susan Ford Wiltshire, Greece, Rome and the Bill of Rights (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1992), 104.
6 Colaiaco, 118-119.
7 Ibid., 119.
8 Plato, Apology, 29.
9 Colaiaco, 215.
10 Ibid., 220.
11 Paul Rahe, Republics, Ancient and Modern: Classical Republicanism and The American Revolution (Chapel Hill, NC:
University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 196.
12 John Courtney Murray, We Hold These Truths: Catholic Reflections on the American Proposition. New York: Sheed and
Ward, 1960, 159.
13 Ibid., 163.
14 Ibid., 166.
15 Jacques Maritain, Man and the State, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1951, 114.
16 Ibid., 116-117.
17 Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776- 1787 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina
Press, 1998 [1969]), 49.
18 Jennifer Tolbert Roberts, Athens on Trial: The Antidemocratic Tradition in Western Thought. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1994),179.
19 The Federalist Papers, quoted in Roberts, 181.
20 Roberts, 186.
21 Wiltshire, 105.
22 Carl Richard, The Founders and the Classics: Greece, Rome, and the American Enlightenment. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1994.233-234.
23 Ibid., 234.
24 Ibid.
25 Michael Novak, Free Persons and the Common Good (Latham, MD: Madison Books, 1989), 55.
26 Michael Novak. On Cultivating Liberty, 9-10. See also his prior work, The Experience of Nothingness, (Rev. & exp. ed.
New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1998, [1970]).
27 Centesimus Annus, 46, Encyclical Letter, May 1, 1991. http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encycli-
cals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_01051991_centesimus-annus_en.html.
28 Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, “Relativism: The Central Problem for Faith Today,” Address to CDF, May 1996,
http://www.ewtn.com/library/CURIA/RATZRELA.HTM. 
29 Michael Novak, On Cultivating Liberty: Reflections on Moral Ecology. (Latham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), 28.
30 Ibid. 133-134.
31 Michael Novak. The Universal Hunger for Liberty: Why the Clash of Civilizations is Not Inevitable (New York: Basic
Books, 2004), 138-139. The idea that a return to virtue is required in order for modern democracies to survive is, of
course, not a novel one. Novak introduces his book with that exact notion. He suggests that the twentieth first centu-
ry will see a departure from modern political philosophy — and a return to older philosophy — to a philosophy that
“sees statecraft as a kind of soulcraft” (p. 13). 
32 Washington’s Farewell Address, 1796. http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/washing.htm. Most observers believed
that without the virtues of Washington the war would not have been won, the Constitution might not have been writ-
ten and the country might not have survived its first decade of existence.
33 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, translated by George Lawrence and edited by J.P. Mayer (New York:
Anchor Books, 1969), 46-47.
34 George Weigel, “Religious Freedom: The First Human Right.” In The Structure of Freedom: Correlations, Causes, and
Causations. Edited by Richard John Neuhaus (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing, 1991), 42-43.
35 Obviously the end of slavery and women’s suffrage were good things. Nevertheless, the movement to widen fran-
chise as far as possible is clear. It could potentially include felons and immigrants, legal or illegal, or even residents of
the District of Columbia.
225
H E M L O C K  A N D  T H E  F I R S T  A M E N D M E N T
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AND MADISONIAN LINES
THE SUPREME COURT’S USE OF HISTORY 
IN RELIGION CLAUSE CASES
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In Everson v. Board of Education,1 Justice Wiley Rutledge observed that “[n]o provision of theConstitution is more closely tied to or given content by its generating history than the reli-
gious clause of the First Amendment. It is at once the refined product and the terse summation
of that history.”2 Scholars and activists argue about the relevance or irrelevance of the Supreme
Court’s use of history in general and the extent to which Justices are good historians.3 These
debates have been particularly furious with respect to the Court’s use of history in Religion
Clause cases.4 Although broad claims are often made about the Court’s use of history in these
cases, they are either unsupported generalities or extrapolations from a careful reading of
only a handful of the Court’s many Free Exercise and Establishment Clause cases.5
In this essay, I offer a systematic analysis of every Religion Clause case decided by the
Supreme Court. In Part A, I provide original data drawn from the Court’s Religion Clause
cases that clearly and succinctly address how Justices have used history in their Religion
Clause opinions. I show the extent to which Justices have appealed to history and, when they
do so, to whom or what they appeal. In Part B, I look at the distribution of Religion Clause
cases over time and consider whether there are patterns with respect to the Court’s use of history.
In Part C, I consider individual Justices, particularly the extent to which they tend to write
opinions in Religion Clause cases and how often they use history. In this discussion, I define
what it means to be “liberal” or “conservative” in Religion Clause cases and place Justices on
an ideological continuum based upon every vote cast between 1940 and 2005. I follow this
with an examination of the extent to which jurisprudential liberals and conservatives differ in
their use of history. In Part D, I offer a narrative account of the Court’s use of history in
Religion Clause cases with an emphasis on opinions where Justices consciously reflect on the
relevance or irrelevance of history.
The primary purpose of this essay is to provide a systematic account of how Justices have
used history to help them interpret the Religion Clause. I do not attempt to evaluate every as-
pect of the Court’s use of history nor do I address the question of whether Justices should use
history. In the concluding section, I do contend that if Justices are going to make historical ar-
guments, they should make good ones. I also suggest ways in which their historical argu-
ments in Religion Clause opinions could be significantly improved.
A Few Comments on Methodology
The United States Supreme Court has decided 115 cases in which at least four Justices consid-
ered the Free Exercise or Establishment Clause (or both) to raise substantial issues.6 This
count does not include cases where religion played a significant role but that were decided
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upon other constitutional or statutory grounds.7 Nor does it include cases where a Religion
Clause claim is dismissed without serious consideration.8 Of these 115 cases, 60 primarily in-
volve the Establishment Clause, 44 primarily involve the Free Exercise Clause, and 11 con-
cern both clauses (and, of course, some of these cases contain other constitutional or
statutory issues).9 Altogether, these cases generated 365 separate opinions.10
Having determined the relevant pool of cases, I carefully read each opinion and quantified
distinct appeals to different Founders, documents, and events. In most instances the number
of appeals was clear, but in cases rich with historical discussions the number can be difficult
to determine. For instance, Justice Black, in his opinion in Everson, wrote:
The movement toward this end reached its dramatic climax in Virginia in 1785-
86 when the Virginia legislative body was about to renew Virginia’s tax levy for the
support of the established church. Thomas Jefferson and James Madison led the
fight against this tax. Madison wrote his great Memorial and Remonstrance against
the law. In it, he eloquently argued that a true religion did not need the support of
law; that no person, either believer or non-believer, should be taxed to support a
religious institution of any kind; that the best interest of a society required that the
minds of men always be wholly free; and that cruel persecutions were the in-
evitable result of government-established religions. Madison’s Remonstrance re-
ceived strong support throughout Virginia….11
Although Madison’s name is mentioned three times in this passage, two pronouns refer to
him, and The Writings of James Madison is referenced in a footnote, I consider Black to have
appealed to Madison only one time in the passage. However, when Black proceeds on the
next page of his opinion to refer to Madison’s role in drafting and authoring the First
Amendment, I count this as an additional appeal to Madison.12 Altogether I conclude that
Black made five separate appeals to Madison in Everson, even though Madison’s name ap-
pears twelve times in his opinion.
My decision to separate distinct appeals to particular Founders and events introduces more
ambiguity into this study than if I had simply counted references to them, but I believe it
more accurately reflects the extent of these appeals. As well, it avoids counting references in
which something or someone is criticized or that have nothing to do with the Religion Clause.
As a point of comparison, a simple LexisNexis search of Religion Clause opinions reveals 419
references to Madison, 303 to Jefferson, 63 to George Washington, and 17 to George Mason. In
contrast, by my count, Justices appealed to Madison 189 times, Jefferson 112 times,
Washington 21 times, and Mason 6 times.
A. Overview of Appeals to History
From the Supreme Court’s first Religion Clause case, Reynolds v. United States,13 to the most re-
cent one considered in this study, Cutter v. Wilkinson,14 Justices have appealed to the history
surrounding the writing of the First Amendment, the Founders generally, and specific Founders
to shine light upon the meaning of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses. An appeal to
the “Founders” includes any general reference to “the Founders,” “the Framers,” or “the First
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Congress.” An appeal to “context” includes references to the “Founding era,” the political cul-
ture of the time, or laws, constitutions, and similar documents from the era that purport to
 illustrate general concerns of the time.15 Finally, appeals to specific Founders include com-
bined references to Founders and documents that they authored (e.g., “Jefferson’s Letter to
the Danbury Baptists” or “Letter from George Washington to the Religious Society Called
Quakers”).16 The following table provides a broad overview of the basic trends:
Table 1  Overview of Appeals to History in Religion Clause Cases
Combined Establishment and
Reference Establishment Cases Free Exercise Cases Free Exercise Cases Total
Founders 177 35 3 215
Context 120 68 2 190
Madison 173 16 0 189
Jefferson 94 18 0 112
Washington 19 2 0 21
J. Adams 6 1 0 7
G. Mason 4 2 0 6
R. Williams a 5 1 0 6
Sherman 3 0 0 3
Ellsworth 1 2 0 3
Gerry 3 0 0 3
D. Carroll 3 0 0 3
Franklin 1 1 0 2
Iredell 2 0 0 2
Huntington 2 0 0 2
Livermore 2 0 0 2
J. Allen 1 0 0 1
S. Adams 1 0 0 1
F. Ames 1 0 0 1
I. Backus 0 1 0 1
Benson 0 1 0 1
Boudinot 1 0 0 1
Hamilton 1 0 0 1
P. Henry 1 0 0 1
R.H. Lee 1 0 0 1
J. Jay 1 0 0 1
Pendleton 1 0 0 1
Spence 1 0 0 1
Wythe 1 0 0 1
Witherspoon 0 1 0 1
Sylvester 1 0 0 1
J. Marshall 1 0 0 1
Rutledge 1 0 0 1
Sullivan 1 0 0 1
Vining 1 0 0 1
Total 631 149 5 785
a It is a stretch to count Roger Williams as a Founder, and I otherwise avoid including individuals who fall outside the
Founding era — even figures far closer to it such as Joseph Story. However, I include Williams because of the significant
role some Justices believed he played in forming the American conception of religious liberty and church-state relations. 
Table 1 shows that Justices have been far more likely to appeal to history to inform their in-
terpretation of the Establishment Clause than the Free Exercise Clause (although, intriguing-
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ly, not when both clauses are at issue). They clearly prefer general appeals to the Founders or
the general historical context, although, as we shall see, they often flesh out these general ap-
peals with quotations from or references to documents by specific Founders. When doing so,
in the aggregate they favor appeals to Jefferson and Madison over the other thirty-one
Founders who appear in Religion Clause opinions by a ratio of almost four-to-one. As dis-
cussed below, appeals to history are not evenly distributed among Justices, but it is worth not-
ing that in Religion Clause cases there are an average of 6.8 appeals to history per case and
more than 2.2 per opinion.
B. Historical Trends
The Supreme Court heard few Religion Clause cases until the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses were applied to the states in 1940 and 1947, respectively.17 As indicat-
ed by the following tables, the Court decided only five Establishment Clause cases prior to
1961, and virtually all references to history from these cases are contained in one opinion,
Everson.18 Since 1961, however, the Court has faced a constant stream of Establishment Clause
cases and has been fairly consistent in its appeals to history.
By contrast, the Court resolved sixteen cases involving the Free Exercise Clause in the
1940s, but since then the Court has addressed an average of five cases per decade. As noted
above, Justices seldom appeal to history to shine light on this clause. This fact was noted by
Justice Souter in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,19 and led to histori-
cally rich responses by Justices O’Connor and Scalia in City of Boerne v. Flores.20 These two
opinions account for fifty-nine of the seventy historical references in Free Exercise Clause
cases from the 1990s — and more than forty percent of the historical references made in all
Free Exercise cases combined. The following tables illustrate historical references by decade.
Table 2  Establishment Clause Cases
Decade No. of Cases Context Founders Jefferson Madison Other
Founders
Pre- 
1940 2 0 0 0 0 0
1940s 2 20 8 24 37 7
1950s 1 1 0 1 0 0
1960s 8 18 27 21 25 11
1970s 12 15 16 9 28 1
1980s 20 23 56 9 25 26
1990s 8 29 37 16 36 8
2000-2005 7 14 33 14 22 14
Total 60 120 177 94 173 67
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Table 3  Free Exercise Clause Cases
Decade No. of Cases Context Founders Jefferson Madison Other
Founders
Pre-
1940 2 2 0 2 2 0
1940s 16 16 12 9 4 4
1950s 4 0 0 0 0 0
1960s 3 2 0 1 0 1
1970s 6 7 2 3 4 2
1980s 8 1 4 0 1 0
1990s 3 40 17 3 5 5
2000-2005 2 0 0 0 0 0
Total 44 68 35 18 16 12
Table 4  Establishment and Free Exercise Clause Cases
Decade No. of Cases Context Founders Jefferson Madison Other
Founders
Pre-
1940 1 1 1 0 0 0
1960s 1 0 0 0 0 0
1970s 2 1 0 0 0 0
1980s 6 0 2 0 0 0
1990s 1 0 0 0 0 0
Total 11 2 3 0 0 0
C. Individual Justices
Tables 1 through 4 show Court trends with respect to Religion Clause cases in general, but it
could merely reflect the proclivity of a few Justices to write Religion Clause cases and appeal
to history. Table 5 lists Justices in order of the number of opinions they have written in
Religion Clause cases. Because some Justices serve longer than others or in eras when more
Religion Clause cases came before the Court, the third column lists the number of Religion
Clause cases in which written opinions were issued during each Justice’s tenure. I also delin-
eate exactly to what or whom these Justices appeal. The final column lists the average num-
ber of historical references per opinion for each Justice.
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Table 5.  Use of History by Individual Justices
Reference
Justice No. of No of Context Founding Thomas James Other Total Average
Opinionsa Religion Fathers Jefferson Madison Founders No. of
Cases Reference
During Per
Tenureb Opinion
Brennan 30 68 13 36 10 14 7 80 2.7
(44)
Burger 27 44 18 29 3 6 8 64 2.4
(61)
O’Connor 26 50 24 13 2 5 3 47 1.8
(52)
Rehnquist 26 67 4 16 1 10 16 47 1.8
(39)
Stevens 25 60 5 5 10 5 2 27 1.1
(42)
White 23 67 1 1 0 0 0 2 0.1
(34)
Douglas 22 50 2 3 1 23 0 29 1.3
(44)
Blackmun 19 60 2 5 3 3 2 15 0.7
(32)
Scalia 14 31 23 23 5 5 15 71 5.1
(45)
Black 13 38 13 6 13 11 5 48 3.7
(34)
Stewart 13 37 1 1 0 0 0 2 0.2
(35)
Powell 13 42 7 3 5 8 3 26 2
(31)
Souter 12 18 11 33 15 41 4 104 8.7
(67)
Frankfurter 12 28 9 3 10 8 3 33 2.8
(43)
Jackson 9 17 1 2 0 0 0 3 0.3
(53)
Kennedy 9 21 8 5 0 2 1 16 1.8
(43)
Reed 8 22 10 8 4 3 1 26 3.3
(36)
Marshall 8 65 0 0 1 0 0 1 0.1
(12)
Thomas 8 15 8 10 1 4 0 23 2.9
(53)
Murphy 6 20 1 0 5 1 0 7 1.2
(30)
Harlan II 6 16 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.2
(38)
Warren 5 12 6 1 5 7 2 21 4.2
(42)
Breyer 5 13 4 3 0 0 0 7 1.4
(38)
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Stone 4 15 1 1 0 0 0 2 0.5
(27)
Rutledge 3 12 13 4 11 28 6 62 20.7
(25)
Fortas 3 4 1 1 1 0 0 3 1
(75)
Ginsburg 3 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(21)
Roberts 2 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(18)
Per Curiam 2 NA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(…)
Goldberg 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(50)
Vinson 1 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(13)
Clark 1 12 0 2 4 3 1 10 10
(8)
Hughes 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(33)
Bradley 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(25)
Field 1 3 1 1 0 0 0 2 2
(33)
Fuller 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(33)
Peckham 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(50)
Waite 1 2 2 0 2 2 0 6 6
(50)
Total 365 956 190 215 112 189 79 785 …
a The percentage of Religious Clause cases in which each Justice wrote an opinion is included in parenthesis.
b This figure includes all cases in which a Justice cast a vote. If a Justice missed a case or recused
himself or herself from it, the case is not counted.
Data in column two of Table 5 suggests that Justices are drawn to write opinions in Religion
Clause cases. Overall, since 1946 Justices have penned opinions in 25% of the cases in which
written opinions were issued.21 In roughly the same period, Justices wrote opinions for 38%
of the Religion Clause cases that came before them.22 With some Justices this may simply
 reflect judicial productivity.23 With others it seems to be a result of a Justice’s innovative or
unique approach to the Free Exercise or Establishment Clause cases, which may lead the
Justice to write a greater percentage of concurring or dissenting opinions advocating his or
her position.24
Most Justices who write Religion Clause opinions have appealed to history to shine light on
the meaning of the Clause. Specifically, 76% of the Justices who have written at least one
Religion Clause opinion have appealed to history, and every one of the twenty-three Justices
who authored more than four Religion Clause opinions have done so. Of course even among
these Justices, some have utilized history significantly more often than others. Of the twenty-
three Justices who authored more than four Religion Clause opinions, six made an average of
233
J E F F E R S O N I A N  WA L L S  A N D  M A D I S O N I A N  L I N E S
less than one historical reference per opinion as opposed to nine who average more than two
historical references per opinion.
Why are some Justices more likely to appeal to history than others? One possibility is that
conservative Justices (who are presumably concerned with original intent) are more likely to
appeal to history than are liberals. To test this hypothesis, however, it is necessary to define
what it means to be a judicial “conservative” and a judicial “liberal.”
For the purposes of this essay, I consider a liberal vote in a Free Exercise Clause case to be
one that favors an individual or group over the state. In Establishment Clause cases, a liberal
vote is one that prohibits the government from supporting religious activities or groups. When
both clauses are at issue, a liberal vote is one that favors the individual or group against the
state unless the question involves government support of a religious individual or organization.
In that case, a liberal vote is one that favors separation.25 Table 6 considers all votes on Religion
Clause cases cast in and after Cantwell v. Connecticut.26 Labeling votes in complicated cases
over a span of decades as liberal or conservative obviously does not reflect the nuanced opin-
ions of many Justices, but it has the virtue of providing a clear and objective measure for
 liberalness or conservativeness with respect to the Religion Clause.27
Table 6.  Use of History by Judicial Liberals and Conservatives
%of
% of % of Liberal Liberal
Total No. of Religion Clause Votes Liberal Votes in Votes in
Party Combined Votes in & of Liberal Combined Free All
of Free Exercise Free Votes in Exercise and Religion
Nominating Free and Exercise Establishment Establishment Clause
Justice President Exercise Establishment Establishment Cases Cases Cases Cases
Fortas D 1 3 … 100 100 … 100
Goldberg D 1 1 … 100 100 … 100
Douglas D 26 21 3 81 86 100 84
Brennan R 18 41 9 78 83 56 78
Ginsburg D 3 11 … 33 91 … 79
Stevens R 16 38 6 44 92 67 77
Rutledge D 9 3 … 78 67 … 75
Minton D 4 … … 75 … … 75
Black D 23 14 1 74 71 0 74
Marshall D 21 35 9 57 86 56 72
Souter R 4 14 … 75 71 … 72
Murphy D 17 3 … 76 33 … 70
Clark D 6 5 1 67 60 0 67
Blackmun R 15 36 9 73 64 56 65
Breyer D 3 10 … 67 50 … 61
Stewart R 10 23 4 80 43 75 57
Stone R 15 … … 53 … … 53
Harlan II R 4 11 1 50 45 0 53
Warren R 3 8 1 67 50 0 50
Hughes R 2 … … 50 … … 50
Vinson D 5 3 … 60 33 … 50
Burton D 7 3 … 43 67 … 50
Frankfurter D 21 6 1 38 67 0 46
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Powell R 10 26 6 40 46 50 45
Reed D 20 2 … 40 0 … 45
White D 18 40 9 67 23 78 42
Jackson D 14 3 … 29 100 … 41
Whittaker R 1 3 1 100 33 0 40
O’Connor R 12 32 6 50 38 17 38
McReynolds D 3 … … 33 … … 33
Burger R 10 27 7 50 15 43 27
Thomas R 3 12 … 67 17 … 27
O. Roberts R 11 … … 27 … … 27
Kennedy R 6 14 1 50 21 100 24
Scalia R 9 20 2 56 5 50 23
Rehnquist R 18 41 8 17 2 38 10
Byrnes D 2 … … 0 … … 0
Having ranked Justices on a spectrum of liberal to conservative, it remains to be seen to
what extent their votes correlate with their use or neglect of history. Justices who wrote opin-
ions in Religion Clause cases in or after Cantwell (i.e., all of the Justices in Table 6 except
Minton, Burton, Whittaker, McReynolds, and Byrnes) appealed to history to shine light on the
meaning of the Free Exercise or Establishment Clause an average of 2.2 times per opinion.
Among these Justices, those with a liberal voting record of 66.6% or higher made an average
of 2.9 historical references per opinion. By contrast, the six Justices with a conservative voting
record of 66.6% or higher made 2.6 historical references per opinion. The fourteen Justices
who fell in the middle made significantly fewer appeals to history — just 1.3 per opinion.
Somewhat counterintuitively, jurisprudential conservatives are actually slightly less likely to
appeal to history than liberals, although both conservatives and liberals do so more than mod-
erates.
Although Justices on both the right and the left routinely appeal to history to support their
opinions, they do not necessarily appeal to the same history. As shown by Tables 7 and 8,
when comparing Justices listed as jurisprudential liberals or conservatives as defined in the
previous paragraph to the types of references these Justices make, the most striking element
is the liberal block’s overwhelming number of appeals to Thomas Jefferson and James
Madison. Indeed, Table 7 shows that 54% of all of their appeals are to these two men — more
than their appeals to the historical context, the Founders in general, and all other Founders
combined.
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Table 7  Liberal Justices and Appeals to History
Other 
Founding Thomas James Founding 
Context Fathers Jefferson Madison Fathers Total
Fortas 1 1 1 0 0 3
Goldberg 0 0 0 0 0 0
Douglas 2 3 1 23 0 29
Brennan 13 36 10 14 7 80
Ginsburg 0 0 0 0 0 0
Stevens 5 5 10 5 2 27
Rutledge 13 4 11 28 6 62
Black 13 6 13 11 5 48
Marshall 0 0 1 0 0 1
Souter 11 33 15 41 4 104
Murphy 1 0 5 1 0 7
Clark 0 2 4 3 1 10
Total 59 90 71 126 25 371
% of Appeals 
Made to Each 
Referencea 16% 24% 19% 35% 7% …
a Percentages do not add up to 100% due to rounding.
By contrast, Table 8 shows that conservative Justices are significantly more likely to appeal
to a wide range of historical sources. Only 17% of these Justices’ historical references are to
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison — a full 37% fewer references than those made by the
liberal block. As well, conservative Justices are more than twice as likely as liberals to refer to
other Founding Fathers.
Table 8  Conservative Justices and Appeals to History
Other 
Founding Thomas James Founding 
Context Fathers Jefferson Madison Fathers Total
Rehnquist 4 16 1 10 16 47
Scalia 23 23 5 5 15 71
Kennedy 8 5 0 2 1 16
O. Roberts 0 0 0 0 0 0
Thomas 8 10 1 4 0 23
Burger 18 29 3 6 8 64
Total 61 83 10 27 40 221
% of Appeals 
Made to Each 
Referencea 28% 38% 5% 12% 18% …
a Percentages do not add up to 100% due to rounding.
D. Religion Clause Cases and the Use of History
The above data show that the vast majority of Justices who have written Religion Clause opin-
ions have used history to shine light upon the Clause’s meaning. This has been particularly
true with respect to the Establishment Clause, in which appeals to history have been steady
throughout the Court’s cases. Justices have been far less likely to appeal to history to illumi-
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nate the Free Exercise Clause, but recent opinions suggest that history may become increas-
ingly important for understanding this clause as well. Moreover, the data show that liberal
Justices are slightly more likely to appeal to history than conservatives, although they do not
necessarily appeal to the same history.
Quantitative data are useful for supporting generalizations about the Court’s use of history,
but qualitative analysis helps answer questions such as how, why, and when Justices appeal
to history. The following discussion provides a narrative overview of the Court’s use of history
in Religion Clause cases with a particular focus on cases where Justices consciously reflect
upon their use of history. I assume a general familiarity with these cases and make no effort
to summarize every important Religion Clause case or even to describe the development of
Free Exercise or Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
1. Reynolds to Everson
The Court inaugurated its use of history in its first Religion Clause case, Reynolds v. United
States.28 Asked to decide whether the First Amendment protects the right of a member of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints to commit polygamy, the Court responded with a
resounding no. In his opinion, Justice Waite noted that:
“[R]eligion” is not defined in the Constitution. We must go elsewhere, therefore, to
ascertain its meaning, and nowhere more appropriately, we think, than to the his-
tory of the times in the midst of which the provision was adopted. The precise
point of the inquiry is, what is the religious freedom which has been guaranteed.29
Waite began his discussion of history by exploring early colonial attempts to regulate reli-
gious practice and belief.30 He then considered reactions against these regulations, particular-
ly those in Virginia.31 Specifically, he reasoned that the First Amendment must be understood
in light of James Madison’s and Thomas Jefferson’s opposition to Patrick Henry’s general as-
sessment bill.32 To explain these Founders’ views on church–state relations, he relied heavily
on Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance, Jefferson’s Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom,
and Jefferson’s 1802 letter to the Danbury Baptists.33 Waite concluded that the Founders in-
tended the Free Exercise Clause to deprive Congress “of all legislative power over mere opin-
ion” but left Congress free “to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or
subversive of good order.”34
The four church–state cases decided between Reynolds and Cantwell v. Connecticut35 con-
tain no judicial innovations and virtually no discussion of history. This changed rapidly after
the Supreme Court applied the Free Exercise Clause to the states in 1940.36 Between 1940 and
1946, the Court decided sixteen cases involving the free exercise of religion (usually in cases
involving freedom of speech as well), often overturning local ordinances. This aggressive ex-
pansion of the Court’s power to promote liberty was seldom defended by appeals to the
Founders’ intent. In fact, the opposite was true. Of the forty-five historical references in these
cases, thirty-one of them are from three opinions favoring restrictions on religious speech or
action (or inaction, in the case of West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette37).38 Thus,
with respect to the Free Exercise Clause, most Justices were not particularly interested in the
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Founders’ views, and the few who cited them did so to support a restrictive conception of reli-
gious liberty.
Everson v. Board of Educationmarks a critical turning point in the Court’s Religion Clause
jurisprudence. The case applied the Establishment Clause to the states and offered an inter-
pretive approach to the First Amendment that has exercised enormous influence. Justice
Black, in his majority opinion, accepted Waite’s claim that the Religion Clause must be under-
stood in light of “the background and environment of the period in which that constitutional
language was fashioned and adopted.”39 Like Waite, Black argued that the Founders’ views are
summarized well in Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance, the then-recently discovered
Detached Memoranda, Thomas Jefferson’s Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty, and his 1802 letter
to the Danbury Baptist Association.40 In his opinion, Black made several general historical
claims, but he fleshed them out with specific examples involving Jefferson and Madison.
Indeed, he made five distinct references each to Jefferson and Madison but appealed to only
one other founder, Patrick Henry, in his capacity as an attorney in the famous “Parson’s Case.”41
Despite Black’s strong separationist language, the majority affirmed the constitutionality of
a New Jersey program that reimbursed parents for the cost of transporting their children to
private religious schools.42 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Jackson famously quipped that
Black reminded him of “Julia who, according to Byron’s reports, ‘whispering “I will ne’er con-
sent,” — consented.’”43 More significant for our purposes, however, is Justice Rutledge’s dis-
senting opinion, which was joined by Justices Frankfurter, Jackson, and Burton. In a record
unbeaten to this day, Rutledge made sixty-two distinct historical appeals to support his con-
clusion that the Founders intended to erect a high wall of separation between church and
state.
Rutledge began his opinion by quoting the Religion Clause and several sentences from
Jefferson’s “A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom.”44 The bulk of his opinion rests on the
proposition that:
[N]o provision of the Constitution is more closely tied to or given content by its
generating history than the religious clause of the First Amendment. It is at once
the refined product and the terse summation of that history. This history includes
not only Madison’s authorship and the proceedings before the First Congress, but
also the long and intensive struggle for religious freedom in America, more espe-
cially in Virginia, of which the Amendment was the direct culmination. In the doc-
uments of the times, particularly of Madison, who was [the] leader in the Virginia
struggle before he became the Amendment’s sponsor, but also in the writings of
Jefferson and others and in the issues which engendered them is to be found ir-
refutable confirmation of the Amendment’s sweeping content.45
Rutledge followed this passage with an extensive discussion of church–state struggles in
Virginia and a short examination of the framing of the First Amendment.46 Altogether he
made sixty-two distinct historical references — including eleven to Thomas Jefferson and
twenty-eight to James Madison. Lest anyone miss Madison’s significance, Rutledge attached a
copy of his Memorial and Remonstrance as an appendix to his opinion.47
238
T H E  A M E R I C A N  E X P E R I M E N T:  R E L I G I O U S  F R E E D O M
In Everson, Black and Rutledge presented an argument that has had a tremendous influ-
ence on the Court’s Religion Clause jurisprudence. Although not formally a syllogism, it has
the appearance of one, and I will refer to it throughout this essay as “Everson’s syllogism.” It
goes as follows:
The Establishment Clause must be interpreted in light of the Founders’ intent.
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison represent the Founders.
Jefferson and Madison favored the strict separation of church and state.
Therefore, the Establishment Clause requires the strict separation of church and
state.48
Of course Justices do not always agree on what the strict separation of church and state re-
quires, and occasionally a Justice would challenge or attempt to qualify a premise or the con-
clusion of this syllogism. But for forty years this syllogism reigned supreme in Establishment
Clause cases, and it often impacted Free Exercise Clause cases as well. As noted above, nu-
merous scholars have criticized the accuracy of Everson’s history,49 but for many Justices and
students of church–state relations it remains the definitive account of the origins of the
Religion Clause.
2. McCollum to McGowan
Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education,50 the next Religion Clause case decided by the
Court, illustrates well the impact of Everson on future church–state cases. Although in
McCollum Black and Frankfurter made four and five historical references respectively, their
arguments primarily rely upon the historical account of the origins of the First Amendment
offered by Black and Rutledge in Everson. These two opinions cite Everson eleven times, and
Everson is cited as the source for many of the historical quotations in McCollum.51 It is, of
course, not surprising that the Court would rely on an earlier account of history as Justices
can hardly make extensive historical arguments in every Religion Clause opinion. Yet it is im-
portant to recognize the proclivity of Justices to rely upon Everson’s history if one is to grasp
its full impact on the Court’s Religion Clause jurisprudence.
Justice Reed, dissenting by himself in McCollum, offered the first response by a Supreme
Court Justice to Everson’s history. Reed began his historical discussion with the suggestion
that “[t]he phrase ‘an establishment of religion’ may have been intended by Congress to be
aimed only at a state church.”52 He conceded that the Clause’s meaning may have expanded
over time; however, he contended that nothing in the Founding era suggests that it should be
interpreted so broadly as to prevent Illinois from allowing school children to receive volun-
tary religious training from ministers in public schools during school hours.53 Indeed, he
 attempted to turn the tables on Black and Rutledge by showing that Jefferson and Madison
supported religious education at the University of Virginia.54 As well, he argued that texts
such as Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance do not require McCollum’s outcome.55
Reed’s dissent is notable for offering the first sustained effort by a Justice to make a historical
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argument to support what later became known as the accomodationist or nonpreferentialist
interpretation of the Establishment Clause. It is significant as well insofar as he did not chal-
lenge the Court’s reliance on history but only its interpretation thereof.
Of the ten church–state cases decided between McCollum and Engel v. Vitale,56 only
McGowan v. Maryland57 contains an extensive discussion of history. Chief Justice Warren, in
his majority opinion, and Justice Frankfurter, in his concurring opinion, apparently felt com-
pelled to explain how state recognition and protection of the Christian Sabbath (and discrimi-
nation against those who worship on other days) could be squared with the high wall of
separation between church and state described in Everson.58 Each Justice showed that states
had historically banned unnecessary labor on Sunday, but a critical part of their historical
 argument is that these laws are constitutional because Jefferson and Madison did not oppose
similar legislation.59 Specifically, both Warren and Frankfurter emphasized that Jefferson
 authored and Madison supported in the Virginia General Assembly “A Bill for Punishing
Disturbers of Religious Worship and Sabbath Breakers,” which, among other things, fined indi-
viduals who worked on Sunday.60
3. Engel to Marsh
Engel remains one of the most controversial church–state cases ever decided. Justice Black, in
his majority opinion declaring teacher-led devotional exercises in public schools to be uncon-
stitutional, deviated little from Everson’s syllogism. As in Everson, he argued that Virginia’s ex-
perience is particularly relevant:
In 1785-1786, those opposed to the established Church, led by James Madison and
Thomas Jefferson, who, though themselves not members of any of these dissent-
ing religious groups, opposed all religious establishments by law on grounds of
principle, obtained the enactment of the famous “Virginia Bill for Religious
Liberty” by which all religious groups were placed on an equal footing so far as the
State was concerned. Similar though less far-reaching legislation was being consid-
ered and passed in other States.61
Black never explained why legislation in other states is less relevant than that of Virginia,
but he made it clear that he considered Jefferson and Madison to be the key Founders.62 He
also introduced readers for the first time to a new “Founder” — Roger Williams of Rhode
Island.63 Williams, of course, appealed to Black as “one of the earliest exponents of the doctrine
of separation of church and state.”64 Other than Madison, Jefferson, and Williams, Black men-
tioned no other Founder.
The most intriguing element of Engel from the perspective of the Justices’ use of history is
Justice Douglas’s admission in his concurring opinion that “I cannot say that to authorize this
prayer is to establish a religion in the strictly historic meaning of those words.”65 Douglas even
conceded that “[r]eligion was once deemed to be a function of the public school system.”66
Few separationists on the Court have been willing to concede that the Founders wanted any-
thing other than the strict separation of church and state. Despite this departure from Everson’s
argument, Douglas had no doubt that school prayer was unconstitutional, at least in part be-
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cause “once government finances a religious exercise it inserts a divisive influence into our
communities.”67
The Court’s holding in Abington School District v. Schempp,68 is a logical extension of Engel.
For the purposes of this essay, it is notable for two reasons. First, Justice Clark’s opinion con-
tains the most concise (albeit slightly expanded) statement of Everson’s premise that Jefferson’s
and Madison’s views define the Establishment Clause: “[T]he views of Madison and Jefferson,
preceded by Roger Williams, came to be incorporated not only in the Federal Constitution but
likewise in those of most of our States.”69
More significantly, Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion contains the first sustained argu-
ment against relying on “[a] too literal quest for the advice of the founding fathers” to interpret
the Establishment Clause.70 In several much-quoted passages, he contended that such a quest
is misdirected for the following reasons:
[T]he historical record is at best ambiguous, and statements can readily be found to
support either side of the proposition.
… [T]he structure of American education has greatly changed since the First
Amendment was adopted.
… [O]ur religious composition makes us a vastly more diverse people than were
our forefathers.
… [T]he American experiment in free public education available to all children has
been guided in large measure by the dramatic evolution of the religious diversity
among the population which our public schools serve.71
Brennan’s concerns are often referred to, quoted, or excerpted in such a way so as to sug-
gest that he believed the Court should abandon altogether the use of history in Religion
Clause cases.72 However, the core of his argument is that Justices should avoid focusing on
specific practices that the Founders did or did not favor and instead explore the principles
they embraced. These principles, rather than specific policies, appropriately guide the
Court’s jurisprudence. After a sweeping discussion of a wide range of historical documents
and church–state cases, Brennan concluded,
Specifically, I believe that the line we must draw between the permissible and the
impermissible is one which accords with history and faithfully reflects the under-
standing of the Founding Fathers. It is a line which the Court has consistently
sought to mark in its decisions expounding the religious guarantees of the First
Amendment. What the Framers meant to foreclose, and what our decisions under
the Establishment Clause have forbidden, are those involvements of religious with
secular institutions which (a) serve the essentially religious activities of religious
institutions; (b) employ the organs of government for essentially religious purposes;
or (c) use essentially religious means to serve governmental ends, where secular
means would suffice. When the secular and religious institutions become involved
in such a manner, there inhere in the relationship precisely those dangers — as
much to church as to state — which the Framers feared would subvert religious
 liberty and the strength of a system of secular government.73
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Brennan also noted that there are “myriad forms of involvements of government with reli-
gion” that do not violate the Establishment Clause.74 Details about his views are not important
here, but his qualifications as to how the Court should use history are. It is critical to empha-
size that Brennan did not abandon Everson’s commitment to history — indeed, he appealed to
“the Founders” as a group in this opinion more than any other Justice in any other Religion
Clause opinion.
Between Schempp and Walz v. Tax Commission of New York City,75 Justices primarily relied
upon precedents in Religion Clause cases, and, to the extent to which they appealed to histo-
ry, they grounded these appeals in previous historical discussions.76 In Walz, Brennan issued
a concurring opinion in which he agreed with the majority that it is constitutionally permissi-
ble to exempt churches from certain taxes.77 In explaining this relatively rare accomodationist
vote, Brennan seemed to abandon Everson’s tenet that the only Founders who matter are
Jefferson and Madison. Of his ten references to history, only two are to these men.78 Douglas,
dissenting in Walz, would have none of this — of Douglas’s eleven appeals to history, all are to
James Madison.79 And to make sure no one missed Madison’s significance he, like Rutledge in
Everson, included as an appendix to his opinion a copy of Memorial and Remonstrance.80
During the 1960s and 1970s, no Justice offered an extensive or detailed rejection of Everson’s
history, but it was occasionally challenged. For instance, Justice Harlan, in his solo dissent in
Flast v. Cohen,81 noted “that the First Amendment was not intended simply to enact the terms
of Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance.”82 More fundamentally, in Nyquist, Justice White
contended that “one cannot seriously believe that the history of the First Amendment fur-
nishes unequivocal answers to many of the fundamental issues of church–state relations.”83
Few Justices have accepted White’s proposition, although he religiously followed it himself,
appealing to history only one time in his twenty-three Religion Clause case opinions.
In the richest historical opinion since Brennan’s concurrence in Schempp, Chief Justice
Burger made a sweeping argument to uphold the constitutionality of legislative chaplains and
prayer in Marsh v. Chambers.84 Drawing from a range of documents, actions, and Founders,
Burger contended that legislative chaplains and prayer were widespread in the Founding
era.85 Moreover, he emphasized that the very men who drafted and approved the First
Amendment also agreed to hire legislative chaplains and approved of legislative prayer.86
Even in the case of Virginia, he noted that the state continued the “practice of opening legisla-
tive sessions with prayer.”87
Altogether Burger made twenty-five distinct appeals to history in Marsh, although only one
of these appeals was to Madison and he did not mention Jefferson at all. By virtually ignoring
Madison and Jefferson, he implicitly challenged Everson’s premise that these two men repre-
sent all of the Founders. Significantly, Burger did not attack the Court’s Establishment Clause
jurisprudence in general but merely focused on the constitutionality of the law in question. A
broad challenge to the reign of Eversonwould have to wait for another two years.
Brennan, dissenting in Marsh, seemed to acknowledge that Everson’s account of history
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was in jeopardy. After criticizing Burger for not relying on the legislative history of the
Establishment Clause (even though few Justices have discussed its legislative history), he dis-
missed his reliance on the actions of the First Congress, arguing that they may not have re-
flected the Founders’ views on church and state.88 Instead, he suggested that “the passions
and exigencies of the moment, the pressure of constituents and colleagues, and the press of
business” may have led them to pass legislation that violated principles enshrined in the
Establishment Clause.89 As evidence he pointed to Madison, who “voted for the bill authoriz-
ing the payment of the first congressional chaplains” but “later expressed the view that the
practice was unconstitutional.”90 Brennan did not explain why Madison’s unpublished reflec-
tions written at least twenty-four years after his vote should be preferred to Congress’s over-
whelming support of the practice, but the conclusion makes some sense in light of Everson’s
premise that Madison and Jefferson speak for the Founders. Brennan’s commitment to this
premise is suggested as well by the fact that four of his seven appeals to history are to these
men and that he appealed to no other Founder.
Brennan’s opinion did not completely reject the use of history for Establishment Clause ju-
risprudence, but it significantly downplayed its relevance. Critically for our purposes,
Brennan contended:
[T]he argument tendered by the Court is misguided because the Constitution is not
a static document whose meaning on every detail is fixed for all time by the life ex-
perience of the Framers. We have recognized in a wide variety of constitutional
contexts that the practices that were in place at the time any particular guarantee
was enacted into the Constitution do not necessarily fix forever the meaning of
that guarantee. To be truly faithful to the Framers, “our use of the history of their
time must limit itself to broad purposes, not specific practices.” Our primary task
must be to translate “the majestic generalities of the Bill of Rights, conceived as
part of the pattern of liberal government in the eighteenth century, into concrete
restraints on officials dealing with the problems of the twentieth century….”91
In this passage, Brennan moved significantly beyond his concurrence in Schempp to more
aggressively contend that the Constitution is a living document that must change with the
times — an argument that he fleshed out in the mid-1980s.92 Although he conceded that histo-
ry is not irrelevant for constitutional interpretation, his use of it fell off dramatically in his re-
maining eleven Religion Clause opinions, which contain an average of only 0.8 appeals per
opinion. This contrasts with his first 19 opinions where he appealed to history 69 times with
an average of 3.6 appeals per case. Clearly something had changed.
4. Wallace to Cutter
In Everson, the Court embraced a syllogism that defined its Religion Clause jurisprudence —
especially in Establishment Clause cases — for almost forty years. Although this syllogism
was occasionally criticized — either tacitly or in short, separate opinions by individual
Justices — it did not receive a sustained and substantial challenge until Justice Rehnquist’s
dissenting opinion in Wallace v. Jaffree.93 In this case Justice Stevens, for the majority, declared
Alabama’s moment of silence law to be unconstitutional.94 He conceded that there is evidence
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that the Founders did not oppose government support of general Christian practices.95
However, he contended that the Court had rejected the Founders’ views in favor of a broader
conception of religious liberty.96 Ironically, he supported this proposition with citations to
Everson and Schempp (cases that rely heavily on history) and quotations from Madison’s
Memorial and Remonstrance.97 Similarly, Justice O’Connor, in her concurring opinion, ac-
knowledged the value of using history to illuminate the Religion Clause but argued that
“[w]hen the intent of the Framers is unclear, I believe we must employ both history and rea-
son in our analysis.”98
Rehnquist, in his dissenting opinion, unequivocally endorsed the first premise of Everson’s
syllogism: “The true meaning of the Establishment Clause can only be seen in its history….
As drafters of our Bill of Rights, the Framers inscribed the principles that control today.”99
From his perspective, the problem was not with relying on history but that “[t]here is simply
no historical foundation for the proposition that the Framers intended to build the ‘wall of
separation’ that was constitutionalized in Everson.”100 In short, according to Rehnquist, the
critical error in the Court’s approach to history was its proclivity to focus on a few select docu-
ments written by Madison and Jefferson — particularly Jefferson’s letter to the Danbury
Baptists — rather than the Founders more generally.101
Three other Religion Clause opinions contain more appeals to history than Rehnquist’s dis-
sent in Wallace, but none come close to drawing from as many different sources. Among
other things, Rehnquist leads his readers through the most extensive discussion to date of the
framing of the First Amendment’s Religion Clause. In doing so, and in setting the broader
context by examining in detail the actions of the First Congress, he discussed a more diverse
group of Founders than any other Religion Clause opinion ever written. Throughout his dis-
sent he appealed to the beliefs or actions of twelve different Founders — including indis-
putably significant ones such as John Adams and George Washington (who had collectively
been cited in only five Religion Clause opinions)102 and important but neglected Founders
such as Roger Sherman, Elias Boudinot, and Daniel Carroll.103 Rehnquist did appeal to
Madison nine different times, but never to his Memorial and Remonstrance.
Rehnquist agreed with Everson’s premise that history is relevant for interpreting the
Religion Clause, but he disagreed with Black’s and Rutledge’s interpretations of history.
Recognizing that he was challenging almost forty years of precedents, he poignantly noted
that “stare decisismay bind courts as to matters of law, but it cannot bind them as to matters of
history.”104 To be faithful to this history, he concluded, the Court should abandon attempts to
create a wall of separation between church and state and return to the Framers’ understand-
ing that the Establishment Clause merely prohibits the designation of a “national” church or
the preferential treatment of one religious denomination or sect over others.105
Given Rehnquist’s assault on the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence, it is interest-
ing that no Justice responded to his arguments until County of Allegheny v. ACLU.106 In his
 majority opinion upholding one religious display on public land and striking down another,
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Justice Blackmun acknowledged that the Founders may not have found such displays to be
problematic.107 Indeed, he noted that:
[P]erhaps in the early days of the Republic [the words of the Religion Clause] were
understood to protect only the diversity within Christianity, but today they are rec-
ognized as guaranteeing religious liberty and equality to “the infidel, the atheist, or
the adherent of a non-Christian faith such as Islam or Judaism.”108
Blackmun’s strategy, apparently, was to paint the Founders’ understanding of religious lib-
erty as being so limited as to be unpalatable. Accordingly, he rejected Rehnquist’s interpreta-
tion that they desired neutrality with respect to the support of religion and pointed out that:
[T]he history of this Nation, it is perhaps sad to say, contains numerous examples
of official acts that endorsed Christianity specifically…. Some of these examples
date back to the Founding of the Republic, but this heritage of official discrimina-
tion against non-Christians has no place in the jurisprudence of the Establishment
Clause.109
Thus, Blackmun concluded, in spite of the Founders’ views, “the bedrock Establishment
Clause principle [is] that, regardless of history, government may not demonstrate a prefer-
ence for a particular faith.”110
Blackmun, following Brennan’s lead, largely abandoned the use of history in Religion Clause
cases. Justice O’Connor, in her concurring opinion, suggested something similar.111 However,
Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion, made several general appeals to the Founders to
support his separationist conclusion.112 Kennedy, in a dissent joined by Rehnquist, White, and
Scalia, reiterated Rehnquist’s argument that the Religion Clause should be informed by the
Founders’ intent.113 He argued that when one looks at a broad range of Founders it becomes
evident that their chief concern was prohibiting coercion or favoritism in matters of religion.114
In his view:
[T]he principles of the Establishment Clause and our Nation’s historic traditions of
diversity and pluralism allow communities to make reasonable judgments respect-
ing the accommodation or acknowledgement of holidays with both cultural and re-
ligious aspects. No constitutional violation occurs when they do so by displaying a
symbol of the holiday’s religious origins.115
In Allegheny, Kennedy appealed to history to support religious displays on public land, but
in Lee v. Weisman116 he did the same to prohibit prayer at public school graduation exercises.
The critical distinction for Kennedy was an element of coercion that was present in Lee but
absent in Allegheny.117 Justice Blackmun, apparently regretting his retreat from history in
Allegheny, offered a substantial defense of Everson’s logic and history.118 Not surprisingly, in
doing so he emphasized, in practice if not by argument, the priority of Thomas Jefferson,
James Madison, and Roger Williams, to whom he appealed a total of six times out of a total of
nine historical appeals.119
Lee is most notable for Justice Souter’s remarkable effort to restate Everson’s argument on a
wider evidentiary base. His concurring opinion is also significant as the first explicit reply to
Rehnquist’s dissent in Wallace.120 In it, he conceded that Rehnquist and others have made a
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case for the nonpreferentialist position but contended that “it is not so convincing as to warrant
reconsideration of our settled law; indeed, I find in the history of the Clause’s textual develop-
ment a more powerful argument supporting the Court’s jurisprudence following Everson.”121
Souter’s concurrence provides a detailed discussion of the legislative history of the First
Amendment, and he concluded, contrary to Rehnquist, that it requires the separation of
church and state.122 Throughout his opinion, Souter made numerous broad appeals to the
Framers in general. But when he turned to specific Founders to support his position, he ap-
pealed to Madison seventeen times, Jefferson seven times, and all other Founders twice. To
his credit, Souter acknowledged that some of Madison’s and Jefferson’s actions work against
his argument, such as the latter’s treaty with the Kaskaskia Indians.123 His response to such
actions, following Brennan’s earlier lead, is that they “prove only that public officials, no mat-
ter when they serve, can turn a blind eye to constitutional principle.”124
Souter contended that history supports a separationist reading of the First Amendment’s
Establishment Clause, but he was clearly aware that the argument was weaker than it was
portrayed in Everson. Central to his conclusion, as suggested by the passage quoted above and
as articulated elsewhere in the opinion, is that the accomodationists’ arguments are not so
powerful as to require the Court to rethink its precedents.125
Justice Scalia, in a dissent joined by Rehnquist, White, and Thomas, offered a response to
Souter. He began by forcefully reminding his fellow Justices that they have time and time
again agreed that “our interpretation of the Establishment Clause should ‘comport with what
history reveals was the contemporaneous understanding of its guarantees.’”126 He proceeded
to document from a variety of sources that “[t]he history and tradition of our Nation are replete
with public ceremonies featuring prayers of thanksgiving and petition.”127 Even Jefferson and
Madison, he highlighted, invoked God in their inaugural addresses.128 Like Kennedy in both
Allegheny and Lee, Scalia contended that the Establishment Clause is intended merely to pro-
hibit coercion in religion, and he argued that there is no coercion in having a prayer at a vol-
untary high school graduation.129
Having reinvigorated historical debates about the Establishment Clause, Justice Souter also
helped ignite a similar debate with respect to the Free Exercise Clause. As we have seen,
Justices have appealed to history to shine light on this Clause, but they have done so with sig-
nificantly less regularity than they have in Establishment Clause cases. In Employment
Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith,130 Scalia’s majority opinion signifi-
cantly reduced the degree to which the Free Exercise Clause protects actions based on reli-
gious conviction (at least according to many jurists and scholars).131 In Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,132 Justice Souter, in his concurring opinion, pointed out that
Scalia had reduced the vitality of the Free Exercise Clause without considering “the original
meaning of the Free Exercise Clause.”133 He then suggested that “when the opportunity to re-
examine Smith presents itself, we may consider recent scholarship raising serious questions
about the Smith rule’s consonance with the original understanding and purpose of the Free
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Exercise Clause.”134 He made it clear that if Smith departs from the original understanding of
the Clause, this would be a “powerful reason” to overturn the case. 135
Justice O’Connor accepted Souter’s invitation to examine the “original understanding” of
the Free Exercise Clause in her dissenting opinion in City of Boerne v. Flores.136 Specifically,
she announced, “I examine here the early American tradition of religious free exercise to gain
insight into the original understanding of the Free Exercise Clause.”137 In one of the richest
historical opinions to date, and the richest ever with respect to a Free Exercise Clause case,
O’Connor offered a sweeping examination of Founding era history to support her thesis that
the “drafters and ratifiers more likely viewed the Free Exercise Clause as a guarantee that gov-
ernment may not unnecessarily hinder believers from freely practicing their religion.”138 To
support her claim, she quoted at some length numerous colonial and Founding era laws and
constitutions.139 Although they figure less prominently than in many Establishment Clause
cases, Jefferson and Madison play significant roles in her argument, particularly Madison’s
contributions to the Virginia Declaration of Rights, Madison’s authorship of Memorial and
Remonstrance, and Jefferson’s Bill for Establishing Religious Liberty.140
In his concurring opinion, Scalia rejected O’Connor’s contention “that historical materials
support a result contrary to the one reached in [Smith].”141 Scalia questioned neither the rele-
vance of history nor the texts to which O’Connor appealed. Rather, he challenged her inter-
pretation of these documents, arguing that the Founders’ support of religious liberty did not
include the right to refuse to obey generally applicable laws unless a legislature explicitly
sanctioned an exemption.142
Although Justice O’Connor is no longer on the Court, history suggests that debates over
the original intentions of the Founders regarding the Free Exercise Clause will continue and
expand. As we have seen, Justices have spilled a great deal of ink debating the Founders’
views of the Establishment Clause, and these disagreements show little sign of abating. Indeed,
recent Justices have evidenced an inclination to expand these debates. For instance, Justice
Thomas, in his concurring opinion in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia,143
criticized the tendency of some Justices to rely on the views of James Madison — noting
poignantly that “the views of one man do not establish the original understanding of the First
Amendment.”144 As well, he aggressively challenged the view that Madison favored the strict
separation of church and state.145
The significance of history for contemporary Religion Clause jurisprudence is perhaps best
demonstrated by the recent Ten Commandment cases Van Orden v. Perry,146 and McCreary
County v. ACLU of Kentucky.147 Authors of seven of the ten opinions in these cases collectively
appealed to history sixty-two times.148 Four of these seven opinions opposed displays of the
Ten Commandments on public property, and the Justices authoring them made thirty-three
appeals to history, sixteen of which (almost fifty percent) were to Jefferson and Madison.149
On the other hand, the three Justices appealing to history who favored allowing such displays
made twenty-nine historical references, of which only four were to Jefferson and Madison
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(about seven percent of the total).150
Justice Stevens, in a dissenting opinion in Van Orden joined by Justice Ginsburg (one of the
two Justices in the last half-century who has never appealed to history in a Religion Clause
opinion),151 criticized the majority’s use of history. Throughout his opinion, he reiterated
 traditional separationist arguments, including the idea that “the widely divergent views es-
poused by the leaders of our Founding era plainly reveal [that] the historical record of the
preincorporation Establishment Clause is too indeterminate to serve as an interpretive North
Star.”152 Implicitly acknowledging that accomodationists can marshal a large amount of evidence,
he contended that such “early religious statements and proclamations made by the Founders
is also problematic because those views were not espoused at the Constitutional Convention
of 1787 nor enshrined in the Constitution’s text.”153 As well, he took the accomodationists to
task for neglecting the views of important Founders, notably Madison and Jefferson, to whom
he appeals eight times to shine light on the meaning of the Establishment Clause.154
Like Justice Blackmun in Allegheny, Stevens conceded that “the requirement that govern-
ment must remain neutral between religion and irreligion would have seemed foreign to
some of the Framers; so too would a requirement of neutrality between Jews and Christians.”155
The word “some” in this passage could be taken to imply that he thinks only a few Founders
believed this, but his claim a few sentences later that “we are not bound by the Framers’ ex-
pectations — we are bound by the legal principles they enshrined in our Constitution”156
 suggests otherwise. Although Stevens’s opinion still has an element of an appeal to the “legal
principle” embraced by the Founders, it is clear that in his mind these principles are only to
be understood in light of Jefferson’s and Madison’s vision of how church and state should be
related. In her concurring opinion in McCreary, Justice O’Connor emphasized this point, not-
ing that the Court’s “guiding principle has been James Madison’s — that ‘[t]he Religion …  of
every man must be left to the conviction and conscience of every man.’”157
Justice Scalia’s dissent in McCreary challenges Stevens’s claim that accomodationist senti-
ment and actions were “idiosyncratic,” arguing instead that “they reflected the beliefs of the
period.”158 Appealing to a range of Founders, documents, and actions, he added a twist to the
accomodationist argument by pointing out that his opinion primarily relies on
[O]fficial acts and official proclamations of the United States or of the component
branches of its Government, including the First Congress’s beginning of the tradi-
tion of legislative prayer to God, its appointment of congressional chaplains, its
legislative proposal of a Thanksgiving Proclamation, and its reenactment of the
Northwest Territory Ordinance; our first President’s issuance of a Thanksgiving
Proclamation; and invocation of God at the opening of sessions of the Supreme
Court.159
Notably, Scalia appeals to the actions and addresses of President Washington seven times —
a record number of appeals in a single opinion to any Founder other than Jefferson or Madison.
One implication of Scalia’s suggestion that “official acts and official proclamations” of fed-
eral officials are more important than the thoughts and deeds of private or state officials is
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that Everson’s reliance on documents penned by Jefferson and Madison before the creation of
the Bill of Rights (e.g., Memorial and Remonstrance (1785) and Bill for Religious Liberty (1786))
or afterward when Madison was a private citizen (e.g., his Detached Memoranda (c. 1817)) is
problematic. That Scalia had Everson in mind is evident when, early in his opinion, he quoted
Edward S. Corwin’s famous observation that the Court had been “sold …  a bill of goods” in
Everson.160
Cutter v. Wilkinson,161 the last Religion Clause opinion considered in this study, contains a
historical argument by Justice Thomas that could have even more profound implications
than that made by Scalia in McCreary. In his concurring opinion, Thomas reiterated and ex-
plained his controversial claim that “a proper historical understanding” of the Establishment
Clause should lead the Court to understand it as a “federalism provision.”162 In concurring
opinions in Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow163 and Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,164 he
had earlier contended the primary purpose of the Establishment Clause was to protect “state
establishments from federal interference” and as such “it makes little sense to incorporate the
Establishment Clause.”165 In Cutter, he was forced to clarify his argument, rejecting Ohio’s
contention that it prohibited “Congress from legislating on religion generally.”166 Instead, he
concluded that it merely prohibited “legislation respecting coercive state establishments.”167
Justices have hesitated to accept Thomas’s 2004 invitation in Newdow to “begin the process
of rethinking the Establishment Clause” based on a more accurate account of the history of
the Founding era.168 At least one Justice has refused, not because he thinks it is wrong as a
matter of history, but because of its consequences. In his dissenting opinion in Van Orden,
Justice Stevens conceded that constricting “the reach of the Establishment Clause to the
views of the Founders” would “leave us with an unincorporated constitutional provision,” but
he rejected this outcome as “unpalatable.”169
Justice Stevens’s opinions in recent Religion Clause cases often, but not always, have the
virtue of clearly rejecting the relevance of history for interpreting the Establishment Clause.
Few Justices, notably Blackmun, Douglas, and, to a lesser extent, Brennan, have joined him
in doing this. Others, including Justices Ginsburg, Marshall, and White, have perhaps implic-
itly endorsed this approach through their neglect of history. However, as shown above, most
Justices have regularly used history to help them interpret the Religion Clause.
Conclusion
The current Court contains an interesting mix of views on the propriety of using history to
 interpret the Religion Clause and, where applicable, the requirements of this history. On
 balance, Justices Stevens and Ginsburg fairly consistently reject the use of history and sup-
port liberal outcomes; Justices Souter and Breyer often use history to support liberal out-
comes; Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy regularly use history to support conservative
outcomes; and Justices Roberts and Alito have yet to vote on a Religion Clause case. Moreover,
Scalia and Thomas have made historical arguments that could radically change the Court’s
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. It is perhaps therefore an opportune time for Justices
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and scholars to reconsider the relevance or irrelevance of history for Religion Clause jurispru-
dence. Understanding how Justices have used history in previous cases may help answer the
question of how they should use it in the future — or if they should use it at all.
In this essay, I have shown that the vast majority of Justices who have written Religion
Clause opinions have used history to shine light upon its meaning. This has been particularly
true with respect to Establishment Clause jurisprudence, and appeals to history in this area of
law have been steady throughout the Court’s cases. The Court has been far less likely to appeal
to history to illuminate the Free Exercise Clause, but recent opinions suggest that history may
become increasingly important for understanding this Clause. As well, the data show that lib-
eral Justices are slightly more likely to appeal to history than conservative Justices, although
these Justices do not necessarily appeal to the same history.
I have not attempted to resolve broader theoretical questions about the appropriateness of
Justices appealing to history, and I have not evaluated the accuracy of their use of history.
Cynics might reply that such questions are meaningless because Justices simply reach con-
clusions they desire and then use history to justify them. A slightly less cynical observer
might suggest that the policy preferences of Justices color their understanding of history so
that they give greater weight to evidence that supports their desired outcomes. It is true that
there is no such thing as historical objectivity, but as Bernard Bailyn has written, “the fact that
there is no such thing as perfect antisepsis does not mean that one might as well do brain sur-
gery in a sewer.”170 Some historical arguments are better than others, and if it is appropriate to
interpret the First Amendment in light of its “generating history,” it is reasonable to expect
Justices to make an effort to get that history right.
This is not the place to evaluate the Court’s use of history throughout the entirety of its
Religion Clause jurisprudence, but I will suggest that the syllogism developed by Black and
Rutledge in Everson is flawed. Simply put, relying on the views of Jefferson and Madison to
represent the Founders’ intent is bad history.171 Both were, to be sure, important Founders,
and if Jefferson was not involved in writing or ratifying the First Amendment, arguably no
single American played a more significant role in drafting it than Madison. Yet the First
Amendment did not spring fully clothed from Madison’s mind like Athena from Zeus’s head.
Madison’s proposals were revised significantly in the House of Representatives, changed by
the Senate and Conference Committee, agreed to by Congress, and ratified (initially) by nine
state legislatures. Surely any attempt to delineate the meaning of this critical Amendment
must go beyond the views of two Founders — no matter how prominent.
When Justices have looked beyond the drafting and ratification of the First Amendment to
cast light on its meaning, many have still found it difficult to escape the gravitational attrac-
tion of Madison and Jefferson. When they consider pre-amendment history, they often ap-
peal to Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance (1785) and Jefferson’s Bill for Religious Liberty
(1786), and when they turn to post-amendment history, they appeal to Jefferson’s letter to the
Danbury Baptist (1802) and Madison’s Detached Memoranda (c. 1817). Although these docu-
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ments are undoubtedly important, it is not self-evident that they reflect the views of the men
who wrote and ratified the First Amendment.
An accurate account of the “generating history” of the First Amendment necessarily in-
volves careful consideration of the debates over it in Congress and the state ratifying conven-
tions. Records of these debates are notoriously scanty, but many of the men involved in them
reveal their views of the proper relation between church and state elsewhere. An obvious
place to begin this investigation is with actions of the first Congress, but a thorough study
would go beyond this to subsequent Congresses, the other branches of the federal govern-
ment, and the state legislatures.172 In looking at the latter, Justices should move beyond their
almost singular focus on Virginia to consider similar debates in other states. And if Justices
conclude that they should focus only on the thoughts and deeds of prominent Americans,
surely they should consider the views of men such as George Washington, John Adams,
James Wilson, Roger Sherman, John Witherspoon, and John Jay, in addition to Thomas
Jefferson and James Madison.173
As indicated by the above paragraph, carefully exploring the history of the First Amend -
ment is hard work, and perhaps Justices simply do not have the time to do it well. But as
Michael Flaherty says with respect to legal theorists, this is no excuse for “habits of poorly
supported generalization — which at times fall below even the standards of undergraduate
history writing.174 At a minimum, he contends that legal theorists should take advantage of
“the often tedious work that keeps historians employed.”175 Justice Souter makes a similar
claim with respect to Justices in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah.176 Of
course Justices cannot be expected to keep abreast with every minor development in the lit-
erature on religious liberty and church–state relations in the Founding era, but they clearly
should do more than simply rely on Everson’s account of this history.
A cursory reading of Religion Clause cases reveals that Justices do in fact use academic
scholarship to support their Religion Clause opinions. Selected examples include works by
James M. O’Neill,177 Leo Pfeffer,178 Robert Cord,179 Leonard Levy,180 Michael McConnell,181 and
Akhil Amar.182 It goes without saying that influence is not always reflected in the number of
citations a work receives in Supreme Court opinions (for instance, Corwin’s famous and influ-
ential response to Everson has been cited in only one Religion Clause case — and this more
than a half a century after it was written).183
Proposals that Justices seriously consider academic scholarship raise questions about how
they have used such scholarship in the past. Do Justices use the best scholarship available?
Do they consider a range of scholarship, or do separationist Justices simply cite separationist
works and accomodationist Justices accomodationist works? Undoubtedly Justices appeal to
books and essays simply because they support their desired outcomes — and of course citations
may only be padding added by law clerks. Yet it is not unreasonable to assume that some arti-
cles and books have changed the way Justices view the First Amendment. Studying these issues
in the context of the information provided in this essay could help resolve questions about the
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impact of academic scholarship on the Supreme Court’s Religion Clause jurisprudence.
More broadly, this essay suggests lessons for how scholars might evaluate the use of history
by Supreme Court Justices. Most literature on this subject relies on broad, unsupported gen-
eralizations about Justices’ use of history or careful consideration of only a handful of cases. If
studies such as this one are replicated for other areas of law, students of the Court will be able
to better answer questions about whether Justices should use history to help them interpret
the Constitution and the degree to which they are good historians.
In this essay, I have systematically investigated how Justices have used history in Religion
Clause cases. I have shown that both liberal and conservative Justices often appeal to history
to help them interpret the Religion Clauses, especially the Establishment Clause. I have not
addressed the propriety of using history in this way, but I have suggested that if Justices are
going to use history they should use good history. In the words of Edward S. Corwin, “the
Court has the right to make history …  but it has no right to make it up.”184
Appendix
List of Religion Clause Cases Considered in this Study
The United States Supreme Court has decided 115 cases in which at least four Justices consid-
ered the Free Exercise or Establishment Clauses (or both) to raise substantial issues. This
count does not include cases in which religion plays a significant role but were decided upon
other constitutional or statutory grounds. Nor does it include cases where a Religion Clause
claim is dismissed without serious consideration. Of these 115 cases, 60 primarily involved
the Establishment Clause, 44 the Free Exercise Clause, and 11 concern both clauses:
1. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (Free Exercise Clause).
2. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890) (Both Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses).
3. Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890)
(Free Exercise Clause).
4. Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899) (Establishment Clause).
5. Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908) (Establishment Clause).
6. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (Free Exercise Clause).
7. Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) (Free Exercise Clause).
8. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (Free Exercise Clause).
9. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (Free Exercise Clause).
10. Jones v. City of Opelika (I), 316 U.S. 584 (1942) (Free Exercise Clause).
11. Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943) (Free Exercise Clause).
12. Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418 (1943) (Free Exercise Clause).
13. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (Free Exercise Clause).
14. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (Free Exercise Clause).
15. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (Free Exercise Clause).
16. Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944) (Free Exercise Clause).
17. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944) (Free Exercise Clause).
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18. In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945) (Free Exercise Clause).
19. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (Free Exercise Clause).
20. Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S. 517 (1946) (Free Exercise Clause).
21. Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946) (Free Exercise Clause).
22. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (Establishment Clause).
23. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (Establishment Clause).
24. Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951) (Free Exercise Clause).
25. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (Establishment Clause).
26. Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952) (Free Exercise Clause).
27. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953) (Free Exercise Clause).
28. Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953) (Free Exercise Clause).
29. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (Establishment Clause).
30. Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961) (Establishment
Clause).
31. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (Free Exercise Clause).
32. Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market of Massachusetts, Inc., 366 U.S. 617 (1961) (Both
Establishment and Free Exercise Clause).
33. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (Establishment Clause).
34. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (Establishment Clause).
35. Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (Establishment Clause).
36. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (Free Exercise Clause).
37. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (Establishment Clause).
38. Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (Establishment Clause).
39. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (Establishment Clause).
40. Presbyterian Church v. Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969) (Free
Exercise Clause).
41. Walz v. Tax Commission of New York City, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (Establishment Clause).
42. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (Establishment and Free Exercise Clause).
43. Lemon v. Kurtzman (I), 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (Establishment Clause).
44. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (Establishment Clause).
45. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972) (Free Exercise Clause).
46. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (Free Exercise Clause).
47. Lemon v. Kurtzman (II), 411 U.S. 192 (1973) (Establishment Clause).
48. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973) (Establishment and Free Exercise Clause).
49. Levitt v. Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973)
(Establishment Clause).
50. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973) (Establishment Clause).
51. Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973)
(Establishment Clause).
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52. Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973) (Establishment Clause).
53. Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974) (Free Exercise Clause).
54. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (Establishment Clause).
55. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976) (Free Exercise Clause).
56. Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976) (Establishment Clause).
57. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (Establishment Clause).
58. New York v. Cathedral Academy, 434 U.S. 125 (1977) (Establishment Clause).
59. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (Free Exercise Clause).
60. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979) (Free Exercise Clause).
61. Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980)
(Establishment Clause).
62. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (Establishment Clause).
63. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (Establishment Clause).
64. Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (Establishment and Free Exercise Clause).
65. Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (Free
Exercise Clause).
66. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (Establishment and Free Exercise Clause).
67. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464 (1982) (Establishment Clause).
68. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (Free Exercise Clause).
69. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982)(Establishment Clause).
70. Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982) (Establishment Clause).
71. Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (Establishment and Free Exercise
Clause).
72. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (Establishment Clause).
73. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (Establishment Clause).
74. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (Establishment Clause).
75. Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985) (Establishment
and Free Exercise Clause).
76. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (Establishment Clause).
77. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985) (Establishment Clause).
78. School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (Establishment Clause).
79. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) (Establishment Clause).
80. Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986)
(Establishment Clause).
81. Bender v. Williamsport Area School District, 475 U.S. 534 (1986) (Establishment Clause).
82. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (Free Exercise Clause).
83. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (Free Exercise Clause).
84. Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 477 U.S. 619 (1986)
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(Establishment and Free Exercise Clause).
85. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission of Florida, 480 U.S. 136 (1987) (Free Exercise
Clause).
86. O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (Free Exercise Clause).
87. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (Establishment Clause).
88. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483
U.S. 327 (1987) (Establishment Clause).
89. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protection Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (Free Exercise Clause).
90. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988) (Establishment Clause).
91. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (Establishment Clause).
92. Frazee v. Illinois Department of Employment Security, 489 U.S. 829 (1989) (Free Exercise
Clause).
93. Hernandez v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680 (1989) (Establishment and
Free Exercise Clause).
94. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (Establishment Clause).
95. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization of California, 493 U.S. 378 (1990)
(Establishment and Free Exercise Clause).
96. Employment Division, Department of Human Resouces of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990) (Free Exercise Clause).
97. Board of Education v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (Establishment Clause).
98. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (Establishment Clause).
99. Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, 508 U.S. 384 (1993)
(Establishment Clause).
100.Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (Free Exercise
Clause).
101.Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District, 509 U.S. 1 (1993) (Establishment Clause).
102.Board of Education v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994) (Establishment Clause).
103.Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995) (Establishment Clause).
104.Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995)
(Establishment Clause).
105.Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (Establishment Clause).
106.City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (Free Exercise Clause).
107.Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (Establishment Clause).
108.Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (Establishment Clause).
109.Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 98 (2001) (Establishment Clause).
110.Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002)
(Free Exercise Clause).
111. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (Establishment Clause).
112.Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004) (Free Exercise Clause).
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113.Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005) (Establishment Clause).
114.Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (Establishment Clause).
115.McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (Establishment Clause).
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1 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
2 Id. at 33 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
3 By “history,” I mean general history that is external to the law, not legal history that concerns the particular back-
ground of a case, legal precedents, or the legislative history of a statute. Even more specifically, I am concerned with
the Justices’ use of history to shine light on the meaning of the Religion Clause, as opposed to the use of history to il-
luminate general American practices or mores. An example of the latter use of history is Justice Stewart’s dissent in
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 446 (1962) (Stewart, J., dissenting), where he provided a lengthy list of examples to show
that prayer has long been a part of American public life. For further elaboration on the distinction between general
and legal history, see CHARLES A. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY 20-28 (1969); Alfred H. Kelly,
Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 119, 119-32. For discussion and criticism of the Court’s use of
history, see MILLER, supra; Kelly, supra; William M. Wiecek, Clio as Hostage: The United States Supreme Court and the
Uses of History, 24 CAL. W. L. REV. 227 (1988); and John G. Wofford, The Blinding Light: The Uses of History in
Constitutional Interpretation, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 502 (1964).
Debates about the relevance of history are closely related to, and often overlap with, debates about originalism.
See, for instance, the well-known exchange between Edwin Meese and William J. Brennan in EDWIN MEESE III ET AL.,
THE GREAT DEBATE: INTERPRETING OUR WRITTEN CONSTITUTION 1-25 (1986). DENNIS J. GOLDFORD, THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION AND THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINALISM (2005) discusses much of the literature published on this subject since
the Meese–Brennan exchange.
4 The Court’s use of history in Religion Clause cases has often been critiqued. SeeMARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN
AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 1-31, 149-76 (1965); Edward S.
Corwin, The Supreme Court as National School Board, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3 (1949); John Phillip Reid, Law and
History, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 193, 220 (1993) (“There are no other decisions dealing with American constitutional law
that owe more to violations of the canons of historical interpretation than those dealing with the establishment and
free exercise of religion.”). A good overview of this literature is provided by Daniel L. Dreisbach, Everson and the
Command of History: The Supreme Court, Lessons in History, and the Church-State Debate in America, in EVERSON
REVISITED: RELIGION, EDUCATION, AND LAW AT THE CROSSROADS 23-58 (Jo Renée Formicola & Hubert Morken eds., 1997).
5 For an example of an article that makes a number of unsubstantiated claims about the Court’s use of history in
Religion Clause cases, see David Reiss, Jefferson and Madison as Icons in Judicial History: A Study of Religion Clause
Jurisprudence, 61 MD. L. REV. 94 (2002). For a good example of an article that provides careful consideration of the
Court’s use of history in a select number of Religion Clause cases, see John E. Joiner, Note, A Page of History or a
Volume of Logic?: Reassessing the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 507 (1996).
The most thorough and broad examination of the Court’s use of history in Religion Clause cases is ROBERT L. CORD,
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION (1982).
Martin S. Flaherty notes that “habits of poorly supported generalization — which at times fall below even the stan-
dards of undergraduate history — pervade the work of many of the most rigorous theorists when they invoke the past
to talk about the Constitution.” Martin S. Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L.
REV. 523, 526 (1995).
6 Most lists of Religion Clause cases contain numerous cases that were not decided upon either Establishment or Free
Exercise grounds. I combined several lists and read through each case, eliminating cases where fewer than four
Justices considered one of the Religion Clauses to raise substantive issues. I adopted this “rule of four” because I
wanted to include only cases where at least a substantial minority of Justices thought the case should be determined
on Religion Clause grounds. This rule led me to exclude cases like United States v. American Friends Service Committee,
419 U.S. 7 (1974), and Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004), where only one and three
Justices, respectively, believed the cases should be decided on the basis of the Free Exercise or Establishment Clause.
General lists of Supreme Court cases involving religion include JOHN WITTE, JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT 272-303 (2d ed. 2005) and CARL H. ESBECK, U.S. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS RELATING TO
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND CHURCH–STATE RELATIONS (the January 2006 version was generously provided to me by the au-
thor). Witte’s list contains 190 cases and Esbeck’s contains 290. My list of 115 cases is in the Appendix.
7 For instance, it does not include cases involving church property that are decided upon non-Religion Clause
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grounds, e.g., Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1871); significant religious claims that are decided upon statutory grounds,
e.g.,United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); and cases involving religious speech if the decision is based on free-
dom of speech or press, e.g., Lee v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 505 U.S. 830 (1992).
8 For example, in the Selective Draft Law Cases Chief Justice Edward White wrote in his majority opinion that “we
pass without anything but statement the proposition that an establishment of a religion or an interference with the
free exercise thereof repugnant to the First Amendment resulted from the exemption clauses of the act to which we
at the outset referred, because we think its unsoundness is too apparent to require us to do more.” Arver v. United
States, 245 U.S. 366, 389-90 (1918). Nor do I include cases in which petitions for certiorari are denied or that are sum-
marily affirmed, even if the cases involve Religion Clause issues. E.g., Heisey v. County of Alameda, 352 U.S. 921
(1956) (mem.), denying cert. to Lundberg v. County of Alameda, 298 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1956); Luetkemeyer v. Kaufmann, 419
U.S. 888 (1974) (mem.), aff’g 364 F. Supp. 376 (W.D. Mo. 1973).
9 Only cases where at least four members of the Court believed the case involves significant Establishment and Free
Exercise issues are classified as “both.” As suggested in note 4, supra, if Justices mention but do not treat seriously is-
sues raised by one of the Clauses, the case is not counted as involving that Clause. See, for example, Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s treatment of the Establishment Clause claim in Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S 712, 719 (2004).
10 I include in this number opinions of Justices who simply concur or dissent without opinion or who explicitly deny
that the case should be decided upon Religion Clause grounds.
11 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1947) (footnotes omitted).
12 Id. at 13.
13 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
14 544 U.S. 709 (2005).
15 If the author of an opinion clearly associates a statute with someone’s name (e.g., “Thomas Jefferson’s Virginia
Statute for Religious Liberty”), I consider the phrase to be an appeal to the person. However, if the bill is referred to
without a name (e.g., “Virginia Statute for Religious Liberty”), I count it as an appeal to “context.” I have not catego-
rized appeals to specific laws, constitutional provisions, and documents. Books and essays that trace the influence of
individual texts include DANIEL L. DREISBACH, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE WALL OF SEPARATION BETWEEN CHURCH AND
STATE 97-106 (2002) and Cushing Strout, Jeffersonian Religious Liberty and American Pluralism, in THE VIRGINIA STATUTE
FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: ITS EVOLUTION AND CONSEQUENCES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 201-35 (Merrill D. Peterson & Robert C.
Vaughan eds., 1988).
16 Because the phrase “a wall of separation between church and state” is so identified with Jefferson in the context of
Religion Clause cases, I consider its use without Jefferson’s name to still be an appeal to him. On the other hand, I do
not count the broader phrase, “separation of church and state,” as an appeal to Jefferson, specifically, or history, more
generally.
If the author of an opinion mentions someone negatively, or cites evidence that goes against his or her historical
argument, I do not count these as appeals to history. For instance, when Justice Rutledge wrote about Patrick Henry’s
general assessment bill in Everson, he did so not to shine light on the meaning of the First Amendment but to set the
stage for a discussion of Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance, which he believed was “the most concise and the
most accurate statement of the views of the First Amendment’s author concerning what is ‘an establishment of reli-
gion.’” Everson, 330 U.S. at 37 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
17 Everson, 330 U.S. at 15 (applying Establishment Clause to states under Fourteenth Amendment); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) (applying Free Exercise Clause to states under Fourteenth Amendment).
18 I discuss Everson in detail in Part I.D.1.
19 508 U.S. 520, 575 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring).
20 521 U.S. 507, 537-66 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring in part, and O’Connor, J., dissenting).
21 LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS, AND DEVELOPMENTS 597-99 tbl.6-11 (3d ed. 2003).
This figure covers 1946 to 2001.
22 This figure, derived from my calculations, includes cases decided in and after 1940 (thus excluding five earlier
cases). I limit my discussion to these cases because the earlier cases were so spread out that most Justices only had
one or two cases come before them. As such, the percentage of cases in which they did or did not write opinions is ar-
tificially high or low. As well, the earlier jurists served in an era where concurring and dissenting opinions were less
common.
23 For instance, Justice William O. Douglas issued almost thirty-six opinions a year as contrasted with Justice Charles
E. Whittaker, who wrote slightly more than four opinions per year during his five years on the Court and issued no
opinion in the five Religion Clause cases that came before him as a Justice. Of course these are extreme cases.
Indeed, Henry J. Abraham reports that Douglas drafted a majority opinion for Whittaker in a case in which Douglas
was dissenting. HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF U.S. SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS
FROMWASHINGTON TO CLINTON 204 (rev. ed. 1999).
24 For example, Justice O’Connor repeatedly concurred or dissented to promote her endorsement test, and in the late
1970s and mid-1980s Justice Rehnquist’s originalist approach to the Establishment Clause often left him at odds with
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his colleagues.
25 This definition is compatible with that used in the United States Supreme Court database. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra
note 22, at 489. Table 6-2 of this volume provides a breakdown of votes cast by Justices between 1946 and 2001 on
First Amendment issues generally, but not specifically on Religion Clause cases. Id. at 486-89 tbl.6-2.
26 310 U.S. 296 (1940). I begin in 1940 rather than with the five preceding Religion Clause cases for reasons mentioned
in note 23 and, in this case, because the votes in these cases were unanimously conservative with the exception of
three dissenting votes in Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890).
As well, adding so many individuals to the table makes it unwieldy. The twenty-two Justices who voted on Religion
Clause cases who are not included in the table as well as the number of votes they cast and the percentage of liberal
votes are as follows: Bradley (3, 0%), Peckham (2, 0%), Waite (1, 0%), Brown (1, 0%), Shiras (1, 0%), E. White (2, 0%),
McKenna (2, 0%), Holmes (1, 0%), Day (1, 0%), Moody (1, 0%), Brewer (4, 0%), Blatchford (2, 0%), Gray (3, 0%),
Harlan I (4, 0%), Hunt (1, 0%), Strong (1, 0%) Miller (2, 0%), Swayne (1, 0%), Clifford (1, 0%), Field (3, 33%), Fuller
(4, 25%), and Lamar (2, 50%).
27 Of course just because a Justice is liberal or conservative in one area of jurisprudence does not mean he or she is
liberal or conservative in other areas. As well, combining all Religion Clause votes may obscure the extent to which
jurists shift their approach to these clauses over their careers.
Also problematic is deciding how to count votes where a Justice votes to uphold some programs and strike down
others in the same case (e.g., Justice Stewart’s vote in Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975)) or where cases are com-
bined and Justices vote in a seemingly contradictory manner (e.g., Justice O’Connor’s votes in County of Allegheny v.
ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989)). In these relatively rare instances, I characterized the votes as liberal or conservative
based on the overall context.
28 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
29 Id. at 162.
30 Id. at 162-63.
31 Id. at 163-64.
32 See id. at 163.
33 Id. at 162-64.
34 Id. at 164.
35 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
36 Id.
37 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
38 These opinions include Justice Frankfurter’s opinions in Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 591
(1940) and Barnette, 319 U.S. at 646 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (overruling Gobitis); and Justice Reed’s dissent in
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 117 (1943) (Reed, J., dissenting).
39 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947).
40 Id. at 12 & nn.12-13, 16.
41 Id. at 11 n.10.
42 Id. at 18.
43 Id. at 19 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
44 Id. at 28-29 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
45 Id. at 33-34 (footnotes omitted).
46 Id. at 34-44.
47 Id. at 63-72 app.
48 Daniel L. Dreisbach offers a different syllogism explaining Everson’s historical argument in his essay, A Lively and
Fair Experiment: Religion and the American Constitutional Tradition, 49 EMORY L.J. 223, 230 (2000).
49 See supra note 3.
50 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
51 Id. at 205-33.
52 Id. at 244 (Reed, J., dissenting).
53 Id.
54 Id. at 244-47.
55 Id. at 246-48.
56 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
57 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
58 Id. at 437-39 (majority opinion); id. at 492-95 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
59 Id. at 437-39 (majority opinion); id. at 492-95 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
60 Id. at 438-39 (majority opinion); id. at 494-95 & nn.67-68 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
61 Engel, 370 U.S. at 428-29 (footnote omitted).
62 Id. at 428-32.
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63 Id. at 434 n.20; see also discussion of Roger Williams’s role as a “Founder,” supra note 17.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 442 (Douglas, J., concurring).
66 Id. at 443 n.9. Douglas quoted Article III of the Northwest Ordinance to support this claim. Id.
67 Id. at 442.
68 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
69 Id. at 214 (footnote omitted).
70 Id. at 237 (Brennan, J., concurring).
71 Id. at 237-38, 240-41.
72 See, e.g., GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1466 (13th ed. 1997); DAVID M. O’BRIEN, 2
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLITICS: CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 731-33 (6th ed. 2005).
73 Schempp, 374 U.S. at 294-95 (Brennan, J., concurring).
74 Id. at 295.
75 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
76 See, e.g., Justice Powell’s opinion in Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 770
(1973) (“The history of the Establishment Clause has been recounted frequently and need not be repeated here.”)
(citing Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947)). Although primarily relying on Everson and precedents, Powell, a
proud son of Virginia, did include a defense of the centrality of debates about religious liberty in Virginia for inter-
preting the First Amendment. Id. at 770 n.28.
77Walz, 397 U.S. at 692-93 (Brennan, J., concurring).
78 Id. at 684-85.
79 Id. at 704-17 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
80 Id. at 719-27.
81 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
82 Id. at 126 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
83 Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 820 (1973) (White, J., dissenting).
84 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
85 Id. at 786-95.
86 Id. at 787-88.
87 Id. at 788 n.5.
88 Id. at 814 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
89 Id.
90 Id. at 815.
91 Id. at 816-17 (footnote omitted) (quoting Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 241 (1963) (Brennan, J., con-
curring), and W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943)).
92 In the Court’s next term, Brennan continued his retreat from history in his dissenting opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly,
465 U.S. 668 (1984). Arguing that the Court had theretofore “limited its historical inquiry to the particular practice
under review” (a highly questionable characterization of the Court’s use of history in Religion Clause cases), he con-
tended that the multitude of religious practices engaged in by governments in the Founding era are irrelevant to the
question of whether or not religious displays are permissible on public land. Id. at 719 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For
instance, Brennan noted, “[T]he widespread celebration of Christmas did not emerge in its present form until well
into the nineteenth century.” Id. at 720.
Brennan’s most significant nonjudicial statement on this subject is his 1985 speech at Georgetown University.
There he contended that:
[w]e current Justices read the Constitution in the only way that we can: as Twentieth Century Americans. We look to
the history of the time of the framing and to the intervening history of interpretation. But the ultimate question must
be, what do the words of the text mean in our time. For the genius of the Constitution rests not in any static meaning
it might have had in a world that is dead and gone, but in the adaptability of its great principles to cope with current
problems and current needs.”
William J. Brennan, Jr., in MEESE ET AL., supra note 3, at 17.
93 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
94 Id. at 61.
95 Id. at 52.
96 Id. at 52-53.
97 Id. at 52-55.
98 Id. at 81 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
99 Id. at 113 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
100 Id. at 106.
101 Id. at 91-114.
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102 John Adams is referenced by Frankfurter in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 653
(1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Brennan in Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 n.19 (1982); and Burger in Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 675 n.2 (1984). Washington is appealed to two times by Brennan in Abington School District v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 296 n.71 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurrung); and Burger in Lynch, 465 U.S. at 675.
103 Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 95-104 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
104 Id. at 99.
105 Id. at 113.
106 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
107 Id. at 590, 604-05.
108 Id. at 590 (quoting Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 52 (majority opinion)).
109 Id. at 604-05 (citations & footnotes omitted).
110 Id. at 605.
111 O’Connor wrote that “[h]istorical acceptance of a practice does not in itself validate that practice under the
Establishment Clause if the practice violates the values protected by that Clause.” Id. at 630 (O’Connor, J., concur-
ring).
112 Id. at 646 (Stevens, J., concurring).
113 Id. at 669-73 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
114 Id. at 659-61. In his opinion, Kennedy made it clear that it is the principles embraced by the Founders that are sig-
nificant, not specific practices. Hence, it is irrelevant that “displays commemorating religious holidays were not com-
monplace in 1791.” Id. at 669.
115 Id. at 679.
116 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
117 Id. at 587-93.
118 1 See id. at 599-609 (Blackmun, J. concurring). 
119 2 Id. at 600 n.1, 608 & n.11.
120 Id. at 612 (Souter, J., concurring).
121 Id.
122 Id. 612-16.
123 Id. at 616 n.3.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 612, 622.
126 Id. at 632 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984)). Scalia went on to quote sim-
ilar passages from Schempp, Marsh, and Walz. Id. at 632-33.
127 Id. at 633.
128 Id. at 633-34.
129 Id. at 640-44.
130 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
131 See, e.g., id. at 891 (O’Connor, J., concurring); Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1.
132 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
133 Id. at 574 (Souter, J., concurring).
134 Id. at 575.
135 Id. at 576.
136 521 U.S. 507 (1997). The majority decided the case on separation of powers grounds, but four Justices considered
the case to involve substantial Religion Clause issues. Justice Souter dissented in this case because he thought the
Court should not have granted certiorari. Id. at 565-66 (Souter, J., dissenting).
137 Id. at 548 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
138 Id. at 549.
139 Id. at 550-60.
140 Id. at 555-57, 560-62.
141 Id. at 537 (Scalia J., concurring in part).
142 Id. at 537-44.
143 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
144 Id. at 856 (Thomas, J., concurring).
145 Id. at 852-63.
146 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005).
147 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005).
148 The Justices appealing to history were O’Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia, Souter, and Stevens.
149 See Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2883-86 & nn.23-26 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2892 (Souter, J., dissenting);
McCreary, 125 S. Ct. at 2746-47 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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150 See Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2858-62 (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality opinion); id. at 2865 (Thomas, J., concurring);
McCreary, 125 S. Ct. at 2748-50 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
151 The other is Justice Arthur Goldberg.
152 Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2888 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
153 Id. at 2883 (footnote omitted).
154 Id. at 2883-85 & n.27.
155 Id. at 2889-90.
156 Id. at 2890.
157McCreary, 125 S. Ct. at 2746 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (alteration and omission in original) (citing A Memorial and
Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments).
158 Id. at 2749 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
159 Id. at 2754.
160 Id. at 2751 n.2 (omission in original) (quoting Corwin, supra note 4, at 16).
161 544 U.S. 709 (2005).
162 Id. at 726-27 (Thomas, J., concurring).
163 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
164 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
165 Newdow, 542 U.S. at 49-50 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Zelman, 536 U.S. at 677-80 (Thomas J., concurring).
Newdow is not included in this study because only three Justices thought the case should be decided on Religion
Clause grounds.
Other Justices have raised Thomas’s point about federalism, but none have advocated it as vigorously as Thomas.
See, e.g., Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 309-10 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Establishment Clause
was primarily an attempt to insure that Congress not only would be powerless to establish a national church, but
would also be unable to interfere with existing state establishments.”); see also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 641
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Establishment Clause was adopted to prohibit such an establishment of religion at the
federal level (and to protect state establishments of religion from federal interference).”).
166 Cutter, 544 U.S. at 729 (Thomas, J., concurring).
167 Id.
168 Newdow, 542 U.S. at 45 (Thomas, J., concurring).
169 Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2887 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
170 BERNARD BAILYN, ON THE TEACHING AND WRITING OF HISTORY 73 (1994).
171 SeeDAVID HACKETT FISCHER, HISTORIANS’ FALLACIES: TOWARD A LOGIC OF HISTORICAL THOUGHT 109-16 (1970). Of course
some scholars deny that it is possible to distinguish between good and bad history. I presume these scholars do not
believe that history is relevant for constitutional interpretation (except perhaps for rhetorical purposes), and I invite
them to skip the remaining paragraphs.
172 Of course when looking at the actions of state legislatures, scholars must take into account the possibility that
some political leaders believed that the state governments could do things that the federal government could not.
173 Good overviews of a broader range of Founders’ views of church–state relations may be found in DANIEL L.
DREISBACH, MARK D. HALL & JEFFRY H. MORRISON, THE FOUNDERS ON GOD AND GOVERNMENT (2004) (containing essays
about Washington, John Adams, Jefferson, Madison, Witherspoon, Franklin, Wilson, Mason, and the Carrolls); DANIEL
L. DREISBACH, MARK DAVID HALL & JEFFRY H. MORRISON, THE FORGOTTEN FOUNDERS ON CHURCH AND STATE (forthcoming)
(containing essays about Abigail Adams, Samuel Adams, Oliver Ellsworth, Alexander Hamilton, Patrick Henry, John
Jay, Thomas Paine, Edmund Randolph, Benjamin Rush, Roger Sherman, and Mercy Otis Warren).
174 Flaherty, supra note 5, at 526.
175 Id. at 590.
176 See 508 U.S. 520, 575 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring) (suggesting that the Court consider scholarship on the Free
Exercise Clause’s original purpose and understanding).
177 JAMES M. O’NEILL, RELIGION AND EDUCATION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION (1949). Written in response to Everson, this
book has only been cited in three Religion Clause opinions, but “it is still widely regarded as a leading manifesto for
the nonpreferentialist position.” Dreisbach, supra note 4, at 35.
178 LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM (1953). Pfeffer authored, coauthored, or edited numerous books support-
ing the strict separation of church and state. This volume is cited in six different Religion Clause cases: McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 578 n.9 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 227
(1963); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 622 n.3 (1978); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 n.17 (1982); Marsh v.
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 791 n.12 (1983); and Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 716 n.23 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing).
179 CORD, supra note 5. The book helped lay the groundwork for Rehnquist’s dissent in Wallace. See Wallace v. Jaffree,
472 U.S. 38, 104 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). It has also been referenced in four other Religion Clause cases: Lee
v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 612 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring); Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School
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District, 508 U.S. 384, 399 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia, 515
U.S. 819, 855 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring); and McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2745 (2005)
(Souter, J., dissenting).
180 LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1986). Levy’s attack on the non-
preferentialist interpretation of the Establishment Clause was written at least in part as a response to Rehnquist’s
opinion in Wallace. See LEVY, supra, at xvii-xviii. It has been cited by the Court in five Religion Clause opinions: County
of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 646 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), Lee, 505 U.S. at
613 (Souter, J., concurring); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 869 (Souter, J., dissenting); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 214
(1997); and Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 729 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring).
181 Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Undestanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409
(1990). McConnell’s article played a particularly prominent role in Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Boerne. See City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 551, 553, 557-59 (1997) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). As well, it is cited in two other
Religion Clause cases: Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 574 (1993) (Souter, J., con-
curring); and Board of Education v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 723 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
182 Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131 (1991). Amar’s article, along with other
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JACQUES MARITAIN, RELIGION, 
AND THE AMERICAN EXPERIMENT
 B Y  T H O M A S  A L B E RT  H OWA R D *
Since the birth of the United States in the late eighteenth century, this “land of the future,”in the philosopher Hegel’s words, has received no shortage of commentary from European
intellectuals. Oscillating between paternal interest and fraternal rivalry, Europe’s ambitious
scribes have braved the Atlantic, written sprawling books, instructed us in manners and morals,
measured our development against Old World benchmarks, and patched us into various
schemes of the progress of the human mind. Sometimes this interest has exhibited a positive
mien, sometimes ambivalent; more often in recent years it has been negative and conde-
scending, hence, the much-discussed topic of European anti-Americanism.1
The French have proven especially eager and prodigious explainers of America. From
Crevecoeur, Chateaubriand, and Tocqueville long ago to Simone de Beauvoir, Jean Baudrillard,
and Bernard Henri-Lévy in more recent decades, French thinkers have left lasting guideposts
of interpretation, if not always on the actual America of Iowa City and Cleveland, then on the
symbolic “America,” that golem of soulless modernity, which nourishes “critical theory” in the
academy and inspires oppositional righteousness across the globe. 
As the process of post-Cold War European unification has unfolded, hostility to this “America”
has proven to be a useful intellectual reflex to help define the new European identity, with
French elites in the vanguard often decrying the actions of what France’s former Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Hubert Védrine, dubbed history’s first hyperpuissance (hyper-power). To be
sure, American intellectuals have given as good as they’ve got, lobbing criticism and contempt
across the Atlantic, often erroneously assuming Europe to be a much more homogenous entity
than it actually is, or claims to be. One thinks, for instance, of Robert Kagan’s much-discussed
Of Paradise and Power, which divvied up the transatlantic world into denizens of Mars (America)
and Venus (Europe).2
In an intellectual landscape of vitriolic anti-Americanism and cavalier over-generalization
on both sides of the Atlantic, one wonders where to turn to gain a more judicious outlook on
America from an outsider’s perspective. The French neo-Thomist philosopher Jacques
Maritain provides a good starting point. Often ignored by secularists as an overtly religious
thinker and of interest to philosophers for a myriad of other reasons, Maritain’s image de
l’amérique is one to reckon with, especially as glimpsed in his Reflections on America (1958),
based on a seminar held at the University of Chicago in 1956, but also in other works. What
one finds in Maritain’s pages is not universal praise, but speculative curiosity nourished by
long experience in the United States, constructive criticism tempered by restraint, and, over-
all, a profoundly sympathetic reading of the United States, one that deftly mixes theological
reflection and an acute regard of American history and society.
That such a sympathetic treatment of the United States by a leading French Catholic
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thinker would appear in the middle of the twentieth century is far from obvious and deserves
a word of historical contextualization.
For the “throne and altar” Catholic imagination of the nineteenth century, the United States
long stood under a cloud of suspicion. As an expression of political modernity, the new nation
was regularly viewed through the lenses of the French Revolution, the European-wide revolu-
tions of 1848, and the Italian Risorgimento, all of which had made scant room for Rome in their
blueprints of human emancipation. Despite the appeal of a handful of Catholic thinkers, such
as a Félicité de Lammenais, to the constitutional liberties of the United States, the Church
came to regard notions of religious freedom and the separation of church and state as the
error of “indifferentism.” Pope Gregory XVI made such a pronouncement in the encyclical
Mirari vos (1832), and the sentiment was driven home in Pius IX’s better-known Syllabus of
Errors (1864).3
The image of America from Rome was not helped by the fact that Italian liberals and na-
tionalists, often rabidly anticlerical, regularly lionized the United States as a model for Italy’s
future. When Rome was sacked in 1848 and the last vestiges of the Papal States dissolved in
1870 by revolutionaries appealing to American-style liberties, the association of America with
impiety and a wrongheaded social order became an idée fixe among many ultramontane
Catholics. The so-called “Americanist crisis” during the papacy of Leo XIII further contributed
to misgivings about the United States — misgivings that persisted well into the twentieth cen-
tury.4 John Courtney Murray, it will be remembered, received a censure from Rome as late as
the 1950s for his optimistic endorsement of church-state relations in the United States. 
European Catholic skepticism toward the United States cannot be isolated from more per-
vasive Old World doubts about the upstart nation. Some of these doubts have longstanding his-
torical antecedents. In the eighteenth century, for example, putatively “scientific” theories of
the “degeneracy” of flora and fauna in the New World circulated widely among intellectual
circles — what Philippe Roger has called “the Enlightenment’s strange hostility to the New
World.”5 Unfit for human habitation, full of bizarre beasts and wild men, “the conquest of the
New World . . . has been the greatest of all misfortunes to befall mankind,” summed up
Cornelius de Pauw in his Philosophical Reflections on the Americans (1768-69), widely regarded
as a founding text of anti-American sentiment.6
In the early nineteenth century, misgivings about America passed from a focus on the nat-
ural environment to a focus on the social and political conditions of the new nation. After the
collapse of the democratic experiment in France in 1815, the American republic was for a
time the only state of size in the world to practice what many believed were the invalidated
ideas of democracy, equality, and religious freedom. That a reactionary milieu in Europe co-
incided with the emergence of “Jacksonian America” produced an especially jarring contrast
between the continents. During this period, lasting anti-American images first gained wide
currency in European thought and have since been passed down, across the political spectrum,
to subsequent generations. The post-1815 age of Romanticism and Restoration, notes Dan
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Diner, “can with all justification be considered the main workshop for lasting anti-American
images and metaphors.”7
Many criticisms first voiced in this era have a familiar ring: America was a nation of boors
and backwoodsmen; it was barren of the arts and high culture; it had no sense of history or
tradition; it lacked an appreciation of the finer things of life; it was deficient in manners and
propriety; its religious life was sectarian and driven by populist passions; it was a land of swin-
dling in business and libel in the press; it had produced no great writers or artists; industry
and the dollar mixed with all things; it was destined for mediocrity, ignominy, or worse; and
on and on. While not all Europeans were given to such one-sided sentiments (Tocqueville’s
high-minded outlook comes to mind), the fact that such criticisms appear consistently among
leading intellectuals is quite striking. (See Talleyrand, Hegel, Jacob Burckhardt, Stendhal,
Baudelaire, Hölderlin, Dickens, Frances Trollope, Nietzsche, and Matthew Arnold, among
many others.)
The United States’ growing industrial might in the early twentieth century and its involve-
ment in European affairs as a result of the Great War often exacerbated anti-American feelings.
The politically polarized 1920s and 1930s stand out for the high volume of anti-American liter-
ature published in Europe, both on the political left and right. In France, Georges Duhamel’s
1930 book Scènes de la vie future (translated as America the Menace: Scenes from the Life of the
Future) may be taken as an illustrative example. With obsessive intensity, the noted French
novelist felt bound to express his loathing of industrialization, crowd culture, and entertain-
ment in America. He recorded his depression and horror at American religion, movies, jazz,
advertisements, college life, automobiles, and mass production. Three years before Hitler
came to power in Europe, he saw in the United States nothing but the brutalization of con-
science, the standardization of culture, the debasement of all civilized values. America was
the ugly face of a gangly new Leviathan, destined to drown Old Europe in a sea of banalities,
trivialities, and overweening power.8
Maritain laconically wished Duhamel had enjoyed a better visit in the United States, and
he regretted that Duhamel’s attitude was not isolated to few malcontents, but, if in less ex-
treme form, increasingly characteristic of Europe’s intelligentsia as a whole, especially after
mid-century among those influenced by growing currents of Marxist thought in Western
Europe. UNESCO meetings in Sao Paulo and Geneva in 1954, which witnessed the eruption of
much antipathy toward the United States, confirmed for Maritain, who always considered
himself a man of the Left, the blinkered ideological reasoning of many of his fellow Europeans.9
What distinguished Maritain from many other European commentators on America was
that he and his wife Raïssa actually lived in the United States. What is more, his first encounter
with America was not on the coasts, but in the Midwest, in Chicago, where he lectured in
1933. Returning to the states frequently in the 1930s, Maritain left war-torn Europe altogether
in 1940 for what was to be a brief exile in the United States. As things turned out, he accepted
academic appointments in New York and Princeton and wound up living in the United States
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until 1960, punctuated by a three-year period as French Ambassador to the Vatican directly
after the war. His time in America, in other words, corresponded to the fascist undoing of
Europe and the anxious early years of the Cold War.10
In Reflections on America, European elite criticism of the United States is never far from
Maritain’s mind. When unwarranted, he contravenes this criticism; when justified, he seeks
to present it shorn of more general antipathy toward America; throughout, he speaks in what
we might call a transatlantic voice, neither American nor European, but paradoxically both
and neither. But his stance is not dispassionate: he exhibits the affection of a grateful refugee
and divines in the American constitutional order and society promising elements of what he
sought to articulate theoretically in The Things That are Not Caesars, Integral Humanism,
Scholasticism and Politics, Man and the State, and other works of philosophy and political thought.
That Americans lacked any sense of history or tradition was a refrain among European
critics. Maritain did not categorically dispute this charge, but he gave it a more nuanced and
positive valuation. For him, “openness to the future” was a salutary consequence of America’s
very historical conditions, which he regarded as “an element of the greatness of America.” In
Europe, the “rotten stuff of past events, past hatreds, past habits” amounted to an “overwhelm-
ing historical heredity,” a “sclerosis”; and it was well and good that Americans might be deliv-
ered from much of this. The Old World’s past was not theirs in a direct sense; it was their
“pre-history.”11 By implication, Americans possessed an important vantage point to help dis-
tinguish the valuable and enduring in Europe’s own history, being less constricted by nation-
al(ist) attachments and long-standing hostilities.
But openness to the future did not mean that Americans had no historical consciousness.
Maritain was struck by how the spirit of America’s founding era continued to penetrate the
present, as evidenced by widespread knowledge of Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence, a
lively sense of personal freedom and human rights, even the desire to preserve colonial-era
furniture and architecture. This ongoing sense of a living past, instead of an exhausted one,
and a palpable sense of a future amenable to human initiative, appeared to him to have inocu-
lated Americans from revolutionary ideologies, claiming “historical necessity,” that swept the
Continent in the first part of the twentieth century. Accordingly, he posited a “root incompati-
bility … between the American people and Marxist philosophy.” “For Marx,” he elaborated, 
[H]istory is … an immense and terrible set of concatenated necessities, in the
bosom of which man slaves toward his final emancipation. When he becomes at
last, through communism, master of his own history, then he will drive the chariot
of the Juggernaut which had previously crushed him. But for the American people
it is quite another story. They are not interested in driving the chariot of the
Juggernaut. They have gotten rid of the Juggernaut. It is not in any future mes-
sianic freedom of mankind, nor in mastering the necessities of history, it is in
man’s present freedom that they are interested.12
One might read this as Maritain’s reply to European socialists, who had wrung their hands for
decades over the ideologically telling question, enshrined in the title of Werner Sombart’s
 famous book of 1906, Why is there no Socialism in the United States?
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In a chapter on “The Old Tag of American Materialism,” Maritain sought to rebut the per-
sistent European charge that Americans were a people peculiarly given to materialistic pursuits.
He did not deny that untoward attachments to consumer goods and pleasures constituted a
problem throughout the industrialized world, but he wondered if Americans, at least in some
respects, were in fact the least materialistic among the wealthy nations. “[F]ew things,” he
wrote, “are as sickening as the stock remarks with which so many persons in Europe, who are
themselves far from despising the earthly goods of the world, reproach this country with its
so-called materialism.” This reproach did not derive from empirical evidence alone, he felt,
but drew its strength from an Old World elitist tradition of “confusing spirituality with an aris-
tocratic contempt for any improvement in material life.” This elitist or “pseudo-spiritual”
 critique — perfected “among certain high-brow Europeans with large bank accounts and deli-
cious wine in their cellars” — exerts such a powerful moralistic appeal, that “you yourselves
[Americans] are taken in by it.”13
To make the countervailing case, Maritain, in the spirit of Tocqueville, pointed to the “infi-
nite swarming” of American charitable organizations, philanthropic foundations, private
schools and colleges, and religious societies, which, in size and scope, had no counterpart in
modern Europe. The enormous creative energy of the American private sector, both in gener-
ating wealth and giving it away, constituted for Maritain an historically unprecedented contri-
bution to human welfare. While he admired the efforts of America’s largest foundations —
“born of freedom and immune from state control” — he equally praised the voluntarist and
giving spirit of average Americans as upholders of “the ancient Greek and Roman idea of the
civis praeclarus, the dedicated citizen who spends his money [and time] in the service of the
common good.”14 While he does not explicitly invoke statistics, the sizable imbalance in
 private-sector giving between the United States and western Europe from the time of Maritain
until today would seem to bear out his observation. Arthur C. Brooks of Syracuse University,
for example, speaks of “the huge transatlantic charity gap,” with Americans in the past few
decades giving away, per capita, considerably more than citizens in most European countries.15
In his writings on political philosophy, Maritain esteemed democratic forms of government
because of their potential to give political expression to the Judeo-Christian belief in the invi-
olable dignity of the individual. While true about all genuine democracies, in his view, Maritain
nonetheless felt that the United States added something significantly to the theological under-
pinnings of democracy: the widespread reality of immigration, the fact that a modern nation
had been conjured up by peoples once persecuted, rejected, offended, and humiliated. The
cultural memory of past suffering coupled with a chance to make good in a New World had
deposited for Maritain “a reminiscence of the Gospel in the inner attitude of people” and a re-
solve that misery and want need not be the accepted lot of humankind. “Here lies,” he elabo-
rated, “a distinctive privilege of this country, and a deep human mystery concealed behind its
power and prosperity. The tears and suffering of the persecuted and unfortunate are trans-
muted into a perpetual effort to improve human destiny and to make life bearable; they are
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transfigured into optimism and creativity.” This “concealed” spiritual identity did not always
avail itself to urbane, aesthetically sensitive critics of America; it was under the surface, “hid-
den in the secret life of souls, and covered by all the ordinary selfish desires and concerns of
human nature. It exists, however, and is active in the great mass of the nation. And what is
more valuable in this poor world than to find a trace of Gospel fraternal love active among
men?”16
Maritain placed great value on the American experiment in “voluntary” religion, a historical
novum, he believed, and a phenomenon quite distinct from some European efforts to separate
church and state. In Integral Humanism (1936), before having extensive first-hand knowledge
of the United States, he had argued for the goodness of a secular polity in which people of
 diverse religious backgrounds worked for the common good, albeit in a constitutional frame-
work inspired by an implicitly theological sense of natural law and the dignity of the individ-
ual.17 He felt this to be a proximate reality in the United States, and this constituted for him
one of the sharpest points of contrast between American and European (particularly French)
civilization. As he expressed it in Man and the State (1951): 
[A] European who comes to America is struck by the fact that the expression
“separation between Church and State” … does not have the same meaning here
and in Europe. In Europe it means … that complete isolation which derives from
century-old misunderstandings and struggles, and which has produced most un-
fortunate results. Here it meant, as a matter of fact, together with a refusal to grant
any privilege to one religious denomination in preference to others and to have a
State established religion, a distinction between the State and the Churches which
is compatible with good feeling and mutual cooperation…. [T]here’s a historical
treasure, the value of which a European is perhaps more prepared to appreciate,
because of his own bitter experiences. Please to God that you keep it carefully, and
do not let your concept of separation veer round to the European one.18
Although the religious settlement of the United States represented the most dramatic de-
parture from the Old World in Maritain’s view, he regarded the whole of its constitutional
order truly as a novus ordo seclorum. But he was less inclined to locate its origins strictly in
English common law or among Enlightenment-era thinkers, many of whom, particularly
Rousseau, he viewed as deeply flawed. Rather, it reflected and resonated with much older,
classical and medieval Christian, conceptions of natural law and a flourishing polity. His line
of reasoning on this point strikingly parallels that of John Courtney Murray’s in We Hold
These Truths (1960).19 Not bonds of strict necessity and custom, but the collective decisions of
free men, Maritain maintained, characterized the good state for both Aristotle and Thomas
Aquinas. Theirs is a community based on virtue and reason, and “implies a will or consent to
live together, which freely emanates from the … people…. [N]owhere in the world has this no-
tion of the essence of political activity been brought into existence more truly than in
America.”20 Since he located his own political thought in the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition,
the United States, in short, represented the fortuitous historical approximation of realities that
he had long theorized about.21 Unlike in Europe, where secularist forces increasingly defined
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modern democracy against an older natural law tradition, America preserved this tradition in
its founding documents and political structures, never losing sight of the implicitly “Christian
principle” quietly animating democracy, as he noted in Christianity and Democracy (1943).22
Accordingly, he felt that the United States had a special role to play in the postwar world.
Nowadays when many educated American Christians (perhaps with a volume by Stanley
Hauerwas lying around) equate political theology with prophetic jeremiads against “liberal
democracy” and “globalization,” the language of America’s historical role might come across
as dangerously providentialist. And of course, a dose of caution is in order, given the wide-
spread abuse of providentialist claims in American history. But, as an outsider to America
and a trenchant observer of the political convulsions that shook Europe in the 1930s and
1940s, Maritain cannot be easily brushed aside in the name present-day moralisms. 
Maritain mounted his case by noting what he called “the obvious fact” of America’s unusu-
al identity. This was not a nation among nations, in the European sense, based on race, reli-
gion, and geography, but, in Lincoln’s phrase, a novel “proposition” that diverse peoples could
live in freedom and preserve, in a modern secular order, a vital residuum of the classical natu-
ral law tradition and the Christian belief in the dignity of all people. Upholding this dignity —
the dignity of the least among us — constituted America’s historic vocation, even if this meant,
as in the Civil Rights Movement or in present-day debates about foreign policy and war, “a
perpetual process of self-examination and self-criticism” — an ongoing interrogation of prac-
tices in light of principles.23 This might not constitute a high calling, understood as producing
great art or literature, but rather one at once quotidian and indispensable. Americans might
lack many refinements from the standpoint of Paris or Florence, Maritain could admit, but
[T]here is one thing that America knows well and that she teaches as a great and
precious lesson to those who come into contact with her amazing adventure: that
is the value and dignity of the man of common humanity…. In forms so simply
human that the pretentious and pedantic are at pains to perceive it, we find [in this
country] a spiritual conquest of immeasurable value. The mainspring of American
civilization is this dignity of each one in daily existence.24
Maritain connected the “spiritual conquest” of American democracy to what he had earlier,
perhaps infelicitously, called a new Christendom, a nouvelle chrétienté, not the coercive, hier-
archical order of the Middle Ages, but a progressive world system of democratic states imbued
by “evangelical sap” — an appreciative, instead of an antagonistic, regard for the historical in-
fluence of the Gospel on the modern quest for freedom and human rights.25 Often at pains to
make clear he was advocating a way forward, not a restoration of the deservedly obsolete,
Maritain reiterated, “I am far from saying that today’s American civilization is a new Christen -
dom, even in outline. It is rather a combination of certain continuing elements of ancient
Christian civilization with new temporal achievements and new historical situations.”26 To
bring about this new order on a wider scale in the postwar world, the American experiment
was pivotal. “If we want civilization to survive,” he wrote during the darkest period of World
War II, the “American spirit” must help lead the way in creating “a world of free men penetrat-
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ed in its secular substance by a real and vital Christianity, a world in which the inspiration of
the Gospel will direct the common life of man toward an heroic humanism.”27
While perhaps fairly criticized for overvaluing the potential of the political, Maritain had
no illusions about the difficulty and complexity of his proposition — one he knew would be
met by ridicule among pro-socialist, anti-American voices in postwar Europe, and obscured in
America by unsavory McCarthy-era forms of patriotism. He also candidly recognized that the
religious element in American civilization could, in the wrong hands, degenerate into imper-
missible forms of civil religion, instrumentalizing Christianity for “national or temporal inter-
ests.” Immanent, moralistic religiosity, “temporalized” belief in the service of this-worldly
causes, he opposed in the strongest terms, insisting that Christianity was essentially other-
worldly and supra-political.28 When it touched the political order, it did so as a salutary leaven,
not as a fundamental substance. The realm of Caesar possessed its own justification.
But he also worried about the secular drift of Europe, an outright animus toward any reli-
gious leaven in society. These worries have been amply confirmed over the past few decades
as secularization has continued apace on the Continent and as shapers of a unified Europe
have insisted, against the logic of historical causality, that modern democracy could only
arise from the ashes of Europe’s theistic past. “Europe’s problem is to recover the vivifying
power of Christianity in temporal existence,” Maritain had presciently written in the 1940s,
for without this power the machinery of democracy might go on, but the individuals in this
machinery have been stripped of the transcendental justification of their dignity.29
In light of his assessment of Europe, it is, finally, of moment that Maritain also worried
about the obsequiousness with which the American academy and elite culture, then and now,
habitually looked to the Continent for intellectual respectability and fashion. The “cultivated
American,” he noted, who is “anxious to have America criticized” listens with “special care
and sorrowful appreciation” to “any [European] writer who bitterly denounces the vices of
this country.” This reality, combined with populist anti-intellectual sentiments in the United
States, did not augur well for the articulation and dissemination of Maritain’s ideas. Still, to
American audiences, he pled for “the need for an explicit philosophy,” which would take its
cue from American political arrangements, however experimental and imperfect, and extrap-
olate them into “the philosophical formulation of a universal ideal,” the centerpiece of which
was the nonnegotiable principle of the dignity of the individual — the least among us foremost.30
Of course, Americans concerned about the life of the mind on these shores might justifi-
ably ask whether taking Maritain at his word, once again, would risk indulging our craving for
Continental tutelage. But then again, might one also make a virtue of our national docility?
The reign of Marx, Sartre and Foucault has passed. Derrida is dead. The age of Maritain: has
its hour come round at last?
* Thomas Albert Howard is Associate Professor of History and Director, Jerusalem and Athens Forum at Gordon
College in Wenham, Massachusetts.
A previous, much shorter version of this essay appeared as “Maritain’s America” in the journal First Things (January
2007): 13-16. I am grateful to the editors of this journal for allowing me to reprint material here.
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROPHETS
ANCIENT PARADIGMS AND 
MODERN EXPECTATIONS1
 B Y  C H R I S  S TA D L E R *
The durable role of biblical text as available tradition, which the community tends always toutter and experience again, is not done, characteristically, either with a full-blown canonical
awareness or with a full-blown critical awareness (Walter Brueggemann).
Presidential scholar Thomas Cronin is quoted in The Presidency and the Challenge of
Democracy, as saying, 
The American presidency is a uniquely necessary, and always potentially danger-
ous, leadership institution. The framers of the U.S. Constitution were aware of
this: they knew that if they designed a presidency with too much power, they
risked ending up with an arbitrary tyrant, yet if they designed a presidency with
too little power, the nation might not have the decisive leadership needed in times
of emergency. Today, 11 generations later, we face the same questions the framers
faced: what kind of president do we need, and what kind of presidency do we want.2
We face these questions because the rise of America has also meant the rise of presidential
power. When the United States became a world economic and political power, a strong presi-
dency emerged. With World War II, the Cold War and now the current war against terrorism
the notion of a dominant president who moves the country and the government by means of
strong, effective leadership has taken root. As Genovese and Han point out, “With the United
States as the world’s only super power, foreign policy animates and empowers a swollen presi-
dency.”3 Although driven and shaped by crises, does this heroic model of the presidency run
contrary to constitutional design? “War,” as Cronin points out, “has always nourished the pos-
sibility of an imperial presidency and the abuse of powers.”4 The concern is not new. “War is
in fact,” as James Madison warned in 1795, “the true nurse of executive aggrandizement.”5
The title of this presentation is Constitutional Prophets: Ancient Paradigms and Modern
Expectations. The purpose of the paper is two-fold. First, and more narrowly, it is to provide a
corrective emphasis on current explanations of the Bush presidency. Secondly, and more
broadly, it seeks to illustrate the role and functions of the American presidency from a cultural
perspective, that is, reflecting on how presidents lead as a social institution.
Methodologically, the questions that surround Bush’s claims of inherent constitutional
powers 6 (for example, his actions are non reviewable by the other branches) stem from the
issue of how to conceptually identify the dynamics of presidential leadership without missing
or distorting their actual implications. In as much as scholars must grapple over whether or
not Bush’s justifications are “farfetched and dangerous”7 the issue should be rephrased. In the
current political environment, have the claims of presidential power changed or has the envi-
ronment merely brought to light different aspects/possibilities of its purpose? In other words,
crises and wars have not changed the wording of the Constitution, but has the scope of presi-
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dential power been altered? This is the reference to ancient paradigms and modern expecta-
tions in the title.
The specific focus for explanation will be on a regularly noticed but under-conceptualized
symbolic paradigm of presidential leadership during times of crisis. Analytically this is driven
by the proposition that foreign policy is a product of the actions officials take on behalf of the
nation-state they lead. Because of this, it can be argued that the way a government is struc-
tured for purposes of policy-making will also affect the conduct and content of foreign affairs.
In other words, a relationship can be hypothesized to exist between the substance of policy
and institutional setting from which it derives. The importance of leadership in this regard, as
Murray Edelman reminds us, is that its very idea makes a complex and largely unknowable
social world understandable even while it assuages personal guilt and anxiety by transferring
responsibility to another. As an individual, leaders can be praised and blamed and given “re-
sponsibility” in a way that processes cannot.8 That the American presidency is the central and
preeminent leadership focus of the American political system is beyond dispute. Several studies,
most notably by Fred Greenstein, have articulated that claim: 
The president is first a symbol for the nation; second an outlet for affect — a way
of feeling good about one’s country; third a cognitive aid, allowing a single individ-
ual to symbolize and substitute for the complexity and confusion of government;
and fourth a means of vicarious participation through which people identify with
the president and feel more a part of events occurring around them.9
In other words, the president is the initial point of contact, the general symbol of the gov-
ernment, and orientation point from which the rest of the government is perceived. And that
this leadership function often narrows to essentially a speaking role is at least by implication
in many accounts, hardly more disputable. Certainly among contemporary scholars there is
nearly unanimous agreement that among other presidential responsibilities, the designation
of America’s number one office holder as “tribune of the people” and/or “spokesman of the
nation” must be included. Bruce Lincoln puts it more precisely “the American state speaks to
the American nation through him [the president] as its representation and conduit.”10
Nowhere is this more evident than in the area of foreign affairs. “The President” as Clinton
Rossiter designated him fifty years ago, is the nation’s “Chief Diplomat.” 11 Although authority
in the field of foreign relations is shared constitutionally between two organs — President and
Congress — “his position is paramount, if not indeed dominant.”12 In times of war, few citizens
would question the obligation of the president to preserve and protect the nation. Few would
deny the president the constitutional and statutory authority to do so. 
Yet it is also a fact that the terms of crisis leadership remain little defined.13 By focusing
more on how individual presidents structure and manage the decision-making process, schol-
ars have explained little, specifically about how this role colors — or does not color — the
manner or style officeholders fulfill their duties as commander-in-chief or faithfully execute
the office of the President. We have been told even less that would consistently elucidate the
basis or platform on which a president should rise to defend the interests of the assembled
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people, or of the kinds of words he should utter in the nation’s name and why. Why is it, for
example, that no other country’s leaders so frequently invoke the Lord’s name to bless its in-
ternational enterprises? It seems mostly left to common understanding to accept, without
 detailed specification or explanation, that what presidents do in this role, sometimes well,
sometimes poorly, is a politically significant attribute of the office. But if there are no explicit
specifications for this role, how and by what criteria is it determined that some have per-
formed it well, others ill? More importantly, is this a role that is well assigned to the president,
one which — if we knew with precision what it was — we would want given to the president
in its present form in times of crisis? 
This paper will attempt to answer these unattended questions by applying to this central
speaking role in the presidency a paradigm of leadership drawn from biblical sources.
Scholars have long recognized that, although American civilization is complex and counts
many points of origin, the Bible remains a source of great significance. It should not be sur-
prising that the historical development of the presidency might be supposed to have been in-
fluenced by biblical thought patterns. Many evaluations of current policy do in fact highlight
some aspect of this feature. At best however, analysts only go so far as identifying such bibli-
cal influences as the source of the moral certainty that American leaders have traditionally
carried abroad.14
With roots going back to John Winthrop’s sermon, “A Model of Christian Charity,” this
moral certainty is commonly referred to as American exceptionalism. Jerel Rosati identifies
three attributes of this self-image: innocence (the desire merely to be the “City upon a hill,” a
model for other nations to emulate); benevolence (the desire to do good for the world and not
merely for oneself); and exceptionalism (a confidence and optimism about the superiority —
not merely the distinctiveness — of the American experiment to create “a new nation, con-
ceived in liberty”).15 These three attributes — innocence, benevolence, and exceptionalism —
are those to which, according to Anders Stephanson, Woodrow Wilson turned. Of Wilson,
Stephanson wrote, 
[W]hen he wanted to accentuate the providentially assigned role of the United
States to lead the world to new and better things. To him, what defined “America”
was precisely this special calling or mission. The nation had been allowed to see
the light and was bound to show the way for the historically retrograde. There was
a duty to develop and spread to full potential under the blessings of the most per-
fect principles imaginable.16
To be sure, this is a language and style seemingly far removed from the language and provi-
sions of presidential duties under the Constitution.
With regard to the presidential role as it is to function during times of national stress, it
should be noted that some commentators have been prompted to talk of Americans as having
recovered the oldest form of human government, the “elected king.” In stressing the immer-
sion of political systems in their historical contexts, it should be pointed out, however, that
Americans have no experience with elected kings. On the other hand — and this is a subtle
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but crucial distinction — because culturally they were predominantly and profoundly a
Protestant people they have had right from the beginning, a ready available leadership image
from the Bible. As such, what matters to the present paper is that there is a remarkable “fit”
between the Bible’s leadership paradigm and what is from time to time expected of modern
presidents.17 Moreover, it will be argued that it is this fit between the ancient paradigm and
modern expectations that both confirms and illuminates their relationship, that the first is
both the source of the second and a reliable guide to its definition and analysis. And it will
 finally be argued that this confirmation and illumination will bring to prominence aspects of
the presidency which now require urgent attention.
1) The Mosaic Leadership Paradigm18
In this paper, the biblical leadership paradigm will be identified with Moses. It could have been
identified just as easily with Abraham, Joshua or David. Moses is chosen because all biblical
examples are seen being called to account against an original paradigm that is applied with
great consistency to all of them.19 In a word, they all expected to be “prophetic.” The biblical
prophetic role is essentially concerned with words, with language, with dialogue. The prophetic
leader must utter words and the people must hear them and respond to them. The prophetic
emphasis on words arises from the fact that the Hebrews were situational thinkers. 
Without even a remote capacity for philosophical reflection and detachment, they
spoke and wrote exclusively about experience, their own, personal and subjective.
They wrote of experience directly as they remembered it, had it, anticipated it.
Words, designating subjects and objects actions and attributes, brought experiences
to mind, evoked them in all their vivid particularity, and thereby compelled hear-
ers to relive those events, to suffer and endure them again, or alternatively, to feel
them in the offing, impending, and disturbing.20
The essential Hebrew literary structure is, therefore the narrative. The essential problem
the story teller leaves with his hearers or attempts to solve for them is always the same: what
does the story do to the hearer, where does it put the hearer in the story, how does it demand
that he or she respond to its telling? There are typically three parts to the narrative. The first
is an account of the past to recall or associate the hearer with it. In other words, the story
teller reminds the listener of how they became a people — the trials and victories which
brought them to their present place and time. The second part of the narrative is an experien-
tial now, a moment of crisis occasioned if only by the hearing of the story being told. The final
narrative part is concerned with an unfulfilled future — what the hearer will do now that the
story has been told.
The Hebrew prophetic leader is essentially the teller of a story, the hearers are his people,
and the story he tells is the story of their life together. Technically the prophetic leader’s
words are an act of congregation. He is not there to debate or to negotiate. Rather, by his call,
he summons the people before him into one body, one life or enterprise of souls, so that, in
the Bible’s repeated phrasing, they may go out as one man and speak with one voice. In gen-
erating their unity the prophetic leader also becomes, to quote Roelofs, “as a father to them[;]
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a patriarchal hero gathering them into the ambit of his instruction of their story.”21
The interpretation of the moment in which the people stand is not, however, exhausted by
its announcement. The prophetic leader now presses upon his people their moment of choice.
They have come this far in their history, they have achieved what they have because they
have been true to their tribal commitments and loyal to their god of destiny. But now troubles
heap up on every hand. There has been a falling away of commitment, a weakening of identity,
a dispersion of social and psychic energy, a loosening of community. The patriarch demands
the people’s attention to meet the need to choose again the objects of their highest loyalties,
to reach again for a life with their god and his chosen hero, the national leader. Alternatively
the people can choose to go their separate ways, to abandon their founding commitments,
loyalties, and social meaning. 
The choice is historic, existential, moral and redemptive. “I” said Moses to the people of
Israel, “call heaven and earth to witness against you this day, that I have set before you life
and death, blessing and curse; therefore choose life, that you and your descendants may live”
(Deuteronomy 30:19). “Now therefore” said Joshua to all the people assembled at Shechem,
“choose this day whom you will serve” (Joshua 24:14-15). When the choice is made positively
the soul of the heroic leader will meld again with that of the people, magnifying them, unify-
ing them, and they and he will together be renewed, historically ennobled to go forward with
their god. The covenant between god, man, and people has been renewed: god will protect,
man will lead and the assembled people in love will obey.
2) The Prophetic Presidency
It is clear that the prophetic leadership paradigm delineates a role that, in its communal
 significance is both powerful and important. To an extraordinary degree, it has the power to
 cultivate community identity, solidarity and a belief in community legitimacy. The quick
statement of evidence for the presence of the prophetic character in the American presidency —
now that the pattern is recognizable — comes so easily from presidential speeches as to seem
not to need justification. Here is Abraham Lincoln at Gettysburg focusing on our need to
choose again to be a chosen people.
It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us — that
from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they
gave the last full measure of devotion — that we here highly resolve that these
dead shall not have died in vain — that this nation, under God, shall have a new
birth of freedom — and that government of the people, by the people, for the people,
shall not perish from the earth.22
Here are the words of John F. Kennedy informing and reassuring Americans of who they
 legitimately are: 
We dare not forget today that we are the heirs of that first revolution. Let the word
go forth from this time and place to friend and foe alike, that the torch has been
passed to a new generation of Americans — born in this century, tempered by war,
disciplined by a hard and bitter peace, proud of our ancient heritage — and unwill-
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ing to witness or permit the slow undoing of those human rights to which this
Nation has always been committed, and to which we are committed today at home
and around the world.23
Similarly, one need look no further than Woodrow Wilson’s written commentary on the
presidential office. A more literal summons for a charismatic patriarchal Moses would be hard
to find: 
For he [the president] is also the political leader of the nation, or has it in his
choice to be. The nation as a whole has chosen him, and is conscious that it has no
other spokesman. His is the only national voice in affairs. Let him once win the ad-
miration and confidence of the country, and no other single force can withstand
him, no combination of forces will easily over power him. His position takes the
imagination of the country. He is the representative of no constituency, but of the
whole people. When he speaks in his true character, he speaks for no special inter-
est. If he rightly interpret the national thought and boldly insists upon it, he is irre-
sistible; and the country never feels the zest of action so much as when its
Presi dent is of such insight and caliber. Its instinct is for unified action, and it
craves a single leader.24
The purposes of this paper will not be served, however, unless it can be shown why — for
what reasons — the ancient Hebraic paradigm worked its way into the Oval Office. We begin
with a discussion of the Federalist Papers— the best guide to how the framers understood the
Constitution when they wrote it. 25 To what degree does the Constitution welcome presidential
activity that reasserts national identity and regime legitimization? In Federalist no. 70,
Alexander Hamilton outlines its importance in the following. 
Energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good govern-
ment. It is essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks; it is
not less essential to the steady administration of the laws; to the protection of
property against those irregular and high-handed combinations which sometimes
interrupt the ordinary course of justice; to the security of liberty against the enter-
prises and assaults of ambition, of faction, and of anarchy.
In what seems a strange defense of an office designed for a people fearing tyranny, Hamilton
unflinchingly goes further:
Every man the least conversant in Roman history knows how often that republic
was obliged to take refuge in the absolute power of a single man, under the formi-
dable title of dictator, as well against the intrigues of ambitious individuals who as-
pired to the tyranny, and the seditions of whole classes of the community whose
conduct threatened the existence of all government, as against the invasions of ex-
ternal enemies who menaced the conquest and destruction of Rome.
There can be no need, however, to multiply arguments or examples on their
head. A feeble executive implies a feeble execution of the government. A feeble ex-
ecution is but another phrase for a bad execution; and a government ill executed,
whatever it may be in theory, must be in practice, a bad government (emphasis in
original).
Clearly the framers wanted the president’s function to go beyond the Constitution’s simple
phrasing of “see[ing] that the laws are faithfully executed.”26 What the framers were seeking to
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address through the institution of the presidency was the principle of “crisis government” or
to use Rossiter’s term: “constitutional dictatorship.”27 The importance of this principle was
first raised by Hamilton in Federalist nos. 23, 25, 26 and 31. It was argued that the new govern-
ment “ought to be clothed with all the powers requisite to complete execution of its trust” and
that “it is both unwise and dangerous to deny [it] an unconfined authority in respect to all
those objects which are intrusted to its management.” In a struggle between “parchment pro-
visions” and “public necessity” necessity will invariably win out. When certain actions are de-
manded by the force of events, political leaders will take them whether or not constitutionally
authorized to do so. History proves, Hamilton writes, that:
Nations pay little regard to rules and maxims calculated in their very nature to run
counter to the necessities of society. Wise politicians will be cautious about fetter-
ing the government with restrictions that cannot be observed, because they know
that every breach of fundamental laws, thought dictated by necessity, impairs that
sacred reverence which ought to be maintained in the breast of rulers towards the
constitution of a country, and forms a precedent for other breaches where the
same plea of necessity does not exist at all, or is less urgent and palpable.
A constitution which is not comprehensive enough to meet the dangers posed by extraordi-
nary events will soon lose, through the precedent of disobedience, much of its restraining
force even in ordinary times. According to Rossiter, the principle of constitutional dictatorship
finds its rationale in these three fundamental facts: 
[F]irst, the complex system of government of the democratic, constitutional state is essen-
tially designed to function under normal, peaceful conditions, and is often unequal to the
exigencies of a great national crisis.… Therefore, in time of crisis a democratic, consti-
tutional government must be temporarily altered to whatever degree is necessary to over-
come the peril and restore normal conditions. This alteration invariably involves
government of a stronger character; that is, the government will have more power
and the people fewer rights.28
A properly framed constitution must, then, embrace two distinct and conflicting character-
istics. It must genuinely channel and moderate governmental power while at the same time
assuring that, according to Federalist no. 31, “it contain in itself every power requisite to the
full accomplishment of the objects committed to its care … free from every other control but
a regard to the public good and to the sense of the people.” The need to limit authority does
not imply a need to weaken it. This is not to say that the Constitution, as Lincoln noted, “is
different in time of insurrection or invasion from what it is in time of peace and public security,”
but rather that “the constitution is different, in its application in cases of Rebellion or Invasion,
involving Public Safety, from what it is in times of profound peace and public security.”29
The Founders’ solution was to make the executive the key to achieving both limited (for
normal or routine issues) and forceful (for issues of crisis or regime legitimation) govern-
ment. By establishing the legislature as the de jure “supreme power,” but then restricting it to
the formulation of general rules, the executive was made responsible for much of the real
work of government, i.e. its day-to-day operations. In consequence, Article II that sets out the
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bulk of presidential powers under the Constitution should be read as containing a set of prin-
ciples which both restrain and empower.
First, the office is to carry out the law where it is clear and easily stated. Derived from the
need to remedy the administrative problems occurring under the nation’s first constitution
(the Articles of Confederation), executive power is to serve Congress as an effective but subor-
dinate instrument. The second principle addresses the fact that not all the circumstances of
political life can be foreseen or encompassed by laws. Although the rule of law was designed
expressly to replace personal discretion, the executive must be left sufficient latitude for con-
fronting the unexpected. 
Possessing a legitimate right to mold the commands of legislators,30 this greater independ-
ence signifies an equality — if not, indeed, a superiority — of the executive to the Congress.
To paraphrase Federalist no. 71, executives are expected, ‘to dare to act [their] own opinion
with vigor and decision.’ A then former President Thomas Jefferson would write in 1810:
The question you propose, whether circumstances do not sometimes occur, which
make it a duty in officers of high trust, to assume authorities beyond the law, is
easy of solution in principle, but sometimes embarrassing in practice. A strict ob-
servance of the written laws is doubtless one of the high duties of a good citizen,
but it is not the highest. The laws of necessity, of self-preservation, of saving our
country when in danger, are of higher obligation. To lose our country by a scrupu-
lous adherence to written law would be to lose the law itself, with life, liberty,
property and all those who are enjoying them with us; thus absurdly sacrificing
the end to the means.31
Lincoln would ask half a century later: “Was it possible to lose the nation and yet preserve
the Constitution? By general law, life and limb must be protected, yet often a limb must be
amputated to save a life; but a life is never wisely given to save a limb. I felt that measures
otherwise unconstitutional might become lawful by becoming indispensable to the preserva-
tion of the nation.”32 Theodore Roosevelt would proclaim that the president is “a steward for
the people bound actively and affirmatively to do all he could for the people, and not content
himself with the negative merit of keeping his talents undamaged in a napkin.”33 Wilson put it
this way: “Crisis gives birth and a new growth to statesmanship because they are peculiarly
periods of action … [and] also of unusual opportunity for gaining leadership and a controlling
and guiding influence. . .”34
This sort of prophetic power, which places strong emphasis on the organic quality of politi-
cal life, is enhanced by the absence of any formal internal check. In consciously rejecting a
plural executive or one checked by an executive council, the framers ensured that the presi-
dency would display the elements, they believed, best characterized any well-constructed ex-
ecutive office: “decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch.”35
3) Institutionalized Charisma
To this point the focus has been on defining the dimensions of the prophetic paradigm in
presidential terms. It is appropriate that we now turn to an examination of the limits and haz-
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ards the role encompasses as an institutional practice. The prophetic tongue with which the
American president speaks in his legitimizing role is powerful, emotional, and deeply evoca-
tive. Its mutually reinforcing and balancing concepts of national identity and heroic leader-
ship — of shared experience in memory, present trial, and hope — answer to the needs in the
psychology of all Americans. 
But compelling as it may be the fact remains that the concept of the heroic, charismatic,
prophetic leader, is inherently unstable. It is naturally given to taking those who would oper-
ate in its conceptual terms to the furthest extremes. “Even presidents who are themselves of
mild and pacific nature can get caught up in its demands for clarion call to exalted hopes.”36
When crisis looms, presidents must step forward with a mind set to undertake the work of the
Lord in the name of a people aroused in history. Speaking to the uncertainties of the 1920s,
here is the conservative and constrained Calvin Coolidge (or “silent Cal”):
America seeks no earthly empire built on blood or force. No ambition, no tempta-
tion, lures her to thought of foreign dominations. The legions which she sends
forth are armed not with sword, but with cross. The higher state to which she
seeks the allegiance of all mankind is not of human but of divine origin. She cher-
ishes no purposes save to merit the favor of Almighty God.37
The language of biblical prophecy is, however, narrow. To use it in its own terms and for its
own ends is no great difficulty. To translate it, to move from it to other grammars and vocabu-
laries without loss of meaning, without profound moral compromise is virtually impossible.
Yet this, given the general character of both the American political system and the interna-
tional community, is what presidents are compelled to attempt in order to translate their
 legitimizing efforts into practical courses of political action. Many of the difficulties are lodged
in the office’s first responsibility and primary power: to inspire, focus and legitimize American
enthusiasms. In the forceful words of Richard Nixon, a president “has to take hold of America
before he can move it forward…. He must articulate the nation’s values, define its goals and
marshal its will.”38
In understanding the greatest strength of American people to be its communal vision of it-
self, incumbents come to hold that political consensus is possible in all realms, goals and
methods. If there is a national purpose, if all Americans stand for the same values, all political
discord and divisions can be resolved. Consensus for the prophetic hero comes to mean what
he can convince the people to do. Lyndon Johnson pointedly defined consensus as “first de-
ciding what needed to be done regardless of the political implications and, second, convincing
a majority of the Congress and the American people of the necessity for doing those things.”39
The process of confusing a consensus about ends with a consensus over means is the result
of a truncated presidential perspective that centers on the prophetic hero’s moral mindset. To
be “the one man distillation of the American people” is an inherently difficult and dangerous
claim. George Reedy eloquently describes the gravity of this prophetic disposition: 
The presidential burden does not lie in the workload. It stems from the crushing
responsibility of political decisions, with life and death literally hanging in the bal-
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ance for millions of people. A president is haunted every waking hour of his life by
the fear that he has taken the wrong turn, selected the wrong course, issued the
wrong orders. In the realm of political decision he can turn to no one for authorita-
tive counsel. Only he is authoritative.40
Even the modest and unprepossessing Jimmy Carter was quoted in 1976 to the effect that,
“the president is the only person who can speak with a clear voice to the American people
and set a standard of ethics and morality, excellence and greatness.”41 Two consequences flow
from this centralization of political responsibility. The first is that presidents must not only be
the genuine architects of U.S. policy, but they must approach the policy-making process with
vigor. Here is Franklin Delano Roosevelt: 
We do not distrust the future of essential democracy. The people of the United
States have not failed. In their need they have registered a mandate that they want
direct, vigorous action. They have asked for discipline and direction under leader-
ship. They have made me the present instrument of their wishes. In the spirit of
the gift I take it.42
George W. Bush put it this way: “If America is under attack, my job as the President is to
protect the homeland, to find out the facts, and to deal with it in a firm way.”43 Strong leaders
do not tarry with indecision; they weigh the alternative, choose a line of action, and once
committed to it, see it through to the end. Any change in course of action has to be resisted
because it implies error; and error implies incompetence and/or a lack of courage. From his
April 30, 1970 address Nixon states, “Here I stand, I can do no other…. I would rather be a one-
term President and do what I believe is right than to be a two-term President at the cost of see-
ing America become a second rate power.”44 Here is George W. Bush two weeks before
hostilities got under way in Iraq in 2003: 
The risk of doing nothing, the risk of hoping that Saddam Hussein changes his
mind and becomes a gentle soul, the risk that somehow — that will make the
world safer is a risk I’m not willing to take for the American people … I think the
threat is real. And so do a lot of other people in my government. And since I be-
lieve the threat is real, and since my most important job is to protect the security
of the American people, that’s precisely what we’ll do.45
When asked, in his news conference of April 13, 2004, by a reporter to indicate his biggest
mistake after September 11 (given the absence of a “first shot” or “smoking gun” in the rush to
war with Iraq), Bush replied: 
I wished you had given me this question ahead of time, so I could plan for it. John,
I’m sure historians will look back and say, gosh, he could have done it better this
way, or that way. You know, I just — I’m sure something will pop into my head
here in the midst of this press conference, with all the pressures of trying to come
up with an answer, but it hasn’t yet.46
The second consequence that flows from centralized responsibility is that incumbents, as
Doris Kearns observed of one president, “are unable to foresee the possibility of resentment
based, not on objections to [their] social goals or to the practicality of specific measures, but
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on hostility to the implicit assertion of increased central authority to define the general welfare
and confer benevolences which, however desirable in themselves, should not be imposed by
presidential will.”47 The independent role of Congress is delegitimized. As Samuel Kernell has
noted, this type of leadership “usurps [congress members’] prerogatives of office, denies their
role as representatives and questions their claim to reflect the interests of their constituents.”
At best Congress is reduced to being viewed as the handmaid of the president and at worst —
should it be bent on doing its duty — an outright obstacle in the way of progress. Truman
would defend his actions to deploy troops in Korea without consulting Congress by stating:
“The congressional power to declare war has fallen into abeyance because wars are no longer
declared in advance.”48 When confronted with criticism for disregarding congressional advice
and consent in ordering troops into Cambodia, Nixon’s administrative spokesman concluded:
“It is not the proper posture for anyone to correct the President of the United States.”49
This situation is compounded by the fact that there is little in the root Hebrew tradition to
give prophetic or charismatic leadership a rational, principled, and above all, restrained con-
tent. Indeed, the record in the Bible of Hebrew leaders is on balance an unhappy one. Abraham
Heschel observes, “To be a prophet is both a distinction and an affliction. The mission he per-
forms is distasteful to him and repugnant to others; no reward is promised him and no reward
could temper its bitterness.” 50 All too often content is to be filled by pure faith, love, anger,
fear, daring, and exalted intuition. To be sure, combinations such as these make for high drama.
They also make, as Roelofs reminds us, “for extremes of megalomania and paranoia, however
disguised.”51
When Moses came down from the mountain and found the people worshipping the golden
calf, his anger was kindled. He ground up the calf into powder, put it in water, and made the
people drink it. More than that, he stood in the gate of the camp and said, “Who is on the
Lord’s side? Come to me.” He then made the sons of Levi go to and fro through the camp and
slay every man his brother and every man his companion and every man his neighbor.
Thousands fell (Exodus 32: 19-29). Is this what a modern critic would call a proportionate re-
sponse — or vengeance of the Lord?
In presidential terms, the lack of prophetic restraint creates an almost insidious mentality
in situations threatening war. It tilts those possessed by it to prefer decisive, military solutions.
Enemies are dehumanized, condemned not only for what they have done but also for being
themselves evil. In a press conference the day after September 11, 2001, Bush said, “The delib-
erate and deadly attacks which were carried out yesterday against our country were more than
acts of terror. They were acts of war … This will be a monumental struggle between good and
evil. But good will prevail.”52 At the national prayer service at the Washington Cathedral, the
President reiterated, “Our responsibility to history is already clear … to answer these attacks
and rid the world of evil.”53 To the nation on September 20, 2001 Bush announced: “This is
not … just America’s fight. And what is at stake is not just America’s freedom. This is the
world’s fight. This is civilization’s fight. This is the fight of all who believe in progress and
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 pluralism, tolerance and freedom.”54 Fortunately, there is no need to debate issues of right
and wrong: “Moral truth” Bush told graduating West Point cadets in 2002, “is the same in every
culture, in every time, and in every place…. We are in a conflict between good and evil, and
America will call evil by its name.”55 So self-evident is the distinction between right and
wrong that Bush expressed utter amazement that others did not see it that way:
I’m amazed that there is such misunderstanding of what our country is about, that
people would hate us … like most Americans, I just can’t believe it. Because I
know how good we are…. We are fighting evil. And these murderers have hijacked
a great religion in order to justify their evil deeds. And we cannot let it stand.56
So too did Dwight Eisenhower express amazement when faced with angry anti-American
demonstrations in the Middle East. He wondered why it was so hard for “people in these
down-trodden countries to like us instead of hating us.”57 Of course, to imagine one’s national
self image in an exemplary manner, that its values are universal is not unique to the United
States. “Every nation-state” as Anders Stephanson notes, “lays some claim to uniqueness, and
some nations or empires, historically, have even considered themselves Higher Authority the
anointed focal point of world or universal history.” 58 [T]o lead the world” in the words of
Woodrow Wilson, “in the assertion of the rights of peoples and the rights of free nations,”59
leads, however, to a blatant disregard for the sovereignty or rights of others. Listen to the
moral certainty couched in the Roosevelt Corollary of 1904:
All this country desires is to see the neighboring countries stable, orderly, and
prosperous. Any country whose people conduct themselves well can count upon
our heady friendship. If a nation shows that it knows how to act with reasonable
efficiency and decency in social and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its
obligations, it need fear no interference from the United States. Chronic wrongdo-
ing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized so-
ciety, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some
civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States
to the Monroe Doctrine may force the U.S., however reluctantly, in flagrant cases
of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power.60
By 1950 the pushing aside of state sovereignty would expand globally. Here is part of the
National Security Council paper 68 — the document that would become the blueprint for the
Cold War: 
In a shrinking world, which now faces the threat of atomic warfare, it is not an ade-
quate objective merely to seek to check the Kremlin design, for the absence of
order among nations is becoming less and less tolerable. This fact imposes on us,
in our own interests, the responsibility of world leadership. It demands that we
make the attempt, accept the risks inherent in it, to bring about order and justice
by means consistent with the principles of freedom and democracy….
Even if there were no Soviet Union we would face the great problem of the free
society, accentuated many fold in this industrial age, of reconciling order, security,
the need for participation, with the requirements of freedom. We would face the
fact that in a shrinking world the absence of order among nations is becoming less
and less tolerable.61
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Thus endowed with prophetic vision, Eisenhower would authorize a CIA operation to over-
throw the Iranian leadership. Lyndon Johnson would worry that unless the Vietnamese com-
munists were put in their place, revolutionaries everywhere would “sweep over the US and
take what we have.”62 Faced with the election of a socialist president of Chile in 1970, Presi -
dent Nixon would determine that the United States could not accept the result. It was irre-
sponsible, so he reasoned, since Allende had been elected with only 36 percent of the vote in
a three-way race. Shortly after Allende was overthrown and died (although apparently without
direct U.S. involvement) Operation Condor began. Under Operation Condor, Latin American
dictators banded together, with the knowledge and approval of U.S. leaders, to carry out politi-
cal assassinations of Pinochet’s opponents who were active outside of Chile.63 It is but a short
step to the remarks of Richard Haass, a senior state department official, in 2002:
Sovereignty entails obligations. One is not to massacre your own people. Another
is not to support terrorism in any way. If a government fails to meet these obliga-
tions, then it forfeits some of the normal advantages of sovereignty, including the
right to be left alone in your own territory. Other governments, including the
United States, gain the right to intervene. In the case of terrorism, this can even
lead to a right of preventive, or peremptory, self-defense. You essentially can act in
anticipation if you have grounds to think it’s a question of when, and not if, you’re
going to be attacked. 64
In his address to the nation on September 20, 2001, Bush would first make this ultimatum
to Islamic fundamentalist Taliban government of Afghanistan: “Give the United States full
 access to terrorist training camps, so we can make sure they are no longer operating. These
demands are not open to negotiation or discussion. The Taliban must act, and act immediately.
They will hand over the terrorists, or they will share in their fate.” The president would then
go on in charismatic presentation to say:
We will starve terrorists of funding, turn them one against another, drive them
from place to place, until there is no refuge or no rest. And we will pursue nations
that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation, in every region, now has
a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this
day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be re-
garded by the United States as a hostile regime. 65
From the perspective of Mosaic paradigm, American presidents must be unflinching and
unyielding as they prove themselves and the nation worthy of the mantle of history. There
can be no negotiations, surrender must be unconditional. In thinking about current U.S. ac-
tions it is important to not simply view them through the prism of political realism (that is,
the U.S. is merely acting like a normal state that has achieved a position of dominance), or
that it is an accident of history (that is, the new American stance was precipitated, if not
caused by the interaction between the terrorist attacks, the election of George W. Bush, and
the influence of neoconservatives in the White House), or that there has always been both a
strong pull and precedent in the direction of unilateralism.66 What this paper has aimed to
show is that the general principles and institutional functioning of presidential crisis govern-
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ment is, in Rossiter’s phrase, “political and social dynamite.” “Each incumbent,” as Cronin
 reminds us, “defines and exploits, up to a point, the formal and latent authority that exists in
the … presidency.”67 The question of whether Bush’s leadership will prove to be the most
 effective way to conduct the war on terror is for history to say. It is for us to ask whether the
construction of presidential leadership, as it has been defined within the American political
tradition, is strong and safe for democracy. 
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CONSCIENCE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
ANTIDOTE TO THE TOTALITARIANISM 
OF THE POSITIVIST MIND
 B Y  R O B E RT  J O H N  A R AU J O ,  S . J . *
Now that the court has determined to condemn me, God knoweth how, I will discharge my mind …
concerning my indictment and the King’s title. The indictment is grounded in an Act of Parliament
which is directly repugnant to the Law of God … I am the King’s true subject, and I pray for him
and all the realm … I do none harm, I say none harm, I think none harm … Nevertheless, it is not
for the Supremacy that you have sought my blood — but because I would not bend to the marriage!1
The sphere of action of the State has grown steadily larger until it now threatens to embrace the
whole of human life and to leave nothing whatsoever outside its competence.2
I always say, as you know, that if my fellow citizens want to go to Hell I will help them. It’s my job.3
I. Introduction
The issue of conscience and religious liberty has had a prominent role when conflicts arose
between individuals and the civil authorities about the extent to which an individual had to
endorse publicly particular views favored by the state. Conscience and its frequent compan-
ion, religious liberty, form that core of the person who, with the exercise of right reason guid-
ed by the quest for objective truth and frequently in the exercise of the practice of faith in
God, deliberates and discerns regarding what is right and what is wrong and formulates the
belief that guides one’s path in life. The path chosen and the choices made along the way
clearly have an impact on the individual and his life; moreover, one person’s exercise of con-
science can have a bearing on the lives of other individuals and society at large. 
The exercise of conscience within a legal system that affirms religious liberty has often
presented itself as a difficult task when conflicts arose between the individual’s exercise of
conscience and faith and the expectations of the civil authorities. Often, this has taken place
when an individual had to endorse publicly the views favored by the state which this individ-
ual could not endorse. People like Thomas More and Rosa Parks were brought before the law
because they disagreed with some rule that they knew was unjust or wrong in some impor-
tant way. In spite of pressure, they maintained their position, typically in a quiet and dignified
way. They reinforced their positions with reason and objectivity. Any public message they
conveyed was done without violence, pressure, vitriol, or sensation. It was accomplished
through the harmonious synthesis of mind, heart, and soul. 
The objective of this paper is to examine the exercise of conscience and religious liberty in
a particular light — removed from the drama and heroism — of peaceful civil disobedience.
My effort is designed to look at the nature of properly formed conscience and the corresponding
exercise of religious freedom and what it may mean in the context of the legal setting of the
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United States today. The dual expression of conscience and the exercise of religious belief is
often relied upon as a defense when the law and its rules — the fruit of positive law — go in
one direction but the person of high principles, scruples, and ethics chooses to go the opposite
or a different way. 
In other contexts, this manifestation may be a mechanism by which an individual defends
resistance to an unjust law. The manner in which conscience and religious liberty are and
will be exercised in the future continues to evolve. This is due, in part, to what I perceive as
an emerging danger residing in a new type of totalitarianism that confronts and finds a home
in western democracies, including that in the United States. I suggest however that the proper
exercise of conscience and religious freedom may just be the antidote the United States, and,
for that matter, the rest of the world, need to avert the form of totalitarianism that beckons the
present age.
Let me continue by providing my explanation of the nature of conscience and religious
freedom. Consider the example of the lunch counter civil rights activists of half a century ago.
They attempted to sit and dine where the law forbade because of their race. The law was de-
fied, and the justification for the defiance was frequently rooted in conscience and belief in
the justice of God — the need to take action and show why the law and its application are
wrong and why those who are disobedient are justified in their defiance. 
But conscience and religious belief can be manifested in more subtle ways. Thomas More,
unlike the lunch counter protesters, took no action in defiance of the law. He merely chose
not to do something which the civil law mandated to justify a problematic marriage desired
by the King. For the most part during the legal controversy involving King Henry’s marital sit-
uation, More chose to remain silent, but he prayed for God’s guidance. He had no public quar-
rel with Parliament or the King, and he said nothing about the propriety or impropriety of the
Act of Succession until after he was convicted of treason. He recognized that both the King
and Parliament had proper roles in the making of law — human, positive law. If Parliament
said that the King were God, he would not have interfered, even though, in the exercise of rea-
son, conscience, and faith, More knew that this could not be. But when Parliament said the
King rather than the Pope was head of the Church and commanded More to declare openly
his agreement by subscribing to a public oath that conflicted with his convictions about the
respective authorities of the Church and the King, he could not comply. This was due to the
fact that in his conscience and because of his faith More also knew that he was subject to
God’s law, and to make such a declaration would violate the higher law that More, and for that
matter everyone else, was bound to follow. Whether they chose to follow the way of More or a
totalitarian law was up to them.
These cases of Rosa Parks, the lunch counter protesters, and Thomas More provide insight
into the nature of law in a democratic society as it relates to the exercise of conscience and
the religious faith that is often its companion. Fundamentally, democratic societies need law.
Typically, the law is often considered a good, or at least a necessity, which promotes an ordered
292
T H E  A M E R I C A N  E X P E R I M E N T:  R E L I G I O U S  F R E E D O M
society whose objective is to protect all its members and their peaceful coexistence with one
another. Normative principles that are known in advance through the promulgation of law
guide everyone including those who make, administer, and decide under the law. By way of
illustration of one fundamental principle, both the Decalogue4 and the common sense under-
lying most democratic systems, dictate that one person should not kill another human unless
it is absolutely necessary in the act of self-defense. 
This basic principle, also found in Judaism and Christianity, has a wide appeal in civil society
and leads the lawmaker to declare that homicide is a criminal act, the commission of which is
punishable by law. However, there may be occasions when, in conscience, a person might be
justified in taking the life of another. One illustration would be the law-abiding citizen who is
accosted by an assailant who intends to kill our model citizen. The only way in which the lat-
ter can repel the attack is through the use of deadly force because any other alternative would
be ineffective under these circumstances. It might be said that conscience has justified the
homicide in this case because an internal sense or conviction leads the would-be victim to the
conclusion that it is good to live and that, while regrettable, it is essential to take the life of the
assailant if no alternative is present in order to preserve the would-be victim’s life. This exer-
cise of conscience supports justification of what the intended victim did, which considered by
itself, would normally contravene the law against taking human life. But, in fact, civil law typ-
ically provides a rationale for taking human life through the principle of justifiable self-defense
when it is essential to the preservation of the innocent. Here, conscience and the law coincide
in that the exercise of conscience is protected by the civil law. 
In the contemporary world of the twenty-first century, the law also may be viewed as
something that promotes the common good or welfare even though it may cause inconven-
ience to some individuals (e.g. legal requirement to pay taxes) or outright frustrations to others
(e.g. legal prohibition against robbing banks). It can also be concluded that good laws respect
human dignity, the exercise of conscience and the need for religious liberty, which often
 accompanies the exercise of conscience. At this stage, we can begin to assemble some core
principles about the law and the good citizen whose conscience has been informed by religion.
Typically the good citizen dutifully complies with the law. This person greets in friendly atti-
tude all that come his way and is a productive member of the community and contributes
physically and spiritually to the common good. But then one day, obedience to law demands
that this person compromise on a principle the individual holds dearly. It is not simply the
authority saying “you must think this way” and leave it at that (for then the person could go
on thinking as before), but the authority now insists, “You must do it this way, and if not, you
will have to face consequences that are not of your liking for the force of the law is against you.”
This is the story of Thomas More, but it likely is the story of many others less well known
to us and to history. The three quotations that appear at the beginning of this essay set the
stage for what is to follow. I begin this examination with the exercise of conscience by Thomas
More. Thomas More was lawyer, husband, father, statesman, legislator, judge, and saint. He
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was scrupulous in what he did in all these contexts. But one day, his reasoned intellect in-
formed him that he could not publicly assert what he believed in his reasoned judgment to be
a falsehood about the sanctity of marriage — especially the one between King Henry and
Queen Catherine — and the proper authority of the Church. If he could say nothing, which
was the course he preferred to take, he may have retained his high status in the community
and died an old man in his bed surrounded by the company of his family and friends. But be-
cause he would not bend to something that the positive civil law required, he was declared a
traitor, tried, sentenced and executed under the law. The first quotation cited at the beginning
captures the essence of the exercise of properly formed conscience. 
And this brings us to the second quotation appearing in the introduction of this essay.
Christopher Dawson — who was the first holder of the Charles Chauncey Stillman Professor
of Roman Catholic Theological Studies at Harvard University — was a gifted student of history
and of his times. He understood well the threats that the nascent National Socialist Party, the
Communists in Russia, and the Fascists in Italy posed not only within their own countries but
also throughout the world. He expressed his insights about these dangers in much of his
 writing. But he also warned that even the western democracies could duplicate, in their own
fashion, enormous challenges and menace to religious faith as expressed through the exercise
of conscience. 
In the present moment, we accept as essential to the democracy we expect and enjoy —
 although the reality sometimes leaves much to be desired — that the law cannot transgress
into certain places (as it did in Germany, Russia, and Italy) because the law and the state are
instruments and servants of humanity. The human family is not the vassal of the state or the
law it promulgates; it is the master with the state, government and law as servants. But in
Germany, in Russia, and, to a lesser extent, in Italy, the state (or the “party”), exceeding its
rightful role, claimed the sustaining of its existence to be the paramount justification of human
existence. Humanity was understood to serve the state; the state did not exist to be the servant
of humanity. The state and its highly centralized authority determined not only what people
must do but also what they must think — and if they thought and acted contrary to the views
and dictates of the state, they would do so at their peril. 
When this constriction adversely impacts on the moral decisions properly formed by con-
science and religious faith, the state is a totalitarian one, in spite of the fact that the state in-
sists that it governs by law that is both knowable and known. And this brings the present
examination to a consideration about the role of positivism in the totalitarian system — where
the law is made and exists simply because the lawmaker presents the law without any further
evaluation of its impact on society. The law’s objective is not to serve society and the com-
mon good but to achieve the goal of the uniformity mandated by the state. Here the positivist
mind of the lawmaker exercises a will but not a moral intellect for justification of a rule. 
Although he has been highly regarded as a skilled lawyer and jurist, Justice Holmes’s
 observation, in the correspondence quoted in the prelude to this paper, captures the essence
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of the kind of positive law that does not venture farther from the pen or computer keyboard
of the drafter. The law is what the lawmaker says and, without further evaluation or critique,
that is that. The lawmaker who so engages the lawmaking process in this fashion has the
 positivist mind of which I speak. And when the law made by this type of person evolves to
mandate a uniform adherence from which there is no dissent, the political system in which
this law is promulgated is a totalitarian one. 
One might think that the matters I raise here are of no concern to the Americans of the
early twenty-first century because the totalitarian state is a relic of the past, or so that is the
common belief. Moreover, most law of today is posited because it is the function of the law-
maker to posit. But this is not positivism with which I am concerned where the culture and
citizenry have no ability to evaluate critically, objectively, and morally the law. Positivism
generates a type of human-worship that knows only the mind of the lawmaker and what this
person or group sees as the end of the human purpose. As Dawson suggested, it is the “dominant
prejudices of the moment” rather than some objective and moral compass that guide society.5
This point can be illustrated by the 2003 Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court opinion in
the Goodridge case where the four-member majority asserted that “civil marriage is an evolv-
ing paradigm” and redefined marriage to include unions of homosexual couples.6 The conclu-
sion of the court and the declaration it used to justify its decision is a display of the positivist
spirit of which I speak. This approach to law making is the basis of the totalitarian state’s
legal, positivist system. But surely the world of today does not have to worry about such
 matters, does it? And if it did, would not the exercise of conscience/religious liberty and the
ability to object through their exercise as guaranteed by applicable law of the United States
make this problem disappear at least in the domestic context?
Conscience and faith are at that core of the person who, with the exercise of right reason
guided by the quest for objective truth,7 deliberates and discerns regarding what is right and
what is wrong and formulates the beliefs that guide one’s path in life. The path chosen and
the choices made clearly have an impact on the individual and his life; however, they can also
have a bearing on the lives of others. The exercise of conscience and religious freedom en-
dorsed here is not the one that permits a person to conclude that one has the right to do what-
ever one’s conscience instructs simply because this conscience decides this. This is precisely
what John Courtney Murray warned about in his commentary on the Declaration on Religious
Freedom (Dignitatis Humanae Personae) promulgated by the Second Vatican Council. As Father
Murray stated, 
[T]he Declaration nowhere lends its authority to the theory for which the phrase
frequently stands, namely, that I have the right to do what my conscience tells me
to do, simply because my conscience tells me to do it. This is a perilous theory. Its
particular peril is subjectivism — the notion that, in the end, it is my conscience,
and not the objective truth, which determines what is right or wrong, true or false.8
The peril of this view of conscience in the context of religious liberty, as demonstrated by
Father Murray, is that it is purely subjective and makes no provision for considering the
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 objective truth extending beyond one’s self that is needed to determine what is right and
wrong not only “for me” but for everyone who may be affected by the exercise of individual
conscience. Otherwise the exercise of conscience risks confusing falsehood and wrong with
truth and right. A person has the right to express the view of his conscience and to say the
other person is wrong. In doing so, the individual who has relied on the objective truth may
also have to be prepared to be persecuted — as was the case of those who objected to many of
the policies of National Socialism in Germany — when they asserted, based on conscience
and religious belief, that the state and its enforcement arm were wrong. But the threat of per-
secution or the persecution itself is not sufficient to preclude the exercise of these rights of
conscience and religious freedom as I have explained them. Surely there is a need for public
peace and security, but when properly understood and used, conscience and faith, objectively
formed, pose no threat to the common good. In fact, they enhance and safeguard it.
Let me now provide a few illustrations of the exercise of conscience to demonstrate between
those claims of conscience which are not objective and those which are based on this objec-
tive truth that is claimed by religious liberty. While people have the right to claim conscience,
the question is whether their exercise is founded on “objective truth” or on individual fancy. 
Private Smith is a vegetarian. No one in the service requires Smith to eat meat; however,
she is required one day to serve Kitchen Police duty and refuses, in conscience, to assist the
cook in preparing the meat loaf dinner. This is an exercise of conscience not based on objec-
tive truth but, rather, on personal preference and conviction. The case of Private Jones is
quite another matter. He is a member of an elite unit sent to a dangerous assignment to pur-
sue terrorist suspects. His unit finds a terrorist suspect, and he joins in the apprehension.
Eventually a superior decides to use interrogation techniques that violate applicable legal
norms for the permissible extraction of information. Jones resists participation in these activ-
ities and demurs based on an objectively formed conscience. He realizes that his superior
may reprimand and punish him, but Jones, in the reliance on good conscience, cannot unduly
harm the suspect who has been apprehended, for in his conscience and his religious upbringing,
he knows that there are permissible ways of interrogating the prisoner and those that are not.
The subject of conscience and religious freedom that I am addressing deals with the matter
of where no government authority should go — into the innermost convictions of those who
are its citizens, subjects, and ultimately masters. The state may properly ask for citizens’ alle-
giance on issues of public import affecting the common good, but the state ought not to go
any further. The manifestation of conscience and religious belief is a fundamental right. The
state does not confer it; its source is not the state. Its foundation is in authentic human nature,
authored by the Creator. And for those who make no claim to and even deny any theistic belief,
I say this: the state did not create you; it is neither your author nor your final master. What
the state cannot give, the state cannot lawfully retrieve even though it tries to on occasion. 
II. A Basic Understanding of Conscience and Religious Liberty
The need to have a clearer understanding of conscience and its companion religious liberty is
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now in order. Conscience and the correlative religious freedom must be more than simply
subjective views and beliefs, particularly when one considers the reality that some people
may believe strange things that should not be put into practice as John Courtney Murray sug-
gested. Conscience and religious liberty do not confer the freedom to believe in whatever one
chooses to believe simply because an interior and personal directive says so. These exercises
are guided by pure subjectivity. For example, someone may consider that, in conscience, it is
permissible to do terrible acts such as to rape, kill, or steal. The justifications for these acts
that threaten others are flimsy. Authentic conscience is far more than a thin veil to follow
whatever is the fancy of the individual. A major source of the corruption of conscience is that
it is based on a purely subjective approach to what is right and what is wrong — there is no
safeguard other than the individual who regulates the exercise of conscience and determines
what it means and what it does not.9 This point is noted throughout the Declaration on
Religious Liberty.
In the United States today, the exercise of false conscience is exemplified by the famous
Casey dicta: there is “a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty
which the government may not enter.”10 Had the Court plurality stopped there, this dictum
may not have become the problem that exists today. However, the plurality continued in its
elaboration of what it meant by “liberty.” This personal liberty is premised on additional
Casey dicta stating that, “At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of exis-
tence, of meaning of the universe, and the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters
could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the
State.”11 While Justice Kennedy may have been correct in placing some limit on what the state
can do in the formulation of liberty, critical thinking, right reason, and points of reference be-
yond the purely subjective assuredly have a role in determining the boundaries of personal
liberty. The Casey dicta offers no guidance when the conceptions of liberty offered by two or
more persons following the decision’s roadmap end up on a collision course. The highly sub-
jective Casey definition of liberty is not a desirable method of finding out what conscience
means and what it does not.
One can begin to ask some questions about conscience and the degree to which it can be
exercised without running afoul of the limitations on some acts which can restrain the proper
exercises of conscience. This investigation raises a distinction between active and passive ex-
ercises of the right to conscience. The active exercise might be characterized in this fashion:
“not only will I disobey the rule that conflicts with my conscience, I will be proactive against
the rule; if the rule states that I cannot do something, I will, out of an active exercise of con-
science, do that which is forbidden by the law.” This could be a legitimate exercise of conscience
or it could simply be the act of a non-conformist. In contrast to the active exercise is the pas-
sive exercise of conscience. It typically surfaces in those cases where the person exercises
conscience by stating: “I will not do that which is required, but I will do nothing else contrary
to that which is required; I will simply not act.” In the case of active exercise, the state may
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take action to arrest the activity that the conscientious objector pursues. In the case of passive
exercise, the state may coerce the conscientious objector into doing what the rule requires.
Another way of considering these two forms of the exercise of conscience can be viewed as
active conscience having a person do something not in conformity with the rule. With the
passive exercise, the rule requires an action, but the objector does not visibly respond to the
situation.
In both active and passive exercises, there is disobedience to the law. Even though the con-
scientious objector is in some fashion being disobedient, this individual is still a citizen or a
member of society. He may very likely be concerned about the society, but he fears the im-
pact that the rule, which is actively or passively being disobeyed, will have on the society. 
I would like to illustrate this point with a story about England and the Second World War.
Many years ago, an elderly woman, who was a retired member of the English faculty at
Oxford University, befriended me. We would get together from time to time so that I could
celebrate the Eucharist for her since she was housebound. After Mass, we would have some
refreshments, and she would tell me many stories about her past. She was a woman of pro-
found faith, and she did not miss much about the ups and downs of human existence. She
grew up in Oxford and escaped the devastation of London during the blitz. One day when we
were outside, she looked up into the sky and said that Oxford was a target of the Luftwaffe
since it was an industrial center as well as the home to a great teaching and research university;
nevertheless, the city was spared. She explained why she thought this to be the case. Either
the Luftwaffe pilots and targeting officers were terribly bad at their assignment or they were
exceedingly good, moral men who saved Oxford and its environs. She doubted that they were
bad at their craft because her husband had been in the Royal Air Force and informed her
 otherwise. They likely represented passive conscience because they did not deliver the ord-
nance to the intended targets — they refused to drop the bombs on the city and its center of
learning and research. They also represented active conscience because they knew they
could not return to their home base with a complement of bombs still on board their aircraft,
so they did what they were not supposed to do and probably dropped their bombs in the
English Channel rather than on the intended targets. 
III. Challenges to Conscience and Religious Liberty in the United States
We begin in this segment of my presentation by recalling the Pledge of Allegiance cases in-
volving the objections of Jehovah’s Witnesses and the array of cases dealing with young men
who claimed conscientious objector status during the Viet Nam War. In the case of the Pledge
cases, the conscientious objectors based their position on religious claims that forbade wor-
ship of graven images — in these cases, the flag of the United States. In the context of the draft
cases, some complainants based their claim on religious grounds against all combat; others
based the religious claim not on war in general but to a particular war (Viet Nam)12; however,
others did not establish their claim on any religious belief, but they maintained their opposi-
tion to war on the basis of a humanist (secular) conscience.13 As the Court worked its way
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through these cases, which often presented different circumstances about and attitudes of the
claimants, the decisions, while not necessarily in neat accord with one another, gave some in-
dication of how an argument based on conscience could insulate a young man from military
service and how it could not. 
Today in the early twenty-first century, new issues are emerging that pertain to the exercise
of conscience by medical personnel and pharmacists who object to certain medical practices
(in particular, abortion or assisted suicide/euthanasia) or to the distribution of pharma ceuticals
that destroy nascent human life.14 Waiting in the wings are cases about mandates to perform
marriages of same-sex couples. I suspect the list will grow. 
Over the past several months, ominous developments regarding “conscience exceptions”
have been emerging, and the state legislatures and Congress have been responding. Abortion
providers such as the Planned Parenthood Federation (PPF), have been alarmed by the exer-
cise of conscience clause protections invoked by pharmacists, physicians, and other health
care providers that would excuse them from having to give “emergency contraception” to
women who request these agents. PPF has argued, “Prescription refusal is a disturbing trend
that can jeopardize woman’s (sic) reproductive health.”15 Apparently, the jeopardy to the
health of the infant is of little or no consequence. The same report of PPF also raises a chal-
lenge to religious liberty by noting that access to “reproductive health care diminishes as an
increasing number of non-religiously affiliated hospitals are merging with Catholic hospitals.”16
PPF has asserted that while it believes that individuals have the right to their own opinions
and moral beliefs, “it is unethical for health care providers to stand in the way of a woman’s
access to safe, effective, legal, and professional health care” as PPF defines it.17 PPF supported
the efforts of the Illinois Governor who issued an executive order requiring health care
providers and pharmacies in that state to dispense “emergency contraception” and other birth
control pharmaceuticals.18 It is clear that many of the health care providers who have object-
ed to prescribing or dispensing abortifacients are doing so out of conscience or religious or
moral conviction. 
When the democratic state has alternatives to obtain the goals (and “orthodoxy”) it pursues
in these kinds of debatable situations, should it not respect the innermost convictions of those
persons who choose to be excused for reasons substantiated on conscience and religious con-
victions? This claim is all the more substantiated when one acknowledges that there are
 medical providers and pharmacists who are willing to perform the services demanded by
some. To put the point candidly: if some are willing to take actions that threaten human life
and the law permits this, should the law not also recognize and respect those members of the
society who, in the exercise of conscience and religious belief, elect not to participate in these
activities that someone else will readily perform? The answer would appear to be yes. If the
legislature has the competence to say the governor is the head of the state, why should the
 citizen be required to swear in a public oath that this is indeed the case? If the state is able to
secure goals the positive law deems legal, should all persons be made to comply when these
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goals are not interfered with when persons of conscience based on religious belief ask to be
excused? Surely this protection seems consistent with a fair and objective reading of the First
Amendment which declares that Congress shall make no law prohibiting the free exercise of
religion.
The right to conscience and the exercise of religious liberty are also protected under inter-
national law, which has some bearing on these rights within the United States. For example,
one needs to consider Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) which
states: “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right in-
cludes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community
with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice,
worship and observance.” The rights conferred by this text have both public and private
 dimensions. There is the private component of “innermost conviction,” and there is the pub-
lic expression of it. Importantly, this text correlates to principles found in the Declaration on
Religious Liberty promulgated at the Second Vatican Council. 
Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)19 duplicates
much of this provision from the UDHR. Although the ICCPR contains some limitation on the
exercise of the right when “necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the
fundamental rights and freedoms of others” in accordance with the law, this limitation itself is
subject to the “non-derogation” provisions of Article 4 of the ICCPR. 
The drafters of the UDHR realized on the one hand that no one could ever really know
what beliefs or thoughts a person had (unless of course they were extracted by unlawful
means such as torture); however, they realized that a person’s innermost convictions would
mean little if the holder had to proclaim in a public manner a contrary position. As Professor
Johannes Morsink concludes in his book, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which
studies the travaux prèparatoires of the UDHR, “Behind this seemingly innocuous right lies the
profound right not to be compelled to profess a belief or ideology which one does not hold.”20
The drafters of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights agreed with René Cassin, a French
delegate and member of the drafting committee, that a person should not be compelled to do
something indirectly that one could not be forced to do directly.21 And this point reiterates a
theme presented by Pope Benedict XVI in his address at Regensburg in September of 2006
when he quoted the Koran in which it is stated, “there is no compulsion in religion.” When
one carefully considers what the Holy Father said, with the backdrop of the Declaration on
Religious Liberty in mind, the prohibition against compulsion means two things. The first is
that no one, individually or in community, should be forced to believe in something to which
they cannot subscribe. The second follows: no one, individually or in community, should be
forbidden to believe in something that is important to them particularly when this belief is
founded on the basis of right reason.
IV. The Problem — A New Form of Totalitarianism 
As already suggested, we live in a nation of positive law. Typically Congress and the state leg-
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islatures promulgate or posit the law, and judges interpret and apply this law when disputes
about its meaning arise. This is an accepted way of life in our democratic and legal culture.
Positive law is the vehicle by which the natural law — as objectively derived by right reason —
is articulated and appropriately implemented; this is essential to the success of any democratic
institution where faith and reason are accepted as compatible and cooperative members of
the body politic. A significant problem arises, however, when a singular reliance on positive
law, unchecked by the application of right reason, leads to positivism. This concern was ad-
dressed by H. L. A. Hart in his discussion of the Nazi regime and post-war Germany where he
stated, “Wicked men enact wicked rules which others will enforce.”22 Even Hart, a strong
 advocate for positive law, conceded that in dealing with the abuse of power and law making
authority exercised by the Nazi regime, obedience is not simply contingent on “legal validity;”
it may also require some kind of moral scrutiny that transcends the official legal system.23
This abuse of power can exist even in a democratic state where free thinking based on con-
science and religious belief may not only not be welcome but not tolerated. Professor Michael
Scaperlanda, who holds the Gene and Elaine Edwards Family Chair in Law at University of
Oklahoma, has carefully studied and written about this phenomenon in the context of parents
desiring to use vouchers to educate their children in the manner they deem proper for the
younger members of their family.24
Tudor England provides a framework for a related abuse of power that ignored objective
right reason and moral scrutiny in the making of law by an elected assembly, Parliament.
From Thomas More’s perspective, it was not only possible but also necessary for the law that
Parliament made to reflect the harmonious relationship between human law and the law of
right reason. In More’s mind the connection between the two bodies of law was both indis-
pensable and compatible. But the Act of Succession unsettled this balance for him and many
others in the realm. More initially believed that he could ignore the Act (an exercise of passive
conscience), which would continue on its course without any further expression of opinion
from him. Perhaps that would have been to his liking; however, the King, or those close asso-
ciates advising him, demanded a public endorsement, and therein lay the problem. Not the
reason for the law but, rather, the King’s and Parliament’s ability to make and enforce it became
the justification for obedience to the law — and this is the hallmark of the positivist state. 
A significant problem began to emerge for More when this approach was subject to his dis-
creet moral scrutiny that was an essential part of his public and private life. But the King and
Parliament would not permit this; and they concluded that private views critical of the Act
had to be neutralized and eradicated by a public oath of allegiance proclaimed by the citizens,
and most assuredly by those in prominent positions within society like Thomas More.
More’s refusal to profess publicly the oath would expose his innermost conviction that the
Act and its underlying justification were seriously flawed. But if More could remain silent and
preserve his religiously formed conscience, no one would ever know his conviction against
the Act, and the law andMore’s life could continue. By this time More’s public allegiance be-
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came a crucial element of the Act’s success, Henry’s England had evolved into a totalitarian
state in which conscience was no longer a protection for inner conviction. For the King, there
was “a canker in the body politic, and he would have it out.”25 The process he adopted for its
extraction was totalitarianism. Public support of and allegiance to the law was required, and
there would be no exception. Thought, action, and belief had to be uniform — this is the hall-
mark of totalitarianism.
Totalitarianism is a dictatorship that relies on a centralized, universal control of all aspects
of public life that can include the disclosure of even the “innermost convictions” of society’s
members.26 The totalitarian state often conjures means of ensuring public endorsement of its
control by demanding the uniform support of all over whom the state exercises dominion.
The oath required by the Act of Succession in Tudor England guaranteed the uniformity and
cohesion within society is an important component of the totalitarian state.27
In spite of efforts at universal and central control, there often remain elements of the society
that preserve a moral force and function as a counterpoint to the pressure of this state. In the
context of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union there were religious and intellectual groups
who served as counterpoints, usually at their peril. By pursuing their goals, the members of
these groups themselves faced persecution and annihilation if discovered by the state’s en-
forcement mechanisms. What they thought and believed could never become public if their
views were to survive. Perhaps with knowledge of this, those states pursued means of discov-
ering ways of forcing disclosure so that uniformity and cohesion of action and belief would be
guaranteed. 
Christopher Dawson, who spent a career studying conscience, religious faith, and public
life, noted that in more modern times, Christianity needed to become an underground move-
ment in order to survive.28 But Dawson properly conceded that Christianity as a way of life is
ultimately faced with a dilemma in that the display of conscience that goes along with it can-
not always be concealed. He recognized that not only the totalitarian state but even the mod-
ern, democratic state “is not satisfied with passive obedience; it demands full co-operation
from the cradle to the grave.”29 Dawson continued by stating that such obedience often was
necessary to avoid being “pushed not only out of modern culture but out of physical existence.”30
In the context of evolving situations in the United States regarding conscience-based excep-
tions on policy issues of the day (e.g. abortion, morning-after pills, public education, and
 marriage to mention but a few issues), Dawson’s words from the first half of the twentieth
century may be an accurate prophecy about the transformation of the democratic world of
the early twenty-first century. The views and beliefs of religiously formed conscience that are
targeted today by the democratic state need not be held by a few isolated individuals; they
can and likely are held by many other persons. In this context, the hallmark of the totalitarian
regime is its plan to eradicate beliefs and actions based on these beliefs. Surely this is the case
with perspectives on abortion, same sex marriage/unions, euthanasia, and the “emergency
contraception” that are more and more becoming not only the permissible policies but the re-
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quirements of the modern state. These are not only interesting times, they are challenging as
well. And how should these challenges be met? With resignation? With defiance? Or, with the
reasoned response of conscience and the exercise of religious liberty? 
V. A Hopeful Response
The exercise of conscience and religious liberty can often, even in democratic countries like
the United States, trigger unexpected and peculiar reactions. If there can be freedom for
“choice” exercised by an individual to take the life of a baby in utero, why should the same
 society prevent freedom of choice for an individual who does not wish to participate in this
action? If there is freedom to marry whomever one wishes, should there not also be the free-
dom to say that there is a problem with this choice? If there is freedom for a person to take
one’s own life, should there not also be the freedom for others to announce that they will
 neither participate nor assist in taking life. 
Let us return to the “mystery of life passage” from Casey. Some might argue that the posi-
tions contained in this dicta of the Supreme Court represent the natural and proper evolution
of the liberal and democratic state and the exercise of conscience,31 but others (perhaps keep-
ing in mind the counsel of Thomas More who suggested that “when statesmen forsake their
own private conscience for the sake of their public duties … they lead their country by a short
route to chaos”32) can reasonably argue that this is not correct.
If American society today would applaud the doctor who, in the exercise of his conscience,
refused to conduct some morally problematic scientific experiment encouraged or required
by the law of a totalitarian state on persons without their consent, why would that same society
disapprove of the doctor who, also in the exercise of conscience, refused to terminate human
life at its early stages when this is permitted by the law of a democratic state that considers
 itself liberal or progressive? Put simply, this society’s action would indicate that it is more
 totalitarian than it is democratic and liberal. This society would be guided by a dangerous sub-
jective whim and caprice that demands uniformity rather than diversity of opinion. It would,
notwithstanding its democratic claims, be a totalitarian society. As John Paul II once said, “the
value of democracy stands or falls with the values which it embodies and promotes.”33 What
values are being promoted today by “liberal democracies” such as the United States? Are they
truly consistent with and respectful of the principles, including the right to conscience and
 religious liberty, that should under gird them?
If some are prepared to cheer the physician depicted in the film “The Cider House Rules”
who, in the exercise of his ether-molded “conscience,” would abort the babies of young,
unwed mothers,34 why could they not also commend the physician who, in the exercise of his
conscience, refuses to associate himself with such actions when the regulatory mechanisms
of the state require the doctor to terminate innocent life that has not given its consent?
Perhaps because, as Dr. Edmund Pellegrino, a physician and ethicist, has cautioned, this kind
of society offers an “immediate utopianism of a man-made heaven on earth” where there is
no world — nothing beyond the here and now.35 In Pellegrino’s view, this kind of utopianism
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determines the secular society’s choices about what is permitted and what is not.36 Pellegrino
has admonished members of liberal democracies that the kinds of policy mandates I have
identified parallel those of totalitarian systems that subverted the use of medical knowledge
to further particular political and economic purposes, which are riddled with grievous errors.37
Dr. Pellegrino, in the company of many other Americans, laments the 1973 decision in Roe
v. Wade that effectively removed all, not just some, prohibitions against abortion.38 Under the
guise of protecting physicians from criminal liability, the decision has been transformed into
the basis of an unrestricted “right” to kill another human being. Pellegrino reminds us that the
decisions in Roe and its progeny are “morally repugnant to many physicians and the public.”39
If there is any question about this, one need only consider the number of attempts which
state legislatures and the Congress have undertaken to regulate the abortion practice and the
judicial responses overturning much of the democratically enacted legislation, which may
not eliminate but regulates abortion practice. By way of illustration of my point, one need
only consult Stenberg v. Carhart40 to survey the degree to which judges are capable of affording
legitimacy to a particularly barbaric form of abortion. For the time being, the legislative con-
scientious objection protections exempting physicians from participation appear to remain
intact. But a chill wind is beginning to precede a coming storm in the lawsuits against phar-
macists who are resisting mandates to dispense contraceptives they believe morally offensive.
Is there any hope that the law might properly respond to this quandary?
Thomas Aquinas’s first principle of the law to do good and avoid evil offers an initial answer
to this important question.41 Of course it is critical to this principle that the good identified
and the associated conscience that is its natural companion of religious belief be well and
properly defined. Otherwise, as Dr. Pellegrino states, errors of conscience can occur when in-
dividuals or groups relying on the “conscience defense” misidentify the good.42 If the good is
misidentified, the subsequent acts based on conscience can also be flawed. And, in societies
that pride themselves in being diverse and pluralistic, such as the United States, the good
identified and the conscience claimed in its support can be mistaken.
Recognizing that there is a potential problem in justly dealing with claims of conscience,
some cases offer clear distinctions about competing claims to the good that may underlie the
exercise of conscience. For example, the highest court of the United States declared in 1973 in
Roe, that the physician, in the exercise of professional judgment, could determine if nascent
human life could be sacrificed. Some would celebrate this as a legitimate exercise of con-
science. However, others would assert that this exercise of conscience is flawed because the
result, mistakenly identified as a good, is in fact not a good from the perspective of the child
who is destroyed. What would happen to the second physician who, in the exercise of her pro-
fessional judgment and conscience, concluded, “I cannot take this life.” Does the “mystery of
life” of Casey supply the sole solution to this predicament? Or, might there be some search for
a solution that goes beyond Casey’s endorsement of exaggerated personal liberty, which takes
little or no recognition of others into the exercise of conscience and religious belief? 
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If Casey remains the solution, would the second physician, like Thomas More, be com-
pelled to bend to the mother’s demand for terminating the pregnancy? If not, it could be said
that the society and its law respect the conscience of all rather than some. If, on the other
hand, the doctor who objects is in some manner compelled to participate in the practice to
which she objects (e.g. referring the patient to a doctor who will perform the abortion), this
society has begun its metamorphosis toward totalitarianism. In this case, the admonition
 attributed to Edmund Burke needs to be taken into account: “All that is necessary for the
 triumph of evil is that good men do nothing.”43
Some may view the labeling as totalitarian the liberal democratic state, which removes
conscience protection from the second doctor, a harsh or unsubstantiated conclusion. But is it
when one considers that this type of state may be pursuing a well-crafted plan that dictates
which beliefs or convictions and actions on those beliefs and convictions are permitted and
which are not? When the modern state can legally insist on the following: that all who sell
prescriptions must provide abortifacients; that all who are physicians must be trained to do
and perform abortions; that all clergy and justices of the peace must perform weddings be-
tween same-sex couples, has not this modern state assumed the power to dictate which be-
liefs are protected and from which there can be no dissent? When reality demonstrates that
people can and do differ about the propriety of abortions, same-sex unions, and the use of
abortifacients, should the state demand that all comply with its rules on these subjects know-
ing that there are those who will offer, even gladly, these services to which others object
through the exercise of objective reason, conscience, and religious belief? If the state, which
calls itself a liberal democracy, in fact commands uniformity of opinion and action on these
divisive issues of the day, does it remain valid to use the appellation “liberal democracy” to
 describe that state? The answer becomes obvious. 
The problem does not end here. In the early twenty-first century we believe that we are re-
mote from the attitude of the German concentration camp commander who, when asked,
“Where was your conscience?” replied that he was simply following orders. In fact, we may
not be so removed from this circumstance as we might like to think. Dr. Pellegrino has noted
that some “ethicists” of the present day have begun to suggest that physicians “must separate
their personal moral beliefs from their professional lives if they wish to practice in a secular
society and remain licensed (by the state) … ”44 He points out that “health care” is beginning
to merge with “death care.” Thus, physicians may begin to wonder that if they raise objections
about specific procedures, would they only be entitled to a limited license to practice the heal-
ing arts?45 This question can be taken a step further, that is, would they be given a license at
all? And, if they have a license, would it be stripped from them when they refuse, out of con-
science or religious belief, to engage in these procedures? 
The problem does not stop here. Let us assume that the state is willing to respect the exer-
cise of conscience of this physician but then insists that this doctor provide the patient with
the identity of those physicians willing to perform the services to which the first doctor ob-
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jects on conscience? The physician’s conscience has still been compromised, but this time in-
directly. It is one thing for the physician to turn over a medical file to another doctor when
the patient authorizes this; it is quite another for the physician to be required to search for
this doctor, for then he or she would become an accomplice to the activity that strikes at the
very heart of the conscientious objection that had been previously registered.46
The “liberal democracy” continues on its path, either by itself or after heavy lobbying from
interested parties, of mandating compliance with a uniform regime. The state has no qualm
about this even if 99% of the physicians are willing to comply. Should the state, however, be
concerned if the compliance number decreases? What if it were 60%, or 40%, or 30%, or 1%?
As the “liberal democracy” becomes more totalitarian in its outlook, all will have to comply
whether this is necessary or not. In the case of performing abortions or euthanasia, assisting
in state-sanctioned suicides, distributing poisons to destroy nascent human life, sanctioning
same-sex unions (be they in the name of God or of the state), there can be no diversity or tol-
erance of opposing views — there is insistence that all comply whether the need for universal
compliance is necessary. 
Today’s reality demonstrates this. In the context of abortion, euthanasia, assisted suicide,
morning-after cocktails, or same-sex unions, there are others willing to comply — sometimes
in the name of conscience or something like that.47 There is no need to coerce all citizens
with state sponsored sanction (imprisonment, denial of licenses, or fines) to perform acts to
which they object in good conscience and faith, based not on “feeling” but on sound and rea-
soned views of rightness and wrongness. Nevertheless, the totalitarian state insists universal
compliance simply because there can be no different voice, there can be no diversity of opin-
ion on matters that previously one could hold as a matter of conscience and religious belief. 
In the past experience of the twentieth century, one totalitarian state demanded adherence
to the view that not all persons were equal on fundamental points of human nature — some
were subhuman and could be annihilated. But reasoned judgment said otherwise. To have
been a law-abiding citizen in that state, one had to hold and practice the view advanced by the
state or suffer dire consequences. In the past, another totalitarian state required its citizens to
proclaim that there is no God when reason and belief said there is. If a person held and ex-
pressed the state’s view, he or she was a comrade and patriot. But if one did not, that person
became a traitor and would risk calamity.
The views that are suppressed by the totalitarian state need not be unpopular ones. Rather,
they may demonstrate that a society or community is deeply divided on certain issues —
such as abortion, euthanasia, morning after pills, and same sex unions or marriages. The views
that are the subject of the suppression may be widely held, even by a majority of the polity.
But the state has a plan to change all that. So, what is one to do? 
One can respond with violence — but that raises serious concerns and can quickly remove
the cloak of legitimacy from the divergent view. One can resist through peaceful civil disobe-
dience, but some may consider the deleterious effect this will have on the desire to be a
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 contributing member to one’s family and community. And then there is the approach of
Thomas More. 
From the observations and conversations of one present at his trial, Will Roper his son-in-
law, we learn that More was simultaneously a principled and pragmatic individual. The com-
bination made for a remarkable person clever in dealing with and confounding adversaries
but straightforward enough to let the honest listener understand why he did what others
would or could not. Thomas More, a man of profound faith in God, often spoke of conscience
and used the term in his correspondence that was written after his arrest and prior to his trial.
But during his trial, writing and sending correspondence became difficult. However, Roper
was able to capture the essence of More and his final understanding of conscience. Roper
noted that at the end of his trial when the Lord Chancellor pressed him with the fact that “all
the bishops, universities and best learned of this realm” had agreed to the Act of Succession and
that More stood by himself by not joining his voice with theirs, More spoke from conscience.48
In doing so, he began his reply to this question as the astute lawyer: with this abundance of
evidence that the Act is Lawful as demonstrated by such overwhelming endorsement of so
many distinguished persons, what need was there for one final endorsement by Thomas
More? As More expressed, “why that thing in my conscience should make any change.”49 His
comment rhetorically asked if the legitimacy of the Act were truly in question, what could his
humble opinion offer at this late stage? He made the distinction between all those alive who
had subscribed to oath and those in heaven who might have thought otherwise.50 If he were to
be in the second category rather than the first, what matter would it make? It mattered a great
deal, apparently. Yet More persisted in his tack, and so the Lord Chief Justice declared, “I must
confess that if the act of Parliament be not unlawful, then is not the indictment in my con-
science insufficient”?51 With that, More’s condemnation was sealed.
The man who returned More to the Tower where he would await his execution had this to
say to Roper: “I was ashamed of myself, that, at my departing from your father, I found my
heart so feeble, and his so strong, that he was fain to comfort me, which should have rather
comforted him.”52 By this time, the condemned man — an ordinary man who, nonetheless,
has become a man for all seasons — had been fortified by a remarkable synthesis of con-
science and faith. In a letter sent to his daughter Margaret from his Tower cell, he explained
how his conscience guided him: he would take precaution not to deny outright what the act of
Parliament required, but the oath itself must be avoided — for by taking it he would condemn
himself to a much higher authority, namely God. As he said, “in good faith my conscience so
moved me in the matter that though I would not deny to swear to the succession, yet unto the
oath … I could not swear, without the … [jeopardizing] of my soul to perpetual damnation.”53
More demonstrated graciously and courageously the essence of his identity as a prudent
man, but in doing so, he maintained that he was also a man of conscience. On the one hand,
he searched for ways of remaining the faithful citizen, but on the other, he knew well there
was a boundary beyond which he could not pass, for if he did, a far more basic law binding all
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humanity would be violated.
More was quick to point out that by exercising his conscience, he could not demand how
others should exercise theirs.54 Certainly it was his fervent hope to do what he could to remain
publicly the good citizen who would abide in all respects by what the earthly sovereign com-
manded. But when his Rubicon had to be crossed, he had no expectation that others out of
 necessity must follow him and the path he chose. Conscience was simultaneously a private
matter between him and the higher authority of God’s law. By fulfilling the transcendent
 requirement, he neither expected nor demanded that others must follow him in his calling.
As he said: “As for other men’s consciences, I will be no judge … [but, if he did subscribe to the
oath] ye may reckon sure that it were expressed and extorted by duresse and hard handling
[torture].”55 He was resolved to remain true to the conviction of his conscience, but he would
oblige no other — “as for other men’s, I will not meddle of.”56
It was the style of More to keep his exercise of conscience a quiet matter. But on the other
hand, his life was a very public act. His silence proclaimed to the realm where he stood when
the law demanded what his conscience would not permit: to profess the oath. He would not
meddle with the conscience of others, for they would stand or fall on their own deeds. As for
himself, he declared, “I am no man’s judge.”57 But he also knew he must be prepared to meet
his final judge who is not of this world. Conscience was not exercised for the convenience of
the continuation of his earthly life; it was exercised to determine the righteousness of how he
would live this life as he prepared for the eternal one.
Another and more recent example of the exercise of conscience and religious freedom is
Clemens Cardinal von Galen. In the early stages of the Second World War, Galen was a dioce-
san bishop in Germany. In July of 1941 he delivered a homily in Münster. The homily was de-
livered in the context in which the enforcement mechanisms of the Third Reich, once the
Reich had tightened its strangling grip on the Jewish community, were being applied to the
Christian, especially the Catholic, community. Galen understood well what was going on and
the effectiveness and the brutality of the totalitarian state. But he was also a faithful disciple
for whom conscience and religious freedom meant a great deal — so much so that he was
willing to sacrifice himself by proclaiming the Good News. With these words, he exhorted his
Münster congregation:
[S]teel yourselves and hold fast! At this moment we are not the hammer, but the anvil.
Others, chiefly intruders and apostates, hammer at us; they are striving violently to
wrench us, our nation and our youth from our belief in God. We are the anvil, I say,
and not the hammer, but what happens in the forge? Go and ask the blacksmith and
see what he says. Whatever is beaten out on the anvil receives its shape from the
anvil as well as the hammer. The anvil cannot and need not strike back. It need only
be hard and firm. If it is tough enough it invariably outlives the hammer. No matter
how vehemently the hammer falls; the anvil remains standing in quiet strength, and
for a long time will play its part in helping to shape what is being moulded.
The memories of Thomas More and Clemens von Galen remain vividly today. Our tradi-
tion is richer, better, and more just because of who they were: men of well-formed conscience
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and filled with faith in God and His Church. As I have attempted to illustrate, there still remain
challenges in exercising conscience and religious liberty today even in places that claim to be
liberal democracies. Will there be new scaffolds to mount and new jail cells to inhabit as a re-
sult of the exercise of conscience and religious freedom? If so, may those who choose this
path because of conscience remember these extraordinary and wise predecessors in faith.
Their guidance offered through the manner in which they lived and confronted the imposing
challenges of their times may just be what the world and our beloved country need to avert
the totalitarianism that beckons and lures the present age. 
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HOW PROTECTING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
SUSTAINS FREEDOM ITSELF
 B Y  DAV I D  C A R R O L L  C O C H R A N *
Why does religious freedom matter? Most answers to this question begin with the impor-tance of religion. Since religion matters it should not be suppressed. I agree, but, my
purpose here to come at the question from the other direction. I want to claim that religious
freedom matters because freedom itself matters. Religious freedom plays an inescapably vital
role in sustaining freedom more generally, even in those areas where freedom does not touch
on religion directly. So if we value freedom itself, then we must also protect religious freedom
in particular. I will develop this argument by examining two broad understandings of freedom
and the role played by religious liberty in each. After a brief look at the first, freedom under-
stood as negative liberty, I will draw on the work of Charles Taylor to develop and argue for
the second, freedom understood as autonomy.1
Freedom as Negative Liberty
It is obligatory to begin any investigation into different concepts of freedom with Sir Isaiah
Berlin’s famous distinction between negative and positive liberty.2 Negative liberty under-
stands freedom as noninterference. It is the ability to act without external restraint, either by
government or fellow citizens, within a private sphere marked off by strong individual rights.
In contrast, positive liberty understands freedom as self-realization or self-direction. It is the
capacity to act in accordance with truth or reason. Rather than external constraints, positive
liberty is more concerned with the standards by which we decide how to live, and this is why
Berlin saw positive liberty as so dangerous. He believed that it easily slipped into authoritari-
anism when those in power sought to coerce people into embracing a particular variety of
truth or reason, essentially forcing them to be free in Rousseau’s infamous formulation.
Berlin’s concept of negative liberty is the basis for the first view of freedom I want to exam-
ine. Freedom understood as negative liberty has long been the predominant view of freedom
in Western liberalism. It is what John Locke meant when he pointed to the “equal right that
every man hath to his natural freedom, without being subjected to the will or authority of any
other man.”3 This understanding relies on what Taylor calls an “opportunity-concept” of free-
dom, one that sees it primarily as a lack of external obstacles that block the opportunity of in-
dividuals to live their lives as they see fit.4 On this view, I should have an opportunity to
pursue my goals in life without undue interference or barriers thrown up by others. 
This view of freedom comes in both libertarian and egalitarian varieties. The libertarian
version keeps close to Locke’s original focus and emphasizes the threat of an overweening
state. Government power, especially its tax and regulatory functions, threatens to hem in
 individual liberty by blocking opportunities for free action according to one’s own lights. The
egalitarian version emphasizes economic and social inequalities as the real barriers to individual
liberty. Poverty, racism, sexism, and other injustices are what limit opportunities individuals
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face in pursuing their goals in life. While often opposed to each other, what these two streams
of liberalism share is the understanding of freedom as a lack of external obstacles. They just
disagree about the nature of those obstacles.
This account of freedom as negative liberty is familiar to those who know the long-running
communitarian-liberal debate. It emphasizes a sphere of thought and action marked off by
strong individual rights and procedural protections of due process. Its moral understanding of
individuals is prior to or abstracted from their particular social and cultural contexts. It is neu-
tral when it comes to competing notions of the good, instead emphasizing procedural notions
of fairness that afford all persons an equal right to pursue their own version of the good with
as little interference as possible. 
In some ways, an understanding of freedom as negative liberty has been good for religious
liberty specifically. Locke, for example, was an early and eloquent proponent of religious tol-
eration. What is significant, however, is that religious liberty tends to be a subsidiary rather
than constituent principle in this understanding of freedom. As a result, the grounds and ex-
tent of religious liberty can vary widely. Indeed, it is not hard to identify a least four different
views of religious liberty, each perfectly consistent with this understanding of freedom:
1. Religious liberty is important because religion is an important part of some people’s lives.
If it matters to them, they should be free to express it, just as they are free to pursue other
personal interests. 
2. Religious liberty is important because it takes a potentially divisive issue off the table.
Since government should be neutral when it comes to competing visions of the good,
 letting individuals cultivate their own religious views in the private sphere helps keeps the
procedural peace provided by value neutrality. 
3. Religious liberty is a prudent form of benign neglect (John Stuart Mill comes to mind
here). A society characterized by individual freedom will include the right of religious con-
science, but such a progressive society will also eventually evolve beyond the outmoded
superstitions of organized religion altogether. 
4. Religious liberty can actually be dangerous for individual freedom. If some religious beliefs
and practices threaten to oppress, discriminate against, or otherwise limit the opportunities
people face, then rather than being protected, religion is something that must at times be
regulated and controlled. 
If within freedom understood as negative liberty there can be such a wide range of views
about religious liberty specifically, then there is nothing unique about it. Religious liberty is
not special. It can be part of freedom or it can threaten freedom. It can be important or it can
be trivial. In other words, religious liberty is incidental rather than inherent in this under-
standing of freedom. And so if we want to find an understanding of freedom in which religious
liberty is much more central, then we must look elsewhere. 
Freedom as Autonomy
Taylor’s work on the nature of human freedom provides the basis for an alternative to under-
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standings based solely on negative liberty. In his essay called “What’s Wrong with Negative
Liberty,” he argues that an opportunity-concept of freedom cannot fully capture what it means
to be free.5 Any compelling understanding of freedom must also include what he calls an
 “exercise-concept” that recognizes the internal dimension of freedom, the process by which
we are self-directing persons. External opportunities are not the only things that make us
free. We also need the internal capacities necessary to take advantage of those opportunities.
Internal reflection and judgment about the kind of person we want to be and the kind of life
we want to lead are as much a part of being free as the range of external options that we face
in life. 
In making this argument, Taylor does not reject negative liberty. He just thinks it isn’t suf-
ficient. But at the same time he does not embrace positive liberty as Berlin describes it. On
Taylor’s account, traveling from negative to positive liberty requires two steps. The first moves
from a view of freedom as doing what we want to one that includes elements of internal self-
direction and the process of deciding exactly what it is that we want. The second brings in
some kind of state authority attempting to shape this internal process through coercion or
 indoctrination. Taylor’s notion of an exercise-concept of freedom endorses the first step but
avoids the second, the one that Berlin rightly sees holding totalitarian dangers.
The internal dimensions of freedom, those capacities that allow us to actually take advan-
tage of the opportunities that negative liberty guarantees, are what we mean by the term
 autonomy. Autonomy literally means self-rule. We are autonomous if we are the authors of
our own lives, developing and pursuing projects that are authentically our own. This hinges
on the difference between first-order and second-order desires. First-order desires are what
we want at any particular time, and freedom understood as negative liberty usually refers to
our ability to act on these without external obstacles to their fulfillment. Second-order desires,
on the other hand, are desires about first-order desires themselves. In the words of Gerald
Dworkin:
It is characteristic of persons that they are able to reflect on their decisions, motives,
desires, and habits. In doing so they can form preferences concerning these. Thus
a person may not simply desire to smoke but also desire that he not have that de-
sire. He may not only be motivated by jealousy or anger. He can also desire that
his motivations be different (or the same).6
This capacity to evaluate and control our own desires and motivations, discarding some and
embracing others, is how we exercise autonomy. 
No one has written more perceptively on this process of reflecting on one’s own motivations
than Taylor. For him, a fundamental feature of human agents is the capacity for what he calls
“strong evaluation.” He writes: “Our emotions make it possible for us to have a sense of what
the good life is for a subject; and this sense involves in turn our making qualitative discrimi-
nations between our desires and goals, whereby we see some as higher and others as lower,
some as good and others as discreditable, still others as evil, some as truly vital and others as
trivial, and so on.”7 This is the ability to rank and evaluate desires according to their value
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rather than standards inherent to the desires themselves. In Taylor’s words, “It means we are
not taking our de facto desires as the ultimate in justification, but are going beyond that to
their worth.”8 Rather than evaluating desires by how best to achieve them, or just delaying
gratification of one desire in order to satisfy another, strong evaluation means drawing on
standards independent of desire itself. Taylor points to contrasts like good/bad, noble/base,
higher/lower, and virtue/vice to illustrate how we make distinctions of qualitative worth
among alternatives. Rather than simply calculating maximum satisfaction of desires, we reject
some desires because they conflict with the type of person we want to be or the kind of life
we want to lead. Strong evaluation is the process of reflecting on and evaluating desires ac-
cording to judgments about what constitutes a good life. It is how we exercise autonomy as we
strive to construct meaningful lives from the inside.
As this account of strong evaluation shows, for Taylor autonomy is inescapably linked to
morality. We are moral creatures, ones with fundamental “moral and spiritual intuitions” that
form the basis for strong evaluation.9 According to Taylor, as humans we rely upon moral
“frameworks” that incorporate a “crucial set of qualitative distinctions” to tell us that certain
ways of living or acting are “incomparably higher” than others, thereby providing the basis for
strong evaluation.10 Doing without such frameworks is “utterly impossible” since the moral
horizons they provide are “constitutive of human agency,” and as humans we are necessarily
“oriented in moral space” defined by such frameworks.11 For Taylor, then, this orientation in
moral space means people “cannot do without some orientation to the good.”12
Autonomy requires moral frameworks and the orientation to the good that they provide,
but such moral frameworks don’t just appear out of thin air. Taylor is clear that the moral
 materials we use for strong evaluation are rooted in particular communities, cultures, and tra-
ditions. As he says, “We first learn our languages of moral and spiritual discernment by being
brought into an ongoing conversation by those who bring us up.”13 This is why the “full defini-
tion of someone’s identity thus usually involves not only his stand on moral and spiritual
 matters but also some reference to a defining community.”14 The link between autonomy and
morality is only one that is established in specific social and cultural circumstances. For Taylor
“the free individual or autonomous moral agent can only achieve and maintain his identity in
a certain type of culture.”15 This is why the internal process of autonomy depends upon
 particular external social and cultural institutions to sustain it, to furnish it the moral materi-
als it needs to operate.
Drawing from Taylor, then, we can summarize our second understanding of freedom —
freedom as autonomy — this way. Negative liberty is important but not sufficient. In addition
to external threats to freedom, we must also pay attention to the internal capacities that allow
persons to exercise freedom. Critical here is the process of strong evaluation, one in which we
make fundamental moral judgments about the kind of person we are to be and the kind of life
we are to live. Such moral reflection and evaluation is made possible by the moral materials
we draw from particular communities and traditions, which help orient us in moral space and
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provide connections to substantive notions of the good. 
So what is the role of religious liberty in this understanding of freedom? It is a critically im-
portant one. At the very heart of this view of freedom are the moral frameworks provided by
particular moral traditions, and the most important moral traditions, both historically and
today, are religious ones. Religion has always been and still remains the most significant
source of moral reflection and orientation to the good that people draw upon. This is certainly
true of devout religious believers, but it is more widely applicable as well. Even those who are
not strict adherents of a particular religion benefit from the moral wisdom of religion generally.
They may be loosely affiliated with a religious tradition; they may have moved among several
traditions; or they may not be believers at all, but they still participate in a culture rich in reli-
gious meanings, one in which the basic moral understandings at work are shaped by religious
sources. The voices of religion enrich the moral dialogue that we all, believers or not, partici-
pate in and draw upon. 
What this means is that a public culture with an array of rich and vibrant religious voices
helps provide the moral underpinnings of autonomy. It furnishes the moral materials au-
tonomous reflection needs. This requires a space in which such religious voices can develop
and express themselves, and religious liberty helps create this space. A civil society in which
religious groups and their members are free to worship, evangelize, and practice the tenets of
their faith is critically important. This is why the various protections for religious institutions
and forms of expression detailed elsewhere at this conference are so important, not just on
their own terms but in the sense that they help create a civil society with robust religious
 traditions in dialogue with each other and the culture at large, a dialogue that helps furnish
the moral meanings and orientations to the good that citizens need to exercise autonomy. 
So we are left with a fairly straightforward formula: Freedom requires the internal capacity
for autonomy, which requires moral frameworks and orientations to the good, which require
a civil society with robust religious traditions, which requires strong protections of religious
liberty. This is why working for religious freedom is not just good for religion but for freedom
itself.
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“TWO THERE ARE”
UNDERSTANDING THE SEPARATION 
OF CHURCH AND STATE
 B Y  R I C H A R D  W.  G A R N E T T *
I. Introduction
With respect to problems of church-state relations, or “law and religion” more generally, we
do well to start from a fundamental, bedrock premise: As President Clinton put it, over a
decade ago, “religious freedom is literally our first freedom.”1 The freedom of religion is not
only listed early in the Bill of Rights; it was central to our Founders’ vision for the American
experiment. To be sure, the Framers — just like Americans today — did not always agree
about what precisely the “freedom of religion” meant or means. But they knew, as we do, that
it matters.
The protections afforded to religious freedom in our constitutional text and tradition are
not accidents, anomalies, or anachronisms. They are not, as one prominent scholar has
claimed, “aberration[s] in a secular state.”2 Quite the contrary: in our traditions, religious free-
dom is cherished as a basic human right and a non-negotiable aspect of human dignity.
Correctly understood, our Constitution does not regard religious faith with grudging suspicion,
as a bizarre quirk, or as a quaint relic, left over from a simpler past. The goal of our First
Amendment is not to push religion to the margins, in the hope that it will wither; it is to pro-
tect religion from government distortion, so that it can flourish. The Establishment Clause is
not a sword, driving private religious expression from the marketplace of ideas; rather, the
Clause constrains government, and serves as a shield, protecting religiously motivated
speech and action. As Professor Garvey once observed, our laws protect and promote the
freedom of religion because, put simply, “the law thinks religion is a good thing.”3
This point might seem obvious. Still, it is easily and often forgotten. It means, among other
things, that we should regard restrictions on religious life, not religious life itself, with sober
skepticism. In a free society like ours, the “[t]he calculus of religious liberty … is determined”
not by the extent to which we confine religion to the private sphere, but instead “by the meas-
ure of religiously motivated thought and action that is insulated from [state] authority.”4
And so, with this bedrock premise in mind, step back to “kinder, gentler” days. In 1988,
while out on the campaign trail, then-Vice President George H.W. Bush recalled his experi-
ence, as a young pilot in World War II, being shot down over the South Pacific. He said:
Was I scared floating in a little yellow raft off the coast of an enemy-held island,
setting a world record for paddling? Of course I was. What sustains you in times
like that? Well, you go back to fundamental values. I thought about Mother and
Dad and the strength I got from them, and God and faith — and the separation of
church and state.5
This train-of-thought probably strikes us as a bit absurd. And yet, it is entirely American. That
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“God” and “faith” could not be invoked by a would-be President, as “fundamental values,”
without the awkward addition of “the separation of church and state,” speaks volumes — for
better or worse — about how we Americans think about the content and implications of our
“first freedom.”6
An earlier President, Thomas Jefferson, in his 1801 Letter to the Danbury Baptists, famously
professed his “sovereign reverence” for what he saw as the decision of the American people to
constitutionalize church-state “separation.”7 In so doing, he supplied what is for many the
 “authoritative interpretation” of the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses.8 Indeed, Professor
Dreisbach observed not long ago that “[n]o metaphor in American letters has had a greater in-
fluence on law and policy than Thomas Jefferson’s ‘wall of separation between church and
state.’”9 “Jefferson’s words,” Professor Hamburger has observed, “seem to have shaped the
 nation”10 and are, for many of us, “more familiar than the words of the First Amendment itself.”11
However, that we are familiar, even intimate, with Jefferson’s words hardly means we
agree about their meaning. Notwithstanding our third President’s “reverence” for church-state
separation, and the comfort it supplied to our 41st President, the idea remains both controver-
sial and contestable. What does it mean, really, for “church” and “state” to be “separate”? Is
church-state “separation” even an imaginable reality, let alone a constitutional requirement?
Or, are Professors Eisgruber and Sager right to insist, in their recent and important book, that
“[c]hurch and state are not separate in the United States, and they cannot possibly be sepa-
rate”?12 The bookstores and blogs are awash in dire warnings of attacks by theocratic fascists
on the wall of separation,13 but has such a wall ever really existed? 
Indeed, what about the recent assertion by Rep. Katherine Harris that the separation of
church and state is a “lie we have been told” to keep religious believers out of politics and pub-
lic life?14 This charge seems well off the mark. And yet, there is no denying that separation is
often presented, both by its opponents and by many of its self-styled defenders, as an aggres-
sively anti-religious program, rather than — as John Courtney Murray once put it — a “policy
to implement the principle of religious freedom.”15 To hear some tell it, the point of church-
state separation is not merely to rule out a formally established church, or test-oaths for public
office, or official meddling in churches’ internal disputes, or even financial aid to religious
schools. It is, more broadly, to engineer through law the privatization of religion, the secular-
ization of civil society, and the exclusion from the political arena of religiously grounded argu-
ments about the common good, and how to achieve it. Many appear to share Professor Rorty’s
opinion that it is in “bad taste to bring religion into discussions of public policy.”16 On this
view, as Professor Carter memorably put it, religion is “like building model airplanes, just an-
other hobby: something quiet, something trivial–not really a fit activity for intelligent …
adults.”17
Scholars continue to wrestle, of course, with the question of the appropriate place for reli-
giously grounded arguments in public life. This is a rich and important conversation. Still, the
bottom line is clear: Neither the Constitution, nor a correct understanding of church-state sep-
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aration, imposes a “don’t ask, don’t tell” rule on religious believers who participate in public
life18 or demands that they “sterili[ze]” their speech before entering the public forum.19 If a
member of the Sierra Club, or the AARP, may bring her values into civic life, so may a mem-
ber of the United Methodist Church. 
William James once quipped, “in this age of toleration, [no one] will ever try actively to in-
terfere with our religious faith, provided we enjoy it quietly with our friends and do not make
a public nuisance of it[.]”20 Sometimes, though, religious people are called precisely to “make a
public nuisance” — and also to engage respectfully their fellow citizens in dialogue about how
we should live together. There is no good reason why religious citizens should not speak and
act as though their faith had consequences for state and society. Indeed, as Justice Thomas
has insisted, it would be a “most bizarre” reading of the First Amendment that would “reserve
special hostility for those who take their religion seriously, [and] who think that their religion
should affect the whole of their lives.”21
Of course, there are plenty of good reasons for reasonable, faithful believers to decide that
it is unwise for church leaders to address difficult political questions, particularly when they
are questions — as most are — about which reasonable, faithful believers can disagree. It com-
promises and disrespects religion to offer clunky, hasty baptisms of one’s policy proposals.
But — and this is crucial — it is not unconstitutional to do so, and the question whether one
should has little to do with “separation.” Indeed, we should remember, as Professor Elshtain
has warned, that “if we push too far the notion that, in order to be acceptable public fare, all
religious claims … must be secularized, we wind up de-pluralizing our polity and endangering
our democracy.”22
In any event, neither French-style laicite nor Fr. Neuhaus’s “naked public square”23 connects
well with our history, traditions, and culture. Justice Douglas’s observation, more than 50 years
ago in the Zorach case, needs careful qualification, but is still basically on target: “We are,” he
said, “a religious people” and so, for us, that church and state are and should be “separate”
does not, and could not, mean that “the state and religion [must] be aliens to each other.”24
What, then, does it mean — what should it mean, for us — that “church” and “state” are
“separate”? What is the place of church-state separation, properly understood, in the legal
regime mandated by the First Amendment and, more generally, in the religious freedom that
should exist in a constitutional democracy? What goods and values do we think separation
helps us to attain and affirm? 
We should agree that the “separation of church and state” is an important dimension of,
and safeguard for, religious freedom under constitutionally limited government. It is not a
“lie,” even if it is widely misunderstood and misused. And the reason it is misunderstood, I
suggest, is because we often fail to appreciate that the “separation of church and state” con-
cerns, in fact, the relationship between “church” and “state.” To say this is not to be cute or
banal; this is a serious, if obvious, point: The “separation” that protects religious freedom and
that, we might think, our Constitution requires, need not be between “religion” and “society,”
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or between “faith” and “politics.” In the end, these things are not and could not be separate
(which is not to deny, of course, that they can and should be distinguished). Well understood,
what the term “separation of church and state” describes, or calls for, is not a civic conversation
or social landscape from which God is absent or banished, but rather a structural arrange-
ment, a constitutional order, in which the institutions of religions are distinct from, other
than, and independent of, the institutions of governments.
II. The “Serpentine” Wall of Separation
As Professor Witte has noted, the “wall” of separation has, in public law and in public dis-
course, proved far more “serpentine” — in the sense of winding and twisting, and in the
Edenic sense of “seductively simple” — than many who invoke it appreciate.25 Where did this
image, and the idea it communicates, come from?
Certainly, the idea of a distinction between the Church and the political authorities, between
what Calvin called the “spiritual kingdom” and the “political kingdom,” between believers and
the world, between the City of God and the City of Man, is much older than the American
Constitution and long predates those Enlightenment thinkers widely thought to have influ-
enced it.26 In Professor Witte’s words, although “[s]eparation of Church and state is often re-
garded as a distinctly American and relatively modern invention[,]” it is, in fact, “an ancient
Western teaching rooted in the Bible.”27 Christ’s followers were taught to “repay to Caesar
what belongs to Caesar and to God what belongs to God.”28 More than 1,500 years ago, Pope
Gelasius instructed the Emperor Anastasius that “[t]here are indeed … two powers by which
this world is chiefly ruled”; Pope Boniface VIII identified “two swords, a spiritual … and a tem-
poral”29; and Roger Williams contrasted the “Garden of the Church and the Wilderness of the
world.”30
Usually, though — as was noted earlier — the American separation-story opens in October
of 1801, when the Baptist Association of Danbury, Connecticut wrote to President-elect
Thomas Jefferson, congratulating him on his election to the “chief Magistracy in the United
States.”31 In their letter, no doubt hoping to ingratiate themselves and their cause to the new
President, the Danbury Baptists trumpeted their disagreement with Jefferson’s Congregation -
alist and Federalist opponents, who had energetically attacked him during the 1800 campaign
as “an enemy of religion[,] Law & good order,” and noted also that their own “[s]entiments are
uniformly on the side of Religious Liberty[.]”32
For the Baptists, the letter explained to the President, as for many other dissenters from
Founding-era religious establishments, “religion [is] an essentially private matter between an
individual and his God. No citizen, they reasoned, ought to suffer civil disability on account of
his religious opinions. The legitimate powers of civil government reach actions, but not
 opinions.”33
Jefferson, of course, was “keenly aware of the political implications of his pronouncement
on a delicate church-state issue,” and he replied a few months later in a well considered and
carefully crafted letter of his own. He wrote, in the letter’s key and famous passage:
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Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between Man & his
God, that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship, that the legiti-
mate powers of government reach actions only, & not opinions, I contemplate
with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people which declared
that their legislature should “make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,” thus building a wall of separation between
Church & State.34
Jefferson’s letter was published in Massachusetts, shortly after it was received, but it seems to
have then been forgotten for a half-century.35 (Indeed, the Danbury Baptists themselves were
reluctant to publicize the letter or its contents.36) It does not appear that Jefferson ever em-
ployed the “wall of separation” image again.37
As Professor Hamburger has explained, the idea of “separation” between church and state
served, during most of the 19th century, less as a Jefferson-inspired constitutional doctrine
than as a nativist and anti-Catholic rhetorical weapon.38 However, in the 1879 case of Reynolds
v. United States, one of the Supreme Court’s first major decisions interpreting the First
Amendment’s Religion Clauses, the Justices quoted Jefferson’s letter to the Danbury Baptists,
invoked the “wall” metaphor, and reported that Jefferson’s response “may be accepted as an
almost authoritative declaration of the [Clauses’] scope and effect.”39
The Court did not have occasion to return to the metaphor for almost 70 years. Then, in
the landmark 1947 case, Everson v. Board of Education, Justice Black went even further than
had the Reynolds Court, and announced that — notwithstanding its text — the First Amend -
ment’s Establishment Clause constrains not only the actions of Congress, but also those of
state and local officials.40 Justice Black followed Reynolds in giving Jefferson’s letter, and the
“wall,” controlling, canonical weight. After a lengthy, though misguided, account of the
Establishment Clause’s history, context, and meaning, Justice Black summed up in this way:
“In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to
erect ‘a wall of separation between Church and State.’ … That wall must be kept high and im-
pregnable. We could not approve the slightest breach.”41
To be sure, a great deal has changed in constitutional law — and, in particular, in the under-
standing and application of the Religion Clauses — since 1947. But even though many of
these changes have been in a non-strict-separationist direction, what Chief Justice Rehnquist
once called Jefferson’s “misleading metaphor”42 remains deeply and indelibly ingrained in
Americans’ thinking about church-state relations and religious freedom. As the Court has
moved in recent years from a no-aid-to-religion understanding of the First Amendment to a
more accommodating view, it has been impossible to avoid warnings by the Court’s critics
that the “wall of separation” is being lowered, knocked down, weakened, or breached.
But again, that some invocations of faith in the civic arena might be unwise, unfaithful, or
unseemly does not mean that they violate the “separation” principle, properly understood. To
join Pope Benedict in insisting on the “distinction between Church and State” is not to demand
disengagement by religious believers, communities, or institutions.43 In the context of the
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modern, activist, welfare state, “separation” or “segregation” of church from state — let alone
of religion from public life — seems neither possible nor desirable. We would do better, I
think, not to invoke or rely on the image of a “wall” of separation, but to think instead in
terms of what my colleague, Professor Rodes, has called the “church-state nexus.”44 A “nexus,”
according to my dictionary, is a “means of connection; a link or tie.”45 It suggests not a “wall”
but a relation, even a symbiosis, between two distinct things — neither a collapse of one into
the other nor a rigid segregation of the one from the other. In this nexus, “churches” are not,
and must not be, arms or auxiliaries of the “state.” But again, the point of this arrangement is
not to privatize religion or secularize civil society; it is to protect religious freedom — and
 political freedom more generally — under and through constitutionally limited government.
III. The Freedom of the Church
Whether we speak in terms of a “wall” or a “nexus,” however, the point to emphasize is that,
notwithstanding the idea’s history and baggage, there are good reasons for wanting to get
church-state “separation” right. We should neither embrace, nor war against, a mistaken ver-
sion of the idea. Again: “Separation,” well understood, involves a structural arrangement, a
constitutional order in which churches — not “faith,” “religion,” or “spirituality,” but “church-
es” — are distinct from, other than, and independent of, the state. And yet, consider the hot
button “church-state” issues and disputes that are the stuff of front-page stories and high-pro-
file court decisions: May governments allow privately owned menorahs and nativity scenes
in public parks, or display the Ten Commandments on the grounds or in the halls of public
buildings, or include the words “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance? May the state ban
 ritual animal sacrifice, or the religiously motivated use of hallucinogenic tea, or peyote? May
a child in public school read a Bible story from his favorite book, or hand out pencils with a re-
ligious message, or start a Christian after-school club? And so on.
Cases presenting questions like these are touted in the press as “church-state” disputes.
And, there is no doubt that these cases involve important questions about the freedom of con-
science and the powers and prerogatives of governments. The image of the lone religious dis-
senter, heroically confronting overbearing officials or extravagant assertions of state power,
armed only with claims of conscience, is evocative and timeless. No account of religious free-
dom would be complete if it neglected such clashes or failed to celebrate such courage. And
yet, while the “state” is (usually) easy to spot in these cases, where, exactly, is the “church”?
It is not new to observe that American judicial decisions and public conversations about re-
ligious freedom tend to focus on matters of individuals’ rights, beliefs, consciences, and prac-
tices. The distinctive place, role, and freedoms of associations and institutions are often
overlooked. This pattern is consistent with the widespread assumption that, because the indi-
vidual religious conscience is free, religion itself is entirely private. However, an understand-
ing of religious faith, and religious freedom, that stops with the liberty of conscience, and
neglects institutions, will be incomplete. And — this needs to be emphasized — so will the
legal arrangements that such an understanding produces.
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If we want to understand well, and appreciate, the “separation of church and state,” we
need to broaden our focus. We need to think not only about the clashes between religious be-
lievers and government officials, and about the conflict between government regulations and
individuals’ conduct, but also about institutions, groups, communities, associations, clubs,
families, and — especially — about churches. That is, we need to ask, as two leading law-and-
religion scholars have put it, about the “distinctive place of religious entities in our constitu-
tional order.”46 The separation of church and state involves legal arrangements and constraints
whose point is not so much to artificially exclude religious faith from political life as to respect
religious institutions’ independence and autonomy. And so, we should remember that religious
liberty involves not only the immunities of believers, but also the “freedom of the church.”
But what, in the context of contemporary American law and politics, could one mean by
the “freedom of the church”? This is a hard question. At the same time, this question should
be at the heart of our conversations about, and understanding of, the separation of church and
state. This ancient idea, or something like it, is a crucial component of any plausible and at-
tractive account of religious freedom under and through constitutionally limited government.
A (very) brief historical review is in order here. Today, relatively few in America have
heard of an 11th century monk named Hildebrand, who eventually reigned as Pope Gregory
VII. For three days in late January 1077 — during what we now call the “Investiture Crisis” —
the excommunicated German king, Henry IV, stood barefoot in the snow outside the Countess
Matilda’s castle in Canossa, in Italy. Henry was seeking reconciliation with the Pope, who had
refused to give in to the king’s assertion of power to appoint bishops. These three days, how-
ever, were as important to the development of western constitutionalism as the later events at
Runnymede, or Philadelphia, or Appomattox. As the great legal scholar, Harold Berman, has
described, Pope Gregory VII waged a historic struggle with secular powers for self-government
by the Church. In so doing, he led a “revolution” that worked nothing less than a “total trans-
formation” of law, state, and society.47 And the battle-cry for this revolution — an idea that,
 according to Berman, would serve as the catalyst for “the first major turning point in European
history” and as the foundation for nearly a millennium of political theory48 — was libertas
 ecclesiae, or the “freedom of the Church.” Here, and not in Jefferson’s letter to the Danbury
Baptists, are the foundations of church-state separation, properly understood.
The “freedom of the Church” claimed by Pope Gregory was the “independence of the
Church from secular control.”49 What was at stake at the Countess’s castle — as at the
Cathedral in Canterbury, a century later, when the “meddlesome priest” St. Thomas Becket
was murdered by another ambitious King Henry50 — was the “principle that royal jurisdiction
was not unlimited … and that it was not for the secular authority alone to decide where its
boundaries should be fixed.”51 In George Weigel’s words:
Thanks to the resolution of the investiture controversy in favor of the Church, the
state … would not be all in all.  The state would not occupy every inch of social
space. Indeed, the state had to acknowledge that there were some things it couldn’t
do because it was simply incompetent to do them — and that acknowledgment of
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limited competence created the social and cultural conditions for the possibility of
what a later generation of constitutionalists and democrats called the limited state.52
No Justice of the United States Supreme Court has ever mentioned — at least, not accord-
ing to Westlaw — Hildebrand, Gregory VII, or Canossa in any published opinion. Never the -
less, engagement with the 11th century Investiture Crisis, Hildebrand’s “revolution,” and the
idea of the “freedom of the church” is essential to an understanding of constitutionalism gen-
erally and, more specifically, of religious freedom under law. As Fr. Murray once observed,
persons are not really free if their “basic human things are not sacredly immune from profa-
nation by the power of the state[.]”53 And so, the challenge has long been to find the limiting
principle that would “check the encroachments of civil power and preserve these immunities”
and, Murray thought, “[w]estern civilization first found this norm in the pregnant principle,
the freedom of the Church.”54
It is tempting to assume that such a “great idea,” or “revolutionary” principle of limited
 government in the service of human freedom, must be deeply rooted and comfortably well
established in our Constitutional law. It is not entirely clear, though, that there actually is, in
American constitutional doctrine, a commitment to the freedom of the church, revolutionarily
understood. This is not to ignore the fact that there are a number of constitutional doctrines
that, in effect, guard the churches’ right to control their internal structure, to select their own
ministers, to propose their own messages, to administer their own sacraments, to conduct
their own liturgies, and so on. Appearances are deceiving, though, it is not clear that these
doctrines evidence a robust, foundational commitment to church autonomy as structural
principle of constitutional government. Instead, it could well be that we are living off the cap-
ital of this idea — that is, we enjoy, embrace, and depend upon its freedom-enabling effects —
without a real appreciation for, or even a memory of, what it is, implies, and presumes.
For us today, the principle or idea that does the hard work of ensuring that the state is not
“all in all” is not the freedom of the church, but the freedom of the individual conscience. In
our religious-freedom doctrines and conversations, it is likely that the independence and
 autonomy of religious institutions are framed as deriving from the free-exercise rights of indi-
vidual persons, rather than as providing the foundation for those rights. A better understand-
ing is one that appreciates both that authentic freedom of religion does not exist when its
manifestation in and expression through the work of institutions is burdened, and also that in-
dependence for such institutions is a necessary condition for political freedom. It is one that
treats the freedom of the church, or something like it, as a structural feature of social and
 political life — one that promotes and enhances freedom by limiting government — and also
as a moral right of religious communities, not simply as an implication of individuals’ immu-
nity from government coercion in matters of religious belief.
Is there a place — could there be a place — in American thought, politics, and law for a
“revolutionary” principle like the “freedom of the church”? Is this a principle that could be in-
corporated into our Religion Clauses doctrine and categories? Perhaps. True, again, there are
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a variety of constitutional cases, tests, and rules that evoke and resemble the libertas ecclesiae
principle. Most notably, there is the doctrine of “church autonomy” which, in Professor
Bradley’s words, is “the issue that arises when legal principles displace religious communities’
internal rules of interpersonal relations (as opposed to prescriptions for personal spirituality).”55
So understood, Bradley insists, “church autonomy” is the “flagship issue of church and state,”
the “litmus test of a regime’s commitment to genius spiritual freedom.”56 But even the “church
autonomy” doctrine seems as much a collection of themes, or a grab-bag of discrete holdings
in particular cases — a mood, even — as a clear rule, prohibition, or principle. It remains un-
clear and unsettled what exactly are the content and the textual home in the Constitution for
the church-autonomy principle. It does not seem unfair to suggest that — like the “right to
 privacy,” perhaps — the doctrine has something of an imprecise emanations-and-penumbras
air about it.57 And this, I submit, is something we might reasonably worry about, because the
freedom of the church, as the heart of separation, matters — and for many reasons.
It matters, for starters, because — as was suggested earlier — there is a plausible argument
that it plays an important, even if unnoticed, role in protecting the freedom of conscience.
The case can be made that the freedom of the church has mattered and does matter for the
development and sustaining of constitutionally limited government. And, as Professor Brady
has explained, freedom for churches and religious institutions makes it possible for them to
continue proposing “national values” and “preserving new visions of social life for us all.”
After all, these values and visions are best, and “prophetically,” nurtured not just in private
consciences but in religious communities.58 What’s more, the freedom of the church would
seem to matter more than the issues at the heart of most contemporary law-and-religion dis-
putes. If religious freedom is the good for which we are aiming, then advocacy and litigation
efforts are probably better directed at defending the freedom of the church than, say, at insist-
ing on snippets of civil religion on the walls of secular courthouses or in professions of nation-
al loyalty. Even if it is true that the First Amendment is best understood to permit official
acknowledgments of religion and public displays of religious symbols, it is still worth remem-
bering that the attention and efforts of religious believers is almost certainly better spent
shoring up the structures on which their ability to challenge and transform the world depends.
Better to insist on the freedom that religious institutions and communities require to evangel-
ize than to urge the state to take up the task of evangelization for itself.
That the freedom of the church matters in many ways makes it all the more troubling that
it is vulnerable. In part, this vulnerability is connected to the limited, and perhaps dwindling,
appeal in public discourse of the term “church autonomy.” We are, generally speaking, enthu-
siastic about autonomy, or self-rule, but many of us are uneasy about connecting “church”
with nomos. Matters are not helped by the fact that the idea is often understood as entailing
the assertion that clergy and church employees are entirely “above the law,” and unaccount-
able for wrongs they do or harms they cause.59 To the extent the church-autonomy principle is
thought to privilege institutions over individuals, or structures over believers, its appeal will
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suffer, given that people today think about faith — and, by extension, about religious freedom —
more in terms of personal spirituality than of institutional affiliation, public worship, and tra-
dition. We are — many of us, anyway — like the woman, Sheila Larson, described by Robert
Bellah and his colleagues in The Habits of the Heart, who described her faith as “Sheilaism.”60
If we approach religious faith as a form of self-expression, performance art, or therapy, we are
likely to regard religious institutions as, at best, potentially useful vehicles or tools or, more
likely, stifling constraints or bothersome obstacles to self-discovery.
At perhaps a deeper level, though, the freedom of the church would seem vulnerable be-
cause of the increasingly widespread acceptance of the idea that liberal values and nondis-
crimination norms ought not only to constrain state action, but also to inform state action
constraining mediating institutions. It is more likely today that churches and their autonomy
are regarded as dangerous centers of potentially oppressive power, as in need of supervision
and regulation by the state in its capacity as protector of individual liberty and conscience.61
But if, as Professor Berman proposed, the freedom of the church is not easily separated from
both the history and the health of political freedom under constitutionally limited govern-
ment, it would appear that, in Professor Hamburger’s words, the illiberal expansion of “liberal
ideals … could … become a threat to freedom.”62
IV. Conclusion
Many argue today that the “separation of church and state” requires governments to scrub
clean the public square of all “religious” residue, or mandates a thoroughly secular civil society.
But this view of church-state separation is just as mistaken as the claim that separation is a
“lie.” It is untrue to the vision of our Founders and to the text of our Constitution. To quote
John Courtney Murray again, arguments like these stand the First Amendment “on its head.
And in that position it cannot but gurgle juridical nonsense.”63 In fact, our Constitution sepa-
rates “church” and “state” not to confine religious belief or silence religious expression, but to
curb the ambitions and reach of governments. In our laws, “Caesar recognizes that he is only
Caesar and forswears any attempt to demand what is God’s. . . . The State realistically admits
that there are … limits on its authority and leaves the churches free to perform their work in
society.”64
Having offered these reflections on the idea of “separation,” I would like to close with a few
thoughts on the integration, not of church and state, but of faith and vocation. I teach and
write at the Notre Dame Law School. At Notre Dame, our goal is to invite and — we hope —
inspire young lawyers to bring their values to their studies, and then to carry them into their
lives in the law. Of course, we do not always succeed. Still, in our view, we cannot expect
young lawyers to think well about law, justice, and the common good if we tell them to priva-
tize their ideals, or to radically separate their fundamental moral commitments from their
law practices. And so, we encourage our students to approach their vocations — as lawyers,
spouses, parents, friends, and citizens — as whole persons. That is, we challenge them to
 integrate their work, their beliefs, their values, and their activism. We urge them always to
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 remember who they are, what they believe, where they came from, and whom they love, and
to resist the temptation to “check their faith at the door” of their professional and public lives.
So, with respect to my topic today — that is, the “separation of church and state,” properly
understood — I want to start with this claim: Those of us who are religious believers and citizens
are entirely free — indeed, we are entitled — to participate in public life, in the civic arena,
and in politics as whole persons. Nothing in the text, history, or structure of our Constitution
requires us to accept dis-integration as the “price of admission” to the life of active, engaged
citizenship. We need not, to be good citizens, bracket our faith, or translate our commitments. 
To be sure, in our tradition, we wisely separate the institutions of religion from those of
government. The Church is not, and must not be, an arm or auxiliary of the state. We do this,
though, precisely in order to protect religious freedom, which includes the freedom to con-
struct and live a faithful, coherent, integrated, public life.
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RESPECTING RESPECTIVE SPHERES
THE ROLE OF RELIGION 
IN PUBLIC LIFE
 B Y  S T E V E N  K .  G R E E N *
Too frequently, discussions about the proper role of religion in American culture andpublic policy have been cast in absolutist terms, for example, the claim that religious
voices have unfairly been excluded from participating in public matters, resulting in a “naked
public square” and the claim that religious voices are divisive and should remain private in
order to avoid an Establishment Clause violation.1 Alternatively, this latter perspective often
seeks to limit public religious discourse to issues that are either uncontroversial or involve
“traditional” matters of religious concern , for example, “no” to politically charged commen-
tary; “yes” to talk about helping one’s neighbor. Both perspectives fail to appreciate that the
appropriate public role and voice of religion turns less on the issue such as abortion, war, or
political partisanship, or of how closely is it associated with a church tenet such as, again,
abortion or a particular tax policy, and more on the particular domain or sphere that serves as
the stage for the issue. 
The ground rules governing the role of religious expression in public life should turn less
on the identity or substance of those voices and more on the spheres of discourse. When reli-
gion is acting in its private capacity without any government involvement, its ability to ex-
press its religious voice in an uncorrupted manner and to become involved in public matters
is at its greatest.2 When religion acts or speaks religiously as a result of a government created
forum that allows for a diversity of voices and approaches, religion’s role and voice may be
constrained by the neutral limitations imposed by that forum. Religion’s voice will likely be
more constrained in this sphere than when it acts in a fully independent or private capacity.
But when the sphere is in the form of a government program or function, the ability to ex-
clude religious voices and approaches is heightened. In this latter sphere, the government
may choose nonreligious voices and approaches without discriminating against religion.
In order to explain this schema, this essay will discuss three recent church-state controver-
sies: (1) religious involvement in partisan politics, (2) religious involvement in government
funded social services under Charitable Choice concepts, and (3) religious displays on public
property. The ground rules proposed are as much aspirational as they are of a constitutional
nature. In fact, the constitutional doctrine governing private religious speech in public set-
tings, though long in developing, has reached a relatively settled and uncontroversial place.
Building on the Jehovah’s Witness colporteur cases of the 1940s and 1950s where religious ex-
pression was awarded protection under emerging free speech doctrines, the Supreme Court
between 1980 and 1997 clarified that religious groups should have similar access to government
property, buildings, and forums that are otherwise open for expression by private actors.3
Although I have previously expressed concern that this expansion could raise issues of
 government attribution of religion (as with a private display of a religious symbol in a govern-
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ment building leading to impressions of official endorsement of religion) or could result in the
capture of public forums by dominant religious groups, I generally embrace this development.4
Provided the government has not manipulated a forum to favor religious voices but truly
treats religious and nonreligious voices alike, then perceptions of endorsement — and citizen
isolation from government — should be minimal. Significant issues remain whether equal
 access principles from speech doctrine should transfer to funding contexts,5 but generally the
clarification that private religious speech is entitled to the same treatment and protection as
other forms of expression has been an important development. This is an area where the con-
stitutional rules chiefly set the outer boundaries, hence, important and necessary discussions
need to take place on a non-constitutional level.
I. Principles
The threshold principle just discussed — regarding the co-equal status of private religious ex-
pression with its secular counterpart — may seem self-evident; however, it deserves brief
elaboration. It is beyond peradventure that the government may place no restrictions on the
religious content or perspective of expression that takes place within the confines of a private
sphere such as within a home or house of worship. Thus clergy and others may from pulpits
and in newsletters condemn the war, oppose abortion or criticize government spending poli-
cies, provided the expression does not cross the line into criminal incitement or other unpro-
tected speech.6 This same allowance extends to similar religious pronouncements to public
audiences beyond co-religionists as in evangelism. The primary limitation on this principle
rests not on the expressive locus, method, or audience but on the subject matter: churches
and other houses of worship are forbidden under the Internal Revenue Code from endorsing
or opposing candidates for public office or becoming engaged in partisan political campaigns
if they remain tax exempt. While courts have acknowledged the free exercise and free speech
rights of churches to express such preferences, they have found no violation by the govern-
ment imposing such a restriction as a condition for receiving an exemption from paying fed-
eral income taxes.7
Free exercise and expression values thus protect the ability of churches to become involved
in social and political issues.8 This constitutional pass-key only says what churches can do; it
does not say what churches should do. For most churches, matters of faith cannot be cabined
in theology, doctrine and liturgy. The prophetic voice of our religious community on social
 issues, and its involvement in social matters, has made our society far richer and more  humane.
Religion has an indispensable role in speaking out about injustice and calling our leaders to
moral accountability. Many of the great moral and social movements of our nation — abolition,
women’s rights, civil rights — would not have taken place without the vocal leadership of
churches, their clergy and their laity. That voice is clearest and most effective, however, when
it maintains its autonomy from the government it is petitioning or critiquing. History has
taught that religion loses its moral authority, effectiveness, legitimacy and, eventually, its
 independence when it relies on the sovereign for support or too eagerly ratifies government
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policies and programs.
That religion should have a strong public voice does not mean that there is an opposite
counterpart. The Establishment Clause bars the government from reciprocating by speaking
with a religious voice. The Establishment Clause, as well as the structure of the Constitution,
ensures that we have a secular form of government. Thus the government may enact programs
to advance important social goals and speak on matters of social and political significance, but
the government is disabled from acting with the purpose of advancing religion or speaking
with a religious voice. On one level, government simply lacks jurisdiction or authority over
religious matters. On a different level, since the Founding Era we have recognized the threat
to the legitimacy and independence of both government and religion when government ex-
propriates religion for its purposes. James Madison wrote that the claim that government
could judge religious truth or “employ religion as an engine of civil policy” was “an arrogant
pretension” as well as an “unhallowed perversion of the means of salvation.”9
The two clauses thus exert tension on the issue of religion in public life: religion must have
a public voice, but at the same time it must remain private, that is, separate from government;
government must remain secular, but not inhibit religious voices.
This tension is reflected in public attitudes. Americans take a schizophrenic approach to
the mixing of religion with politics and social policy. Polling data indicates that an over-
whelming majority of Americans object to excessive political activity by churches and religious
leaders. Most people view it as unseemly for a religious leader to closely align himself with an
elected official or partisan organization or for him to advocate that the government should
promote a religious agenda through public policy or law. Not surprisingly, many Americans
were rebuffed by the religious demagoguery of Pat Buchanan at the 1992 Republican Conven -
tion where he anointed the party as the party of God. People prefer that matters of faith and
politics not be too closely associated. As a result, religious leaders like Pat Robertson and
Jerry Falwell are generally reproved by the public, despite the devotion of their core followers.
This disdain tends to vanish — or at least lessen — when a religious leader’s political pro-
nouncements or a politician’s “God talk” matches one’s own religious/social perspective.
What was once a “religious-political agenda” becomes a compelling basis for policy implemen-
tation. Religious justifications and rhetoric that were once off-putting are now affirming.
Because of the inherent myopia of faith, people tend to exaggerate the universality of their
own beliefs and have a difficult time seeing that their deeply felt positions may not be shared
by others and, in fact, may be offensive. Moreover, because of the certitude of belief in many
faith traditions, particularly within the more fundamentalist communities, differing interpre-
tations or views of religious truths are not worthy of equal regard. Thus, for example, many
religious conservatives have supported President George W. Bush’s normative policies not
only because they agree with values and outcomes they represent, but also because they be-
lieve they are the religiously “correct” positions to hold. In such instances, discourse frequently
becomes absolutist in its terms and political compromise becomes all but impossible.
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The schizophrenia with respect to religious-political discourse is most apparent, however,
when it comes to many Americans’ attitudes about the government’s use of religious rhetoric,
imagery or symbolism. So long as our government officials are not too overt or sectarian in
their religiosity, we appreciate a little religious or moral rhetoric by our leaders. Sixty-eight
percent of Americans state that it is important that the President have strong religious beliefs
(a number that rises to 87% if you ask evangelicals). There is a bit of a paradox in fact that
Americans readily embraced the religious sound-bites of Ronald Regan but were uncomfort-
able with the intensely personal faith of Jimmy Carter. George W. Bush’s apparently deep per-
sonal faith is attractive to moderate and conservative Christians, but raises suspicions among
religious liberals and secularists. Still, no avowed atheist or agnostic will be elected President
(or governor or senator or other significant office) in our lifetime.
We also want our government and its policies to reflect our religious beliefs, notwithstand-
ing the continual threat to religion presented by government misappropriation of things holy.
Witness the furor over the removal of the word “God” from the Pledge of Allegiance or when-
ever ACLU seeks to banish the Ten Commandments from public buildings. Madison’s warning
about the dangers to both liberty and religion that are presented when the government uses
religion as “an engine of civil policy” seems antiquated and far removed from the American
democratic experience. This self-assurance, however, fails to appreciate our own history
where Catholics, Mormon, and Native Americans, among others, were on the short-end of
nineteenth century government policies that reflected the dominant Protestant values of times. 
II. Proposal
First with religious voices. There is a temptation to cabin religious voices to issues that are
“clearly religious”: expressions of faith or doctrine; statements on “core” moral issues; or
 humanitarian concerns for the homeless, hungry and dispossessed. While churches should
engage in self-reflection and self-definition for their own legitimacy, pressure to define the
boundaries of “proper” religious discourse is often external from popular culture, the media,
or government. There is a real threat to religious liberty when government defines as public
matters religious importance. Many years ago I was involved in a controversy over whether a
local church’s feeding program for the homeless conflicted with the city’s zoning policies. 
I remember being told by a city official that the issue could be resolved if the church would
simply stick to its primary function of providing worship. The prophetic voice and mission of
the church will mean little if others can define those areas that are appropriate for religious
engagement. 
Thus the ground rules governing private (i.e., non-governmental) religious discourse in the
public square cannot turn on the substance of the message. This is why I propose a spatial
 approach to these issues. The rules governing the religious expression in public life should
turn on the spheres of discourse rather than on the substance of those voices. I offer a three
level schema.
1. When religion is acting in its private capacity without any government involvement, its
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ability to express its religious voice in an uncorrupted manner and become involved in
public matters is at its greatest. 
2. When religion acts or speaks religiously as a result of a government created forum that
allows for a diversity of voices and approaches, religion’s role and voice may be more
constrained than when it acts in a fully private capacity. 
3. Finally, when the sphere is in the form of a government program or function, the ability
to exclude religious voices and approaches is heightened. In this latter sphere, the gov-
ernment may choose nonreligious voices and approaches without discriminating against
religion.
Maximum: Churches should have absolute control over their liturgy and church doctrine.
When churches speak with respect to those teachings, in instructional or worship settings,
their expressive rights are at their greatest. They are not seeking a government subsidy to ex-
press their views and, usually, are speaking inwardly to their own congregations. 
As a result, in these private settings, the ability of churches to speak out on social and polit-
ical issues should generally be unconstrained. For example, a bishop or priest should be able
to condemn a public official for supporting the war or abortion or failing to provide for the
needy. The common question that arises concerns the endorsement or criticism of political
candidates by religious leaders. Episodes of “voters’ guides” or political rallies in churches are
legend. The Internal Revenue Code forbids churches from engaging in any political election-
eering, and a few churches have run into trouble. Recently, the Internal Revenue Service
threatened an Episcopal Church in California with revocation of its tax exemption for the rec-
tor’s condemnation of the President’s war policy shortly before the 2004 election. The church
had a long history, however, of speaking out on political and social matters, such that its criti-
cism of the President was neither exceptional nor selective in its timing. After several years of
an impending government sanction, the I.R.S. dropped its investigation. Even though the
church “won,” the investigation may have had the same chilling effect on religious speech as
any loss of an exemption. 
I believe the Internal Revenue Code’s prohibition of religiously motivated political speech
should be read narrowly. Religious leaders should be able to speak out on matters of religious
and political significance, particularly when the church is already on record with respect to
the issues and is speaking to its congregants. Thus, a priest or minister should be able to urge
his parishioners to vote for pro-life or pro-choice candidates without violating the I.R.C. I
would draw the line at express endorsements of candidate X or lending a pulpit to a candidate
the Sunday before the election (Congress has legitimate interest in the integrity of elections).
But general admonitions to vote one’s religious conscience should be protected, particularly
when it takes place within this first sphere.
More Constrained:When the government has created or opened a forum for diverse expres-
sion or participation, it may not exclude religious voices. Thus, if government allows public
use of government buildings (libraries, schools, municipal halls), it may not exclude religious
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groups or voices. Similarly, if the government allows for temporary display of private symbols
on government property, it cannot exclude symbols with religious messages such as nativity
scenes.
But the government can always limit the purposes for the access or set criteria for its use,
provided those criteria are neutral. It can also consider the compatibility of speech with
 particular property: general discourse in airports is appropriate; political rallies or religious
revivals are incompatible. When churches decide to broadcast their messages by way of
 government provided forums, they are subject to the same time, place and manner rules gov-
erning other private expression. In some instances, religious speech may not be compatible
with a particular forum, regardless of its message. Thus, religious expression is not at its apex
in such contexts.
A related example concerns government funded programs, such as social service programs.
Depending on the program structure and goals (for example, how competitive is the Request
for Proposal or how much discretion a social service provider has in the content of its pro-
grams), then religious organizations and religious voices may be prominent in such programs.
Much may depend on whether one characterizes a particular government funded program as
an open forum such that government cannot discriminate on the basis of a religious view-
point or more restricted government offering over which government goals and messages
dominate.10 But if the government chooses to structure its program offering more narrowly,
then certain religious approaches may not qualify. 
Minimal Religious Voice: As said, the history and structure of our government contemplate a
secular public order. The Establishment Clause recognizes that America has a secular demo-
cratic government, one in which government may promote liberal democratic principles to
the exclusion of other ideologies, including religious ones. Thus government may and should
promote secular goals over religious goals and voices. This also means an affirmative obliga-
tion on government to maintain a secular order, and a collective right of citizens to enforce
this arrangement, a value which recently was undermined by the Court’s narrowing of tax-
payer standing in Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation.11
Outside of mandatory or designated expressive forums, government is not obligated to
 support private expression, religious or otherwise. Similarly, government is not obligated to
enhance religious voices through its own programs. This is historically true; our experience
has taught that government is ill equipped to enhance religion without reverting to favoritism
and inviting those concerns that drive the Establishment Clause.
Supporters of neutrality theory have made claims, to a large degree unchallenged, of gov-
ernment’s obligation to treat religion as favorably as non-religion, even in its own programs or
speech. In the words of Stephen Monsma, “[t]he key to governmental neutrality is that gov-
ernment does not recognize, accommodate, or support any one particular religion over any
other nor either religious or secular worldviews and groups over one another.”12 As Professor
Suzanna Sherry has summed up the argument:
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The claim that the Establishment Clause should be subordinated when it conflicts
with religious or speech rights of believers is really a claim that … the government
must remain neutral not only on the potential truth of religious claims but also on
their epistemology. It is a claim that the government should not be permitted to
privilege reason over faith as a method of obtaining and verifying truth claims.13
This argument is inconsistent with the secular nature of democratic government,
under which the government is entitled to privilege secular values over religious
ones. The government may favor rational approaches to policy formation over
 alternative epistemologies, including religious systems. The government need not
be neutral or evenhanded toward religion in administering its own programs; it
may prefer rational empirically based solutions and outcomes over religiously
based ones. 
Importantly, the preference for and advancement of secular policies over religious policies
is not the same as discrimination against religion.Where government promotion of secular-
ism crosses the line into coercion is when the government requires private citizens to agree
with its positions or policies. Government must also avoid taking sides on matters of contest-
ed religious belief. But this on its own does not disable the government from promoting secular
policies and perspectives to the exclusion of comparable religious ones.14 In essence, govern-
ment is generally not required to treat religion equally with nonreligion, only not to treat reli-
gion unfairly.
Contrary to what some may claim, the boundary between secularism and religion is not a
zero-sum game, such that every secular value is advanced at the cost of a comparable reli-
gious value. Government may advance secular ideals without disparaging religion. Neither
government nor society operates in a Manichean framework. While government should not
consciously disparage religion or religious choices, it may create incentives for secular ones.
Thus, within government funded programs, particularly those with express policy goals and
outcomes, the government may impose restrictions on the religious (or secular) messages by
private providers in the administration of those programs.
Charitable Choice. As a result, the federal government was under no obligation to change
the rules with respect to the eligibility of Faith-Based Organizations to compete for govern-
ment grants and contracts. The rhetoric surrounding the enactment of Charitable Choice and
the Bush Administration’s promotion of the Faith Based Initiative has been full of claims of
government obligations to include more religious groups. The implication was that the failure
to expand the offering infringed on free exercise and free expression principles. On one level,
the evidence is overwhelming that prior to Charitable Choice the government did not dis-
criminate against religious providers or beneficiaries, but only as against certain religious
uses. But more fundamentally, considering the affirmative quality of nonestablishment with
the negative quality of free exercise, the federal government was under no obligation to re-
structure its funding goals to include religious alternatives. No free exercise burden would be
presented by a secular-only program, neither with respect to beneficiaries nor potential
 religious providers. To quote former Chief Justice Burger:
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Never … has the Court interpreted the First Amendment to require the Govern -
ment itself to behave in ways that the individual believes will further his or her
spiritual development or that of his or her family. The Free Exercise Clause simply
cannot be understood to require the Government to conduct its own internal af-
fairs in ways that comport with the religious beliefs of particular citizens. …”[T]he
Free Exercise Clause is written in terms of what the government cannot do to the
individual, not in terms of what the individual can extract from the government.”15
Religious Displays. As discussed, the government lacks authority to speak religiously; addition-
ally, we should raise alarm at the government’s use of religious imagery and discourse for its
policy purposes. Not only should the government use of religious symbolism be prohibited —
as Justice Stevens argues, there should be “a strong presumption against the display of reli-
gious symbols on public property” outside of a clear public forum.16 Additionally, there exists
an affirmative obligation to disassociate self from impressions of government endorsement.
Again, as Justice O’Connor has stated: “[T]he Establishment Clause forbids a State from hiding
behind the application of formally neutral criteria and remaining studiously oblivious to the
effects of its actions.17 Thus, this is why the Texas Ten Commandments decision — Van Orden
v. Perry— is wrong. Except for those rare situations that are overwhelmingly aesthetic —
National Gallery Madonnas; the frieze in the Supreme Court chamber — the government
should not expropriate, use, or even associate itself with inherently religious symbols. When
the government is speaking — and there was no claim in Van Orden that Texas had created a
public forum for free expression on the state capitol grounds — it must support a secular pub-
lic order.
This does not mean that government cannot acknowledge religious traditions or customs.
It is particularly able to do so when it accommodates the religious needs of its citizens, such
as through religious holidays. But acknowledgement is different from normative proof-claims:
that we are a “Christian Nation,” or that “the Ten Commandments serve as the basis for
American government.” In such instances, government must speak with a secular voice. 
In a related vein, churches should not encourage the government to engage in religious
discourse or acquiesce to the government’s appropriation of religious imagery or symbolism.
People of faith should understand that religious messages are most effective and legitimate
when they take place apart from the realms of the profane. Respecting the appropriate
spheres of discourse will go far to ensuring the credibility and durability of religious commen-
tary on matters of public life.
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NEITHER ROBBER BARONS 
NOR PHILOSOPHER KINGS
POLITICAL PRUDENCE IN THE JUST POLITY
 B Y  J O H N  O ’ C A L L AG H A N *
Introduction
In the very beginning of the Republic, and thus in the very beginnings of Western political
thought, Plato presents his readers with an interesting quandary about justice. He has Socrates
suggest that a community constituted from the joint pursuit of an unjust goal can itself embody
justice. He poses this quandary in the famous “band of thieves” argument against Thrasy -
machus’s claim that justice is nothing other than the pursuit of the advantage of the rulers
through the exercise of power. Socrates appears to be successful in his argument, but the
quandary begins when we ask what his success implies about how such an idea of justice
might apply to an entire city-state or nation. After all, the Republic is not about a measly band
of thieves, but about the conditions necessary for establishing a self-sufficient political com-
munity. Could one have a nation that by all appearances is just within its boundaries, and yet
is constituted for the pursuit of injustice? If not, why not?
I think that when we reflect upon our own age and its political practices, we see the genius
of Plato in putting before us what appears to be a timeless philosophical, but also practical
problem. How should we think about our participation in modern democratic politics? In our
democracies it sometimes seems that the choices we face in electoral politics call for an atti-
tude approaching despair, as we are confronted with having to choose between two or more
bad options, and no particularly good ones, as our politicians appear to be, if not always thor-
oughly corrupt, nonetheless beholden to powerful interests that do not act for the public and
common good. Our own individual political participation in such a setting can appear to de-
generate into nothing more than pursuing our own individual interests, indeed our own indi-
vidual advantages against our fellow citizens. Perhaps this perception and attitude contribute
to the extraordinary lack of political participation on the part of citizens in modern western
democracies, the participation that is necessary for them to function well as self-governing
political communities. Perhaps we have a strong desire to remain pure in the midst of political
corruption, which leads us to a kind of indifference to politics, lest our purity be stained by it. 
The question of purity and perfection on the one hand, and political corruption on the
other hand, is at the heart of Plato’s Republic. It is portrayed in particularly striking terms at
the very beginning in the argument between Socrates and Thrasymachus in Book I. But the
discussion of this problem is carried on in different ways after Plato and into Western political
thought by Aristotle, Augustine, and Aquinas, among others.
In the City of God, Augustine describes looking out upon the span of history and its empires,
only to judge those empires, and in particular the Roman empire, as little more than large
bands of thieves, led, presumably, by rulers who are little more than very powerful robber
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barons. Human relations within a city or state that otherwise might have the appearance of
justice are in reality little more than instruments of state sponsored thievery. This judgment
of Augustine’s is strikingly negative. But, apart from any sense we may have that it applies
equally to our own political institutions, it is difficult to read it without thinking of the “band
of thieves” argument that Socrates uses to positive effect in establishing the positive character
and strength of justice as a political virtue.
What I propose to do here is to look at Plato’s “band of thieves argument,” and the difficulty
about justice that I think it raises, a difficulty that Plato himself does not explicitly raise, but
may have wanted to intimate. Prima facie he uses the argument to defend justice; Socrates’s
 listeners show every sign of being convinced by it, and no doubt countless readers of the dia-
logue since have been convinced by it as far as it goes. I, on the other hand, think it is a failed
argument about justice, and I suspect Plato knew that it was. I will discuss its failure, and turn
to a distinction drawn by Aristotle that distinguishes thieves from citizens in order to address
its failure. Finally, in light of the appeal to Aristotle, I will turn to a similar discussion in
Aquinas, which both relies upon but also differs from Aristotle, in order to say a few things
about the difficult and often negative choices we face in the electoral politics of our modern
democracies.
Justice and Thievery
In the first book of the Republic, Plato dramatically poses an interesting problem for a virtue
based political theory of governance. Is justice strength in those who possess it, or weakness;
if virtues are forms of strength and vices forms of weakness, is justice a virtue or a vice?
Thrasymachus suggests that justice is in fact a kind of weakness. It is a weakness that makes
those who possess it subject to the political governance of the strong. Thrasymachus de-
scribes justice as a weakness in order to support his earlier claim that justice is the advantage
of the strong. Plato’s reader initially thinks that Thrasymachus is claiming that justice is a
power possessed by certain ruling individuals, a power that makes them strong. On the con-
trary, in the heat of discussion it becomes clear that Thrasymachus thinks that the strong are
strong precisely by their lack of justice. Justice is the advantage of the strong in the following
sense: it is advantageous to the strong that there should be weak individuals whom they can
control, and rule. But it is the justice in the weak that makes them weak; and thus the justice
that is the weakness of the weak is the advantage of the strong in ruling them. Justice as weak-
ness renders those who suffer from it incapable of pursuing their desires in a straightforward
way; it makes them timid, and overly careful in their acts. Thus the strong who are not timid,
and who do not worry about the justice of their acts, pursue their desires without scruple, and
can manipulate the weakness of the just to fulfill those desires. So justice is the advantage of
the strong, in the sense in which the lack of skill at playing cards in the seasoned gambler’s
opponent is the advantage of that seasoned gambler. And since the rulers do not possess jus-
tice, but use it to their advantage, justice is not the ruling skill, but an instrument of the strong
because it is the characteristic fault of those members of society too weak to pursue their
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 desires through ruling others.
Thus, Thrasymachus paints what appears to be a very cynical portrait of government,
whether or not, as he points out, it is democratic, aristocratic, or tyrannical.1 The just in
Thrasymachus’s portrait are like Nietzsche’s little lambs. Nietzsche writes in the Genealogy of
Morals:
That lambs bear ill-will towards large birds of prey is hardly strange: but is in itself
no reason to blame large birds of prey for making off with little lambs. And if the
lambs say among themselves: ‘These birds of prey are evil; and whoever is as little
of a bird of prey as possible, indeed, rather the opposite, a lamb — should he not be
said to be good?’ then there can be no objection to setting up an ideal like this,
even if the birds of prey might look down on it a little contemptuously and per-
haps say to themselves: ‘We bear them no ill-will at all, these good lambs — indeed,
we love them: there is nothing tastier than a tender lamb.’2
The unjust rule through strength, while the just are ruled in their weakness, and it is their
very justice that is their weakness; the just are the lambs awaiting their honored place at the
table, right there in the middle, as the rulers gather round the feast.
Still, Socrates tries to demonstrate that however much Thrasymachus may have the ap-
pearances on his side, his portrait of justice as a kind of weakness simply does not express the
reality of justice. The way in which Socrates wrestles with Thrasymachus is highly paradoxical.
He asks us to consider a band of thieves. Allow me to fill out the example in ways that Plato
does not, but that I think are faithful to his intent. One thief may well have the power to
achieve a certain amount of success in fulfilling his desires to possess the property of another.
But thievery being what it is, it feeds that desire in an intemperate way, and so the desire
grows and grows. Perhaps the desire to possess the goods of another will grow so strong that
the individual thief will no longer be able to slake it without help from another. So in order to
satisfy his desires, he must enter into a cooperative relationship with some other thief, who,
presumably, also cannot slake his own desires for the property of others without help. They
are now a band of thieves, if only two.
Within their cooperative relationship, Socrates claims that the thieves must treat each
other with a certain amount of respect, keeping to their agreements with one another, divvy-
ing up the spoils between one another, and, in particular, divvying them up in such a way as
to preserve the bond of thievery that they have established. If they are good thieves, they will
not be satisfied with a one-off act of joint thievery. They will want the relationship to contin-
ue. So they will look out for the good of one another, make sure that each other is well fed,
clothed, housed, and healthy. In short, they will give each other their due — that is, they will
act justly toward each other, even as they continue to steal from those who are not in the band
of thieves.
The crucial point here is that the justice the two thieves show one another is what makes
them strong as thieves. The justice they direct at one another doesn’t weaken them. On the
contrary, it makes them more capable of achieving the end that they set for themselves,
thievery. However, and again thievery being what it is, they will not rest satisfied with being a
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band of two thieves. The two, seeing the growth of their success in thievery, brought about by
the justice they extend to one another, may well desire even more than they can achieve as
two. So one can imagine the band of thieves growing in strength, as more members are incor-
porated into the cooperative relationship that is characterized by justice being extended to
those who enter into the band of thieves, even as they exploit the weakness of those outside
the band. Whether the ruling body consists in a common agreement of all, the decisions of a
few of them, or only one, the ruling body of the band of thieves will care for the members and
seek to promote justice within the bounds of the band of thieves, precisely so that the band of
thieves can be strong in the injustice it perpetrates upon those who are not members of the band.
So, contrary to Thrasymachus’s claim, Socrates’s argument is that justice is actually strength
among those who possess it. It is a strength that enables a community to achieve its ends.
And because it is the strength that informs the rule of the band of thieves, it is the ruling
strength or virtue. Thus, Socrates point is that even if Thrasymachus is right about what the
ruling class looks like, namely, a band of thieves, nonetheless, their actual strength in ex-
ploitation derives from the justice they extend to one another — justice extended to one an-
other makes them strong. On the other hand, if Thrasymachus is wrong, then justice is simply
seen to be strength among those who possess it. So, whether Thrasymachus is right or wrong
about the rulers, justice is in fact strength among those who possess it.
However, I want to extend the band of thieves argument beyond the limited point that it
establishes against Thrasymachus. I want to use it to raise a question about the justice that
Socrates assumes characterizes such a band of thieves, and those who rule them. Is the
strength that the band of thieves displays really a form of justice? Socrates’s listeners appear
to think so, and countless readers of the dialogue who are convinced by it must think so as
well. But consider the band of thieves again. It lives within a larger community from which it
steals. Let us say that the larger community is the city. Now consider again that thievery
being what it is, it will most likely not rest satisfied with mere success in a particular instance
of theft, or a particular amount of theft. Even if the band of thieves embodies justice among
its own members, what characterizes thievery, apart from its injustice directed at outsiders, is
that part of the vice of intemperance that might be called greed, the intemperate desire to
possess material goods not due to one. It must always have more. So imagine that the band of
thieves recognizes that with its current size it cannot satisfy its greed. In order to have more
goods, it must incorporate more thieves. More members must be brought into the band, and
they must be treated justly. The ruler of the band must have the authority to enforce an equi-
table treatment of all the members, seeing to the food, clothing, shelter, health, and perhaps
even education in thievery of the members of the band. Dissension breads weakness, while
unity breads strength. With greater success in thievery comes greater desire. And so the band
continues to grow, and grow, and grow within the boundaries of the larger city.
Of course one paradoxical feature of this growth of the band of thieves is that the growth in
justice within the band of thieves will diminish the arena of injustice beyond its boundaries.
344
T H E  A M E R I C A N  E X P E R I M E N T:  R E L I G I O U S  F R E E D O M
In order that it may grow stronger in the injustice of thievery, it must in some measure diminish
the opportunities for injustice available to it, by incorporating within its scope of justice
 individuals who were once possible objects of its injustice. The marginal rate of return of the
balance of justice to injustice diminishes as their greed grows and the justice within the band
increases. So, one might think that there must be a natural limit to the growth of the band of
thieves.
This diminishment of the rate of return on injustice will probably not be much of a problem,
as long as the band of thieves remains relatively small compared to the size of the city. But I
want to push the boundaries even further, and consider what might happen to the balance of
justice and injustice in the city if the band of thieves simply continues to grow, beyond its nat-
ural limits. Imagine it has now grown to be the largest part of the city. That is, the part that is
subject to its injustice is actually smaller than it, perhaps quite smaller than it. As it continues
to grow, one begins to see a picture in which more and more justice is being done within the
band of thieves precisely because it is larger and larger, more individuals are subject to the
justice of the band, and there are fewer and fewer individuals outside the band who can be
subject to the injustice. Indeed, as the band approaches the size of the city itself, it would
seem that for the most part justice reigns supreme precisely because most members of the
city are in the band, while only a few remain outside as objects of the band’s injustice.
Now imagine that the band of thieves grows to encompass the entire city; no one is left out.
Everyone has become a member, and thus must be treated justly by the band, as ruled by the
leader. What have we here, except a just city pure and simple, in which every member is
treated justly, and acts justly toward every other member. Indeed, it appears that we have a
perfect community of justice. No injustice is done in this city, for the band of thieves has
grown so large, and so perfectly encompasses the city, that there are no individuals left in the
city who could suffer injustice at the hands of the band of thieves. Has not our city achieved
perfect justice through the unrestricted, intemperate, and even unnatural growth of an unjust
band of thieves, a band of thieves that, for the purpose of slaking its greed, perfectly incorpo-
rated within itself all the members of society in order that its strength might be perfect, and
unchallenged? And don’t we have in the ruler of such a city the perfectly just ruler, as his au-
thority assures that there will be no injustice done to a member of the band of thieves; since
the band of thieves just happens to be coextensive with the citizens, this fact entails that under
his rule no injustice will be done to a citizen. Where could one possibly find injustice associated
with such a band of thieves? This is paradoxical indeed — so great is the strength of justice
that it wins out every time, even from the unfettered desire for and pursuit of injustice.
Of course, as I mentioned earlier, there is little reason to expect that a band of thieves
would grow to encompass an entire city. A smart ruler of a band of thieves would keep an eye
out to make sure that his band excluded a sufficient number of other citizens that it could con-
tinue to prey upon in its thievery — a parasite does not seek to kill its host, and the bird of
prey does not carry off all of the sweet little lambs, lest they not be able to reproduce and con-
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tinue the supply. Greed has its just limits. Unfettered greed will destroy itself. But controlled
greed that promotes the good of its members, and keeps its outsiders just healthy and wealthy
enough to make them subject to injustice establishes a kind of harmony of justice and injustice.
But wait. Isn’t it just possible that a smart ruler of a band of thieves might realize the gains
to be had by incorporating the entire city within the bonds of justice because of the gain to be
had by preying upon other cities? Why not make the world itself subject to one’s thievery.
There is little chance that one will simply exhaust the fertile fields of greed when the entire
world is thought to be ripe for cultivation. And then it does not seem so extraordinary to sug-
gest that a band of thieves may grow so large as to be coextensive with the boundaries of city
or state, embodying something like perfect justice within those boundaries, while seeking to
do injustice to those communities that live beyond the frontier or shore, or those individuals
who reside within the city, but are not citizens. Indeed, isn’t that just what St. Augustine
meant: the so called justice of cities and states is little more than thievery writ large upon
world political communities.
The philosophical questions raised by this imaginative case that I want to pursue are twofold.
First, going all the way back to Plato’s small scale example of a band of thieves within a city, is
it really justice that characterizes the social form of the band of thieves within its boundaries?
The answer to that question will answer the larger question raised by St. Augustine’s judgment
in the City of God, whether a city like the one I have described can in fact be just within its
boundaries, if it is devoted to injustice without. The second question addresses the philosopher-
king problem that Plato’s Republic raises both at the level of the city, and at the level of the
band of thieves. If the first question has a negative answer, that is, if there is no real justice
within the band of thieves, but merely the appearance of justice, why is that? What must char-
acterize the ruler of a political community who seeks to be genuinely just? Must he or she be
something like the philosopher-king Plato portrays in the Republic?
At first sight, as it unfolds in the Republic, perhaps we are not troubled by Socrates’s use of
the “band of thieves” argument, in which it is a relatively small part of the city. Perhaps it
does not strike us as a paradox to claim that the small band of thieves embodies a form of
 justice within its confines, even as it seeks to do injustice without, or that it is precisely the
justice that it embodies within itself that strengthens the injustice that it does without. In
English, anyway, we have the perfectly ordinary phrase, “honor among thieves” that would
appear to capture ours and Socrates’s companions’ placid acceptance of his argument. But I
hope that my expansion of the case does trouble us. We ought to be troubled by the idea that a
community ordered toward doing injustice is perfectly just simply because a) it needs to be
internally just in order to be successful in its external injustice, and b) there just doesn’t happen
to be anyone left to be unjust to once it has become coextensive with the city. Counter -
factually, if that city of perfect justice had the opportunity to do injustice to someone, it
would. It needs a victim, lest it be simply and perfectly just. Its justice will not be complete,
will not achieve its goal, unless it goes in search of other communities to abuse and treat un-
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justly. But how can the goal of justice be injustice? How can justice be frustrated in its end by
its inability to achieve injustice?
Consider then the original band of thieves. Do we have reason to think that in fact Socrates’s
argument is a bad argument about justice? I think we do. Socrates’s argument tries to show
that justice is strength in those who possess it. But what it presupposes is that the habits of ac-
tion giving rise to the ways in which the members of the band treat themselves are correctly
described as just — they give each other their due in seeing to the food, clothing, shelter, health,
and education, and so on, necessary to make the band successful in its pursuit of thievery.
I want to challenge that presupposition. Here is my argument against it. At the very least
we should recognize that the justice of the band of thieves presented to us by Socrates is noth-
ing more than a means to an end — it is an instrumental good, if it is good at all. An instrument
derives its character from the end or goal to which it functions as a means. A good hammer in
carpentry is different from a good hammer in sculpture because of the difference between
the good of carpentry and the good of sculpture. A hammer good for carpentry will be bad for
sculpture, and vice versa. The instrument is good because it is well adapted to promoting the
good pursued through it, and thus its goodness is a participation in the goodness of the end;
the goodness of the end is why it is good as a means. Conversely, an instrument is bad either
because it is not well adapted to promoting the end for which it is employed, or because it is
employed to bring about some bad end. Put another way, it does not participate in the good-
ness of an end either because it is ill suited as a means to a good, or because there is no good
in the end that it can participate in. The use of a carpentry hammer to make a chair is good.
The use of a jackhammer to make a chair is bad. Even more, the use of a carpentry hammer
to kill an innocent is bad; as an instrument for killing innocents it participates in the bad end
for which it is used.
However, the habits and the acts that flow from them that Socrates attributes to the band of
thieves within their community, the habits and acts he calls just, are instrumental means for
achieving the end or goal of the community, thievery. But thievery is bad as embodying injus-
tice. Everyone grants that. Therefore those habits and acts that are instrumentally ordered
 toward that bad end participate in the bad character of the end, and are themselves bad.
However, whatever is just is good and not bad. Therefore, those habits and acts characteristic
of a band of thieves ordered instrumentally toward thievery cannot be just. What Socrates pre-
sented us with in the Band of Thieves argument was not the reality of justice, but the appear-
ance of justice.
I think we have reason to believe that Plato knew this problem in the construction of the
dialogue. Almost immediately after Socrates gives the argument, he expresses frustration that
they have been talking about justice, and yet they haven’t actually defined it, and do not
know what it is; the expression of this frustration ends Book I. In addition, the argument I just
made relied upon the fact that what Socrates calls justice among the band of thieves is treated
purely instrumentally in his argument. It is not treated as an end in itself. As a pure instrument
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it shares in the bad character of the end for which it is a means. But at the beginning of Bk. II,
Glaucon and Adeimantus criticize Socrates for failing to praise justice for itself. They do not
want to see justice praised for the rewards it brings, that is, as a means to some rewarding
end. They want to see it praised simply for itself as a good. The discussion leads to distin-
guishing between goods that are purely instrumental, goods that are in some respects instru-
mental and in other respects non-instrumental, and goods that are purely non-instrumental
or good in themselves. Left with the band of thieves argument, which does nothing more than
praise a form of life embodying habits of action justified for the sake of material gain through
thievery, we must conclude that that form of life and those habits of action are merely instru-
mental goods.
It is plausible to think that the criticism directed at Socrates by Glaucon and Adeimantus is
Plato’s way of undermining the justice among thieves argument immediately after he puts it
into the mouth of Socrates, precisely because the nature of justice there has been reduced to
the nature of a mere instrument, and instruments are good or bad according to the ends to
which they are put as means. On the contrary, the only chance that justice really has to be
good is insofar it is something good in itself. Otherwise it is as bad as it is good, depending
upon the character of the one who is wielding it.
Prudence and Cleverness
The real question of justice, then, is the question of its end or goal. To what end, to what good
is justice ordained? Is its end itself, or something else? Even if it can be used instrumentally,
is its nature non-instrumental? And here, perhaps, we begin to see the root of the difficulty in
the band of thieves. We have seen that the form of life presented within the band of thieves
that appears to be justice is ordered toward a bad end, toward injustice. I argued above that
justice cannot be ordered toward injustice. What the Band of Thieves argument shows us is
that we have not apprehended the good of justice, either in itself or in relation to other goods
for which it may serve as a means. We are all experiencing a kind of blindness here that causes
us to fail to recognize the good of justice itself, or to see how it is to be adapted as means to
good ends.
But what is this blindness within the thieves, Socrates, his friends, and Plato’s readers? In
order to see what it is, I think it useful to turn to the sixth book of Aristotle’s Nichomachean
Ethics. In book six, Aristotle tells us what prudence is. We tend to think prudence is a kind of
carefulness that shies away from taking action for fear of failure of unknown bad consequences.
On the contrary, Aristotle says that it is that habit of mind called practical wisdom or practical
intelligence that allows one to recognize goods to be pursued, and how to successfully adapt
means and instruments to the pursuit of those goods. Prudence is a power within us that
drives us to pursue goods, not a kind of considered inaction. One lacks prudence either if one
is incapable of recognizing genuinely good ends, or one is incapable of successfully adapting
means and instruments to achieve those ends. So when we look back at our quandary about
the band of thieves, it appears to be precisely prudence that is missing. The band of thieves
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does not recognize justice as an end. Nor does it appear capable of adapting justice as a means
to a good end, so that it could participate as a means or instrument in the goodness of the end.
Lacking prudence, the habits of action possessed by the band of thieves of providing for the
food, clothing, shelter, health, and education of its members are unjust precisely because they
are done neither for themselves nor for a good end. It is certainly unjust to fatten up an inno-
cent man just so that one can kill him; it is equally unjust to fatten up a man just so that he
can kill an innocent.
Still, there is no question that the band of thieves and its rulers are successful in pursuing
their end. They do adapt those actions of caring for one another to the end of thievery. Aren’t
they good practical reasoners? Aristotle would say no, on the basis of a distinction he makes
in the sixth book between prudence and cleverness3 (phronesis and deinotes). Prudence must
recognize good ends and successfully adapt means to the pursuit of those good ends. But
there is a kind of success in adapting means to ends regardless of the character of the end.
Aristotle calls it cleverness. Cleverness is a kind of neutral characterization of practical
means-end reasoning, instrumental reasoning, abstracting from the questions of the goodness
of the end. Prudence is the ability to order means toward the achievement of a good end, suc-
cessfully balancing the various virtues that bear upon any particular course of action, in par-
ticular, temperance, courage, and justice. Cleverness, on the other hand, is like prudence, but
falls short of it in its neutrality toward good ends. Thus the prudent are certainly clever, but
they are also good for they pursue good ends. Aristotle then describes villains (panourgia) as
those who apply their cleverness to bad ends. So it appears that the prudent and the villains
share an activity or power in common, namely cleverness, a power that is applied differently
in the two cases.
Still, there may well be those who are successful at practical reasoning, who nonetheless
are not good, and thus not prudent. They are merely clever. The merely clever man gives no
thought to the goodness of the end, even if he is pursuing what is in fact a good end. He is
pursuing the good per accidens, that is, by accident. And that is why he could just as well be
pursuing a bad end. And in pursuing the bad end, he is what the philosopher Candace Vogler
calls “reasonably vicious.”4
That is the way to read the failure of the band of thieves argument for establishing justice
as a kind of strength. The band of thieves is clever, but it is not prudent. Its reasoning is merely
instrumental. And being merely clever, it fails to be just. Therefore, insofar as the argument
does not present us with a case of genuine justice, it cannot function as an argument that jus-
tice is a kind of strength. The strength that is characteristic of a successful band of thieves is
no form of justice at all. It is greed coupled to mere cleverness that is their strength. On the
contrary, prudence, not cleverness, is what genuinely empowers justice with its strength.
Consider for a moment Socrates himself. In presenting this argument he shows himself at
this stage of the Republic incapable of grasping the good of justice itself or the successful
 ordering of justice as a means to a good end. In that failure he demonstrates that he too lacks
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prudence, as do his friends, and all those who take the argument to be a good argument.
Socrates is portrayed as being able to successfully achieve an argument that convinces those
around him, despite the bad end to which it is put. So Plato portrays Socrates at this stage in
the Republic as merely clever in argument, not prudent; in other words, at this point in the
Republic, Socrates is portrayed as a mere sophist making the weaker argument appear stronger;
he is unjustly stealing the victory from Thraysmachus, and is thus a thief himself. Indeed, he
is the ruler of the band of thieves he calls his friends who cooperate in this sophistry.
Paradoxically, Thrasymachus in his weakness is the object of their strength, and they take ad-
vantage of his weakness. Socrates is the bird of prey, with Thrasymachus the little lamb that
Socrates loves so much carried away for the slaughter and feast of Socrates’s sophist friends.
In any case, the band of thieves lacks justice even within its own boundaries because it
lacks prudence within the community and its leaders. And Augustine’s worldly empires that
are little more than bands of thieves writ large lack justice within them because they too lack
prudence in their leaders.
Perfect and Imperfect Prudence in Modern Democracies
So, it looks as though leaders of government need the virtue of prudence. Negatively stated,
we can say that the failure to recognize good ends is a sufficient condition for judging that a
leader is a bad leader, and ought not to rule. But this raises troublesome issues against the
background of Plato’s Republic. How deep and comprehensive must a leader’s recognition of
good ends be? Is there some one comprehensive good for all, and if so, must it be grasped by
the rulers in order to have good government? The Republic itself goes on to portray the sup-
posed necessity for the philosophers, those who have grasped the form of the good, to rule in
order that justice might reign. 
That is, supposing for the sake of argument that it is the philosopher who possesses pru-
dence, must we have something like Plato’s philosopher-king ruling the ancient political com-
munity, or, to turn to our modern time and place, a philosopher-president ruling our political
community? One would hope not, given the bizarre utopia that Plato portrays for us in the
Republic. How can a philosopher, the lover of wisdom who has seen the form of the good tell
the noble lie that Plato portrays as necessary for good government, without betraying the
 vision of the good, and thus ceasing to be a philosopher? Indeed, the particular conditions of
the utopian Republic are so bizarre in their authoritarian and draconian dictates concerning
sexual relations between men and women, reproduction, education, art, and so on, that one
cannot help but believe that Plato is undermining the very plausibility of such a philosopher-
king even as he portrays it. 
So, to answer the question of whether the need for prudence requires philosopher-kings or
philosopher-presidents, I think it useful to turn now to a discussion of prudence in Thomas
Aquinas that is heavily indebted to Aristotle, but also reminds us in its own way of the justice
among thieves argument. As we have seen, one of the achievements of prudence is to grasp
the good of an activity, and the good of its end. In representative democracies, if there is any
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hope for a just political order, it appears to be the case that citizens must take into account
more than a mere consideration of the policies advocated by candidates in an election; they
must also consider something of the character of the politician promoting those policies.
They must ask whether the candidates possess genuine prudence, or mere cleverness. But
prudence is the virtue of judgment by which we integrate in our actions other virtues, gener-
ally justice, temperance, and courage. More particularly, it is the habit of successfully inte-
grating these virtues while adapting appropriate means to good ends. It has its place in
evaluating the good circumstances in which and the good goals for which one proposes to en-
gage in an act good in its kind. But there is no prudence involved in an act that is bad in its
kind, for example the killing of innocents, sleeping with another’s spouse, sexual intercourse
without consent, appropriating the property of another without consent, mental and physical
abuse designed to coerce the spirit, and so on.
When Aquinas discusses prudence he is clear that it can be considered with regard to our
own particular lives, or with regard to our lives as part of the common good. In the first case
within our own particular lives it is personal prudence, while in the second within the context
of the polity and the common good it is political prudence. And perfect prudence concerns
the whole or integral good of human life, one’s personal good and the common good integrally
related in pursuit of ultimate human fulfillment. Perfect prudence is that prudence that the
philosopher is concerned with as such.
But according to Aquinas, one can fall short of perfect prudence, personal or political, in at
least two ways. One way he calls a kind of imperfect prudence, the other false prudence.
Imperfect prudence is “true prudence” and yet it may be imperfect according to Aquinas be-
cause of two quite different reasons. On the one hand it may be in pursuit of a genuine but
limited good simply, rather than in pursuit of the whole or integral good of human life. On the
other hand it may recognize genuine goods as goals, and yet fail in some way to carry through
with a proposed course of action because of some defect in adapting means to those goals, or
in incorrectly integrating the other virtues in pursuit of those goals, or simply from weakness
in the execution of the well thought out plan.5 The first type of imperfect prudence is not a
failure of prudence, while the second is. Marital prudence, no matter how well one engages in
it in pursuit of the good of sexual relations, is a kind of imperfect prudence in the first sense
because it does not bear upon the whole of the integral human good, but, rather, a part. So
also for the exercise of prudence in one’s job, or friendships, or the management of one’s
household, and so on. There is no failure of prudence in the pursuit of these limited goods,
however imperfect it may be, and thus no error in one’s acts. The sense of imperfection here
is that sense in which Aquinas might say that human nature is imperfect with regard to angelic
nature. But in making that claim, he is not claiming that human beings are failed angels.
On the other hand, if one mistakenly takes any one of these limited goods, or many of
them together, as the whole of the integral human good to the exclusion of others there is a
failure of prudence, and one will commit error even as one pursues these goods. So there is a
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kind of imperfect prudence here as well, but it is imperfect in the sense of failure, as a man
may be an imperfect investor because of his failures at investing. This kind of imperfect per-
sonal prudence is the kind of prudence one ought to desire to have as a minimal condition,
with the conscious recognition that it falls short of, but may be on the way toward acquiring
perfect prudence. One has hope. One still recognizes and pursues those things which are
good in their kind, however much one’s pursuit of them is disordered. One’s hope then is that
one can bring order into one’s pursuit of these genuine goods in kind, and thus aspire toward
perfect prudence.
Nonetheless, however imperfect as a failure of prudence, it remains genuine prudence be-
cause the goods one is pursuing in disordered ways are genuine goods; as those good goals
participate in goodness as such, so this prudence imperfectly participates in perfect prudence.
One simply fails in some way in one’s ordering of the good ends, one to another, or in adapt-
ing means toward those good ends, or in the evaluation of appropriate circumstances and
goals for performing certain acts good in their kind.
Now suppose we turn from personal prudence to consider the question of political pru-
dence ordered toward the common good. At the level of political prudence in oneself or in
one’s leaders, one ought to hope that we make good well ordered judgments in pursuit of gen-
uine goods. If we do not, one ought to hope that we see the disorder in our pursuit of genuine
goods, and correct them. But it is absolutely necessary that the political goals we pursue
should be policies involving acts good in their kind, for example health care, economic devel-
opment, just wages, punishment, and so on.
However, there is no political prudence involved in legitimating and promoting acts bad in
their kind, like torture, slavery, and the killing of the innocent, just as there is no prudence in-
volved in a band of thieves engaged in thievery. Aquinas describes what he calls “false pru-
dence.” This is not prudence at all. It is called prudence because it resembles prudence in its
ability to adapt means to an end; but it is called false because the end in view is in fact a goal
bad in its kind. It is a matter of the appearance of prudence rather than the reality. He writes,
“in this way a thief is called a good thief because he adapts means well to the end of thievery.
It is this kind of prudence of which the Apostle says in Romans that the prudence of the flesh
is death.”6 Here we are again back at the consideration of thieves and thievery. Aquinas had
no access to Plato’s Republic, but for us it is impossible to read this passage in him without
thinking of Socrates’s band of thieves argument. The very fact that a thief or a band of thieves
pursue theft is sufficient evidence for claiming that they do not possess prudence, for they do
not apprehend the good. But lacking prudence, they cannot have justice, for they cannot even
badly attempt to order their acts of giving what is due to one another to a genuinely good end.
Thus the use of the term ‘good’ here in Aquinas, but also back in the “band of thieves” argu-
ment, does not signify moral or political goodness, but mere success. And the reasoning dis-
played by those who pursue bad ends is not imperfect prudence precisely because it is not
any form of prudence at all. It is success in achieving a goal bad in its kind. Where imperfect
352
T H E  A M E R I C A N  E X P E R I M E N T:  R E L I G I O U S  F R E E D O M
prudence is called prudence by analogy, this false prudence or cunning is called prudence
simply by simile or metaphor. Aquinas is clearly relying upon Aristotle’s account of the differ-
ence between prudence and cleverness in this discussion. However, he goes on to analyze
false prudence. In order to distinguish the kind of practical reasoning involved in true pru-
dence, perfect or imperfect, from that involved in false prudence, Aquinas mentions Aristotle’s
discussion of cleverness in the Nicomachean Ethics, describing it as a kind of reasoning about
means and ends that can be put to a good or bad end. But he goes beyond Aristotle in distin-
guishing what he calls “cunning” (“astutia”).7 Aristotle granted that the prudent man was
clever; his cleverness was characterized by its ordering to a good end. Still, cleverness for
Aristotle appears to be neutral between the good and the bad man. That is, in Aristotle there
seems to be an activity common to the good and the bad man — cleverness. In some respect
the good man and the bad man are doing the same thing when they engage in practical rea-
soning, but they happen to be ordered toward different ends, good or bad as the case may be.
Practical reasoning appears to remain neutral in that respect, and to be related to the good
merely per accidens.
But according to Aquinas “cunning” is the reasoning that characterizes the man who pos-
sesses false prudence. It is not a neutral instrumental rationality that exists in both the good
and the bad. The good man does not possess cunning. So for Aquinas there is no mere clever-
ness shared by the good man and the bad man, related in extrinsic ways to the question of the
good or the bad in action. “Cleverness” is a mere abstraction or way of considering the differ-
ent reasoning processes engaged in by the good man and the bad man. In reality, the cunning
and the prudent agents do not share a common act ordered to different ends. In that respect
the good is not simply the end toward which prudence is directed in the good man, but the
good is in fact its form; it in-forms the practical reasoning, making the practical reasoning of
the good man a different kind of act from the practical reasoning of the bad man that lacks
that form. So strictly speaking, if we want to avoid confusion, we should not say the thief is a
good thief, but a cunning thief. The bad end corrupts practical reasoning, rendering it inca-
pable of being in-formed by the good.
In addition, Aquinas’s use of the notion of false prudence suggests that it is not simply a
failure of prudence with respect to one goal, namely the possession of material goods. That
would be a form of imperfect prudence. No. It is a failure tout court to have true prudence with
respect to any goods. One with this “false prudence” is not capable of discerning true goods
from apparent goods. If, perchance, he happens to hit upon a real good, it is not because of his
capacity to recognize goods, or a genuine willed desire for it as good. He may happen to
achieve a good goal. But because of the lack of true prudence, it is mere happenstance. Most
likely it will be a happenstance driven by selfish interest. The cunning agent or ruler reasons
that it happens to be a key to success here and now to pursue this goal, good or bad. In one set
of circumstances he will pursue the good involved in some goal, while in another set of
 circumstances he will act to destroy that same good; in either case he is probably motivated
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by the desire for success in advancing his interests, as Thrasymachus’s ideal ruler is por-
trayed in the Republic.
In the cunning or clever ruler, true goods become merely instrumental goods in service to
apparent goods. This implication of Aquinas’s discussion is stark indeed, for we do not want to
think that we can appear to be doing good in pursuing a genuine good, and yet not be except
by accident. In false prudence the appearance of all of the other subordinate virtues that
Aquinas describes as involved in true prudence (“memory, understanding and intelligence,
docility, shrewdness, reason, foresight, circumspection, and caution”) will be nothing other
than ersatz likenesses as well. In short there are two quite different ways to fail with regard to
prudence, the failure of prudence which is imperfect disordered prudence, and the failure to
have prudence at all which is false prudence or cunning.
Aquinas’s picture of false prudence is stark, which is why we ought to hope to have at least
disordered imperfect prudence in our political leaders. But with these aspects of Aquinas’s
discussion of prudence in mind, what is there to be said about the need for something like a
philosopher-king or philosopher-president in democratic polities? One ought to aspire to inte-
gral human fulfillment. Thus one ought to aspire to perfect personal prudence in one’s own
life. But perfect prudence in one’s own life, bearing upon the integral human good, requires,
among other things, judgments ordered toward protecting and promoting the common good
of one’s community. Thus one must take care for that community through the means avail-
able and appropriate to the form of government, if one aspires to perfect prudence.
Generically, in any community there are many acts that political prudence must seek to
order as means to the end of protecting and promoting the common good, integrating justice,
temperance, and courage — generally committing one’s time, energy, and goods to the good
of others. And it is important to recognize that commitment to the common good does not ex-
tend only as far as the shores of one’s own community. Aquinas writes, “by nature every
human being stands as friend to every other human being with a kind of universal love; as
Ecclesiastes says, ‘Every animal loves its kind.’” Notice that for Aquinas the basis for inclusion
within the scope of this universal love and the justice that animates it is human nature itself.
And yet, particular judgments of prudence will place greater emphasis upon the familial, and
local in accord with a principle of subsidiarity. The ways in which we pursue these personal
acts are all political acts in some sense. 
However, specifically in democracies like ours, we protect and promote the common good
by electing those who would lead us locally and nationally. In addition to the particular policies
promoted by those who would rule us, we should try to determine to what extent those rulers
possess political prudence. Most likely they will not possess perfect prudence. Who among us
does?
In fact, I think it follows from Aquinas’s discussion that perfect prudence, the prudence of
the genuine and complete philosopher, is not necessary at all to governance. So long as the
 integral and comprehensive common good is not exhausted by the common political good,
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which, according to Aquinas, it is not, this claim is true. The integral and comprehensive
human good for Aquinas is a life of friendship among human beings, with the beatific vision
as the telos that friendship. As Aquinas says, “we are companions in beatitude.” On this view,
to identify the common political good with the integral good is a form of idolatry in which
God becomes the local god of the nation, or the nation itself takes on a divine status in our
politics. And it is the fact that the integral human good transcends the common political good
that allows us to accept something less than perfection in human governance.
If we suppose, on the other hand, that the task of the philosopher is to grasp and make
known the integral human good, and if, contrary to Aquinas, we suppose that the integral
human good does not transcend the common good, but is, rather, identical with it, then it
does look like the philosopher ought to rule in a kind of benevolent totalitarianism akin to
what the Republic seems to suggest, that is, we ought to have something like a philosopher-
king. It appears then that far from posing a threat to democratic politics, a religious form of
life that claims that the integral human good transcends the political good is perhaps the best
bulwark against a kind of benevolent totalitarianism of the majority in democratic politics.
So, if we accept that the integral human good transcends the common political good, then
it is not clear at all that the task of the philosopher is to rule by grasping, making known, and
ruling concerning the common good. Ruling for the common good would in a sense be a be-
trayal of the task of the philosopher, as it would mistake the common political good for the in-
tegral human good, and display imperfect prudence in the sense of failure, a failure that the
philosopher in pursuit of perfect prudence ought to do his best to avoid.
Thus, insofar as the common political good is not the whole of the integral human good,
we need have no desire at all for one who has or pursues perfect prudence to rule us; we risk
idolatry in pursuing such a one. And we are in no more need of philosopher-kings than of the
robber barons; neither ought to rule in a just community. I think in our time, given recent de-
velopments at home and abroad, this argument can be modified in straightforward ways to
show why religious leaders, claiming to have an insight through revelation into the integral
human good as transcending the common good and the political, also should not rule from
that insight. Of course, as a student of Aquinas I would be remiss if I did not point out that
there are some things in Jewish and Christian revelation that can be know apart from it, and
that bear upon the common political good as well as the integral human good.
In conclusion, lest we become disenchanted with the important questions of politics, and
alienated from participation in it, we need to learn the prudence of imperfection in ourselves
and in our leaders. Ideally we should want a ruler who possesses imperfect and well ordered
political prudence. Short of that, a leader who possesses imperfect but more or less badly
 ordered political prudence. What we must avoid are leaders who possess false prudence or
cunning. If we wish to avoid Augustine’s censure, we must act to limit the damage of the cun-
ning thieves in our midst, lest we become complicit in their thievery and tacitly join them, in
which case our political communities will become little more than bands of thieves ruled by
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robber barons. Our hope for justice is in our imperfection.
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6 Summa Theologiae, II-II, q.47, a. 13.
7 Summa Theologiae, II-II 47.13 ad 3. Sinners can take good counsel for an evil end, or for some particular good, but
they do not perfectly take good counsel for the end of their whole life, since they do not carry that counsel into effect.
Hence they lack prudence which is directed to the good only; and yet in them, according to the Philosopher (Ethic.
vi, 12) there is “cleverness,” [*{deinotike}] i.e. natural diligence which may be directed to both good and evil; or “cun-
ning,” [*{panourgia}] which is directed only to evil, and which we have stated above, to be “false prudence” or “pru-
dence of the flesh.”
356
T H E  A M E R I C A N  E X P E R I M E N T:  R E L I G I O U S  F R E E D O M
CLOSING HOMILY
357
HOMILY
MASS FOR THE SECOND SUNDAY AFTER EASTER
THE AMERICAN EXPERIMENT: 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM CONFERENCE
 B Y  H I S  E X C E L L E N C Y  A R C H B I S H O P  J O H N  G .  V L A Z N Y
O R D I N A RY  F O R  T H E  A R C H D I O C E S E  O F  P O RT L A N D  I N  O R E G O N
Conversations about the place of religion in American culture, in fact, in the culture ofevery age, inevitably result in noteworthy variations on the theme and the temperature
in the room. These have been interesting days here in Portland, I am sure, as many of you
have considered, under the sponsorship of the University of Portland’s Garaventa Center, the
American Experiment in Religious Freedom. But as I reviewed the program, I would say the
conversation has been rather in-house. Sometimes I find it is interesting to hear what other
nations have to say about life and faith in this great nation. 
In recent years I have become a subscriber once again to The Tablet, an international
Catholic Weekly published in London which traces its history back to the year 1840, six years
before the establishment of the Archdiocese of Portland. In this year’s March 24th issue I found
a rather interesting article on the subject of religion. The author, Richard Rodriguez, declared
that today, a new atheism is abroad in America, one that is both adolescent and shrill. He
pointed out how recently on TV the comedians Bill Maher and George Carlin claimed that
“most of society’s ills have been caused by religion.” And the audience cheered.
The author went on to assert that he does believe that many atheists are correct in their
 assertion that religion deserves some serious criticism in this new century. But he regrets
their inability to take seriously the human yearning for a transcendent experience.
This university is a proud Catholic institution, serving people here in the Northwest for
more than one hundred years. As a religious institution, it seems to have more freedom than
even some of the great private universities like Harvard on the east coast. It seems that Harvard
recently considered making a course on religion an undergraduate requirement. The proposal
was quickly shot down. Even at a time when religion seems to be in the forefront of much dis-
cussion, Harvard undergraduates will remain out of the loop. 
But all this doubt and denial is nothing new. It goes right back to the day of the Lord’s res-
urrection. There he is in today’s gospel — poor St. Thomas! For many folks he is perceived as
spiritually dense, a skeptic, a truly doubting Thomas. But the picture isn’t completely accurate.
Thomas was no more a doubter than were the other disciples. Thomas had no doubts about
Jesus. But he had plenty of doubts about the word of his fellow disciples. Yet, when Thomas
stood in the presence of the risen Lord, he did believe. 
The problem, you see, was not so much the doubt of Thomas. The problem was the credi-
bility of the other disciples. The sad fact was that this group of frightened followers and recent
deserters, who still locked their doors, did not present a convincing sign of faith. Thomas
truly did want to see Jesus again. But what he saw in his friends did not inspire faith. Those of
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us who style ourselves as believers and followers of Jesus are sometimes troubled by the nay-
sayers and unbelievers all around us in today’s world. They may indeed have a problem with
their doubts and their lack of faith. But we too may have a problem with the quality of our
lives as effective Christian witnesses.
On this second Sunday of Easter Jesus Christ gives us all some valuable insights into what
it means to be a good Christian witness. The existence of a Lord risen and gloriously present
in the human family is not demonstrated convincingly by a beautiful church, an inspiring
homily, uplifting church music, successful programs of religious education, not even by a full
church on Sunday morning, although this is no longer a regular happening, especially on the
Sunday after Easter. Even putting our fingers into the wounds of Jesus Christ will not neces-
sarily change the quality of people’s lives. They will only be convinced that the Easter event
is truly good news when they see that it has transformed the lifestyle of those of us who claim
to be believers, a lifestyle so at variance with the secular culture of our day, that the usual
known norms of ownership and support are perceived as inadequate. In place of these must
be found a unity of mind and heart that compel us to place the concerns of others before our
own.
The standards of faith which Jesus Christ holds up to all of us are challenging and demand-
ing. He calls us all to a change of heart from that all-too-natural instinct to take care of our-
selves and our own needs first and always, and then only secondly to deal with the needs of
others sometimes. 
The church often fails to be a credible sign for people in the world today of the work and
presence of our God. That may be troublesome and even scandalous to some, but it should
not come as a surprise. We are all sinners and it often shows. The church (that means all of
us) like those first disciples, can be a bad sign, a bad witness to the wonderful events of the
paschal mystery of Jesus. Because of this some choose to walk with us no longer. Many others
are not even attracted to be our companions on the journey for a while. Atheism is not new.
Nor is the abuse of religious practice by the scribes and pharisees of every time and place. 
Whenever we gather at the Lord’s Table, we confess our faith in the church because of the
promise of Jesus Christ to be with us, with the church, forever. St. Thomas doubted a weak
and sinful church at its inception, but yet it was there that he met the glorified Jesus Christ.
So it is now and so it will ever be. 
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